

CONFERENCE
ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

1915

JZ
43
C66
1915



Ex Libris

Andrew Dickson White


Cornell University Library
JX 54.C74 1915


Proceedings of the Conference on Interna



3 1924 017 496 328

law





Cornell University
Library

The original of this book is in
the Cornell University Library.

There are no known copyright restrictions in
the United States on the use of the text.



**CONFERENCE
ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS.**



Norman Angell

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CONFERENCE

ON
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

HELD AT
CORNELL UNIVERSITY
ITHACA, N. Y.
JUNE 15-30, 1915

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION
BOSTON
1916

B 24733.

Copyright, 1916, by

WORLD PEACE FOUNDATION

All Rights Reserved

VAIL-BALLOU COMPANY
BINGHAMTON AND NEW YORK



PREFACE

The Conference on International Relations, held in the midst of the greatest and most disastrous war in human history, was an attempt to apply rational and scientific methods to some of the great outstanding problems of war and peace. While the immediate concerns of America's foreign policy—Pan-American relations, America's Asiatic problem, the effect of an increase of American armaments, and a League to Enforce Peace—occupied the foreground in the discussions, the deeper roots of the war in the philosophy of militarism, in the current ideas of economic rivalry between nations, and in the abstract theories of the State, were also studied.

The central idea of the Conference was that an enlightened public opinion is the most urgent need for the solution of the question of war, and that the leaders of the public opinion of the future are to be found in the universities. With this object in view, the Conference was planned to give to the delegates from some twenty universities an intensive training, under the guidance of experts, in the most important principles of international relations.

The utmost freedom of discussion was maintained throughout the Conference. In some cases, as in the discussion on armaments, advocates of extreme measures were intentionally selected in order that the delegates might face up to the most severe intellectual discipline which could be obtained. No issues were avoided because of their complexity and the severest outstanding difficulties were frankly faced in the spirit of the search for truth.

The results of the Conference are apparent, in part, among the hundred students who have been led to make a deeper study of some of these complex problems of America's foreign policy. Its success was also witnessed by the

fact that delegates going out from this conference organized more than six other conferences along similar lines in different parts of the United States during the summer and fall of 1915, while a score of the members of the Conference have been occupied in writing articles, and lecturing in summer schools, on Chautauqua circuits, in the universities and in extension courses.

Because of the complete freedom of discussion which prevailed in the Conference, the World Peace Foundation cannot be understood as endorsing all the views contained in the addresses of this volume. On the contrary, a large part of the value of the Conference and its proceedings lies in the fact that so many points of view are represented.

No account of the Conference, however brief, would be complete without an expression of appreciation of the sacrifices made by the leaders of the Conference, and especially by Mr. Norman Angell, who came from England to attend the Conference and who was the central figure and the inspiration of its members during the entire fifteen days of the session. To the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and the Church Peace Union, without whose coöperation the success of the Conference could not have been possible, grateful acknowledgment is also made.

GEORGE W. NASMYTH.

January 10, 1916.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER	PAGE
I. HAS INTERNATIONAL LAW FAILED?	1
I THE FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW	1
BY PROF. JAMES G. McDONALD	
II THE MEANS OF ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW	4
BY PROF. JAMES G. McDONALD	
III INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WAR	8
BY PROF. WALTER G. SHEPARD	
IV FOR WHAT LAW OF THE SEA SHOULD AMERICA STAND?	15
BY PROF. JAMES G. McDONALD	
V THE PROBLEMS OF A WORLD COURT	20
BY PROF. JAMES G. McDONALD	
II. PAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS	25
I PAN-AMERICAN COÖPERATION AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE	25
BY PROF. G. H. BLAKESLEE	
II AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CREDIT SYSTEM	43
BY WILLIAM S. KIES	
III. AMERICA'S ASIATIC PROBLEM	62
BY PROF. SIDNEY L. GULICK	
I AMERICA'S DUTY IN THE LIGHT OF EUROPE'S TRAGEDY	62
II THE PROBLEM	66
III FIRST POLICY	72
IV THE EFFECTS ON THE WHITE RACE	74
V THE EFFECTS ON ASIATIC PEOPLES	77
VI A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE ALLEGED YELLOW PERIL	80
VII THE SECOND POLICY	86
VIII THE THIRD POLICY	91
IX CONCLUSION	101
GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY	103

CHAPTER	PAGE
IV. THE INCREASE OF AMERICAN ARMAMENTS: THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESULTS	107
I THE QUESTION OF INCREASING THE ARMAMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES	107
BY MAJOR G. H. PUTNAM	
II "DEFENSELESS AMERICA"	129
BY HUDSON MAXIM	
III THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE MANUFACTURE OF ARMAMENTS	146
BY HUDSON MAXIM	
V. A LEAGUE OF PEACE	170
I THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE	170
BY HAMILTON HOLT	
II NON-MILITARY SANCTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW	177
BY NORMAN ANGELL	
III THE HAGUE CONFERENCES, PAST AND FUTURE	194
BY DR. ANDREW D. WHITE	
VI. DEMOCRACY AND WAR	199
I THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS	199
BY PROF. SAMUEL P. ORTH	
II THE SOCIALIST INTERPRETATION OF THE WAR	209
BY WILLIAM ENGLISH WALLING	
III IS WAR A CAPITALIST PLOT?	233
BY NORMAN ANGELL	
IV THE REACTION OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY ON SOCIAL PROBLEMS	250
BY PROF. ALFRED HAYES	
V METHODS OF EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION	262
BY NORMAN ANGELL	
VI FURTHER REMARKS ON METHODS OF PRESENTATION	283
BY NORMAN ANGELL	
VII THE NEED OF DYNAMIC SYMBOLS FOR PEACE	292
BY PERCY MACKEYE	
VII. THE PHILOSOPHY OF FORCE	313
I HUMAN NATURE AND WAR	313
BY NORMAN ANGELL	
II THE PHILOSOPHY OF FORCE: RIVAL THEORIES OF SOCIETY	322
BY DR. GEORGE W. NASMYTH	
III THEORIES OF SOCIAL DARWINISM. IS THIS WAR A STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE?	328
BY MRS. RUBY G. SMITH	

CONTENTS

ix

CHAPTER	PAGE
VIII. MORAL AND MATERIAL FACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	334
I IS THE GOLDEN RULE APPLICABLE TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS? . . .	334
BY PROF. NATHANIEL SCHMIDT	
II DOES MIGHT MAKE RIGHT? INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ETHICS . . .	347
BY SUH HU	
IX. ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF WAR . . .	356
I IS EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY A NECESSARY CONDITION OF PEACE? . . .	356
BY DR. JOHN MEZ	
II CAN THE VICTORS RECOVER THEIR COSTS? . . .	367
BY DR. JOHN MEZ	
X. THE INTERNATIONAL POLITY MOVEMENT: ITS AIM AND ORGANIZATION . . .	377
I WHAT ARE WE HERE FOR? . . .	377
BY NORMAN ANGELL	
II DISCUSSION OF RESOLUTIONS TO BE SENT TO PRESIDENT WILSON, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, ETC. . .	378
III CONFERENCE ON EXTENSION WORK . . .	385
APPENDIX A. REPLIES TO QUESTIONS . . .	393
BY NORMAN ANGELL	
APPENDIX B. IMPORTANT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS	400
APPENDIX C. MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE . . .	404
INDEX . . .	411

PROCEEDINGS OF THE CORNELL CONFERENCE ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

CHAPTER I

HAS INTERNATIONAL LAW FAILED?

SECTION I

THE FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW

By Prof. James G. McDonald

CYNICAL critics are much mistaken when they tell us that International Law has completely failed. Their argument, that the very existence of war is an indication of failure, is based on an erroneous view of international relations, for war, although an anomaly, is a distinct status recognized and regulated by International Law.

Another of their arguments is that International Law has broken down because it has been violated at nearly every point. However, violations do not prove the failure or non-existence of law. The laws against murder and theft are constantly being violated. International Law is generally and habitually, though not always, observed, but in this respect it does not differ from municipal or state law, the rules of which are also frequently violated.

Furthermore, violations of International Law during the present war have probably been greatly exaggerated. For this exaggeration there are three reasons. In the first place, it is difficult to discover the true facts because each belligerent tries to conceal his own delinquencies and seeks to convict his opponent of guilt. Secondly, we fail to dis-

2 PROCEEDINGS OF CORNELL CONFERENCE

tinguish between the different schools of interpretation of International Law, as, for example, the Anglo-American and the Continental views on the subject of contraband. Thirdly, we do not always recognize that changed conditions may justify modifications in the rules of war, although of course the fundamental principles of International Law and of humanity must never be violated. For example, the invention of the submarine has not done away with the necessity for the exercise of the rights of visit and search, though it may necessitate a modification of the methods employed.

After all, the violations of International Law, even in the present war, are exceptional, the bulk of the rules and principles of the law of nations having been observed. For instance, we hear little or nothing of mistreatment of prisoners or of violation of the rights of civilians in occupied territory. It is very unfortunate that this war involves most of the nations of the civilized world and leaves the United States alone as the one great neutral power. Consequently, the tendency is to increase the rights of belligerents rather than those of neutrals.

In the fourth place critics overlook the importance of the protests which have been made by belligerents and neutrals alike during the present war. These protests are at least an evidence of recognition of the rules of civilized warfare. Finally, the critic is apt to forget that the law of war forms but a small part of International Law. In this respect it is comparable to criminal law, which forms but a small part of the great body of law. The law of war constitutes only about one third of International Law.

Democracy is coming to be more and more of a controlling factor in international relations. Hence it is highly desirable that International Law become more widely known to the American public. Often in the past an unenlightened democracy has precipitated war. One of the difficulties in the way of arbitration is the unwillingness of the people to consent to a just settlement of an international dispute when it does not happen to be in their favor. In the Alaskan boundary dispute, for ex-

ample, one of the British commissioners decided against his own country, and was on this account savagely attacked at home. The real purpose of International Law should be more generally known to the newspapers of America, and the American people should be taught a better knowledge of their international rights and obligations. Especially should public opinion be educated to the point of appreciating obligations as well as rights. Then will ensue a new and better conception of International Law and of international relations.

It is not the real interests of nations but their supposed interests which determine their actions. It is not the truth itself but rather our conception or interpretation of the truth which is the determining factor in the conduct of nations. We must educate the democracy to a proper appreciation and interpretation of the truth, and then enlightened self-interest will make International Law more reasonable and rational. It will enable us to make International Law more nearly what it should be in the future. Like every other branch of jurisprudence, International Law is not fixed, definite and unchanging, but an ever growing, evolving, developing body of rules and principles.

Utility or the satisfaction of collective needs and interests should be the guiding motive or purpose of international relations. These become ever greater and more varied as the inter-dependence and solidarity of nations increases. They have become so great and important that it has been found necessary to give to certain rules and customs of international intercourse the solemn character of international or world agreements. There has even been an attempt to create suitable machinery for their better observance and enforcement.

In the further development of International Law motives of utility and a sense of international community interests must be permitted to have at least as much influence as tradition and precedent based upon metaphysical conceptions of law and abstract principles of justice. Jurists should have regard to the probable or possible social consequences of a given practice rather than to mere conformity

4 PROCEEDINGS OF CORNELL CONFERENCE

with past usages and ideals. Social utility or adaptability to human needs and social conditions is thus the real or ultimate test of International as of all human law.

SECTION II

THE MEANS OF ENFORCING INTERNATIONAL LAW

By Prof. James G. McDonald

There are those who claim that International Law is not a true branch of jurisprudence. They say

a. That it lacks the quality of positive authority or command. It does not conform to Austin's definition of law as, "a rule laid down for the guidance of an intelligent being by an intelligent being having power over him." In other words, it is not the general command of a determinate legislature or legislative body with power to enforce its decisions;

b. That there is no legal duty or obligation of obedience imposed upon the states, and that there are no courts or judicial tribunals to interpret and enforce this so-called law;

c. That there are no penalties prescribed for violations or disobedience. Consequently it is said that International Law lacks sanction or physical power to enforce obedience. The so-called law of nations is, it is claimed, a branch of ethics rather than of jurisprudence.

But this Austinian view of law is unhistorical, narrow, arbitrary, formal and unphilological. While it may have some value for lawyers, it does not even furnish a complete definition of municipal law since many laws are permissive rather than mandatory in their nature. Besides, it leaves out of account that large and important part of constitutional law which is based upon usage or convention and is not administrated by courts.

This view is unhistorical because it ignores law in its formative stage when there was little or no machinery for its making or enforcement. Customs are anterior to

statutes, and law existed long before the process of modern law-making was known.

The Austinian or imperative view of law is narrow, formal, and unphilological. The Latin language distinguishes between *jus* and *lex*, the German between *Recht* and *Gesetz*, the French between *droit* and *loi*. This is the difference between *law* and *a law*, the first terms denoting the general conception of law, the second referring to particular law. Unfortunately there exists in English no word serving to differentiate the general from the specific meaning of law.

In the next place, it is an arbitrary definition. Positiveness is not always an essential element in law, neither constitutional nor administrative law possessing this supposed essential.

There are certain great international treaties which are equivalent to international legislation. As pointed out by German jurists, such agreements are not law *between* states, but rather law *above* states since they give expression to a common juristic conviction. They are not two-sided legal creations, but rather common, irrevocable declarations.

Leading authorities have even maintained that physical sanction or the authority of physical force is a mere accident and is not an essential characteristic of law. It is but a means to an end—a part of the machinery of society for the enforcement of law. Far more important than the influence of punishment or penalties is the creation of a law-abiding sentiment among the people. Law does not necessarily involve the use of force.

Law may of course be defined in various ways. It may be made synonymous with right and justice, or it may very narrowly be defined as consisting of rules laid down by politicians and enforced by courts and lawyers. But from our point of view, law is essentially a body of customs, principles or rules for the regulation of the external conduct of human beings in their relations with one another as members of a political community. In order fully to answer a description of law these rules must be gener-

6 PROCEEDINGS OF CORNELL CONFERENCE

ally recognized as binding and enforceable by external power or sanction; but they are not necessarily accompanied by the threat or use of physical force in case of their violation. The guarantees or sanctions securing their observance need not be based upon the assertion of force or the danger of speedy and definite punishment. The guarantees for International Law are mainly of a moral nature and are based upon public opinion and law-abiding habits for their observance.

As compared with municipal law, International Law has been remarkably well obeyed. As a rule, treaties are faithfully executed, and arbitration decisions are nearly always carried out. During both the Spanish-American war and the Russo-Japanese war the rules of warfare were well observed. Even in violating the law of nations, governments render to it the homage of pretended obedience.

But we cannot admit that International Law lacks all sanction. European congresses like those of Paris in 1856 and the recent Hague Conferences exercised virtual legislative power and issued commands which have been recognized as binding and are generally obeyed.

Nor is International Law wholly without judicial sanction. It is frequently administered and interpreted by judicial tribunals, more particularly by courts of arbitration and international prize courts. The Hague Conference of 1907 even made provision for an international prize court which should apply the rules of International Law, but which has unfortunately not come into existence.

However, it is impossible to agree with those authorities who consider war as a sanction for the law of nations. Like intervention, war is a political act—an exercise of sovereign or high political power.

Among other false sanctions of International Law are certain measures "short of war" known as non-amicable or forcible modes of settling international disputes. Among these are retorsion (retaliation in kind), reprisals, hostile embargoes, and pacific blockades. None of these are true sanctions of International Law because they are

almost certain to lead to war when employed against a great nation.

An interesting attempt to create a sanction for the laws of warfare was made at The Hague Conference of 1907. Article III of the Fourth Hague Convention provides that, "a belligerent party which violates the provisions of the Regulations shall, if the case demands, be held liable to make compensation. It shall be responsible for all acts of persons forming part of its armed forces."

In the last analysis it is really public opinion which enforces law; otherwise the sanctions lie inactive on the books. After all, International Law really represents a consensus of opinion and is the result of a long and continuous usage. Governments have at times shown that they were extremely sensitive to public opinion. The Japanese publicity work in the Russo-Japanese war was very carefully devised to the end of winning the united support of Europe. One of the strongest forces which public opinion may bring to bear upon governments is the fear of ostracism. The international boycott or commercial non-intercourse is sure to be impractical unless general, but there is a force in public opinion which overbalances mere military power. As Mr. Root has said, the nation which has the approval of the rest of the world achieves thereby a certain strength.

At present, international public opinion is weak and poorly organized. It encounters the opposition of a sort of hyper-nationalism, a "my country, right or wrong," spirit. Whatever Germany does is right to Germans. Whatever England does is considered right by the English. The economic illusion that war pays, preventing people from opposing war, is another obstruction in the path of international public opinion. So, too, is the militaristic philosophy of force. There are, however, certain factors making for a stronger international public opinion, among them anti-militarism, a spirit of democracy, rationalism, and the growing interdependence and solidarity of nations.

Our duty is to enlighten American public opinion until

8 PROCEEDINGS OF CORNELL CONFERENCE

it demands the extension of International Law—perhaps toward something like a League of Peace.

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING PROFESSOR McDONALD

Suh Hu: A movement was started in China to boycott Japanese goods and it spread like wild-fire although the Chinese government tried to suppress it. It really seriously affected Japanese exports and the sudden change of Japanese attitude in the middle of the negotiations with China was perhaps due to this economic pressure.

It is a striking example of German belief in the value of public opinion that the German White Book was translated into Chinese and sent to Chinese students all over the world.

SECTION III

INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WAR¹

By Prof. Walter G. Shepard

The experience of the world in the past eight months has raised once again, more insistently and more imperatively than ever before, the fundamental question of International Law,—viz. does it really exist, and if so, what are its sanctions; whence comes its binding validity; with what voice does it speak? Is it merely the precepts and pious adjurations of text-writers and publicists; merely a lofty code of international morals to which chancelleries and governments pay the worthless tribute of acceptance in time of peace, only to repudiate and violate when war stalks grim and gaunt o'er land and sea? Have we been living in a fool's paradise of security, believing in the efficacy of a system of international rules and regulations, of norms of state conduct, of national rights and national obligations, only to find when the first

¹ On account of the departure of Professor McDonald for a year of study in Spain, following the Conference, it was impracticable for him to revise the very inadequate notes of his lectures which were available. It has therefore seemed desirable to append the following portion of an address by Prof. Walter G. Shepard of the University of Missouri, delivered in the spring of 1915, on "International Law and the War," since Professor Shepard's point of view is very close to that of Professor McDonald.—THE EDITOR.

great strain is imposed, that the splendid edifice whose cornerstone was laid by Hugo Grotius, and to the building of which the master-minds of all the nations of modern civilization have made their contributions, falls into a mass of broken shards? Is International Law really law? From what authoritative will does it emanate? What are the penalties for its infraction? These are the questions which today demand an answer.

Without attempting to thread the mazes of jurisprudential theory, let us, if we can, fix upon the true essence of law. This consists, we may agree, in authoritative and mandatory rules of conduct commanding what is right and forbidding what is wrong. In many instances prescribed by the supreme power in the State, and enforced by the penalties of fine or the deprivation of liberty or life, it derives its binding force, its validity as law, in other cases merely from the acquiescence and consent which a given society affords it, and from the *social* as distinguished from the *legal* or *penal* sanctions with which it is accompanied. No hangman's rope or dungeon dark and dank hovers threateningly before the imagination of the English minister when he contemplates the unprecedented procedure of refusing to resign upon an adverse vote of the House of Commons. The Constitution of the United States in requiring that fugitives from justice, found in another state, shall on demand of the executive authority of the state from which they have fled, be delivered up to be removed to the state having jurisdiction of the crime, establishes a norm of law, yet no penalty is fixed. Indeed even where law has fixed a penalty it is not that which in many cases prevents its breach. The fear of the county jail or penitentiary, I take it, does not prevent you, my friends, from robbing your neighbors' henroosts or burglarizing your neighbors' houses. The English minister, the American State Governor, the ordinary respectable citizen conforms to the rules of conduct established by the law because to do otherwise would bring down upon himself the displeasure, the reprobation, the odium and contempt of the community in which he lives and of which he is a part.

10 PROCEEDINGS OF CORNELL CONFERENCE

Says Elihu Root, "It is a mistake to assume that the sanction which secures obedience to the laws of the State are exclusively or chiefly of the pains and penalties imposed by the law itself for its violation. It is only in exceptional cases that men refrain from crime through fear of fine or imprisonment. In the vast majority of cases men refrain from criminal conduct because they are unwilling to incur in the community in which they live, the public condemnation and obloquy which would follow a repudiation of the standards of conduct prescribed by that community for its members. As a rule, when the law is broken, the disgrace which follows conviction and punishment is more terrible than the actual physical effect of imprisonment or deprivation of property. Where it happens that the law and public opinion point different ways the latter is invariably the stronger. . . . Not only is the effectiveness of the punishments denounced by law against crime derived chiefly from the public opinion which accompanies them, but those punishments themselves are but one form of the expression of public opinion. Laws are capable of enforcement only so far as they are in agreement with the opinions of the community in which they are to be enforced. As opinion changes old laws become obsolete and new standards force their way into the statute books. . . . The force of law is in the public opinion which prescribes it."

The narrow Austinian theory of law asserts it to be the emanation of the supreme power in the state and subject to enforcement by the courts. Though still numbering many adherents, this view is coming to be discarded for a broader conception which would characterize as really law such systems of mandatory rules of human conduct as Canon Law, Parliamentary Law, and International Law, though lacking Austin's criteria. These emanate from other sources than the State and rely upon other sanctions than the pains and penalties inflicted by judicial decree.

From what source is International Law derived? Whose mandates does it embody? Doctor Pearce Higgins answers these questions thus: "International Law is *not*

a body of rules which lawyers have evolved out of their own inner consciousness: it is *not* a system carefully thought out by University professors, bookworms, or other theorists in the quiet and seclusion of their study. It is a living body of practical rules and principles which have gradually come into being by the custom of nations and international agreements. To the formation of these rules, statesmen, diplomatists, admirals, generals, judges, and publicists have all contributed." Indeed it is true that international law springs from the practice and custom of nations in their dealings one with the other. Its mandates are the mandates of the society of civilized states, which form for this purpose a unity. Though no organ for the expression of international will exists, the mandates which custom and agreement have clearly evolved are just as binding and just as certainly law as though enacted by a world parliament and promulgated by a world executive. The sanction, moreover, for international law is found in an international public opinion, a world consensus, of whose existence no careful observer of international relations can be ignorant. With the spread of education, the perfection of news diffusion, the increase of travel, and the elaboration of a complexity of international relations, intellectual, commercial and political, this international public opinion has become far more definite, far more powerful, far more inclusive than was formerly the case. We are beginning to realize that no nation is capable of living unto itself; that, after all, the world is a unity and that the interests, the problems, the ideals of most importance have a world character. Such problems as the opium evil and white slavery are recognized as world problems and their solution rests upon an international public opinion. Such movements as Socialism and that of the Industrial Workers of the World attest the international character of the labor question. The results of scientific research are immediately internationalized. There is a world consensus among the leaders of thought in every branch of science, in every phase of art. Every important book receives immediate translation into

several other languages and plays upon, and influences, a public opinion that knows no national boundaries and is circumscribed by no racial or political lines. We are developing what Nicholas Murray Butler calls "The International Mind." It is from this universal consensus, this planet-wide public opinion that international law derives its support and to this it must look for its enforcement.

If the principles which we have discussed have led us to perceive that international law is really law, we should not be oblivious to important limitations which still affect it and the imperfect status that it still occupies. The community of civilized nations, from whose authoritative will this system of rules of international conduct emanates, is still indeed in a comparatively undeveloped state. A perfected internationalism is still an ideal of the future, not a reality of the present. Ours is still an age of nationalism or national imperialism. Though international sentiments and opinions have been greatly strengthened, particularly in the last fifty years, national sentiments and national aspirations are still the dominant force. On the basis of international public opinion only a meager body of international law has, after all, yet arisen. The foundations have been laid, the edifice is in process of construction, but as yet it affords protection from winds which blow only from certain quarters. To be really habitable much labor must be expended and much time elapse. The outlook on the whole, however, when the fierce clangor of war's alarm startled us from the repose of summer's holiday last August was far from discouraging. More had been achieved in the past half century than in the preceding two hundred and fifty years, and every evidence pointed to still more rapid progress in the immediate future. One thing, however, must be clearly realized: international law can be developed no faster than the international public opinion upon which it rests. International law is as ineffective without a strong and compelling international sentiment behind it as is municipal law when lacking the sanction of local public sentiment.

Much confusion in thought with regard to international

law is engendered by the failure to clearly distinguish between the international law of peace and the international law of war. There are, in fact, two distinct systems of international law with no legal connection between them. The rules which govern nations in their normal relations have received on the whole a fairly satisfactory development. The system of diplomacy, the international principles governing the consular service, the numerous administrative unions such as the Postal Union, the rules governing naturalization and extradition, the principles by which boundaries are fixed, the practice in regard to treaty making, and international arbitration of disputes incapable of settlement by diplomacy have all been measurably perfected and not inadequately meet the requirements of international relationships. But the moment war breaks out the situation is different. Not only is there a wide diversity of practice and difference of opinion of what is the law, but there is lacking the solid support of international public sentiment to sanction and enforce those rules upon which agreement may be said to have been attained. This deficiency is all the more marked and all the greater when not merely two, but most, of the great nations of the world are engaged in hostilities. How much the more important then at the present moment that the United States preserve its non-partisan and neutral character! To it has been left, with all the world in arms, the sacred but difficult function of maintaining the crumbling foundations of international law.

(The portions of the address dealing with the legality of the specific practises of the belligerents in the present war, are omitted.)

What are the conclusions from our study of the various questions in international law that the present war has raised regarding the fundamental problem that we stated at the beginning of our discussion? Certainly the alluring vision of law triumphant binding and restricting the nations in their conduct of war, ameliorating its conditions and softening its effect, has been rudely dispaled. Crass force still dominates the scene, and if some measure

14 PROCEEDINGS OF CORNELL CONFERENCE

of protection for defenseless civilian population, some meed of mercy for sick and wounded prisoners, some softening of the brutal methods by which the game is played is the tardy fruit of three centuries of international law, it all seems useless and of no avail. Wherein, the skeptic may ask, is Belgium's lot to be preferred to that of Germany? What boots it that Red Cross hospitals are not made targets, so long as more young men, the flower of Europe, are maimed for life or lie rotting in their graves than ever before in eight months' history were offered up as victims to the God of War? Poisoned and dum-dum bullets are no longer used, but far more deadly are the forty-two centimeter guns, the contact mine, the stinging submarine. And as for the rights of neutrals, when, it may be asked, has all the world's trade been so disorganized, all the world's industries so embarrassed as at the present moment? Even though we conclude that the open infractions of the rules of war are not so numerous or so important as have been popularly believed, this only emphasizes the conviction that war itself, even when fought within the broad limits which the law permits, is more terrible, more ghastly, more senseless, more intolerable, than it has ever been before.

What is the remedy? It is not, we must agree, to be found in mere elaborations of the rules of war. The inventive genius of man in devising ever more deadly engines of destruction, the cunning of man in conceiving even more terrible and devastating methods of attack will always outdistance the tardy progress of law which seeks to place fetters upon the armies and navies of the world. As long as the causes for war exist war will remain, and all the efforts of international law to ameliorate the conditions under which it is conducted will not prevent its becoming continually worse. But how can war be ended? Only by a broadening and development of the basis from which international law springs; only by a strengthening of the moral and intellectual bonds which bind men of all nations together. Nationalism must give place to internationalism; patriotism must subside; the world must be

integrated. Men must feel as the deepest conviction of their souls that "above all nations is humanity." Then and only then will a broad and strong world sentiment, a powerful and dominating international public opinion, become the source and sanction of a truly effective international law.

SECTION IV

FOR WHAT LAW OF THE SEA SHOULD AMERICA STAND?

By Prof. James G. McDonald

Maritime law is rapidly growing in importance. It is highly desirable that the American people should cultivate a knowledge of this subject, and that the United States should adopt a definite policy or code of sea law.

First, in respect to the immunity from capture of private property at sea. The Declaration of Paris, made after the Peace of Paris in 1856, is here the fundamental law. It declares (a) that the neutral flag covers the enemy goods, except contraband of war, (b) that neutral goods on enemy ships or under the enemy's flag are not liable to capture unless they are contraband of war. Thus only enemy goods on enemy ships remain subject to capture by enemy warships. Other forms of private capture are prohibited.

Private property on land cannot be captured; private property at sea may be captured. Why is this so? It is argued:

a. That since the individual is an integral part of the state, he should suffer in wars between states. But war is increasingly a struggle between belligerent forces rather than between peoples;

b. That war upon commerce is essential. But war upon commerce is a relic of piratical warfare in the days before national navies existed. It is not an essential part of war. In other respects we have advanced far beyond the practices of the days of Drake and Hawkins and there is no reason why we should not advance in this respect also;

16 PROCEEDINGS OF CORNELL CONFERENCE

c. That there is no real analogy between sea warfare and land warfare. But the aim of both is the same—to reduce the military strength of the opponent;

d. That it would increase the number of wars, because the fear of destruction of commerce is supposed to have acted as a restraint upon wars in the past. As a matter of fact, however, this has never been the case. Germany knew that her commerce would be wiped from the seas a year ago, but that did not prevent her going to war;

e. That such restraint would lengthen a war by weakening the advantage of the stronger belligerents. But this advantage can be replaced by the extension of other laws, such as those of blockade, interruption of commerce, and so forth. The potency of such methods has been illustrated in the present war;

f. That the belligerents would then be forced so to expand the rights of blockade and contraband that no real gain would have been achieved. This would in fact be the tendency, but it would be the duty of neutrals to protest against such extensions.

The argument in favor of the abolition of the right of private capture at sea may be summarized thus:

a. That on behalf of neutrals and humanity at large it is highly important that the realm of belligerent activities should be limited and that of neutral and non-combatant activities should be extended;

b. That neutral and non-belligerent trade should be just as free as military necessity will permit;

(“Military necessity” as used by the Germans frees the belligerents from all restraint. The phrase should be used in its literal sense and only in particular cases. Its application should be determined by the military commanders subject to review by a Prize Court.)

c. If you do away with the right of private capture at sea, you do away with one of the greatest incentives for huge armies and navies. The German and English justification of big navies is dependent upon the right of private capture.

The United States has consistently stood for the aboli-

tion of this right. Our enemies at first said that this was because we had no navy.

An agreement by all the neutrals would be desirable, but Holland and Scandinavia would not dare to take a very radical stand, and the Balkan States, which are near-belligerents, would not dare to do so. It is a question which is better, for the United States to form a weak coalition or to play a strong hand alone. The lone hand has been the policy of the United States in the past.

A blockade is defined as the blocking of ports and coasts of the enemy with the purpose of preventing the ingress or egress of all ships, neutral or enemy. There are three principles of legal blockade:

a. To be legal a blockade must be effective. An effective blockade is defined by the Declaration of London of 1909 as one which would actually prevent the egress or ingress of ships or make it reasonably dangerous;

b. It must be limited to the ports and coast of the enemy or to those of territory occupied by the enemy;

c. The radius or zone of blockade is limited.

England has violated two of these three laws of blockade. Her blockade has indeed been effective, but she has not drawn her ships around the German ports, and captures ships in the English Channel and in the North Sea far from the German coast. Her defense is that changed conditions of warfare make the old blockade unenforcible because of the use of mines. I was surprised at the readiness with which the United States admitted this argument. It was a technical blunder to do so because the doctrine that new methods of warfare change conditions is a very dangerous one. Germany used the same argument in the case of the *Lusitania*.

England has even more certainly violated international law in extending her blockade to the neutral ports of Holland, Norway and Sweden. She has stretched the doctrine of continuous voyage so that it really amounts to a blockade of neutral ports so far as supplies are concerned. It is the duty of the United States and the neutral nations to protest vigorously against this extension of prac-

tice and doctrine. Our State Department erred when it failed to protest against England's announcement that the North Sea would become a war zone, dangerous for neutral traffic. We should protest against such action in the International Conference which will follow the war. The German declaration of a war zone was still more illegal.

The law of contraband was carefully defined by the Declaration of London in 1909. The ten great naval powers were represented at the London Naval Conference and its decisions were signed by all the representatives and accepted by every government except England. England refused on technical grounds and as it was she who had urged the Conference, no other power would promulgate the laws first. However, the principles were generally accepted, not as new law, but as a consensus of opinion. At the beginning of the present war the United States suggested their acceptance as rules of war. Germany said that she was willing if England would agree. England would not agree. However, they were in the main considered as embodying the rules and customs of international law.

Contraband is defined in this Declaration as consisting of "those articles which belligerents prohibit neutrals from carrying to their enemies." Two elements—the kind of goods and the destination of the goods—must be considered. Absolute and conditional contraband should be distinguished. Absolute contraband consists of such things as may be directly used by the belligerent forces of the enemy, such as guns and powder. Conditional contraband consists of such things as have only an incidental military character, for instance, food. Other goods fall into the third class of free goods. Absolute contraband bound for an enemy country can be stopped anywhere, whether its immediate destination is a neutral country or not, if the ultimate enemy destination can be proved. Conditional contraband can be stopped only if consigned directly to the military forces of the enemy. England has violated the law of contraband in two ways. First, by

declaring food to be absolute contraband, not merely subject to blockade but seizable even when bound to a neutral country, if England has any suspicion that it is bound for Germany. Previous to this war England had always contended that food could never be treated as absolute contraband. She has now clearly violated not only the law itself, but even her own interpretation of the law. Payment for cargoes can not legalize a violation of the law. England has a perfect right to starve Germany if she can do it, but she has no right to make conditional contraband absolute. England has further violated international law by declaring cotton, which is defined as a free article by the Declaration of London, as contraband. England at first said that she was holding up cotton merely to search for copper. Then she stopped the trade in copper. Finally, she has declared cotton absolute contraband. The English Foreign Office has been very clever. It has a thorough understanding of the American mind. The German Government's control of food distribution hardly alters the case. In the first place Germany has declared her willingness not to take over imported food. In the second place the situation has not been altered by the new government decree. Without government regulation the use of food by civilians curtailed the amount left for the army just as much as it does under governmental regulation.

The law in regard to mines and submarines is very loose. We should insist on such use of mines as is purely defensive and they should not be allowed to float continuously, endangering neutral commerce.

In regard to the *Lusitania*, the German argument has been as follows:

- a. That the *Lusitania* carried ammunition;
- b. That it was subsidized by the British Government, and was a reserve ship of the admiralty;
- c. That it carried Canadian troops; and
- d. That the British Admiralty had advised merchant ships to ram all submarines, and hence this danger to the submarines made visit and search impossible.

This last is the only point which is at all valid. The right of neutral passengers and of non-combatant enemies' citizens to travel safely on the high seas cannot be justified by any change in the methods of warfare. It is true that the submarine often cannot exercise the rights of visit and search. Technically this argument is similar to the English argument about changed conditions in warfare and blockade, but it goes far deeper in violation of the fundamental principles of humanity. President Wilson's stand has been thoroughly correct throughout this difficult controversy.

SECTION V

THE PROBLEMS OF A WORLD COURT

By Prof. James G. McDonald

The World Court and the International Commission of Inquiry are simply two among many means of maintaining peace. First among the others we may mention diplomacy. Diplomacy is constantly at work relieving international friction and if it can once be democratized it may become one of the most important means of preserving international peace. A second means is what is called "the use of good offices." Just before the present war, Sir Edward Grey offered his good offices to bring about a European Concert. For various reasons he did not succeed. A third method is mediation, which is an extension of good offices. It is really good offices accepted and turned into action. An example bordering on mediation is the activity of ex-President Roosevelt during the Russo-Japanese War.

Further, four international organizations have already been created or planned as machinery for international peace.

1. The Permanent Court of Arbitration, founded by The Hague Conference in 1899.
2. The Hague Court of Arbitral Justice, planned in 1907.

3. The International Prize Court, and
4. The International Commission of Inquiry.

The Hague Court of Arbitral Justice was never actually established because no agreement could be reached as to the method of selecting the judges. A method of selecting the judges for the International Prize Court, which was to have been founded after the Second Hague Conference in 1907, was agreed upon but it never came into being because England found itself unable to ratify it. It would have created a very valuable precedent by deciding international cases on strictly legal lines.

The International Commission of Inquiry provided for in 1899 was unfortunately not permanent, but must be called into being on each occasion. There is thus no continuity of action. There are many questions which may be submitted to such a Commission before being reviewed by the Court. (Extra-judicial questions of honor, etc.) Such Commissions have, however, occasionally been very effective. At the time of the Russo-Japanese War when the Russian fleet was sailing from the Baltic to the Pacific, the Russian Admiral mistook English fishing smacks for Japanese torpedo boats and fired upon them. English public opinion was raised to a tremendous pitch, but the appointment of an International Commission avoided a war. When the report was published six weeks later, the excitement had died down and the report attracted very little attention in the newspapers.

The Hague Court of 1899 is not really a court, but merely a panel or list of judges. The Convention of 1899 provided that each of the signatories should appoint four of their most distinguished jurists to constitute a panel from which arbitrators might be selected to act in any particular case. There is thus no permanent court at all, but merely a panel of judges from which the Court may at any time be selected.

In the past sixteen years this Court has tried fifteen international cases, some very petty, but all bearing the seeds of possible war and including practically all civilized

22 PROCEEDINGS OF CORNELL CONFERENCE

nations. All of the decisions were accepted virtually without question.

Defects and insufficiencies were due chiefly to its lack of permanency. First among these was the difficulty of procedure. Sixteen years has somewhat improved procedure, but at first no one had any idea how to conduct a case. They did not know what to do about the argument, the language, the law, or anything of the sort.

The second difficulty was in the character of some of these judges. Some of them were very distinguished, some were more national than judicial. Too often the one neutral judge had to act as umpire between two nationals who were rather advocates than judges.

Third, there was the difficulty of assembling the Court. A permanent court would obviate this.

Fourth, in many cases the decision was not a judicial decision at all, but was rather a political compromise, as for instance in the *Casablanca* case.

Fifth, the lack of judicial decisions and precedents has prevented the building up of a system of international law.

Sixth, the lack of continuity and permanence has prevented the cumulative effect of the habit of obedience to a court that has won the world's confidence.

These are very serious indictments of The Hague Court and they make it clear that it must be permanent and continuous. In 1907 it was agreed that the permanent court of Arbitral Justice should be established, but the delegates could not agree on a method of selecting judges. Forty-five states were represented at that Hague Conference. Four representatives from each State would make not a court but a judicial assembly, which would be too large and unwieldy, but everyone wanted equal representation.

Since the time of Grotius there have been three axioms of international law theory—namely that all states were equal, were sovereign, and were independent. In practice these have never been realized. The problem was, how to establish a court of fifteen judges representing forty-five nations.

The American delegates proposed that the eight great powers should have a judge every year and that the other states should be represented in rotation in proportion to their commerce, wealth and population. The plan was worked out in great detail. In spite of the recognition of its merit, it was not accepted.

No satisfactory plan on a non-nationalistic basis has yet been proposed, but the Court really should not consist of representatives of the various peoples. For the purpose of justice, national units need not be represented. The settlement should be in terms of the actual interest of humanity as a whole.

If once this difficulty could be overcome, the other troubles would disappear. Such a permanent court would command the respect of the whole world. Procedure would become increasingly simplified and the question of the character of the judges, the crux of the whole matter, would resolve itself naturally. In time the finger of public opinion would point to certain men as the logical embodiment of the highest ideals of international conception. The question of their nationality would be unimportant. Already certain men, such as the Austrian Lammasch, have served at several arbitration tribunals. The crucial weeks are those required to set up the court. It should be a permanent body.

Arbitration as such cannot be a panacea. It is fundamentally weak and inadequate, for it is essentially a compromise. The world court must be judicial. Such a court would tend to codify international law. Legislation is a crude method of creating law. The United States Supreme Court makes our fundamental law. Law set into the whole text of past law is most fundamental.

The jurisdiction of such a court at the beginning is unimportant. Its jurisdiction is bound to expand in proportion to its success and value. The development would be not unlike the development of the King's Court in the Middle Ages. Gradually the King's Court law became the only law court in England, not because the King had force, but because the King gave the best justice, better

than that of the feudal laws. In the same way, if this court would give better justice than could be gotten in any other way, respect for the court would grow automatically.

Is such an achievement possible? We do not know what is possible. Lincoln, asked if the Alabama Claims could be arbitrated, answered that the millennium had not come. But the Alabama Claims were arbitrated. The first Hague Conference accomplished a great deal. The Court then established has in fifteen years accomplished much. There is no cause for discouragement today. In 1899 the small nations refused to give up the principle of equality of representation in the arbitral court. In 1907 all the nations, except England, accepted the international prize court on a non-nationalistic basis. Since 1907 a growing feeling has been evident that insistence upon the theoretical right of absolute equality in the number of judges is an absurd contention. All are coming to realize that the principles of national sovereignty, equality and absolute independence must yield to the actual interest of humanity.

CHAPTER II

PAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

SECTION I

PAN-AMERICAN COÖPERATION AND THE MONROE DOCTRINE

By Prof. G. H. Blakeslee

THE present war is broadening and deepening the conviction that only through the adoption of a system of joint action by the various nations may the peace of the world be permanently maintained. A long list of societies, of influential journals and of public men, have, almost suddenly, declared for the creation of some concert or union or league of states. The ten most representative programs for a constructive peace which have appeared in this country and in Europe all agree that, in addition to a more perfect world court, there must be created a permanent international organization. They aim to form that which, in many and fundamental respects, would be for Europe and the world what Pan-American coöperation is coming to be for this hemisphere.

In the United States, during the past two or three years, there has been a wide swing in educated public opinion towards this policy of joint action with the leading republics to the South of us. This Pan-American sentiment has developed in spite of a feeling, both natural and still strong, that the United States, due to its relative power and importance, should settle by itself alone all international matters in which it may be at all concerned. Our best public opinion would even place our cherished Monroe Doctrine upon a Pan-American foundation. The strength of this feeling is shown by the replies to a printed set of

questions which the writer took the liberty of sending out, a year ago, to all teachers of international law and diplomacy in our colleges and universities, and also to a number of leading newspapers and periodicals. One hundred forty-eight replies were received from the college and university professors: these included answers from the majority seemingly of the men best known as educational leaders in the field of international relations.

A study of these returns shows that certain general conclusions are agreed upon by a very large majority. These are: First, the present status of the Monroe Doctrine is unsatisfactory; of the total number who voted only thirteen believe that it should be continued substantially as it now exists, that is, with its meaning somewhat indefinite and its interpretation and enforcement dependent upon this country alone. Second, it should nevertheless not be abandoned; only nine wish to give up the policy entirely. Third, it should be more clearly explained and decidedly modified by recognizing in some way the importance of at least such sister American republics as Argentina, Brazil, and Chile. It is held, five to one (106 to 20), that the United States should share with these stable republics the responsibility of enforcing the doctrine by adopting one of the three following policies, (1) complete coöperation with them, or (2) abandonment of the policy south of the Equator, or (3) abandonment so far as the stable states themselves are concerned. It is complete coöperation with them, however, which is generally favored; the large majority, eighty against thirty, believe that the stable Latin American states should be invited to coöperate with the United States in both interpreting and enforcing the Monroe Doctrine wherever it may apply on this hemisphere.

These then are the views of a body of Americans who have made this subject a special study: the Monroe Doctrine should not be abandoned, but it should be more clearly explained, and it should be modified so as to rest upon a basis formed by the coöperation of all stable American republics.

But the writer wished also to test the opinions of the

American press, and so sent this same set of questions to a selected list of newspapers and periodicals. From the replies received, and from a few recent editorials in which one or more phases of the doctrine are discussed, answers or opinions upon some or all of the questions submitted have been obtained from forty-seven leading publications.

The important fact regarding the opinion of the press, so far as they have been obtained, is that they accord substantially with those of the experts. Only four publications definitely give full approval to the doctrine as it is generally interpreted at the present time. On the other hand, there is a general conviction that the doctrine should not be given up entirely. The *Louisville Courier Journal* seems to be the only paper to favor complete abandonment.

The modification of the doctrine which the press believe is needed, is the same suggested by such a large majority of the university world, coöperation with at least the stable American republics. So far as definite views have been expressed on this point, thirty favor coöperation of some form, while only six show that they are definitely opposed to it. Twenty-five believe in the most complete coöperation, that is, in joint action by the stable Latin American countries and the United States in both interpreting and enforcing the Monroe Doctrine wherever it may apply on this hemisphere.

A few direct quotations from various papers will show the general dissatisfaction with this policy in its present form: "The Monroe Doctrine is as elastic as India rubber and as comprehensive as all outdoors" (*New York Sun*); "That vague thing known as the Monroe Doctrine" (*New York Evening Post*); "The whole world would be grateful for some dependable definition" (*Detroit Free Press*); "The doctrine should be abandoned or emphatically restated" (*Harrisburg Telegraph*); "The time has clearly come for revaluing the Monroe Doctrine" (*Boston Herald*); "The Monroe Doctrine, President-made in the first place, has been made over and over again until its own father wouldn't know his child" (*The New York*

Press); "It means just what we wish it to mean, and is to be applied only when we think it wise. It has been modified to death" (*The Nation*).

The widely held conviction that the Monroe Doctrine should be changed from a unilateral to a Pan-American basis, is expressed as follows: "It should mean that all stable republics should unite to prevent aggression or colonies representing European or Asiatic Powers" (*The Philadelphia Public Ledger*); "It is only through the frankest coöperation . . . that the Monroe Doctrine can be prevented from becoming a source of offense between the United States and the other nations of the new world" (*Detroit Free Press*); "The remedy . . . is inviting all well established American Governments to join with us in the formulation and enforcement of a Pan-American policy" (*San Francisco Chronicle*); "We believe that thorough coöperation with South American republics, stable or unstable, will convince them of the wisdom of the Monroe Doctrine" (*Tacoma Daily News*); "The doctrine which Roosevelt is preaching in South America to the effect that the stable governments be invited to coöperate with the United States in enforcing the Monroe Doctrine wherever it may appear to be necessary hereafter, meets with my personal views on the matter" (Editor of *The Los Angeles Express*). Of the periodicals, *The Outlook* says: "We emphatically believe that whenever the United States has occasion to interpret and enforce the Monroe Doctrine, the United States should take for granted that it has the approval of Argentina, Brazil and Chile, and in any instance which involves or may involve intervention, the United States ought to invite their coöperation." *The Independent* expresses a similar but slightly different view, which is held by several, that there should be complete coöperation in South American matters but unilateral enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States in the Caribbean region, and adds, "In our concern for the well-being of the peoples of the Western Hemisphere . . . we must be their partner, not their patron."

The Monroe Doctrine has been called a President-made

policy; the present-day opinion, then, of those who have once helped to interpret and to enforce this policy, must have particular value. Ex-President Taft, in a recent address says, in regard to establishing complete coöperation: "If we could do this, I would be glad to have it done, because it would relieve us of a part of a burden and would give greater weight to the declaration of the policy. I would be glad to have an effort tactfully made to this end." After expressing his apprehension that this may not be possible, he adds, "I hope my fear in this respect will prove to be unfounded and that the plan suggested may be successful."

Ex-President Roosevelt holds somewhat similar views. In one of his South American addresses, speaking in regard to coöperation, he expresses the hope that "all of the Latin American peoples will finally reach such a level of orderly self-government, of material prosperity, of potential strength, and of political and social conduct as to make the Monroe Doctrine, in the sense of being a merely unilateral doctrine, a thing of the past and to substitute for it a common agreement among all the free republics of the New World."

Should the Monroe Doctrine, then, continue to be a policy of the United States? In the judgment of a large majority of 148 lecturers upon international law and American diplomacy in our colleges and universities, of a majority of forty-seven leading American newspapers and periodicals, and of our two living ex-Presidents, the Monroe Doctrine should continue to be a policy of the United States; but it should not continue as it is now popularly understood, an indefinite policy, to be interpreted and enforced by the United States alone. It should be more clearly interpreted; and should be placed, in some way, upon a broader all-American basis.

This strong sentiment in favor of joint action with Latin America is not limited to the Monroe Doctrine. During the past few weeks proposals that the United States should invite the A. B. C. states to join in settling the perplexing Mexican situation, have continually been made by many of

our influential publications, societies, and leading men, including members of Congress.

In Latin American countries, also, during the past few months, there has been a remarkable increase of Pan-American sentiment. Their latent suspicion of the big North American Republic, which was greatly intensified by the seizure of Vera Cruz, was turned by the Niagara Conference, into almost an enthusiasm for Pan-America. "Blessed be Pan-Americanism," exclaimed *La Prensa*, of Buenos Aires, the foremost daily of all South America. Some other leading journals of the A. B. C. countries have echoed this sentiment, declaring that Pan-Americanism has now come to be an accomplished fact. These newspaper accounts have been substantiated by personal letters; from Chile an American acquaintance writes, "Chilean opinion regarding the United States has made a complete revolution since the acceptance of the A. B. C. mediation, and now we are held in very high esteem." A distinguished statesman of South America said to the writer, "The Niagara Conference has largely created a real Pan-Americanism; it has made it actual; before this it was merely an idea."

The present war has still further increased this feeling. State after State has cabled its Ambassador or Minister at Washington to bring various matters of common neutral interest before the Pan-American Council. As the Director General of the Pan-American Union has recently said: the war has given a new significance and a new strength to Pan-Americanism. Only a few days ago, Ambassador Suarez, of Chile, declared that, "on the great occasions when the continent is concerned," the common interests of the A. B. C. countries are automatically united with those of the United States. Less than two months ago the President of Argentina, in his formal message to Congress, paid a public tribute to Pan-American coöperation.

It may be stated with considerable positiveness that if the countries of Latin America are treated frankly, courteously and as equals,—and no international aggressions

are made by the United States—they will gladly join with our own country for the common settlement of common American problems.

Coöperation has already won definite and striking successes. In 1906-8 the United States and Mexico mediated between the warring Central American States and induced them to form the Central American Court of Justice. Four years ago, Argentina, Brazil and the United States succeeded in preventing war on the West Coast of South America when it seemed ready to break out between Peru, on the one hand, and Ecuador, possibly aided by Chile, on the other. By the Niagara Conference the past year, Argentina, Brazil and Chile kept the peace between Mexico and the United States; finally during the last few months, the representatives of the entire number of American States have been continually meeting together to consult over their common problems presented by the war. It only remains to extend this occasional coöperation into a generally accepted Pan-American policy.

What definite benefit, it may be asked, will come to the United States from such systematic coöperation? To mention but one important result, it will save us from the temptation to conquer neighboring territory. There is already a natural tendency for us to extend our sovereignty down to the Panama Canal. Foreigners see this clearly; to quote but one of them, Rondet Saint, a French writer on international politics: "The United States is like a giant who will put in his pocket five little children—the five little republics of Central America. This event is almost mathematically certain." A similar statement is made by the English author, F. Fox, in his recent work, "Problems of the Pacific," he says, "It is likely that within this decade the United States flag will fly (either as that of the actually governing or the suzerain Power) over all the territory south of the Canadian border to the southern bank of the Panama Canal." Garcia-Calderon, the brilliant author of "Latin America," writes in a recent magazine article: "The Panama Canal seems, then, destined to fix the provisional limits of North-American Im-

perialism . . . to the north of the Canal nothing seems likely to check the progress of the haughty overlord." This expansion to the Canal is only natural, from a foreign, especially military, point of view. How long would Germany, for example, permit semi-anarchic communities to separate the main part of her empire from the Kiel Canal?

Among our own citizens also there is a latent desire to extend our borders to our canal frontier. While the majority probably do not consciously wish this expansion at the present time, yet it is a factor which must be reckoned with, and guarded against. The United States in its earlier days, when it had an unoccupied continent to develop, was strongly imbued with the spirit of imperialism, to which Stephen A. Douglas well gave expression, when he said: "He is foolish who puts himself in the way of American destiny. You cannot limit this great republic by saying so far and no farther. Just as fast as our interests require more territory, in the North, in the South, or on the islands of the ocean, I am for it." Since the Civil War, however, there has been little of this old style imperialism.

But the spirit of expansion which is slumbering among all peoples has been somewhat awakened by the possession of the canal. One of our conservative papers had an editorial favoring expansion not long ago headed, "All Aboard for Panama." The possible strength of this feeling was shown most strikingly at the time of the seizure of Vera Cruz. The morning after the marines landed, Senator Borah, one of the Foreign Relations Committee of the United States Senate, voiced the feelings of many, when he exclaimed: "This is the beginning of the march of the United States to the Panama Canal." Many a similar expression was heard from men on the street as they talked of the probable outcome of the impending intervention. A newspaper campaign broke out with startling suddenness for the retention of Mexico. We are also being prepared by thoughtful students for the likelihood of expansion further south. The late Charles Francis Adams a year ago called public attention to a so-called law of

History which the historian Mommsen has pointed out, that under-developed countries are conquered and annexed by their stronger, more highly civilized and better organized neighbors.

More recently, we have been frequently reminded, even by our more responsible journals, that some additional Mexican territory would be desirable. *The Independent*, for example, a few months ago, published a prominent article entitled, "Shall we annex Northern Mexico?" and in the same issue a leading editorial commenting favorably upon the idea. United States Senator-elect Harding, of Ohio, recently said, "The magnificent resources of Mexico will never be given to mankind . . . until it is brought under the civilizing influences of the American flag. How and when that condition will be brought about is not for me to say at this time, but it is coming." Rear Admiral Peary, at a banquet in New York, two months ago, exclaimed, "A hundred years hence we shall either be eliminated as a nation, or we shall occupy the entire North American world segment."

Well, why not? Why not take additional territory to the south? It would be for the best interests, it is claimed, both of ourselves and of humanity. Possibly so! But you cannot secure possession of your neighbor's property and of his goodwill at the same time. Seizure of territory south of the Rio Grande would kill all genuine Pan-Americanism for some decades to come. The outcry, through South and Central America, which greeted the occupation of Vera Cruz, the denunciation of their press, the occasional anti-American demonstrations and even riots,—as far away as Uruguay,—give a clear idea of the probable effect upon Latin America of a permanent seizure of territory between us and the Canal. The United States needs, beyond its borders, not additional territory, but stable and orderly government. This could best be secured by the coöperation of several American Republics; it would have the additional advantage that the United States, by acting jointly with other countries, would be freed from any tempting opportunity to seize or retain its neighbors' lands.

What will Pan-American coöperation do for the States of Latin America? Besides making them partners, not subordinates, in the joint work of safeguarding our common America from over-sea imperialism, it will also save them from their own recently revealed imperialistic tendencies. Perez Triana, one of the foremost public men of Colombia, in an open letter, the past year, told of "the shameful imperialisms already arising in Latin America." He spoke the truth. Certain of the leading States of South America are standing to-day at the parting of the ways; their rapidly developing power, their increasing population, their growing navies, the vision of playing the role of a Great Power, are all tempting them to take the old, well-worn road of militaristic competition, which leads to aggression and to war. Their own idealism, however, points along a newer and a better road. At the first Pan-American Congress, in 1890, the delegates of every State but one voted for the declaration, "the principle of conquest is eliminated from American Public Law." Only the other day, the brilliant Ambassador from Argentina publicly said, the motto "'Victory gives no rights,' is the highest expression of our aspirations." Coöperation, on this principle and basis, will keep South America true to its own best ideals. A Chilean acquaintance, a member of one of the foremost families of that Republic, wrote not long ago: "You are well informed by your friends when they tell you that the A. B. C. conference produced an almost revolutionary effect upon opinion in Chile, both as to Pan-Americanism and as to the United States. . . . The most important result of the A. B. C. mediation, however, is, in my judgment, the fact that it constitutes a moral obligation for these nations to keep the peace for all time to come. It is the moral obligation of the preacher to practice what he preaches."

"To keep peace for all time to come"—that is the possible, even the natural result of a genuine policy of Pan-American coöperation. The details of the system may well be left to be worked out as various occasions of common interest arise. A general guarantee to respect the

territorial integrity of each American state should probably be included. The Latin American countries, it is believed, would at present, with one exception, agree to this with enthusiasm; it would be providing for this hemisphere what the international thinkers are convinced is necessary for Europe. In any case, no league can be formed whose power of action is controlled by a majority vote of the States. Coöperation must be sufficiently flexible to meet the varying requirements of the different international problems which arise.

"The Niagara Conference," to quote a South American statesman, "has established the proposition that any war which breaks out between two American States is a Pan-American affair." Excellent! But suppose the war is not between States, but entirely inside of a State. What then? Then we discover a present limitation upon Pan-American coöperation. Public sentiment throughout South and Central America would at present probably refuse to permit any interference in the internal affairs of any American State. The writer has been given very definite assurances to this effect, since the Niagara Conference, by a sufficient number of representative men from the Republics to the south of us. In the United States, however, there is a wide-spread belief that no land has a right to become a lasting "neighborhood nuisance," and a continual international menace. Is it not fair, then, to ask the leaders of South America what they would do in case the anarchy in Mexico should become clearly intolerable? Would it not be better for them and for us, and for our common America if some of their representative States would join us in restoring order in that country, should it be necessary, rather than have the United States do it alone with the great likelihood—in the judgment of many of those best informed on Pan-American affairs—that our flag would then stay forever somewhat beyond the Rio Grande?

Looking into the future, to the time, not far distant, when an increasing number of the Latin American Republics will be strong, powerful, self-conscious States, it is

clear that the new formula of coöperation is the only international salvation for this hemisphere. The responsibility for developing our occasional American coöperation into a definitely accepted system rests especially upon the United States. It is the part of American Statesmanship, then, to hold up as a national aim, a genuine, coöperative Pan-Americanism; to work for it, to make concessions for it, and, if necessary, to sacrifice minor issues to obtain it.

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING PROF. BLAKESLEE

Mr. Robinson (presiding): Some of the points developed by Prof. Blakeslee were intended to show that there is not a very clear idea of what the Monroe Doctrine means. I am going to ask four or five people what they think it is. May I ask you to try to be uninfluenced by what you have just heard.

Mr. Brown: My idea of the Monroe Doctrine, I have made no study of it at all, has been that the United States did not want European nations to go into North or South American countries with the idea of aggression. She took the stand that she would defend these countries from aggression and use her influence, both military and political, to keep out the European countries that might go in to make trouble.

Miss Brown: I agree with the view that an occasion for using the Monroe Doctrine would be any affair of intervention in the new world. The United States is the guardian of the south world powers. The policy that the United States had no intention of interfering in European affairs is the other side.

Mr. Rice: As I understood it, it includes both of these, but of course the only thing needed to be considered here is what policy we should pursue in connection with other nations' treatment of American countries. No European country should expand its colonial holdings in either North or South America, and the second point is that no European government should attempt to influence the form of government to be set up.

Dr. Mez: If I may add one word about the annexation

of northern Mexico. I am sure that the same thing will happen as in so many wars, even if there is no desire to annex anything. There will come the psychological moment when the nation will change. Take Belgium and von Bethmann-Hollweg as an example. There is a similar thing in the case of Japan, which entered the war to take Kiao Chow solely for the purpose of giving it back to China. This was the intention at the beginning, but after Japan had lost five thousand men, more than was expected, there came the idea that something should be gotten out of it, and then they said, "For other concessions we will turn it back to China." There are about 150,000 Germans in Catalonia, and the Germans have the thought in mind that there will be a place for German expansion, and this may involve the United States and the whole Monroe Doctrine. Lamprecht did not think there was much to be expected from expansion in the United States.

Mrs. Mead: I would like to ask a question. I have never understood whether the Monroe Doctrine included peaceful approaches. I did not understand, if a sale could be effected, why it should be affected by the Monroe Doctrine. I do not see why we should not have northern Mexico if we pay for it. I see no reason why there should be the slightest danger if the Germans come into South America by purchase. I hope that Mr. Blakeslee will say that it is not included.

Mr. Robinson: Do you think there is enough attached to this to make it the basis for the future policy of the United States?

Mr. Blakeslee: The real difficulty comes from this fact of mixing up what was the original Monroe Doctrine with the doctrine of sovereignty over the whole continent. I should say the real doctrine, and no two people will agree on it, would provide against further territorial acquisition in this hemisphere by any non-American power. Of course that does not mean that we are to prevent a European state from coming over here and making war on an American state, and when Spain made war on Chile and Peru in 1860 we definitely and specifically declined to

interfere, but we maintained that the Monroe Doctrine was not involved so long as Spain did not attempt to secure territory. But when a European state comes over, as Germany did in Venezuela, the probability is that we will not stand aside. We do not trust them to clear out without taking American territory. That was why in 1891 we went to the very verge of political propriety in interfering in this. Thayer, in John Hay's unpublished letters, says the United States gave Germany ten days to arbitrate the difference with Venezuela. We ordered the American fleet to Venezuelan waters. Although the Monroe Doctrine does not stand between a foreign state and an American state provided no land is taken, it makes us feel very uneasy, and diplomatic measures will be resorted to.

I would say the Monroe Doctrine stands for no territorial acquisition by non-American powers even by purchase. It would be very clear from reading different interpretations that we would most decidedly object to the sale of American territory to a non-American power, because the fundamental purpose of the Monroe Doctrine was to protect us from the encroachments of the militaristic powers of Europe, and secondly it is altruistic. I suppose Germany would be willing to give a great many millions for St. Thomas and Curacao, but I believe that the United States would say instantly that never, even by purchase, would she allow Germany to get a foothold in the Caribbean. Senator Lodge said the United States would not permit any corporation of a foreign country so closely connected with the government as to be in control of that government to attempt to secure any land save for the United States. And we will object and probably call it a violation of the Monroe Doctrine if any foreign power gets such concessions as to give them practical control of the land.

The idea which the South Americans have of the Monroe Doctrine is that it means America for the United States. They say, you state that the Monroe Doctrine is for the Americas, but it is not. They can prove their point absolutely conclusively by quoting from our most important

men. There is Olney's statement, "The United States is the practical sovereign on this continent, and its word is law on the subjects to which it extends its interpretations." Then the statement of Mr. Taft, who said so many things he did not mean and for which he was sorry, "For all practical purposes everybody knows that the United States' power extends down to the Straits of Magellan." South Americans put these statements together and they have proven their point that the Monroe Doctrine means that the United States is keeping the other states away in order to take these countries when it is ready.

Is the Monroe Doctrine the proper basis for an American foreign policy? I believe it is if put upon a Pan-American coöperative basis. If we will make assurances that the states of this hemisphere are to be permitted to work out their own salvation for themselves and not be compelled to be dependencies of any power.

Mr. Roth: I am going to treat the Monroe Doctrine from a different point of view, from the world point of view. Mr. Blakeslee has told us what it is from the Pan-American point of view. That is a personal view of the matter. It strikes me that the Monroe Doctrine has been possibly the greatest political crime of the nineteenth century. When originally established it was meant to maintain the democratic powers of this country and to keep others away from this hemisphere. It was believed to be a success because militarism has been kept away from this continent. It was no crime to have kept it away from here, but it may have kept it on the other continent. When the central nations of Europe came into the field for colonies, then the world was closed to them, not by the colonizing nations of Europe but by the United States with its Monroe Doctrine. They felt this, but have so far been unable to challenge that doctrine. By closing the Americas to European civilization, the United States has shut off that safety valve which might have prevented the present European catastrophe.

Mr. Sachs: Is it true that at the League of Peace meeting Mr. Taft or Mr. Lowell said, if the United States

entered into the League of Peace the Monroe Doctrine would have to be given up? Supposing a purchase of some portion of South America were made by Germany with the expressed policy of colonial expansion, with local autonomy, should we allow it if it does not prevent democratic and local government?

I have another question in regard to internal interference. Suppose some country becomes too much of a nuisance, should we not interfere? Other countries have gone through civil wars. Why should we not allow them to go on through this experimenting? This has been the method of getting good things, it involves the sacrificing of other good things. Our interference in the internal question in Mexico is aggravated; what of half interference which makes whole interference necessary?

Mr. Blakeslee: It was said in Philadelphia that if the United States entered the League to Enforce Peace it would of course be necessary for the United States to take part in the affairs of Europe. The impression is that a definite statement was made that that would necessarily force the United States to renounce that part of the Monroe Doctrine. The idea was not expressed that that would in any way affect the fact that the United States would not permit non-American possessions on this hemisphere.

As to the statement of the expulsion of France from Mexico; that refers to French intervention in Mexico. France wished to establish an empire in Mexico. Secretary Seward carried on the negotiations with France in a very delicate manner without stating the position in such a way as to force the issue with France. We finally sent a military power there and demanded that French troops be withdrawn. Napoleon III went into the Franco-Prussian war to reestablish his prestige damaged in Mexico by America.

I am fully convinced that the majority of those to whom we would look for the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine, together with the responsible leaders of our foreign policy, would say that a purchase of a portion of South America for colonial expansion would be contrary to our

Monroe Doctrine. If the southern states of Brazil should be made fully self-governing and fully an equal part of the German Empire, I believe that the United States would object.

Miss Wood: I have a question about Pan-Americanism. Is it not a dangerous term for us to be using? Is this wise now when we want to carry forward the idea of coöperation in the world? Would it not be better to avoid that term with its military connections or can we redeem it?

Mr. David Hudson: It has been said that some of our statesmen think it possible or probable that the United States would take the northern part of Mexico. Would not such occupation of part of Mexico make a radical change in the conception of the Monroe Doctrine?

Mr. Blakeslee: I can not see that it would if we hold to the idea of the Monroe Doctrine that has existed from about 1823 until the time of the Pan-American movement. The seizure of northern Mexico would kill any genuine idea of the Pan-American doctrine. After 1823 occurred the first Mexican War, which came from aggression ideas. It is not supposed to have exerted any influence on the Monroe Doctrine.

This depends upon whether we cling to the original idea of the Monroe Doctrine, protection of the American hemisphere from non-American aggression, or give to it the idea of the South American interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine for the United States. In the latter case the A. B. C. powers would have no interest in holding with the United States, but if we have the other idea they would. They would rather have the name Monroe Doctrine dropped. The Latin-American peoples will like it better if the name is changed. Proof that the A. B. C. powers would join with the United States may be fairly conclusively drawn from the action of Argentina when there was danger of territorial aggression in Venezuela. Argentina officially stated that it not only approved of the Monroe Doctrine but wished to establish the additional doctrine, the Draco Doctrine, that no foreign power might intervene

in the affairs of a South American state in order to collect a debt owed it or its national by that state.

As to the question regarding the term Pan-Americanism, there has been a feeling that Pan-Americanism meant simply the policy which would give the United States supreme power in this hemisphere. This must be fought. Of course we mean genuine coöperation, if we treat Latin-American countries frankly and as equals.

Some one spoke of the necessity of policing weak American countries. If Europe cannot do what she wishes to punish weak American states, is it not our duty to step in and compel them to carry out their obligations? We say we will not punish Latin-American states for delinquencies committed against Europe. What are you going to do about weak, unstable countries over here which have not been able to conduct their own stable governments? There is a radical difference between the best Latin-American nation and the rest. Where so many lines have been tried as in Mexico, then we must step in and show them how or establish a protectorate over them as in Cuba. It has recently come out that the government in Cuba was thought out and written out by Elihu Root and then discussed by the whole Cabinet and President McKinley. It was always Senator Root's policy that the proper thing for the United States to do was to establish control over the anarchic governments of the Caribbean. Another means at our disposal is the financial protectorate. Santo Domingo is one example. We tried to get it in Nicaragua, Hayti, but the Senate would not allow it to go through. We tried to pick up all the naval bases to keep the military countries from getting them. It is our policy to build up weak countries which are a danger to themselves and a menace to us. We ask them why they do not come in, and they say, "You took this proposition from the wrong end. You make a weak country strong not by going into it but by economic means, and slowly. If you wish to do something, say, for Venezuela, see that proper immigration and capital go there and then you will have a good, stable government, but you are going about it in the wrong way."

Mr. Angell: Let me just tell you a story about the Monroe Doctrine. Jones met Brown and said, "What is this I hear about your not believing in the Monroe Doctrine?"

To which Brown replied, "I do believe in it; I would lay down my life for it. What I did say was that I did not know what it meant."

Dr. Nasmyth: Mr. Roth's challenge should not be permitted to go by without some opposition. If the Monroe Doctrine did not exist some other development would have taken its place, such as in Africa, where there was nothing of the sort. One of the deep causes of the present war lies in the partition of Africa. Militarism does not come from the Monroe Doctrine, it comes from false ideas as to the relation of political and military power to national advantage. Immigrants have been welcome in Brazil, the United States and Canada. If they had not been, the western continent could not have had the larger opportunity for expansion. A good deal of that lack of elbow room is due to militarism itself.

Those instances which Professor Blakeslee brought out are striking illustrations of the way in which slow and invisible causes together crystallized into definite action in a crisis. The work which we are doing here, the work which Professor Blakeslee has been doing for so many years, does not seem to have any effect in visible, outward result, but the result shows when the crisis comes. The Pan-American nations were crystallized into definite action, and when the action came it resulted in Mexican mediation.

SECTION II

AMERICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CREDIT SYSTEM

By William S. Kies

Of the Foreign Trade Department of the National City Bank of
New York

I am very glad to meet a conference of this kind, made up of very sincere students who are trying to get light, and

44 PROCEEDINGS OF CORNELL CONFERENCE

to talk over with them in a quite informal way the changes and readjustments taking place in international commerce and finance at the present time. Before we go further, it may be well to get before the conference a number of fundamentals.

The war which many believed never would come, and which a large number of economists said never could come because of the close and intimate financial relations between the various countries of the world, has come. The war, which many prophesied would last only a few months, has now lasted a year, and, from present prospects, may last several more. Here in the midst of peace we are unable to appreciate in all their possibilities the tremendous changes now going on. I do not know whether you have had the following figures, but I want to get them before you in this discussion.

First I want to call your attention to the financial condition of the great nations before the declaration of war. The debts were as follows:

United Kingdom for 1914	\$3,444,000,000
France " 1913	6,346,000,000
Russia " 1914	4,536,000,000
Italy " 1913	2,921,000,000
Japan " 1913	1,267,000,000
German Empire " 1913	1,194,000,000
(This is exclusive of the debt of the German States, which is \$3,855,000,000.)	
Austria Hungary	1,043,000,000
Turkey	675,000,000

It is calculated that the following amounts have been added through war loans up to May 1st:

Great Britain	\$2,525,000,000
France	1,802,400,000
Germany	3,491,000,000
Austria	730,000,000
Russia	1,065,000,000

Approximately \$9,500,000,000 added to the debts of these countries in the last twelve months. The combined funded debt of these five countries before the war was

\$17,250,000,000. The loans add \$9,500,000,000, an increase of nearly 60 per cent. These figures are astounding. They mean that to the debt of Europe before the end of the war will be added probably 100 per cent. When you consider that the taxes in some of the European countries have heretofore been excessive, you can readily realize what they will be hereafter.

Now let me give you some figures as to the cost of the war. A very noted French economist estimated the total military expenditures for the Allies, for the first year of the war, at \$10,000,000,000, and for Germany, Austria and Turkey at \$7,400,000,000—\$48,400,000 a day on an average.

The losses of the various countries engaged in the war, up to the end of July, are estimated at approximately \$33,000,000,000, distributed among the different countries as follows:

Germany	\$9,480,000,000
France	6,690,000,000
Austria Hungary	6,300,000,000
Russia	6,000,000,000
Great Britain	4,000,000,000
Belgium	2,432,000,000

In these figures the loss of lives is not capitalized.

In what way does this situation affect this country? You have often heard the statement that we are a debtor nation. You have heard of the invisible balance of trade. It is estimated that prior to the war we owed Europe between five and six billion dollars—that is European capitalists and investors had purchased our securities to that extent. The money we obtained from Europe has been utilized in developing the resources of this country. The interest charge, at an average of 5 per cent. on the money we have borrowed from Europe, would mean annually between \$250,000,000 and \$300,000,000. These sums paid in interest, as well as the amount of money spent yearly by Americans traveling abroad and the amounts of money remitted by foreign laborers to their home countries have, together, constituted heretofore a drain upon this country,

and have offset the balance of trade which appears from our export and import statistics.

Since the war has begun, we have been buying back our securities from Europe. There is no means of accurately estimating how many we have bought. It may not be an exaggeration to say that there has been returned to this country in the neighborhood of \$600,000,000 in such securities. It has been often stated that before the war is over we shall have to take back all of our securities which we now have in Europe. But in this connection it may be well to remember that the American security will be a very desirable thing to own, and just as good money—that is gold and silver—goes into strong boxes when there is a flood of paper money. So, likewise, will American securities be retained when people appreciate their soundness and desirability.

The invisible balance of trade against us, which may be estimated at approximately \$600,000,000, is, therefore, being materially reduced by the decrease in interest payments, by the fact that American tourists are not spending money in Europe this year, and by the further fact that large numbers of foreigners in this country have been obliged to return for military service, and, therefore, not being able to earn in this country and send their savings to Europe.

We have been for years an exporting nation, and have had for a number of years a favorable balance of trade resulting from our foreign commerce. The growth of our export trade presents a cheering picture. Exports of domestic merchandise from the United States to foreign countries have grown from \$376,616,000 in 1870 to \$2,428,506,000 in 1913. The increase in the exportation of manufactured articles alone grew from \$485,021,000 in 1900 to \$907,520,000 in 1911, a gain of 87 per cent. Germany, during the same period, increased her exports of manufactured articles from \$745,000,000 to \$1,396,000,000, or practically the same percentage. From 1870 to 1913 the population of Germany increased from 41,000,000 to 67,000,000, a gain of 64.6 per cent., while the population of

the United States increased, during the same period, from 38,558,000 to 97,026,000, or 151.6 per cent. The United States exports only 7 per cent. of its total manufactured product, whereas, from the best figures obtainable, it is estimated that Germany exports approximately 25 per cent.

We have had a favorable balance of from \$200,000,000 up to \$600,000,000 with the exception of two or three years, when the balance went down. The figures for 1914-15 are extremely interesting as indicating the effect of the war on the trade balance. For July the exports of the country were \$154,000,000, and the imports \$159,000,000, an excess of imports over exports of \$5,000,000. For August the excess of imports was \$19,000,000. The balance was against us. Beginning with September, the balance in our favor was as follows:

September	\$ 16,000,000
October	56,000,000
November	79,000,000
December	130,000,000
January	145,000,000
February	174,000,000
March	140,000,000
April	133,000,000

The next two months are expected to bring the balance in our favor for this year up to practically a billion dollars. This situation has been brought about by a number of causes—the closing of the Dardanelles brought our wheat into great demand; the shutting off of certain manufacturing sections in France enabled us to sell our goods in markets previously closed to us; the embargo on coal enabled us to furnish South America with a great many hundreds of thousands of tons of coal formerly purchased from England, and the great demands for munitions of war have constituted the larger part of this very great balance.

What will be the effect, commercially and financially, upon the future of the United States of this enormous trade balance? It has been estimated by Sir George Paish, the eminent English financial authority, that we produce

in this country about \$35,000,000,000 of wealth a year. I suppose, in arriving at this estimate, there is considered what we take out of the ground, what we add to the value of our products by manufacturing processes, and all sources of wealth. It has been estimated, also, that we can save in this country by proper economy \$7,000,000,000 a year. By reason of our new trade possibilities, in getting into markets never before open to us, our potential saving power should be even greater than this.

It is reasonable to assume that with a favorable trade balance, and by practicing proper economies at home, we shall be in a position to cancel a large part of our indebtedness to Europe. We are creating capital here, while across the water wealth is being recklessly destroyed. According to the census returns of 1912 the total wealth of this country was placed at approximately \$187,000,000,000. In the period since these estimates were made, we have probably added \$25,000,000,000 more. But with all our wealth, we do not seem, as yet, to have reached the stage where we can supply our own needs of capital for development purposes and have a surplus to loan to other nations for similar development work.

We still need vast sums of money in the west for the development of our agricultural resources, we need money for railroad building, for public utilities, for port and harbor works, for the construction of internal waterways, and for many other enterprises. Will we be able to meet these demands for capital for home consumption and, at the same time, furnish to Europe capital for reconstruction and to South America and the Orient capital for the development of latent resources? The demands from Europe after the war is over will be very great. Already we have loaned to Europe many millions of dollars. Orders have been placed in this country for munitions of war amounting to date to approximately a half billion dollars. Some form of credit will have to be arranged to meet these obligations already incurred.

In addition to materials purchased for war purposes, millions of dollars of supplies for clothing and sustenance

must come from this country. These supplies must be paid for. One way of settlement is by means of the shipment of gold. Gold is the only real money having an intrinsic value of its own, recognized by every nation of the world. A nation's credit is based, fundamentally, upon its gold supply, and the gold supply of the warring nations of Europe cannot long stand the drain necessary to pay in gold the balances which Europe now owes and will shortly owe to this country.

You have probably noticed the suggestion that American securities in Europe be collected and be used as collateral security for a loan to be raised in the United States. To what extent American securities would be available under an arrangement of this kind is questionable, but it may be safely estimated that Great Britain, with her billions of dollars of foreign investments, will be able to maintain her credit for an indefinite period; whether she will be able to assume the burden of financing herself and all her allies is open to reasonable doubt.

It is perfectly clear, however, that the nations of Europe must look to the United States for capital and credit with which to finance themselves during the war, and with which to carry on the work of rehabilitation after peace has been declared. At some price the notes and bonds of foreign governments will attract investors in this country, but in so far as American capital is loaned to Europe, it will not be available for our own development purposes. In addition to the demands of the warring nations of Europe, there is now, and will be in the future, a large demand for capital from foreign nations, which have heretofore been financed by Europe. The largest demands will come from South America and the Orient. Germany, France and England have invested in South America between four and five billions of dollars. If the war continues, European investments in South America will have to be liquidated. South America may be able to buy some of these securities but our market will be the one which will be called upon to bear the burden of this liquidation. South America will need new capital, and will need large

amounts. The legitimate inducements offered to capital in South America are perhaps larger than in any other part of the world, unless, perhaps, in China and the Orient.

Brazil, Colombia, Bolivia and Peru are very rich in mineral resources. Bolivia is the second largest tin producer in the world. Colombia has gold, precious stones, and other minerals, and a large amount of low grade coal. Brazil and Chile have an almost unlimited supply of iron ore, and Peru boasts of great mineral wealth. On the agricultural side, these countries present a very interesting prospect. Argentina is one of the greatest grain producing countries in the world, but it needs capital. The possibilities of the soil are such that returns on this capital will be large and promising. The same is true of Uruguay. Colombia and Venezuela have plateaus with ideal climates and vast stretches of fertile lands. In Colombia there are approximately five million people, with about eight hundred miles of railroads. Large portions of South America have no railroads.

China has iron and coal in almost unlimited quantities, and vast oil fields. With her unlimited supply of cheap labor, she needs only capital to make her one of the greatest manufacturing nations in history.

What are the conclusions that may be drawn from this hasty and imperfect survey of world conditions as they affect the world's demands for capital?

First—that this country must, of necessity, in the future supply not only the capital needed for its own development, but will be called upon to provide the capital needed for the rehabilitation of Europe and to carry on the work of developing the resources of South America and the Orient.

Second—that the money we spend in upbuilding the resources of countries whose markets we seek will be in the nature of a permanent investment, from which this country will derive year by year increasingly large returns.

Third—that, with so many demands upon us for capital, this country should start out on a definite policy of economy and thrift, and every person in the United States

should realize that it is his duty to his country first to save money and, second, to invest it where it will do his country the most good.

One of the things most necessary to be done in this country is to begin the education of our people to the possibilities of foreign trade and the great value of investments as a means of building up such trade. To this end, it is necessary that information about foreign countries whose markets we seek be spread throughout the country, and this is one of the activities of the Foreign Trade Department of the National City Bank. We are trying to impress upon our people the great possibilities of development of these countries, and to induce a study of these countries, their peoples and their resources.

I have been asked to discuss, as part of the general subject assigned me, the conditions in South America, and the possibilities and problems in connection with our development of that market. As I pointed out to you a moment ago, England, France and Germany have large investments in South America. It was the usual thing to make loans for development work with a string attached—that the proceeds should be spent in the country making the loan. It has, therefore, been almost impossible in the past for an American coal dealer to have his coal used on South American railroads even if it proved a superior grade, where the roads were built by English or German capital. Consequently, although we are the greatest coal producing country in the world, England's coal exports have been more than fifteen times those of ours. The same is true in the railroad equipment field, and practically every line where materials are needed for development purposes. At the present time, however, we are selling to the English owned companies, as well as German owned companies, because their sources of supply at home have been curtailed.

The war could not have struck South America at a worse time. Argentina had been experiencing a real estate boom. For a period of ten years, prices had been going up, and instances were numerous of lands near the cities increasing tenfold in value, and of lots increasing even

more. But during the two years prior to the war, crop failures had begun to puncture this boom. Business failures had begun to increase at an alarming rate. The war came and Argentina found herself in a bad way. She had been doing most of her business with England and Germany. The English acceptance houses that had been financing her were obliged to shut off credit. England declared a moratorium and Argentina was obliged to follow suit. Business failures increased, governmental revenues decreased, and for a time the situation was acute.

A bountiful crop and a large wool clip, together with a spirit of enforced economy and certain wise legislative measures caused the skies to brighten, and, within a comparatively short period of time, a decided recovery had set in. In fact, the experience of Argentina was a good deal like that of this country. Being a great producer of food products, cattle, hides and wool, her market expanded, prices increased, and her recovery was based upon a solid foundation.

With Brazil the situation was even more unfortunate, and substantial progress toward recovery has not yet been shown. Brazil's finances have for years been in bad condition. It is stated that a large loan had been arranged for prior to the outbreak of the war. Negotiations, however, were ended by the war and Brazil was obliged to default on some of her interest payments. Paper money has been issued in large amounts. Coffee, Brazil's only large crop, has not moved as in former years. Exchange has, therefore, been against the country, and the milreis has depreciated 25 per cent. in value.

The Chilean situation likewise became acute at the beginning of the war. Chile possesses the largest nitrate deposits in the world. A large proportion of the government expenses are paid by export duties on nitrate. The revenues from this source were cut in two. Chile had large sums on deposit in Europe, which became unavailable. Improvement here has been slow, and conditions are still abnormal.

In the other South American countries whose financial

relations were almost entirely with Europe, similar conditions exist. Credits have been curtailed or cut off entirely, former sources of supply are no longer available, and, naturally, these countries are now turning to the United States. Whether the business relations which are now being formed between South America and the United States are merely incidental to the great war and only of temporary value will depend entirely upon the ability of the business and financial men of this country to see the situation clearly and to use the present opportunity for the purpose of laying a foundation for a future permanent and substantial commerce.

Our foreign trade has heretofore, with few exceptions, not been the result of scientific planning and intensive development. We have been fortunate enough to build up a large foreign trade. It has come rather in spite of than as a result of our efforts. The total of the figures seems very encouraging, but an analysis indicates that we have been exporting to a very large extent raw materials, and of our exports in manufactured products the greater proportion comes under four heads—oil, copper products, iron and steel, and agricultural implements. The most successful foreign business has, therefore, been built up through the efforts of our large industrial organizations, which we popularly call the trusts. The Standard Oil Company, by reason of its splendid organization, has been able to sell American-made oils the world over. The International Harvester Company has made American agricultural machinery standard in all the great agricultural countries. The United States Steel Company, through intensive effort, has built up an export business of nearly one hundred million dollars a year. The men at the head of this company have realized the economic value of foreign markets and have gone about to obtain such markets in a painstaking and scientific manner. A good deal of the rest of our export trade has been built up in a most haphazard manner. Many of our manufacturers have used foreign markets as a dumping ground in times of over-production. When good times come in the domestic

market and demand increases, foreign customers are forgotten—then foreign business is too detailed and takes too much trouble. A policy of this kind will not bring effective results.

It might be well to consider the example of Germany in its successful effort to build up a large foreign commerce. Twenty-five years ago Germany set for herself the task of building up her foreign trade. Her economists saw clearly that national wealth and prosperity were the sure rewards of a successful foreign commerce; that selling to other nations in return for their raw materials, the products of factory and workshop, meant a permanent income to Germany from the labor and skill of her citizens, and that the value added by the processes of manufacture gave to her either a call upon the gold supply of the world or the option of a credit which could be used in the purchase of foodstuffs or other raw materials. Germany went about the matter in a thoroughly scientific manner. An intensive investigation of the possibilities of the various markets of the world was begun. The characteristics, customs, manners and wants of her future customers were carefully studied in an endeavor to ascertain what goods were desired and those for which a demand could be created. There was to be no attempt to force upon people what they did not want.

Coöperative societies were organized for the advancement of export trade. Chambers of commerce, which were active bodies and not paper organizations, collected data and information for the benefit of all interested.

The government, keenly alive to the fact that commercial supremacy means national power and greatness, shaped its export policies along broad and constructive lines. Export trade needed encouragement; consequently draw-backs and export bounties were provided. The merchant marine needed to be built up; subsidies were voted. Manufacturing towns distant from the ports were at a disadvantage in the matter of railroad rates; the rates were forthwith adjusted so as to encourage manufacturing for export. Foreign trade had to be financed. Branch banks,

under liberal banking laws, were established and became active agencies for promoting trade in foreign countries. In order to safeguard the domestic market, a protective tariff was instituted. To assist the German manufacturer to compete with others efficiency methods became the subject of careful study, and when it was demonstrated that combination meant lessened waste, greater concentration of effort, and more effective production, combination was encouraged. Price agreements, to avoid wasteful competition at home and abroad, were recognized as necessary and made legal. If, in order to meet the competition of other nations in foreign markets, it was necessary to sell below the price prevailing in the domestic market, a public opinion was created which applauded such a course as entirely patriotic, in that the greater the sale of German products abroad the nearer would German manufacturing establishments approach capacity production, and capacity production was early realized by German efficiency experts as the best means of reducing economic waste in production and lowering the unit cost of the products.

Germany saw that successful cultivation of foreign markets must be based upon a thorough knowledge of foreign countries. She planned an educational system for her youth whereby they were taught commercial geography, the business languages, and the financial customs and manners of different peoples, and her young men were encouraged to go into different parts of the world as commercial missionaries to convert the consumer into a user of German goods.

While Germany represents the example of a nation working out a carefully thought out export policy and obtaining truly remarkable results in a short period of years, England's commerce, on the other hand, represents the development of centuries, and her financial and commercial machinery is complete in every detail.

Until recently the United States was severely handicapped by its banking laws. There were no provisions permitting the establishment of national banks in foreign countries. Under our banking system, there could be no effi-

cient mobilization of our reserves and no efficient credit expansion at times when credit was most needed. I shall not attempt to discuss any great benefits to be derived by the country from the various provisions of the Federal Reserve Act, but wish to call your attention particularly to the provisions of the Act which are of special value in the development of our export business.

The provision of greatest value to commercial interests is that which permits national banks to accept six months' bills drawn against actual shipments of merchandise in foreign commerce, and which provides that these bills, when within ninety days of maturity, may be rediscounted by the Federal Reserve Banks.

A not inconsiderable factor in the growth of London as a financial center has been the activity of the large English acceptance houses. London always furnishing a ready market for discounting South American bills, it is not strange that the sight draft on London has been the accepted method of settlement of obligations arising out of international trade. The bank acceptance is a financial instrument until recently almost unknown in this country. The difference between the methods in effect here and in Europe is that commercial transactions were financed in this country by notes, and in Europe by bills of exchange. The one is an unsalable investment; the other a prime quick asset. Credit resources of American banks have been strictly limited to the amount of their real assets. European banks, on the other hand, have been in a position to maintain a contingent liability far in excess of this limitation by accepting and transferring bills of exchange. The services performed by the London bill are not overestimated by an article in the *London Economist* printed just prior to the war, which reads:

"The bill on London is the currency of the world. It is the only currency of the world. It represents gold but it is better than gold and is preferred to gold because transferable with greater rapidity, greater ease, greater certainty, and infinitely less risk of loss. It has therefore become the universal world currency, which and which alone the producer and handler of all nations will accept as wholly

satisfactory and sufficient. There is nothing like it elsewhere. No such function is performed by a bill on Paris, on Berlin, or on New York."

The acceptance privilege conferred by the Federal Reserve Act will result in the building up in New York, the financial center of this country, of a ready discount market for foreign bills, and there will surely follow a large demand on the part of investors for acceptances. In this way, a large part of the money with which to finance our foreign trade, and to grant the credits that are necessary, will be furnished through the banks from the savings of the investors of the country.

The Federal Reserve Act has also made it possible to establish branches of American banks in foreign countries, and to place back of the branches the prestige, influence and resources of the home bank. The first branch of an American bank to be established in a foreign country was opened on November 10, 1914, at Buenos Aires, Argentina. Since that time branches have been established at Montevideo, Uruguay; Rio de Janeiro, Santos and Sao Paulo, Brazil, and at Havana, Cuba.

The establishment of branches in foreign countries is pioneer work for American bankers. There are no signboards to point the way, and the path is by no means clear. The foreign branches established and to be established by American banks deserve the hearty support and the loyal coöperation of American business interests with the management in order that their development may be along lines of mutual helpfulness.

The National City Bank of New York has conceived the system of branches which it is now establishing in South America, and which it will establish in other parts of the world, in a spirit of helpfulness toward American manufacturers. It hopes to develop the various branches into active, forceful agencies in aid of the extension of our foreign commerce. To this end it has made comprehensive plans for the establishment of a commercial service in connection with each of its branches, and to be in a position, through its commercial bureau, to furnish the personal and

confidential representation which is so much needed by American manufacturers. Arrangements have been made to maintain, in connection with the branches, a credit bureau which shall be supplementary to and not in competition with the service successfully maintained for a number of years in South America by the great mercantile agencies of this country. Experienced credit men will be placed in charge of the credit investigation of each branch. Credit information, as rapidly as it is compiled, will be sent in duplicate to New York. Within a reasonable time, therefore, reliable credit information on South American names will be available to American manufacturers.

The branch banks are likewise prepared to do active trade promotion work in the interest of our manufacturers, and for this purpose there have been provided on their staffs trade experts whose entire time will be devoted to the furtherance of the interests of the importers and exporters of this country. These commercial representatives will undertake to study in a thorough and comprehensive manner the opportunities in foreign markets for the products of our factories and workshops. They will cultivate personal acquaintances among the business men of the country in which they are stationed so that they will be in a position to give to American salesmen the personal introductions which are so valuable in foreign countries, and in Latin countries in particular. They will supervise the making of technical investigations into the possibilities of a market for a particular product so that manufacturers in this country will be able to ascertain the price at which their goods can be sold in a foreign market; the cost of delivery to the market, the supply on hand, the manner in which the particular articles must be packed and prepared for the market, the finish and quality desired; and samples of their foreign competitor's goods will be obtained for them upon request. The service as planned is for the benefit of all American manufacturers wherever located, and will sooner be developed to a point of helpful efficiency if freely used by those who are or should be interested in the foreign field.

In discussing the subject of foreign trade development, the question of the development of our merchant marine naturally presents itself. I am not going to enter into a political discussion of this subject, but I desire to call your attention to a few facts, and to at least present the problem.

Prior to the war we had no difficulty in finding ships for all the freight we had to offer. Formerly we had sixteen lines of steamers from New York to the various ports of South America. We had no difficulty in getting all the freight accommodations needed to Europe and the Orient. The war has brought about an unusual condition. Freight rates are abnormally high, and it is impossible, in many instances, to obtain cargo space at all. So long as there exists the possibility of war between the nations of the world, so long is there a possibility of a recurrence of present conditions. It is an indisputable fact that our business with South America is seriously handicapped by the inadequacy of transportation facilities.

Under ordinary conditions, it takes twenty-one days to go to Rio de Janeiro. Formerly there were convenient sailings. Now we are fortunate in averaging a mail a month from our branches in South America. Aside from the sentiment of the thing, it is undesirable that our commerce shall be dependent upon the good behavior of all other nations. But if we want a merchant marine, we must pay for it. It costs more to build ships in this country than anywhere else in the world. The British lay down certain types of ships and turn them out in great numbers. They manufacture ships where we build them. The difference in the cost of building a ship and in manufacturing one of a type is large, running from thirty-five to fifty per cent. The original cost then is the first handicap. Heretofore foreign made ships could not fly the American flag, but we have remedied that, and, if American owned, they are now admissible to American registry.

But in the cost of operation lies the greatest obstacle to the development of a merchant marine. The cost of operating a ship under the American flag ranges from twenty to thirty per cent. more than the cost of operation under

the flag of any other country. The difference in the cost of operation depends, of course, upon the class of steamer. The difference in the cost of operating a high class passenger ship is more than in the case of a tramp steamer. Many figures and estimates have been printed about the cost of operating ships, but a careful consideration of the facts will justify the conclusion that it does cost appreciably more to operate a ship under the American flag than under that of any other country. If we are to build up an American merchant marine, the difference in the cost of operation must be met in some way. It becomes simply a question of method. No one will, for a moment, advocate lowering the standard of living of American seamen. There are only two practical ways to meet the situation, either government ownership and operation of a merchant marine or the granting of subsidies to ship lines equal to the difference in the cost of operation. It is quite clear that our trade development with South America will be seriously retarded until better shipping facilities are provided, and it is equally clear that private capital will not enter into the shipping business under our present maritime laws.

Among the difficulties in the way of the ready development of our export trade is not only our ignorance on the general subject of foreign trade, but our lack of knowledge of commercial geography. We know little of other lands than ours, of their resources, of the kind of people who inhabit them, their characteristics, their customs, their wants, and, least of all, their languages.

How many Americans know that Buenos Aires is the fourth largest city in this hemisphere, that it has the finest equipped newspaper plant in the world, an underground subway, a bank which until very recently, measured by its capital stock and deposits, was the largest in this hemisphere? That Argentina has 27,000 miles of railroad, and an annual total commerce greater than that of China, or of India, or of Australia, or of Japan, and practically equal to that of Canada? That the city of Rio de Janeiro has one of the best natural harbors of the world, that it has miles of finely paved streets, beautiful buildings, and all the con-

veniences of the most modern city in the United States? At Santos more coffee is handled than at any other port in the world. Montevideo, another thoroughly progressive and modern city, is the capital of a republic with a million and a quarter people, which raises every year eight head of cattle and over twenty head of sheep for every man, woman and child in the republic.

The time has come when our viewpoint, hitherto merely national, must become international. Our horizon is broadening, our opportunities are increasing, and, with them, our responsibilities. The country must awaken to the occasion. A spirit of coöperation, and a patriotic co-ordination of efforts, will alone bring the desired results. Across the water men are giving the fullest measure of devotion and sacrifice for their country's good. Here, blessed with peace, may we not see the growth of a similar spirit of devotion and a willingness on the part of all to unite in an intelligent and unselfish endeavor to further the interests of this country along lines which mean so much for our future welfare and prosperity?

CHAPTER III

AMERICA'S ASIATIC PROBLEM¹

By Prof. Sidney L. Gulick

Of Doshisha University, Japan

WITH BIBLIOGRAPHY AND REFERENCES BY
FRED B. FOULK

SECTION I

AMERICA'S DUTY IN THE LIGHT OF EUROPE'S TRAGEDY

AMERICA has suddenly awakened to the character and consequences of modern warfare. The possibility of being herself at war may at any moment be transformed into reality.

The real causes moreover of the European tragedy are now fairly clear. In brief they are national and racial selfish ambitions, aggressions, and oppressions; justified by the materialistic theory of evolution through the struggle for existence and the survival of the strong; the conviction that might and need make right; secret diplomacy, intrigue, falsified international news; cultivated suspicion, fear and animosity; and enormous expenditures for military preparedness.

The vast majority of Americans honestly and earnestly desire peace. We wish peace for ourselves, both now and in the future. We wish the permanent peace of the world. We would fain tell Europe how to adjust her international and interracial political affairs so as to provide for permanent peace. We suggest and even urge the organization of the United States of Europe. We proclaim the importance of prompt establishment of a World Supreme Court and a League of Nations to Enforce Peace, making the

¹ At the request of the editor, Prof. Gulick has expanded his address at the Conference into this form of a convenient Manual for the study of the Asiatic problem.

armies of the nations serve merely as a world police to enforce peace on turbulent or aggressive nations.

A considerable section of our most prominent citizens however hold that danger of war is so imminent that common prudence demands immediate enlargement of our military and naval forces. National security depends chiefly, they insist, on military preparedness.

Many indeed say that permanent world peace is possible only by the establishment and maintenance of international justice and the only hope of world justice lies in the establishment of a world court supported by international police. They accordingly devote their energies to the discussion of ways and means for securing these.

The writer, however, is filled with amazement at the apparent apathy of all in regard to those matters with which we have immediate and unavoidable responsibility, our relations namely with Asia. In the establishment of world peace we neglect the pressing duties immediately at hand, while we concern ourselves energetically with matters relatively remote. We ignore our own wrong doings, which are producing that psychological international state that leads to war, while we call upon other nations and races to deal righteously with one another!

To be specific, our disregard of treaty pledges to China, our humiliating treatment of Chinese and Japanese, and our popular cultivation of anti-Asiatic suspicion, animosity and fear, are producing a spirit and an attitude both in the Orient and in America that may ultimately result in conflict. The history of the rise and culmination of Europe's tragedy throws lurid light on America's attitude toward Asia and on our dealings with Asiatics. We are marching steadily forward in the path that Europe has trodden the past fifty years, whose frightful issue is now clear.

Will America learn the lesson? Will we learn to deal righteously and justly with Asia and Asiatics? Will we place the giving of justice above the demanding of rights? Will we regard international and interracial righteousness and good will as more important methods of providing for national security and permanent peace than the building

of large navies and the purchase of mountains of ammunition? Will we discover that armed peace is in fact but a truce, and a truce that will inevitably be broken when the time is ripe? Will we learn that enormous and increasing armaments increase suspicion among all one's neighbors, compelling them to resort likewise to the same methods of providing for national security?

Has not Europe's tragedy taught us that there is only one safe method for insuring national security and permanent peace, namely the method of ourselves dealing righteously and even generously with our neighbors?

When we begin to seek, not security-at-any-price, nor peace-at-any-price, but righteousness-at-any-cost, then and only then shall we be fairly started on the road to permanent peace.

Americans who are earnest for the establishment of the peace of the world will see to it that we at once undertake to solve the problem of our relations with Asia in the only way that will really solve it.

Those Americans who do not interest themselves in the rectification of our laws and our treatment of Asia and Asiatics must be judged either ignorant of the seriousness of the problem or not really earnest in the establishment of world peace.

World Militarism or Golden Rule Internationalism—these are the alternatives. Which of these paths America is to follow is the great problem now confronting her. Whether or not the voters consciously face it, this will be the real issue in the coming presidential campaign.

The choice will be indicated by the way in which we decide to treat Asia and Asiatics. Shall we bring our laws into harmony with our principles, professions and pledges? Or shall we increase our armaments? Shall we base national safety on the size, wealth and power of our nation and our preparedness for instant conflict, or on the cultivation of international good will and confidence through justice, helpfulness and good-neighborliness?

These questions find their immediate and practical application in the relations of the United States to China and

Japan. These questions therefore should be carefully studied by the rank and file of the responsible citizenship throughout our land. For in their hands lies the fateful decision. Shall the United States accept World Militarism or will it lead in the practice of Golden Rule Internationalism?

REFERENCES ¹

- Ainslee, Peter. Christ or Napoleon. New York: Revell, 1914.
- Gulick, Sidney L. The Fight for Peace. New York: Revell, 1915.
Chapters 1 to 5, 9 and 18.
- Jefferson, Chas. E. Christianity and International Peace. New York: Crowell, 1915.
- Lynch, Frederick. The Last War. New York: Revell, 1915.

¹ A general bibliography on the subject of America's Asiatic Problem will be found on page 103.

SECTION II

THE PROBLEM

Who coined the term "Yellow Peril"? What did he mean by it? What is the objection to the term? Is there any better name for the problem indicated?

I. *A Definition.* The "*Asiatic Problem*" signifies that group of questions and difficulties confronting the peoples of Europe and America due to the adoption by the nations of Asia of the material elements of Occidental civilization, and their entry thereby into the life of the world.

II. *The Elements Distinguished.* The Asiatic Problem as commonly stated, has many elements which need to be distinguished.

1. *The Economic Factor.*

- (a) Through enormous Asiatic migration into white men's lands and by work at a low scale of wages, there will be a lowering of the scale of life for Caucasian workers. "White laborers cannot compete with Asiatics."
- (b) Through development of enormous manufacturing plants in Asia on cheap labor, and the flooding of European and American markets with all kinds of manufactured goods, "made in Asia," cheaper than we can possibly produce them in Europe or America, occidental manufacturers and laboring classes will be hopelessly ruined.

2. *The Military Factor.*

- (a) Through the adoption by Japan and China of occidental science and especially of military and naval machinery and methods, Asiatics are becoming our equals in warfare.
- (b) By their military power Asiatics will be increasingly able to dispute the supremacy of the white races, and will compel them to surrender special privileges and rights acquired and long held in Asia by military superiority.

- (c) When Asia is educated, armed and united, because of her enormous population, she will be able to overwhelm the white peoples, even in their own lands. Their enormous fecundity and reckless disregard of life, will enable them to raise armies and navies of such enormous size as to render impossible successful competition by the nations of the West.

3. *The Racial Factor.*

Asiatic blood, brains and civilization are inherently inferior to those of the white races. They are moreover completely unassimilable. An Asiatic is always Asiatic in ideas, ideals, motives and character and cannot possibly become Caucasian. The intermarriage of Caucasians and Asiatics is abhorrent; the offspring are mongrels, inheriting the bad qualities of both races, and the good qualities of neither. All offspring, moreover, seeing they have Asiatic blood are essentially Asiatic. The supremacy of Asiatics through low economic standards and bare military force will mean the incursion into every white man's land of millions of Asiatics. This will inevitably not only reduce the western scale of life but will also render inevitable wide intermarriage of Asiatics and Caucasians, insuring thus the final downfall of the white man with his civilization and the complete Asiaticization of the world.

The above are the factors usually urged. They deserve careful study. Are they unadulterated truth or do they contain also elements of error? If the latter, how much is true and how much false? But there is also

4. *The Moral Factor.*

(a) *The Treatment of Asiatics in Asia.*

How have the advanced and powerful nations of the West been treating the nations and races of

Asia? Have they been solicitous for righteousness and justice? In seeking their own advantage have they also sought the advantage of Asiatics? Have Asiatics been justified in resenting and resisting the advance of occidental peoples? Has there been in Asia anything that may be rightly called the "white Peril"? Has the sovereignty of Asiatic nations been invaded? Has advantage been taken of their weakness or inexperience? Have treaties been faithfully adhered to? Have European and American traders and Governments practiced the "Golden Rule"? Have not Asiatics been ruthlessly exploited, economically, commercially, politically? And what is to be said of the sexual immorality of white men in Asia?

In what sense if any, have the white nations a "right" to the natural resources of Asia? In view of the countless temptations into which white men have fallen in their dealings with Asiatics, are we justified in speaking of a moral peril involved in our Asiatic relations?

(b) *The Treatment of Asiatics in America.*

What treaty provisions has America made with China and Japan? Has America faithfully kept those treaty pledges? Have Congress, the United States Supreme Court and the Presidents of the successive administrations been faithful to their respective duties in the matter of treaty observance?

Who is responsible for seeing that international righteousness is maintained? Who should see that international righteousness is maintained? Who should see that international wrong and injustice are righted?

- (c) *The deliberate Cultivation of International Suspicion and Ill Will through Falsehood and War-scare Stories.*

Is not the most ominous and the only actually existing "yellow peril" the sensation loving public, catered to by the sensational press? International falsehoods seem to be deliberately cultivated. Consider how the economic interests of many groups of Americans are advanced by widely promulgated and generally accepted war-scare stories.

- (1) Manufacturers of war material,—guns, ammunition, steel plate armor.
- (2) Caterers to Army and Navy.
- (3) Builders of docks and makers of all kinds of army and navy material used in bulk—contractors of all kinds.

Consider how war-scare stories have been periodically circulated when Congress is asked to vote army and navy appropriations.

Consider how eagerly people read the sensational story and how difficult it is to get a full statement of the sober facts in the daily press.

Investigate the facts of the following war-scare stories.

Japanese plans for acquisition of Magdalena Bay.

Japanese secret treaty with Mexico and sale to Mexico of arms.

Japanese occupation of Turtle Bay.

Japanese old soldiers in California armed, organized and drilling.

Japanese purchase of lots in the vicinity of the Dupont Powder Works.

Japanese spies in the United States, photographing, surveying, sounding harbors, etc.

Japanese plans for acquisition of California, Alaska, etc.

Japanese designs on Hawaii; Philippines.

Find the German Cartoon on the "Yellow Peril" and the Japanese reply cartoon.

General Conclusion. A serious problem is arising between the East and the West. Whether the above widely circulated stories are in fact true or are all entirely false, they are popularly accepted and that acceptance is causing a serious psychological situation with considerable international tension. This tension and mutual suspicion seem to be growing both in America and in Japan. China as yet is not much feared, but this is because she has not yet developed her armaments to the degree that Japan has, nor has the Chinese nation yet attained national self-consciousness to any great degree. These however will come as surely as the sunrise follows the dawn. *Asia is awaking.* Napoleon described Asia as a sleeping giant. "Let her sleep," he said; "for when Asia awakes she will shake the world." Does not that depend on the spirit that rules her? And does not that spirit depend on the kind of treatment she receives from the white men?

Stated in the briefest terms *the problem is how to adjust the relations of the great nations of the East and the West in such ways that their new contact shall be mutually advantageous rather than disastrous.*

Three distinct policies may be distinguished among the proposals that are now urged. Their respective merits and defects should be widely studied and understood. For in the final solution of this problem, so far as America is concerned, the rank and file of the responsible citizenship is vitally involved. In their hands lies the decision. The consequences also of that decision will affect the whole nation and every individual in it in a vital way for weal or for woe.

REFERENCES

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

- Coolidge, M. R.** Chinese Immigration. New York: Holt and Co., 1909.
- De Forest, John H.** The Truth About Japan. Boston: World Peace Foundation, free pamphlet.
- Gulick, Sidney L.** The American Japanese Problem. New York: Scribner's, 1913. Chapters 1 to 4, 11 to 15. Also contains pertinent extracts of the treaties between the United States and China and Japan. For race assimilation see chapters 7 to 9.
- The Fight for Peace. New York: Revell, 1915. Chapters 9 and 10.
- The White Peril in the Far East. New York: Revell, 1905. Contains facts on Occidental aggression in the Far East.
- Jordan, David Starr.** A War Scare: The United States and Japan. Pages 63-65 in Syllabus of Lectures on International Conciliation. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1911.
- Japanese Immigration, Anti-Alien Legislation in California, The Race Problem of America. Pages 261 to 272 in War and Waste. New York: Doubleday, Page and Co., 1913.
- Kawakami, Kiyoshi K.** Asia at the Door. New York: Revell, 1914.
- Millis, H. A.** The Japanese Problem in the United States. New York: Macmillan, 1915. Contains a scientific statement regarding Japanese agricultural and other workers in the United States.

PERIODICALS

- Captain Hobson as a War Prophet.** Review of Reviews, Vol. XXXVIII, 366-67, Sept., 1908.
- Chinese and Japanese in America.** Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science. No. 114, Sept., 1909.
- Dangerous Falsehoods.** Outlook, July 26, 1913.
- Diplomatic Communications with Japan.** Outlook, Vol. CVII, 578-80, July 11, 1914.
- Dream Book: War Between Japan and the United States.** Outlook, Vol. CXI, 535-6, Nov. 3, 1915.
- Folly of War Talk.** Review of Reviews, Vol. XXXVI, 131-36, 1909.
- Inevitable War Between the United States and Japan.** P. H. B. d'Estournelles de Constant. Independent, Vol. LXX, 1261-65, 1911.
- If War Should Come.** Richmond P. Hobson. Cosmopolitan, Vol. XLIV, 584-93; Vol. XLV, 38-47, 382-7. May-June, Sept., 1908.

- Japanese Bogy.** World's Work, Vol. XXI, 14076-77, 1911.
- Japan's Preference for Peace with America.** Y. Ichihashi, Outlook, Vol. LXXXVII, 295-97, 1907.
- Oriental Immigration, Problem of.** S. L. Gulick, Survey, Vol. XXXI, 720-22, March 7, 1914.
- Public Nuisance (re R. P. Hobson).** Independent, Vol. LXV, 161-62, July 16, 1908.
- Relations of Japan and the United States.** David Starr Jordan, Journal Race Development, Vol. II, 215-24, Jan., 1912.
- Relations of the United States with China and Japan.** T. Iyenaga. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. LIV, 254-59, July, 1914.
- Relations of the United States with China and Japan.** J. G. Kasai. Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, Vol. LIV, 260-69, July, 1914.
- Straining an Historic Friendship,** Hamilton Holt, Independent, May 1, 1913.
- Views of the Navy and Japan (re R. P. Hobson).** Independent, Vol. LXIV, 165-67, Jan. 16, 1908.
- Why Japan Cannot Declare War.** Literary Digest, Vol. XLVI, 1369, June 21, 1913.
- Why a Japanese-American War Is Impossible.** Review of Reviews, Vol. XLIII, 613-14, 1911.
- Yarn of Turtle Bay.** Outlook, Vol. CIX, 951, April 28, 1915.
- Yellow Peril,** Emperor William's cartoon and the Japanese response cartoon, "The German Peril." Sunset, Jan., 1915.

SECTION III

FIRST POLICY

WORLD SUPREMACY OF THE WHITE RACE MAINTAINED BY MILITARY MIGHT

The first and most vociferously advocated policy for meeting the Asiatic Problem, commonly called by this group the "Yellow Peril," is that which emphasizes the military, economic and racial factors of the problem. It sees no alternative but white-race world-supremacy through superior military might exercised promptly, or final and complete overthrow of the white race and his civilization by a vic-

torious and overwhelming Asiatic invasion. "World supremacy for the white man or his downfall" is the vision of those who advocate this first policy.

The avowed purpose of this group, therefore, is to maintain the race purity, and the economic and military world supremacy of the white man. They would secure these ends:—

1. Through complete exclusion from lands now in possession of white nations of all Asiatic labor, and thus prevent direct economic competition.

2. Through high protective tariff they would exclude all cheap manufactured articles that in any way compete with Caucasian made articles. In this way they would prevent indirect economic competition.

3. Through military and naval force they would retain and even increase the white man's hold on Asiatic territory. This would enable the white nations to suppress at the start dangerous Asiatic military and naval plans and movements.

4. Through possession by Occidentals so far as possible of Asiatic natural resources, mineral wealth and railroad concessions, they would provide for ownership by the white races of the wealth of the world.

5. By keeping from Asiatics, so far as possible, knowledge of the latest occidental military and naval inventions, they would keep Asiatics in complete military inferiority, whatever might be their numbers.

6. Through legislation forbidding intermarriage of Caucasians with Asiatics they would maintain the purity of Caucasian blood and heredity.

In general, those who advocate the above policies regard the white man as intrinsically superior to every other and therefore as endowed with special divine right to rule the world; it is quite right for him to seize its wealth and by force to keep all other races in the position of economic, military and political inferiority. The destiny of the other races is to serve as hewers of wood and drawers of water. They are to live and labor for the benefit of the white race. The white man is a privileged individual. The essential

superiority of the white race is proven by the color of his skin, and the vigor of his defence of his rights and honor, and the character of his civilization.

REFERENCES

BOOKS

Gulick, S. L. *The American Japanese Problem*. New York, Scribner's, 1913. Chapter 12.

PERIODICALS

America, Japan and the Pacific. A. Kinnosuke, *Harper's Weekly*, Vol. LX, 177-79, Feb, 20, 1915.

Inferiority of the Caucasian Race. *Independent*, Vol. LXVI, 330-31, 1909.

Is the United States a World Power? Ignotus, *North American Review*, Vol. CLXXXIII, 1107-19, 1906.

Issue with Japan Grows Into a World Issue. *Current Opinion*, Vol. LV, 7-11, July, 1913.

Not the Right Way. *Outlook*, Vol. CVII, 645, July 18, 1914.

Our Duty to China and to Japan. *Literary Digest*, Vol. L, 737-38, April 3, 1915.

SECTION IV

THE EFFECTS ON THE WHITE RACE

Before attempting to point out the defects of the policy outlined in the preceding section, it will be well to consider the effects of such a policy. And first, what would be the effects on the white nations themselves were this to become the universally accepted policy and program of the West!

Is the following enumeration adequate and correct?

1. Race pride and race prejudice would surely increase by leaps and bounds. But does not pride precede, nay inevitably cause the fall of a race as that of an individual? Do we not have historical examples of this principle? Babylon? Egypt? Rome? Greece? Do not race pride and arrogance and utilization of other races as inferiors to

do menial service produce a psychological condition that surely produces race deterioration and final ruin?

2. The policy of white race world supremacy is racially selfish, materialistic, and frankly militaristic.

3. Such a policy moreover entirely disregards the rights of Asiatics and the imperative duty on the part of the white nations of giving them justice.

4. The fundamental principle of such a policy is that "might makes right." Would not the adoption of such a principle in dealing with other races, lead directly and inevitably to its increasing application not only between white nations themselves but also between competing groups and classes in the same white nation? Would not injustice or denial of rights to Asiatics as a general and recognized policy in any country endanger civil and political liberty and justice in that same country?¹

5. Is not this policy of white race world supremacy one that is really afraid to meet the Asiatic on terms of equal opportunity? Is it not therefore a policy of implied race inferiority?

6. Would not such a policy prevent the wholesome evolution even of the white races themselves, economically, politically, and socially, no less than morally and spiritually? Would not emphasis be continually laid on the lower aspects of civilization to the permanent loss of emphasis on the higher factors?

7. In its denial of the essential unity of mankind and our common human brotherhood, does not the policy run counter to the great movements of human progress? Is there any more remarkable phenomenon of modern times than the amazing rapidity with which the whole world regardless of its races and their history and differences is becoming unified through universal trade, a world financial system, a common education, the adoption of common political practices and ideals and the development of identical moral and religious aspirations? Is not the welfare of any section of the world, in fact intimately dependent upon the welfare

¹ If "might makes right," then as soon as Asiatics have the might have they not also the right to over-run Europe and America and exterminate their excessive white population?

of every other section? Do not national "slums" endanger every neighboring nation? For example, Cuba? Mexico? Does not this policy of white race world supremacy threaten the true welfare even of the white nations by necessitating the degradation of the remaining races?

8. In proportion to the success of the policy, the white nations would indeed become wealthy. But that wealth would not be equally distributed. The capitalistic classes of the West would possess the wealth of Asia, while the working classes would, as before, be dependent upon their own toil. The chasm between capital and labor in Christendom would therefore be increased, with all its ominous consequences.

9. The evils of absentee landlordism would be multiplied, with degenerative luxury and irresponsibility for the owning and ruling class of Christendom and the crushing poverty and misery for the toiling millions of Asia.

10. For the successful carrying out of the above policy, would there not be needed for America a large increase of military and naval armaments? For such a policy can be carried out only by over-powering military force. The complete subjugation of Asia means the complete militarization of the occident.

11. If European and American capitalists gain military and financial control of Asia, is it not clear that they will erect enormous manufacturing establishments in Asia, where labor and raw material are cheap? What will capital care about occidental labor if it can earn larger dividends by investments in Asia? Will it not exploit Asiatic labor in Asia, to the ruin of economically less efficient Caucasian labor in Europe and America?

We conclude that though the proposed policy might easily be carried out for a period of many decades and possibly for a century or two, its ultimate consequences even to the West are sure to be disastrous, morally, economically, and politically. Democracy could not be permanently maintained, for militarism and democracy are incompatible.

REFERENCES

BOOKS

- d'Estournelles de Constant, Baron. "The Respect Which the White Race Owes to Other Races," pp. 383-87 in *Papers on Inter-Racial Problems*. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1911.
- Hobson, J. A. *Imperialism: A Study*. London: Constable, 1906. Pages 251 to 289.

PERIODICALS

- Americans and the Far East*. H. W. Mabie. *Outlook*, Vol. CIV, 754-57, Aug. 2, 1913.
- Are We Honest with Japan?* J. D. Whelpley. *Century*, Vol. LXXXVIII, 105-08, May, 1914.
- Freaks of Race Prejudice*. *Nation*, Vol. LXXXIV, 168, 1907.
- Immigration from the Orient*. H. C. Nutting. *Nation*, Vol. LXVIII, 724-25, June 18, 1914.
- Menaces to American Peace*. E. L. Fox. *McBrides*, Sept., 1915, 86-90; Oct., 1915, 54.
- Our Honor and Shame with Japan*. W. E. Griffis, *North American Review*, Vol. CC, 566-75, Oct., 1914.

SECTION V

THE EFFECTS ON ASIATIC PEOPLES

The successful carrying out of the policy outlined in section III would have effects also on the peoples of Asia, which merit careful consideration.

1. The romantic friendship of Japan for America, and her absolute confidence in America's international justice and idealism, has already been seriously strained, and threatens to be completely lost, even by the slight application already practiced of an anti-Asiatic policy. The complete and definite acceptance by America of Asiaphobia, would surely evoke in Asia deep resentment, indignation and a policy of retaliation. Japan already feels humiliated by American treatment and has publicly said so in her official diplomatic correspondence.

2. Fifty years of contact with the West has taught Japan that she can secure her rights and even her political sover-

eignty, only as she is prepared to argue with the white man with bayonets and battleships.

3. Can we doubt that China will follow the same course of development that Japan has taken? China has definitely abandoned her ancient systems of education, government and communication, and is acquiring as rapidly as possible the practices and the instruments of occidental countries. This enormous change has been entered upon in consequence of European military aggression, and as a means whereby ultimately to oppose it and maintain independence.

4. Can we doubt the development in China as in Japan of deep moral indignation and resentment at the arrogance of other races in their assumption of inherent superiority and of right to own the earth and to exploit all races, keeping them in economic and political inferiority and subjection?

5. Would not the above described anti-Asiatic policy produce such a feeling of pride, of rivalry, of ambition and indignation as would ultimately render inevitable a world-war of the races in comparison with which the present "frightful" tragedy in Europe would pale into insignificance? Certain it is that many already begin to foresee and to predict such a world catastrophe.

6. The economic effect on Asiatics of exploitation by European capitalists needs careful study. Suppose that European capitalists own the mines, the railroads, the shipping lines, and the factories of Asia. They will of course employ labor at the cheapest possible wages; laborers in China are unlimited. Capital will be able through lobbies and vast bribery and intrigue to control legislation in Asia to suit its own interests. Whence could come the moral force that would enact reform legislation, demanding a rising scale of wages, more hygienic conditions, shorter hours of work and one day rest in seven for Asiatic laborers?

7. Such a capitalistic policy, moreover, successfully carried out for a century or two would steadily drain off the wealth of Asia into the pockets of Europe and America. The problems of labor and capital would be expanded to world-wide scope and in their worst forms. The degradation of Asia would be inevitable.

8. Such a policy, accordingly, though successfully carried out, would prevent the wholesome development of China, Japan and India, and thus make it impossible for that great section of the human race to make its best contribution to the world-civilization.

9. In the final struggle for world-supremacy, many are already predicting the victory of the Chinese, because of their vast population, their fecundity, their patience, their economic efficiency and their dogged will. How will they treat the white race if they win their supremacy in the face of arrogance and injustice practiced by the white races in their effort to keep the yellow and brown races in subjection?

Is it not clear that the general adoption by the white nations of a policy aiming at world supremacy through superior military power, would, even though relatively successful for a season, bring ultimate disaster to the entire world?

REFERENCES

BOOKS

Gulick, S. L. *The American Japanese Problem*. New York: Scribner's, 1913: Chapter 13.

PERIODICALS

Attitude of Japan Toward the United States. A. Kinnosuke. Independent, Vol. LXII, 1457-59, 1907.

Japan on the Land-Law Deadlock. Literary Digest, Vol. XLIX, 263-64, Aug. 15, 1914.

Japanese Conceptions of America. Sunset, Vol. XXXIV, 346, Feb., 1915.

Japanese in the United States and the Opinion in Tokyo. Current Literature, Vol. XLIII, 483-88, 1907.

Japanese Rights in America. Literary Digest, Vol. LXIX, 48-50, July 11, 1914.

Japanese Wrath at Our Immigration Bills. Literary Digest, Vol. XLVIII, 252, Feb. 7, 1914.

Snarl of Waking Asia. Everybody's, Vol. XXXII, 587-600, May, 1915.

Yellow Fist. Ackmed Abdullah. Sunset, Jan., 1915.

Yellow Pity for White Prejudice. Literary Digest, Vol. XLIV, 525, 1912.

SECTION VI

A CRITICAL STUDY OF THE ALLEGED YELLOW PERIL

Effort was made in section III to state the Asiatic Problem in the form usually urged.

Does the following critical estimate seem to be justified?

1. The migration in the course of a few years into any single occidental land of millions or even of several hundred thousand Asiatic laborers would unquestionably cause serious economic competition for Caucasian laborers. Asiatic unmarried laborers would underbid, outwork, and outlive Caucasian laborers, especially those having families to support. Caucasian labor would doubtless be driven from any field to which Asiatic labor could enjoy free and unresisted admittance.

2. The alleged danger to Occidental manufacturing classes from the importation of articles manufactured by cheap Asiatic labor is not in reality such as is commonly asserted. For, it is to be remembered that the West cannot purchase goods manufactured in Asia unless Asia purchases corresponding values from us. In proportion, however, as Asiatics purchase from us, will they give us work. In proportion moreover as they sell to us will they be able to buy from us.

3. There is, however, a second form of industrial competition with cheap Asiatic labor that merits serious consideration. Suppose the plans of occidental capitalists succeed for the economic and political domination of Asia. Let us assume also that the mining resources, railroad concessions, manufacturing establishments and merchant marine of China are practically owned by occidental capital. It will of course employ cheap Chinese labor at the cheapest possible rates. Occidental capital will not interest itself in raising the wages and the scale of life of their employees; for the greater the difference between the cost of occidental and oriental labor, the greater the profits of capital on Asiatic manufactures purchased in the West. The purchase moreover by the West of articles manufactured in the

East will not be from Oriental but from Occidental capitalists. The West will need therefore to send to Asia in payment only the amount needed for the actual wages and raw material of the cheap Asiatic labor. The profits will all remain in the hands of Occidental capitalists. It is not indeed impossible that the profits from the sales in Asia of occidentally owned Asiatic factories, mines and railroads would completely pay the low wages of such labor as is employed in manufacturing articles for export to the West. In that case, Asia could export to the West indefinite amounts of manufactured goods, without needing to purchase anything whatever from the West. The transaction would be entirely between occidentals, the purchaser and the seller both being Westerners.

Under such circumstances, the disastrous effect on Occidental factories and factory laborers would be frightful. In other words, the final economic effect on both Asiatics and Caucasians of occidental, economic and political domination of Asia would be highly destructive of the true welfare of both East and West. It would prevent the real economic prosperity of Asia's millions and make it impossible therefore for them to purchase much from the West. But the sale in the West of articles made in Asia without a corresponding purchase from the West by the East would reduce occidental labor to serious economic straits, possibly even more serious than that of Asiatic labor itself. It would keep both Asiatic and Occidental labor in complete economic bondage. This condition, East and West, would inevitably produce corresponding mental and moral degeneration, and the final complete collapse of democracy in every occidental land.

4. The problem of the merchant marine is highly complicated. If the world is to be organized on the principle of the complete self sufficiency of each nation then it is highly important that each nation shall possess a merchant marine adequate to its own needs, regardless of costs. Economically speaking, however, this course is highly expensive. If, on the other hand, the world is to be organized on the basis of coöperation, each nation rendering such service to the

world as its special characteristics fit it for, then the question of the nationality of the merchant marine need cause no anxiety.

It is to be remembered, moreover, that the recent invention of machinery using oil as a fuel has greatly reduced the number of men employed in the crew, and this gives to cheap Asiatic labor relatively little advantage. The real danger is that occidental capital will build and own the merchant marine making use of cheap and docile Asiatic labor, and be able thus to continue the low standards of living, and brutal treatment customary hitherto among sailors.

5. The alleged military "Yellow Peril" is highly problematical. That the inventive genius of occidentals has suddenly vanished is an absurd assumption. That Asiatics will learn to use and may actually acquire all the inventions of the West is altogether probable. But that Asia will ever be able to attack either America or Europe with overwhelming force is incredible. Every added decade makes it less possible. The assertion indeed and the wide-spread fear of an Asiatic invasion are useful devices for promoting the prosperity of manufacturers of army and navy material. They are however to be utterly discredited. Consider how England in spite of her complete possession of the sea is unable to attack a single German port.

6. That Asia is likely to develop armaments for the defense of her own rights and the maintenance of her own sovereignty against wanton and aggressive peoples seems altogether likely. Nay, it is proper, and on the whole is it not desirable?

7. The statement that "Asiatic blood, brains and civilization are inherently inferior to those of the white races" is one that demands careful investigation. Is the statement based on scientific evidence, or is it the dogmatic expression of race pride and race prejudice? Is not a commission needed of experts in biology, sociology, and psychology for the study of this question of the intermarriage of Asiatics and Caucasians?

8. The question of assimilability of individuals of one race and civilization to that of an alien race and civilization

likewise demands careful study. Distinction must be made between social assimilation and assimilation through intermarriage. The two processes and the laws that control them are wholly distinct. The social assimilation of aggregated groups that maintain their own language, customs, ideals, and ambitions, regarding themselves as colonists or outposts of their own race, is doubtless practically impossible. Quite easy however is the assimilation of individuals from any people who do not segregate themselves, who learn the language and desire to become an integral element of the nation of their adoption. This is particularly true of the children of such individuals. Social assimilation can become practically complete without intermarriage.

9. The problem of the intermarriage of whites with Asiatics is undoubtedly one of great importance and should be strongly discouraged. This is, however, a matter for scientific determination, not for a priori dogmatism. After adequate and scientific investigation national legislation may seem desirable.

10. The ambition to make the white race dominant throughout the world controlling the economic, educational, and political life and growth of every other race through the power of superior military equipment ignores the fact that each great race has its own peculiar gifts and contribution to make to the welfare of the world, which gifts and contribution can only be made through a process of free and happy development. Enforced subjection to an alien race produces a mental temper, and an attitude that inevitably prevents normal growth and renders impossible its best life. Rightly viewed, the races are complementary one to the other; none alone is complete; none can rise even to its own highest and best apart from the contribution which the rest should give it.

11. During all past history, mankind has as a whole, been passing through a process of divergent evolution—because of the isolation of the different sections. Thus have developed the diverse races and civilizations. Each race has faced the same great universal human experiences, birth and death, love and hate, sorrow and joy. Each race has created

its own system of thought and action whereby to make life significant and worthwhile. The era of divergent evolution has apparently passed. That of interchange of all good things has come—an era of convergent evolution. The richness of the new era has been made possible through the long ages of divergent evolution when many vast experiments have been tried out and an infinite variety of divergencies has been accumulated.

Consider how much Europe and America to-day owe to Asia—to the Semites who gave us the Bible, with the Prophets and Jesus,—to the Arabs for their system of numerical notation, to India and even to China for many an invaluable contribution to civilization! Surely race arrogance is based on ignorance.

The selfish militaristic policy for the maintenance of the world supremacy of the white race not only ignores all this but renders impossible its wholesome development. An attitude of hostility between the East and the West based on mutual fear, suspicion, scorn, and disdain, would make it impossible for the white nations to impart their own spiritual best to the peoples of Asia, and would also make it impossible for us to acquire from them their spiritual best.

Already the work of Christian missionaries in Japan and China is seriously hampered by the anti-Asiatic agitation of the Pacific Coast States. The giving to Asia of the Christian religion will be increasingly difficult in proportion as the teachings of missionaries regarding human brotherhood and love of neighbors is belied by the selfish action of the nations from which the missionaries go.

REFERENCES

BOOKS AND PAMPHLETS

- Gulick, S. L. *The American Japanese Problem*. New York: Scribner's, 1913. Chapters 9, 14 and 15.
- Ladd, George Trumbull. *America and Japan*. New York: American Association for International Conciliation. Free pamphlet.
- Low, Seth. *The East and the West*. New York: American Association for International Conciliation. Free pamphlet.

Spiller, Gustav. "The Problem of Race Equality," pp. 29-39 in *Papers on Inter-Racial Problems*. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1911.

PERIODICALS

- American Naturalization of the Japanese.** J. H. Wigmore, *American Law Review*, Vol. XXVIII, 818-27, 1904.
- American-Japanese Discussions Relating to the Land Tenure Law of California.** *American Journal of International Law*, Vol. VIII, 571-78, July, 1914.
- Americanizing the Japanese.** W. S. Harwood, *World To-Day*, Vol. IX, 1286-92, Dec. 19, 1905.
- California and Japan.** *Independent*, Vol. LXXIV, 1053, 1115-16, May 8, 22, 1913.
- California and Japan.** F. G. Peabody, *Outlook*, Vol. CIV, 758-59, Aug. 2, 1913.
- California and the Japanese.** *Outlook*, Vol. CIX, 249-50, Feb. 3, 1915.
- California and the Japanese.** *Review of Reviews*, Vol. XXXIX, 278-80, 1909.
- California and the Japanese.** H. A. Millis, *Survey*, Vol. XXX, 332-36, June 7, 1913.
- Can We Assimilate the Japanese?** *Literary Digest*, Vol. XLVII, 165-66, Aug. 2, 1913.
- Democracy and Race Friction.** *American Economic Review*, Vol. IV, 936-38, Dec., 1914.
- History of the Movement.** J. Foord, *Outlook*, Vol. LXXXVI, 101-05, 1907.
- Japan and the United States.** J. D. Whelpley. *Fortnightly Review*, Vol. CI, 885-92, May, 1914.
- Japan in California.** P. C. Macfarlane, *Collier's*, June 6, 1913.
- Japanese as American Citizens.** *Chautauquan*, Vol. XLII, 392-94, 1906.
- Japanese Exclusion.** David Starr Jordan, *Independent*, Vol. LXI, 1425-26, Dec. 13, 1906.
- Japanese Exclusion.** David Starr Jordan, *Independent*, Vol. LXXIV, 978, May 1, 1913.
- Japanese in California.** Chester H. Rowell, *World's Work*, June, 1913.
- Japanese Question.** John Mahan. *American Law Review*, Vol. XLVIII, 698-713, Sept., 1914.
- Relations of Japan and the United States.** David Starr Jordan, *Popular Science Monthly*, Vol. LXXX, 151-57, Feb., 1912.
- Social Assimilation: America and China.** C. R. Henderson, *American Journal of Sociology*, Vol. XIX, 640-48, Mar., 1914.
- White and Yellow in California.** M. V. Woehlke. *Outlook*, May 10, 1913.

SECTION VII

THE SECOND POLICY

WORLD SEGREGATION OF THE WHITE AND YELLOW RACES WITH
MILITARY PREPAREDNESS AGAINST ASIATIC INVASION

A second policy for dealing with the Asiatic Problem has recently been gradually differentiated from that described in section III. It recognizes the injustice to Asiatics of the white man's wanton aggressions. It recognizes that Asiatics have full right to their own territory and natural resources and to complete sovereignty therein. It admits that Asiatics are in many respects our equals, and in some respects our superiors, and that, therefore, the attitude of those white peoples who disdain the Asiatic as inferior, who would exclude them from our lands in ways that reflect on their character and attainments is humiliating to them and reprehensible in us. Such an attitude shows ignorance both of them and of ourselves. It is indeed an expression of senseless race pride and race prejudice.

This second policy nevertheless holds that the admission of Asiatics into Caucasian territory is a distinct danger. The reason for that danger is not that Asiatics are inferior but only that they are profoundly different.

In general the proposal of this group is that Asiatics and Caucasians should mutually agree to keep out of each other's territory—except small numbers of merchants that may be needful for the transaction of business. Travelers and students should be freely admitted but they should not be allowed to settle permanently in the alien land.

The East and the West should be mutually friendly and should carry on commerce to the fullest and freest extent compatible with their respective welfare, each being judge of its own interests. The mutual exchange of all good things should be cultivated. But there should be no intermixture of populations.

This policy would allow Asiatics full swing in Asia with opportunity for free self development there, even as white

men demand free opportunity for development in their own lands.

But this second policy also dreads the development of Asiatic power. It holds that unless the West is prepared to resist Asiatic aggression, the day is not far distant when Asiatics will attempt to invade white men's lands, and demand opportunity for Asiatic migration to these lands less populous than their own and possessed of vast undeveloped resources. This policy accordingly advocates the rapid development of armaments for the resistance of such Asiatic demands. Unless we are prepared, we shall be vanquished.

Such are the main outlines of this second policy. It needs however a more exact statement. Its main assertions and principles may be enumerated as follows:

1. Japan is quite right in resenting occidental invasion of the Orient. She has done well in equipping herself with the instruments of modern warfare, and in checking the military aggressions of Russia and Germany.

2. Japan and China are great nations. They have had a noble history and are destined to play an important rôle in the future history of mankind.

3. Asiatics, however, are so different from Caucasians that their intermixture in the same territory is undesirable. This is not because they are inferior to us, but only because they are different. Their ways of thought, of life, of government, of morals and religion, are so diverse from ours that they and we, like oil and water, cannot mix.

4. It is therefore important that we exclude them completely; thus alone will danger of friction and collision be avoided. All white men's lands should prevent the invasion of Asiatics—especially of Asiatic laborers.

5. It is also desirable that Asiatics should exclude Caucasians from their lands. This would not imply Caucasian inferiority. It would only recognize the seriousness of the problem raised by the intermingling of races so different as those of Asia and Europe.

6. The wealth of Asia should be owned and exploited by Asiatics for the benefit of their own lands. Chinese and

Japanese are fully justified in their efforts to restrain the aggressive and dangerous economic invasion of occidental capital.

7. Japan and China, however, constitute a serious danger, especially to the United States. They are passing through a period of renaissance. They are rapidly acquiring the power conferred by the modern mastery of nature. As their power increases will their demands grow. When they realize how sparse is our population compared with theirs, and how vast are the undeveloped resources of the lands now possessed by the white man, they will insist on freedom for immigration hither.

8. Japan and China are ambitious and unscrupulous; they will take advantage of our weakness. We must therefore be adequately prepared to resist their aggression.

9. Moreover, America should enforce even more rigidly than at present the laws excluding Chinese. For many are smuggling their way in. These laws should be extended and provide for the exclusion of all Asiatics.

10. The economic opportunities for Asiatics in America should be so restricted that those now here would ere long find it to their advantage to return to their native lands.

11. Moreover, since the above course would be misunderstood and resented, and since Japan intends as soon as possible to attack America, seize territory here and demand free acres for her surplus population, it is highly important that America should begin at once to prepare for this danger, by increasing its fortifications in the Philippine Islands, in Hawaii and Guam and on the Pacific Coast, and also to increase its army and especially its navy. These military preparations would of course be solely for defense, not at all with a view to American military aggression in Asia.

What now is to be said concerning this policy? Is the following criticism applicable and adequate?

1. Being a policy of suspicion, will it not evoke suspicion? Though it professes in words to respect the Asiatic and wish him well, does it really do so? When he feels the pressure of our race discriminatory legislation, will he not resent it,

and grow increasingly indignant? Will not such a policy result practically in the same state of national animosity and international friction as the policy of frank selfishness and assertion of Caucasian race supremacy?

2. Would not such a policy lead moreover to increasing armaments in Japan and China as well as in America? When they see our enormous and growing armaments, and know of our distrust of their moral character, is it likely that they will believe our assurances that *our* armaments have no aggressive aim—that they exist only for defense? Will they not feel it necessary for them to strain every nerve to arm themselves adequately—not for aggression, but for defense?

3. And when we in our turn see their increasing armament, will we not feel more and more convinced of their aggressive purposes, and of the pressing need for still further increasing our military and naval preparations? And will not both sides of the Pacific enter thus upon the vicious circle of being “adequately prepared” to be safe from wanton aggression of treacherous foes?

4. And what would be the consequences to America of such a course of “adequate” military and naval preparations? Would not war-preparation taxes grow by leaps and bounds? Expenses for “preparations” would soon exceed expenditures for all other governmental enterprises—for safety is the first necessity. Must not a nation insure its existence before it may devote attention to other matters? There would of necessity develop a large body of trained fighters in our army and navy, absolutely subject to order. The spirit and mental habits of militarism would be more and more widely cultivated. Congress, moreover, would be increasingly beset with lobbies of great manufacturing interests seeking government patronage.

5. The absorption of national attention in the problems of security through military and naval preparation, and the consequent withdrawal of the nation's most forceful personalities from positive productive enterprises, would interfere on the one hand with the highest economic prosperity of the country, and on the other with the solution of the

pressing problems of capital and labor now upon us. The enactment furthermore of suitable legislation for the attainment of social and economic justice would be long delayed and possibly permanently defeated. Those who emphasize vast accumulations of armaments, ammunition and trained fighters, usually fail to see that quite as important an element in national security as economic wealth and prosperity, is a people well fed and well educated, and a social and a political order that gives justice to all classes and individuals.

6. The effects on China and Japan would be even more disastrous. In spite of their relative poverty, they would be forced to expend vast sums for military and naval development. Such expenditures would inevitably prevent the wholesome development of their educational, industrial, judicial and political life. Instead of rising democracy, absolutism would be still more firmly and inevitably rooted in those lands. The pressing problems of poverty, of social and industrial justice, and of capital and labor, would be necessarily neglected, to the enormous detriment of the masses. Their economic poverty would prevent attainment of that scale of wages and life essential to the rise of international commerce. This would have its disastrous effect on the manufacturing and industrial classes of the West.

CONCLUSION

If the above paragraphs have accurately diagnosed the inevitable consequences to America and to China and Japan of the policy of mutual race exclusion and of mutual military preparedness, are we not justified in the judgment that this policy also is fundamentally wrong? Although it does not, like the first policy, propose to inflict wrong on the peoples of the orient, by direct military or economic invasion, does it not in reality do them great injustice, in that it practically forces upon them the disastrous policy of military and naval development after the fashion of the West?

If it were possible to carry out the principle of complete race segregation without the development of mutual suspicion, fear and ill-will and the consequent resort to military

preparation to insure safety, the policy might not be so disastrous. Such however does not seem to be possible. Race segregation decreed by legislation engenders ill-will, misunderstandings, resentment, indignation, suspicion, fear and ever increasing armaments.

Whether or not a final conflict arises, the disastrous consequences of the policy under consideration seem clear.

REFERENCES

BOOKS

- Gulick, S. L. *The Fight for Peace*. New York: Revell, 1915. Chapters 5, 14, 15, 17 and 18.
- *The American Japanese Problem*. New York: Scribner's, 1913. For principles involved pp. 281-284, 303-307. For proposals for concrete legislation pp. 284-303, also in *The Fight for Peace* chapters 12, 13 and 14, and pp. 102-106.
- Millis, H. A. *The Japanese Problem in the United States*. New York: Macmillan, 1915. Chapter 11.
- Myers, Charles S. "On the Permanence of Racial Mental Differences," pp. 73-78 in *Papers on Inter-Racial Problems*. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1911.
- Sugi, Giuseppe. "Differences in Customs and Morals and Their Resistance to Rapid Change," pp. 67-72 in *Papers on Inter-Racial Problems*. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1911.

PERIODICALS

- Asiatic Emigration: a World Question*. S. N. Singh, *Living Age*, Vol. CCLXXXII, 387-92, Aug. 15, 1914.
- Races Cannot Mingle*. *North American Review*, Vol. CLXXXIII, 1201-03, 1906.
- World's Most Menacing Problem*. *Collier's*, May 31, 1913.

SECTION VIII

THE THIRD POLICY

GOLDEN RULE INTERNATIONALISM

The third policy for dealing with the Asiatic problem declines even to characterize it as the "Yellow Peril," for this term introduces a subtle fallacy and antipathy at the

very outset. It holds that the great races of mankind are no chance product of nature. That in the providence of Him who creates and rules all things, some better goal is to be reached by all through their very diversities and the problems raised thereby than would otherwise have been possible.

This policy holds that the precedence of certain races in intelligence, in political, economic and social life and in moral and religious insight and attainments places upon them corresponding moral obligations for right and helpful treatment of nations and races less privileged, and that the further progress of the more advanced races themselves depends closely upon their observance of those obligations. Providence endows races in order that they may render service to the whole world. The giving of that service is essential to their own permanent welfare and wholesome development. Great national wealth must be administered as a trust for the benefit of the world, else it will ruin its possessors.

This third policy holds, moreover, that the real solution to all man's problems, those of the individual, of classes and of races, is ethical. The world is an indivisible unit, between whose various continents, nations and races no hard and fast impassable barriers can permanently be raised.

Selfish racial ambition, it holds, produces international difficulties. True and wholesome relations can be established between nations and races as between individuals only on the principles of the Golden Rule.

In this world in which selfishness, wrong and injustice between nations and races have already had so much sway, producing enmity, fear, suspicion, indignation and ill-will, the only possible method of recovery is the practice by nations as well as by individuals of the moral principles taught by Jesus; those, namely, of service and even of sacrifice. We can overcome the enmity and suspicion of those whom we have already injured, by loving them and doing them positive good. This will not only overcome their ill-will toward us but evoke their gratitude toward and confidence in us. This method in the treatment of Asiatics by Cau-

casians and this alone, will completely solve the so-called "Yellow Peril," because it will completely and manifestly banish the "White Peril." It will in time render needless all military and naval preparations, for international fear and suspicion will vanish.

No country, moreover, is more happily circumstanced to inaugurate this Golden Rule Internationalism than is America. Here, as in no other land, every citizen may help determine international policy. Every citizen accordingly has responsibility in this matter. He should familiarize himself with international problems and decide on the right international policies.

The proposals, however, of those who emphasize the moral element in the problem of the relations of the occident and the orient may be most clearly set forth in a series of statements regarding first the fundamental principles and secondly their concrete embodiment in legislation, and administration.

I. *Fundamental principles.*

1. The real test and proof of racial superiority lies not in the realm of military power but in that of moral and spiritual life.

2. The truly great race, as the truly great man, seeks to give justice rather than to get rights. This policy advocates not peace at any price but righteousness at any price.

3. The domination of Asia by the West, whether economic, political or military, is not the true goal for occidental effort. The proposal moreover that the East and the West shall lead their lives in as complete isolation as possible, each living as far as possible to itself, is also fundamentally wrong. Asia's need is America's opportunity for invaluable services as a good Samaritan. To see the need and pass by unheeding and unresponsive, is not only cruel to Asia but morally disastrous to America.

4. The nations of the West should seek rather to give to the Orient their own best attainments in science, in political organization, in social order, in jurisprudence, in economic and industrial organization and activity, and above all in

moral and spiritual life. The uplift of the life of Asia as a whole is of the highest importance for the real welfare of the Occident.

5. The establishment of social justice between nations is as important as is its establishment between the various classes of a single nation.

6. The dominance of one race over others through the use of brute force is harmful to the victors no less than to the victims.

7. Race domination through force or fraud among peoples is as obnoxious, reprehensible and really disastrous as is the domination of one class over other classes within a single nation. Oligarchy, Plutocracy, Aristocracy and the like have been repeatedly tested and found deficient. So also has Race-ocracy!

Turning next to more specific matters in the relations of America to China and Japan, are the following statements adequate?

8. At the foundation of right relations with China and Japan lies the mutual observance of treaty pledges.

9. The treatment to be accorded to individual Chinese and Japanese in America must be free from personal injustice or race humiliation.

10. Every individual Chinese and Japanese is to be judged and dealt with on the basis of his own individual character, not on the basis of an hypothetical race character.

II. *Concrete Legislation.*

The above enumerated principles call for concrete legislation that shall adequately embody them.

In examining the problem of Chinese and Japanese immigration to America one is impressed with the similarity of the difficulties experienced and objections raised with those that have been experienced and raised in connection with immigrants from Europe.

Moreover the recent coming of such vast numbers from south and east Europe has made it clear to most students

of the question that the time has come for the limitation and regulation of European immigration.

Without question one of the greatest problems before the American people to-day is that of the just and efficient treatment of the incoming tide of alien peoples, European not less than Asiatic. Our immigration laws are unsystematic, inadequate and discriminatory. Moreover our provisions for the proper treatment, distribution and education of aliens already admitted are seriously defective or entirely wanting. We find ourselves accordingly, increasingly embarrassed both internally and internationally. Has not the time come for comprehensive legislation dealing with the entire immigration question? We need laws that deal comprehensively with all races on a basis of absolute equality. This and this alone frees them from invidious and humiliating features. *Chinese and Japanese are not asking for free immigration to America, but only for freedom from individual and racial humiliation.* This statement cannot be made too often nor too emphatically.

On the other hand, the admission of individuals from any nation and race should be limited in such ways as to protect the laboring classes in America from economic disaster. American laborers have rights no less than those in Asia and Europe. *The number of immigrants who may be allowed to come from any land should depend on their ability to enter our economic life without harm to the laborers now here.*

The number moreover who should be admissible annually from any particular country or race should depend in some close way on their adaptability to our life. We cannot afford to admit from any land large numbers who do not propose to settle down and become fully identified with our institutions and methods of life. We cannot allow groups to be formed in our midst who regard themselves as colonists, representatives of their home land, in our midst but not of us; not learning our language, nor adopting our ideals.

We can admit to permanent residence here only those who desire at the earliest possible date to acquire citizen-

ship and help us make successful our great experiment in genuine democracy.

The question as to whether or not any particular people or race is assimilable should be based upon experience. Each group should be considered separately and the numbers to be admitted annually from any particular people should depend upon the number of those from that people who have already become so familiar with our language, customs and institutions and so loyal to them, as to have surrendered allegiance to their native land and become regular American citizens. This method of limiting immigration, throws upon those from any land already admitted the responsibility of deciding and of proving to America whether or not others and how many from their land may be given the same privilege.

The writer has embodied the above principle in the following suggestions for concrete legislation:

1. America should admit as immigrants only so many aliens from any land as she can Americanize.

Americanization, however, takes place largely by means of those already Americanized, who know the languages, customs, and ideals of both peoples—ours and theirs.

2. All immigration should therefore be limited to a definite per cent. (say five) annually from each land of those already naturalized from that land with their American born children. This rate would allow large immigration from Europe, differing of course in actual numbers with the different countries and yet at the same time would permit only a slight immigration from Asia, not more than a few hundred each from China and Japan.

Provision should also be made for the care and rapid Americanization of all who do come to America. It is therefore important to establish

3. A Bureau of Registration; all aliens to be and to remain registered until they become citizens. There should be an annual registration fee of say ten dollars or perhaps five.

4. Also a Bureau of Education—to set standards, prepare text books, and hold examinations, free of charge. The

registration fee should be reduced perhaps by \$1.00 for every examination passed.

5. Also new regulations for the Bureau of Naturalization. Would it not be well to place the responsibility for giving citizenship to aliens in the hands of a Bureau whose administrative officials should be specially qualified for this duty? Certificates of graduation from the Bureau of Education and of good behavior from the Bureau of Registration should be essential to Naturalization.

6. All new citizens might well take the oath of allegiance to the flag on the Fourth of July; the service of admission should be dignified and impressive; there should be processions with banners and badges, welcome orations and responses.

7. Eligibility to American citizenship should be based on personal qualifications. The mere fact of race should be neither a qualification nor a disqualification.

8. And finally, but of the greatest importance, we need Congressional Legislation giving adequate responsibility and authority to the federal administration for the protection of aliens.

Comprehensive immigration legislation embodying the above proposals would coördinate, systematize and rationalize our entire immigration policy, free it from invidious race discrimination, protect American labor from danger of sudden and excessive immigration from any land, and promote the wholesome assimilation of all new-comers. It would restrict immigration to those peoples who prove themselves assimilable by actually qualifying and becoming fully Americanized. It would automatically exclude those who do not wish to become Americans, or who lack the capacity of Americanization. It would also safeguard our democratic institutions. The difficult problems connected with European immigration would thus be met in a comprehensive and thoroughly rational way. Our relations with Japan and China would be set right, for both the spirit and letter of our treaties with those lands would be fully observed. Such a policy would thus maintain and deepen our international friendships on every side and help secure

our share of the enormous commerce which is to develop in the near future between the East and the West.

An essential part of the proposal is of course that the administration of these laws shall be put in the hands of those who approve the general principles and the policy and seek to administer the laws in the spirit of fairness and goodwill. The principles of civil service should from the start be applied to the selection and retention of efficient administrative officials.

One consideration in favor of allowing more or less Asiatic labor immigration to America has not yet been adequately stated. It is this. Asiatic labor needs to learn the best ideals of occidental labor in regard to hygienic conditions, hours of work, periodic rest one day in seven, and a scale of wages that provides for suitable living conditions, adequate nourishment, and proper support of family and education of children. The sooner and more effectively they learn these features and rights of labor, the more rapidly will the scale of life of all Asiatics approach that of Occidentals. Such a condition, however, would not only be positively beneficial to Asiatics themselves but also to Occidentals, for on the one hand it would diminish and finally do away with the destructive economic competition of eastern and western labor and on the other hand it would give the laboring classes of Asia such a rising scale of life as would promote mightily both local and international trade and with it the prosperity of the world.

But how are Asiatic laboring classes to learn these ideals and develop the spirit that will insist on their realization? Such acquisitions will not be secured from books, nor from the suggestion and teachings of capitalistic classes. Asiatic labor will acquire these ideas, ideals and practices, if at all, chiefly as they learn them by imitation and practice from the industrial classes of the West. And this will be most surely and most quickly accomplished if as much labor migration back and forth between the East and the West as possible is allowed without bringing harm to occidental labor. Refusal to give Asiatic labor this opportunity and privilege will retard the wholesome development of Asia's

industrial millions and that delay will hold back the best labor conditions of the West also.

Labor interests throughout the world are closely interdependent. Labor degradation in any land hinders the right development of labor in every land. So far as possible labor in backward lands should be aided to attain better ideals, better organization, better wages, and more wholesome conditions by intimate relations with labor in more advanced countries.

The above proposals for the application of Golden Rule Internationalism deal only with the problems of immigration and the Americanization of those admitted. This, however, is insufficient. If we would adequately play our rôle as a helpful neighbor, we should also consider the economic and political predicament in which China and Japan have been placed by the aggressive nations of the West. Like the traveler from Jerusalem to Jericho, they have been beaten and robbed. Should we not, like the good Samaritan, take steps to heal the wounds already inflicted upon them, to protect them from further predatory aggression, and, so far as in us lies, aid them—especially China, in getting a wholesome and safe start on the arduous road on which they have started?

For the full practice of Good Samaritan Internationalism the following suggestions are offered.

1. Let Congress appropriate a million dollars annually one half of which shall be offered as scholarships to Japanese and Chinese students for study in the United States and the other half to be used for American students for study in Japan and China. Consider what would be the effect on our mutual understanding and appreciation of those lands and also on the development of commerce, if such a policy were carried out for thirty years.

2. In times of special calamity in Japan and China—of flood, famine and earthquake, let Congress appropriate some adequate sum for relief work, amounting to an average of two or three million dollars annually. Would it not be of more value in the maintenance of national "security" than an additional battleship each year?

3. Might not the United States make proposals to the European nations relative to their return to China of the Chinese ports and territories now held by them, as soon as China is prepared to administer those ports and territories in harmony with the principles of individual justice and equity that modern cosmopolitanism requires? And might not the United States hold itself in readiness to aid China in qualifying itself for such recovery of sovereignty?

4. Regarding the question of race intermarriage should not an interracial commission be established for the study of the actual results of race amalgamation? Should the results be found to be as a rule disastrous, resulting in many abnormal, or subnormal individuals, or in monstrosities, physical or moral, laws forbidding intermarriage could easily be passed among Asiatic as well as among Caucasian peoples. Laws passed under such circumstances would not be misunderstood as being due to race prejudice and would not accordingly be resented by either side.

Such are the main principles and proposals of those who urge Golden Rule Internationalism as the solution of the problem confronting the Occident on account of the Awakening of Asia, and her entrance into world life.

Is the proposed solution one that will really solve the problem? Will it overcome fear, suspicion, enmity, indignation? Will it call forth mutual confidence, good-will, co-operation?

REFERENCES

BOOKS

- Aliens, Protection of, reports of committee of Lake Mohonk conference on International Arbitration, viz.:
- Baldwin, Simeon E. Protection by the United States of the Rights of Aliens, Proceedings of 1915, p. 148.
- Short, William H. Federal Protection of Aliens in the United States, Proceedings of 1914, p. 74.
- Wilson, George G. Treaty Obligations and Protection of Aliens, Proceedings of 1913, p. 189.
- Gulick, S. L. The Fight for Peace. New York: Revell, 1915. Chapters 3, 4, 6 and 16.

- Lynch, Frederick. What Makes a Nation Great. New York: Revell, 1914. Chapters 7 and 8.
- Mackenzie, J. S. "Ethical Teaching in Schools with Regard to Races," pp. 433-438 in Papers on Inter-Racial Problems. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1911.

PERIODICALS

- Christianity and Internationalism. K. Kaneko, Biblical World, Vol. XLV, 361-62, June, 1915.
- Our Nation's Duty to Japan. Rev. D. Scudder. The Friend (Honolulu), June, 1913.

SECTION IX

CONCLUSION

If the third policy for meeting the Asiatic problem is regarded as the true one, a practical question immediately arises. How is such a policy to become effective? How is it to be put into operation?

The United States fortunately is so organized politically that any movement of thought or purpose that is widely accepted and deeply believed by the people may be put into practice and tested.

The responsibility for adopting or for not adopting the above policy rests on every citizen. The method for securing its national adoption is also clear. Those who believe in the policy must organize in order first to carry on a *nation-wide campaign of education*. Few Americans are yet sufficiently acquainted with the facts and the factors to have intelligent opinion upon the matter.

When the campaign of education has sufficiently advanced, the time will come for *legislation*. We may not hope that so idealistic an international policy as that here advocated will be universally accepted. It will have to be carried through in spite of no little opposition. Some will oppose it on principle, and some because its adoption would interfere with financial interests. Those who believe in the policy, therefore, should organize. They should prepare for a long and hard fought campaign. For this *an efficient nation wide organization* is essential.

The following method of organization is proposed.

1. Let every Church, Labor Council, Chamber of Commerce, Woman's Club and every regularly constituted organization appoint and maintain a permanent Committee on International Relations; the Committees might well be called Peace Makers' Committees.

2. Let there be organized in every community by representatives from all the Peace Makers' Committees, a Community Peace Makers' League.

3. In every state let there be established by representatives from the Community Peace Makers' League a State Peace Makers' Federation.

4. As soon as sufficient States have established their Peace Makers' Federations, arrangements should be made for holding a National Peace Makers' Congress, at which a regular and permanent National organization should be effected, a constitution prepared, officers elected, and a definite program laid out for the attainment of the legislation needed.

What more important duty calls for patriotic volunteers than this?

What method for promoting national prosperity and international security promises better and more speedy results than this proposal for the national adoption of Golden Rule Internationalism?

America is rapidly approaching a crisis in national opinion as to international policy. During the approaching presidential campaign the questions of additional armaments, and of increase in the army and navy, of "adequate preparedness" will be prominent. The "Yellow Peril" will often be discussed and the policies outlined in Sections III and VII will be vehemently urged.

Is it not important that those who believe in Golden Rule Internationalism shall be prepared by organization and suitable literature, to show that the Golden Rule is the only true and safe international policy for the United States?

Advocates of national security through adequate military and naval preparedness will urge a policy calling for the expenditure of hundreds of millions of dollars. Would not

the expenditure of even half that sum on the principles of the Golden Rule ultimately render needless any large military and naval expansion?

We call for volunteers for this nation-wide campaign on behalf of Golden Rule Internationalism.

GENERAL BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Aliens, Protection of**, reports of committee of Lake Mohonk Conference on International Arbitration, viz.:
- Proceedings of 1913, p. 189. **Wilson, George G.** Treaty Obligations and Protection of Aliens.
- Proceedings of 1914, p. 74, **Short, William H.** Federal Protection of Aliens in the United States.
- Proceedings of 1915, p. 148, **Baldwin, Simeon E.** Protection by the United States of the rights of aliens.
- Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science.** Chinese and Japanese in America. No 114, Sept., 1909.
- This number contains articles by prominent men of the United States giving the arguments in favor of Oriental exclusion, the arguments against the national and international aspects of the exclusion movement and the problem of Oriental immigration outside of America.
- Aubert, L.** *Americains et Japonais*, Paris; Colin, 1908.
- Bell, H. T. M. and Woodhead, H. G. M.** *China Year Book since 1912.* London: George Routledge and Sons, Limited.
- Blakeslee, George H.** *China and the Far East.* Clark University Conference 1910. New York: Thomas Y. Crowell and Co.
- *Japan and Japanese-American Relations.* Clark University Conference 1912. New York: G. E. Stechert and Co.
- Bryce, James.** *The Relations of the Advanced and Backward Races of Mankind.* Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902.
- Bureau of Labor (California)** Biennial Reports, especially "Report on the Japanese in California." 1913.
- Coman, P.** *Contract Labor in the Hawaiian Islands.* New York: Macmillan, 1903.
- Coolidge, Archibald C.** *The United States as a World Power.* Macmillan, 1912. Chapters 17, 18 and 19.
- Coolidge, M. R.** *Chinese Immigration.* New York: Holt and Co., 1909. Every student of American-Chinese relations should familiarize himself with this important volume.
- Collier, Hiram Price.** *The West in the East.* New York: Scribner, 1911.
- De Forest, John H.** *The Truth about Japan.* Pamphlet, free on application to the World Peace Foundation, 1912.

- Eliot, Charles W.** Japanese Characteristics. Pamphlet, American Association for International Conciliation, 1913.
- Some Roads Towards Peace. A report to the Trustees of the Carnegie Endowment on observations made in Japan and China in 1912. Free upon application to Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, D. C.
- Finot, Jean.** Race Prejudice. New York: Dutton, 1906.
- Foster, John W.** American Diplomacy in the Orient. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1903.
- Franklin, F. G.** The Legislative History of Naturalization in the United States. Washington: American Historical Reports, Vol. I, 299-317.
- Graham, John W.** Evolution and Empire. London: Headley Bros., 1912. Chapter 17.
- Grose, H. B.** Aliens or Americans? New York: Eaton and Mains, 1906.
- Gulick, Sidney L.** The American Japanese Problem. New York: Scribners, 1914. This work studies in detail both the narrower problem of the Japanese in California and also the broader one of the relations of the Occident and the Orient.
- The Fight for Peace. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1915. This book urges the adoption of Golden Rule Internationalism as the only real basis for permanent world peace. Concrete application of the principles is made in the form of definite constructive programs for American policy towards Mexico, China and Japan.
- The White Peril in the Far East. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1905.
- Hall, P. F.** Immigration. New York: Holt and Co., 1906.
- Hobson, J. A.** Imperialism: A Study. London: Archibald Constable and Co., 1905, pp. 251-289.
- Hourwich, I. A.** Immigration and Labor. New York: Putnams, 1912.
- Hulbert, Homer B.** The Passing of Korea. New York: Doubleday Page and Co., 1906.
- Immigration Laws of the United States**, Revised Federal Statutes.
- Ichihashi, Y.** Japanese Immigration. San Francisco: Marshall Press, 1915. This book contains an extensive bibliography on the Asiatic Problem.
- Jenks, J. and Lauck, W. J.** The Immigration Problem. New York: Funk and Wagnalls, 1912.
- Jordan, David Starr.** War and Waste. New York. 1913, pp. 261-272.
- Kawakami, Kiyoshi K.** American Japanese Relations. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1912.
- Asia at the Door. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1914.

- Lea, Homer.** *The Valor of Ignorance.* New York: Harper and Bros., 1909. This is an imaginative and sensational treatise by one who posed as a general in the Chinese Army.
- Martin, W. A. P.** *The Awakening of China,* New York: Doubleday Page and Co., 1907.
- Masaoka, Naoichi.** *Japan's Message to America.* New York: Putnams, 1915. A collection of articles by leading men of Japan on Japanese life.
- Millard, Thomas F.** *America and the Far Eastern Question.* New York: Moffatt Yard and Co., 1909.
- *The New Far East.* New York: Scribners, 1906.
- Millis, H. A.** *The Japanese Problem in the United States.* New York: Macmillan, 1915. This is a thorough survey of the whole Japanese situation on the Pacific Coast by a professional economist, sociologist and statistician.
- Nitobé, I.** *The Intercourse Between the United States and Japan.* Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1891.
- Okuma, Count,** assisted by many specialists. *Fifty Years of New Japan.* New York: Dutton and Co., 1909.
- Porter, Robert P.** *The Full Recognition of Japan.* London: Frowde, 1911.
- Ray, Mary Katherine.** *The Immigration Problem.* Madison, Wis.: Wisconsin Free Library Commission, 1909.
- Reinsch, Paul S.** *Intellectual and Political Currents in the Far East.* Boston: Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911.
- *World Politics as Influenced by the Oriental Situation.* New York: Macmillan, 1900.
- Roberts, P.** *The Immigrant Races in North America.* New York: Association Press, 1910.
- Roosevelt, T.** *Fifth Annual Message to Congress.* Dec., 1905. Found in *Richardson, James D. Messages and Papers of the Presidents.* Vol. X, 7386. Washington: Bureau of National Literature and Art, 1910.
- Royce, J.** *Race Questions, Provincialism and other American Problems.* New York: Macmillan, 1908.
- Russell, Lindsay.** *America to Japan.* New York, Putnams, 1915. A collection of articles by eminent Americans on the relations of America to Japan.
- Smith, Richmond Mayo.** *Emigration and Immigration.* New York: Scribners, 1908.
- Spiller, G.** *Inter-racial Problems.* Papers communicated to the First Universal Races Congress, London, 1911. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1911.
- Steiner, E. A.** *On the Trail of the Immigrant.* New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1906.
- *The Immigrant Tide.* New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1913.

106 PROCEEDINGS OF CORNELL CONFERENCE

- Steiner, E. A.** From Alien to Citizen. New York: Fleming H. Revell Co., 1914.
- Streightoff, F. H.** The Standard of Living Among the Industrial People of America. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1911.
- Taft, William H.** The United States and Peace. Chapter II. New York: Scribners, 1914.
- Uyehara, G. E.** The Political Development of Japan. New York: Dutton, 1910.
- Walker, F. A.** Discussions in Economics and Statistics. New York: Holt and Co., 1899.
- Weale, B. L. Putnam.** The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia. New York: Macmillan, 1908.
- The Conflict of Colour. New York: Macmillan, 1910.

For articles dealing with this subject, attention is called to the *Journal of Race Development* published by Clark University, Worcester, Mass., and edited by George H. Blakeslee and G. Stanley Hall.

CHAPTER IV

THE INCREASE OF AMERICAN ARMAMENTS: THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESULTS

SECTION I

THE QUESTION OF INCREASING THE ARMAMENTS OF THE UNITED STATES

By Major George Haven Putnam of the National Security League

THOSE of us who a month or two back brought into organization the National Security League are of opinion that we are doing the work of a peace association; that the measures recommended by us will help to preserve the peace of the world. We are appealing for the coöperation of American citizens who believe that while peace is essential, we must aim for peace with honor. Our citizens must be satisfied with nothing less than the fulfilment of all of our responsibilities, domestic and international. The citizens of the United States look to the government to take such measures as are necessary, first, for the maintenance within our own territory of peace with justice; second, for the defense of our property, not only our coast cities and our resources, but our independence and our right to carry out our own national policies, and, third, for the fulfilment of such obligations as we have assumed, and such further obligations as we ought rightfully to assume, in international relations and particularly for the protection of the weaker states and of the right of the peoples to select their own government.

We take the ground that the nations of the world constitute together a family which ought to live together in harmony as a community. We must admit that at present

it is a very quarrelsome family. The relations of the nations to each other may be compared to those of boys in a big public school. While each boy has his independent interest and career to look after, there are some things which they have got to do together and they have got to learn what is the best method for acting together so that the peace of the school may be assured and the largest efficiency may be secured for its work.

Let us suppose that boys A., B. and C., belonging to the bigger group, have agreed together to look after some of the smaller boys, such as D., E. and F.; to see that they are not bullied and that their possessions are not interfered with. Suppose that A. and B. find C. bullying little D., sitting upon him, emptying his pockets and punching his head when he objects. I need hardly ask what under the circumstances is the duty of A. and B. They have got to take hold of C. and shake the bully out of him. It is for them to see that little D. is again put on his feet and that his possessions are restored to him. They must further take occasion to prevent the bully C., who has broken his word and who has forfeited his right to be one of the governing influences of the school, from again doing mischief of this kind.

If, however, the bully C. has trained himself to be an expert fighter, knowing how to use his fists, and not content with using his fists, knows also how to use his feet and to fight in other ways such as had heretofore been considered uncivilized, while A. and B., believing in peace, have failed to train themselves to the use of their natural weapons, what is the result? We have C. carrying out his bullying without interference. We have other of the bigger boys of the same bullying temperament associating themselves with C. We have prevailing in the school instead of peace and justice, a rule of force and violence accompanied by depredations, head-breaking and injustice. We have anarchy instead of order.

The picture that I have here given of the relations of boys in the school can be taken as a little history of what is happening in Europe to-day. It is Germany which has,

for its personal aggrandizement, been ready to break up the peace of Europe in the attempt to impose its will upon its neighbours, and which stands thereupon in the place of the bully C. It is Germany that has been ready to break its word, and to forfeit its faith, and in the carrying out of its plans for larger imperial domination, to crush and devastate poor little Belgium. Issues of this kind the United States ought not to shut its eyes to and in fact cannot keep away from. It is not only that we have as a nation a moral duty to perform; and that it behooves us to take our part in keeping the peace of the world. We must also bear in mind that bullying increases by what it feeds upon. After one state has been successfully oppressed, the next state which has refused to prepare itself for defense must expect similar aggression, insult and loss of independence. Americans are called upon to study what they have to do for the maintenance of their national honor, dignity and ideals, and for maintaining the influence that belongs to this great Republic in regard not only to the questions of the Western Hemisphere, but to the issues which are now being fought out in Europe.

No nation can have influence on the action of its fellow nations unless it be in a position to maintain its own responsibilities and to defend its own shores. It is not a question of bigness of territory, the extent of its resources, or even the number of its citizens. China is big and is wealthy and contains within its borders some four hundred millions of people, but when this European fight is over and the time comes for the settlement, China will not be asked to the conference, or if by any chance a Chinese delegate should secure admission, very little attention will be given to what that delegate might say; and why not? China will have interests at stake and will have the right to be heard, but the people of China have thus far not been willing to make the sacrifices required for the building up of national feeling, for the cultivation of that respect for their state which alone can secure its rightful influence and which alone in fact can be depended upon to preserve independence. China has stood to the world as a big jelly fish

to be nibbled at by greedy neighbours and by greedy peoples who are not neighbours.

I do not believe that our citizens, with the national feeling that has been developed in the history of our Republic, with the ambitions that we hold, with the ideals in which we believe for government by the people, and with our desire to further popular government throughout the world, I do not believe that these citizens are going to be content to play the rôle of the Chinese.

The nation which is willing to restrict its action merely to an attempt at self-defense will not succeed even in that. As the world to-day is constituted, no nation can live alone. The interstate conditions are complex and in every development of trade, of finance, of the exchange of literature, peoples are brought increasingly into closer relations with each other. We have our own opinion of the citizen who because he keeps within the law believes that he has fulfilled his duties. If a man restricts his action to the earning of money for the support of his immediate family, if he shirks public duty on jury, in the militia, or for service of any kind in an emergency, if he is satisfied simply because he has not brought upon himself any of the penalties of the law, we do not call that man a good citizen. We say he is a coward. We say that he has failed to fulfil his obligations. We take the ground that he owes to the state the protection of which he accepts and which makes life possible for him, such service as the state needs. He must be ready to do his share in the cleaning of the cities, even in the cleaning of the streets. He must be on hand when there is trouble, or threat of injustice, to carry a musket if necessary to help to maintain peace with justice. What is true of the individual is true of the nation. We could not, if we would, take the position of China. No people can live for itself alone. We owe a responsibility to the world in proportion to our great resources and our population of one hundred million of people.

Further, we have, as a nation, asserted certain policies for which we demand acceptance and respect. We have, for instance, for nearly a century taken the ground

that no European nation should be permitted to take possession of territory in the Western Hemisphere. We go so far as to say that if injustice has been done to European citizens, or grievances have been placed upon them, the governments of the country to which those citizens belong shall not be at liberty to use force on this side of the Republic for the redress of such grievances. In taking this position, we assume a large responsibility. If Europeans who have suffered wrongs in states on this side of the Atlantic are not to be permitted to look for defense to their home governments, the United States must be prepared to supply such defense. If we will not allow England, or France, or Germany, to force the collection of debts or the redress of grievances in Mexico or in South America, we must ourselves be strong enough to do what is necessary to secure justice. We must accept the responsibility for anarchy in any portion of the two continents that we are undertaking to control. In addition to these responsibilities arising from what is called the Monroe Doctrine, we have wealthy cities scattered along the coast of the Atlantic and the Pacific that constitute a continued temptation to the marauder.

Further, we have made claim to be listened to in regard to the maintenance of the open door in far off China. In connection with this policy, and with our ownership of the Philippines, we have responsibilities in Asia as well as in America and in Europe. What have we done to put ourselves in a position to maintain these policies and to fulfil our responsibilities? We have simply gone drifting along with no intelligent attempt to utilize our resources for national defense.

Nations are not great because they are big; nations that make large assertions, that possess great ambitions, that talk about world-wide policies, and that take no intelligent action towards the organizing of their resources are futile. They give cause for laughter. It is as if a jelly fish should stand on its hind legs making threats at the rest of the animal world. The little state of Switzerland, which for the purpose not only of protecting its own territory, but of

maintaining its obligations as a neutral and of preventing itself from being utilized by one combatant or another, keeps three hundred thousand citizens under arms, constitutes an example of the fulfilment of national obligations. Switzerland can be called great, while as far at least as this matter of the use of its resources is concerned, the United States must be considered as simply big and futile. Mr. Bryan has told us that if the country called, a million men would spring at once to its defense from the fields of the farms, and the streets of the cities. I am in accord with Mr. Bryan in placing full trust in the patriotic feeling of our citizens. I believe with him that if the country called, a million men or more would offer their services, but I point out, speaking with the experience of a veteran, that these million men would, when they reported for service, be of little value for defense. They would constitute simply what the Germans call "Canonen-Futter" (food for cannon).

With the history of our own Civil War to refer to, with the lessons of the European war now available, a country that would send to the front to contend with trained soldiers, citizens who had had no training, would be responsible for murder. It would be the sacrifice of the best of our American young men and a sacrifice with no possible advantage. Under the conditions now obtaining, even if the men were trained with the use of guns, we have no supply of arms to put in their hands and if the rifles were in readiness, we have no stores of ammunition. All this talk about the manhood of America and the strength that the Republic has available in case of attack, is a mere figure of speech. It is like the reference that used to be made in the years when we were fighting for honest money, to the wealth stored in the mines and the value of our great stretches of fertile prairies. Wealth that is not at hand in shape for exchange is of no service for the payment of debts, and the courage and public spirit of our men, and the material from which guns and machines might be made if time were allowed, are of no service when the invader is on the shores.

I have in my office a volume brought into print some six years back by a German officer who was at the time a lieutenant colonel on the staff in Berlin, Freiherr von Edelsheim. This book is not a visionary romance, but a military report or *précis* based upon precise calculations. In this book, von Edelsheim sets forth a scheme for the domination of Great Britain. He then points out that when certain British Colonies on this side of the Atlantic have been secured as bases of supplies and as coaling stations, there would be no difficulty in crushing the United States. It is the calculation of von Edelsheim (which has been confirmed in a number of other German writings during the past twenty years) that the sacrifice of the German fleet would leave the English fleet so far crippled that the way would be open for the invasion of England by a couple of hundred thousand of men. It is probable enough that if the original plan of Germany could have been carried out, and Great Britain had been called upon to meet alone the attack of its ambitious neighbour, the Islands would have been crushed. If this had been the result, and the colonies on this side had been taken, the question of defense would have been brought home to us very directly. The maintenance of our Republic must not be left dependent upon any such contingency. We have no right to look to England and to France to fight our battles. Von Edelsheim continues with the plan for the assault on the United States. He points out that with the vessels available, they could ship from the mouths of the Weser, the Elbe, and the Ems, 250,000 men a week for three weeks, but, as he explains, the first two shipments would be quite enough for the purpose. "The Americans have no army. There would be no difficulty in taking possession of New York City, of Boston, and not because it had other importance, but simply as a matter of sentiment, of the capital, Washington." It is not necessary, as he reminds us, to assault the harbor defenses of cities like New York and Boston. Under present naval facilities, and with a little care in the selection of the weather, troops would be landed at some distance from the

city;—Boston, say at Nahant, and for New York at Southampton.

The cities would be taken possession of and the alternative would be given of a substantial indemnity or of the destruction of the place. Von Edelsheim estimates that a thousand millions or more could be secured as the price of the sparing of New York. He admits that it would not be possible to over-run the country, but for that he says there is no necessity. He takes the ground that when the coast cities and the capital had been captured, "the Republic would crumble."

Well, I wonder what Chicago would say to that. I think that Chicago feels itself perfectly confident to run the Republic without the aid of New York, or Boston, or Washington, but there is no reason why we should run the risk of having crushing indemnities imposed upon our great coast cities, or of having our capital captured.

When, in 1814, after the battle of Bladensburg, fought by 7,000 trained British, opposed to some 12,000 hastily gathered citizens, the little English army marched into the city of Washington, we had under arms no less than 200,000 men. These men were not trained; they were not placed where they were needed; they had not acted together under commanders who knew their business, and they were helpless for the defense of the Republic. The measures for defense taken under President Madison were those for which Mr. Bryan and his associates express their approval to-day. "Wait," they say, "until we have a quarrel pending, or an enemy in sight. It will be time enough then to bring the citizens together for defense." These are what we call hysterical measures which can result in nothing but inefficiency and disaster. It was because Great Britain was so slow in shaping its measures for defense that the first six months of the present war have been so wasteful for its resources and for the lives of English men. If Britain and France had been ready, the frightful devastation that came upon Belgium might have been spared.

The National Security League is contending in behalf of

a well thought out and properly organized system of national defense. Such a system will take years to put into shape, but there should be no further delay in the beginning. We have no plan or suggestion for a large standing army. We take the ground that in regard to both army and navy, it is the first duty of Congress to pay attention to the reports of the experts that had been trained and appointed for the purpose of studying a matter that is assuredly at best technical, and of giving counsel for action.

The work of our organization has been referred to as the ill-advised action of citizens who did not understand what they were talking about. As a fact, our committees are made up of experts who have direct knowledge of the subjects, veterans of the army, ex-secretaries and assistant secretaries of the Navy and of War. We are, however, not insisting upon any plans of our own. We do need, for the present at least, to go no further than to demand attention to the reports of the successive naval boards and of secretaries of war under both democratic and republican administrations.

We object to the futility of having men who have given years to the study of the subject of naval defense being called upon to make reports as to the needs of our navy, and then to have these reports persistently disregarded by congressional committees which have themselves no knowledge, or very little knowledge, of the subject matter.

Some of us have had direct knowledge of the difficulty of handling green material. My own regiment, at that time serving in Louisiana, had by 1863 been reduced to less than 200 men. We were fortunate enough to secure 500 men from New York to fill up our ranks. They sent us what might almost be called the "refuse of the street." A large number of the fellows had come to the front rather than to accept a sentence of some months on Blackwells Island. They were a rough lot, but coming into the ranks with men who had been doing active service for 18 months, and being trained by officers who, while youngsters, had had experience, these fellows were in a comparatively short time knocked into shape as decent soldiers. After we had

gotten rid of about 40 or 50 of them (by desertion, by hanging and by shooting), the remainder proved to be very good soldiers indeed. There came down to us at this time for service in Louisiana one or two regiments entirely green from the drummer boy to the colonel. These regiments were no good at the time, and it took an indefinite number of months to put them into working or fighting shape. They had begun wrong, and training under such circumstances is difficult.

We need the framework of an army in which shall be placed the public spirited citizens who will be ready, as Bryan says, "to respond promptly to the call of the country." Particularly what we need is officers who are prepared to give the training to such men. Soldiers can be knocked into shape in the course of a few months, but the training of officers takes years. We need at once a thousand more officers than we now have. West Point should be kept up to its proper complement. From time to time there are in West Point serious vacancies because Congressmen do not do their duty in making nominations. One of the recommendations of our Committee is that a congressman who does not fill within three months the appointment that is at his disposal shall lose the power of appointment. This shall revert to the President and will be filled as a rule by the Secretary of War. Under such a system, the Secretary would always have a list of men competent to take the examinations.

Secondly, we would increase the number of officers by having examinations made available for certificates of fitness as officers. These examinations would be taken by a number of the graduates of military schools and by other citizens who had secured military training. It would be to the credit of a man's efficiency as well as of his patriotic spirit that he had in his possession a certificate qualifying him to serve as an officer in time of emergency. The body of organized civil and mining engineers would alone supply a very valuable addition to our force of certificated officers. These engineers have already had in large part the training required for West Point graduates, while they have also

had experience in campaigning and in the management of men. These men holding certificates of qualification, would belong to the reserve line. They would be called upon to report from time to time so that their continued efficiency could be verified. With this addition to the force of men available for service as officers and available for the training of men, we should be able to decrease the term of service with the colours. We should have a reserve force of capable men always available in time of need. Some of the best of the leaders in the Civil War, on both sides of the line, were men who had taken military training and had then returned to civil life.

Thirdly, we want a reserve force of enlisted men and to secure this it is our first suggestion (in line with the recommendation of Secretary Stimson and of Secretary Garrison) that the term of enlistment should be for five years instead of for seven. At the end of two years, however, the men who had passed certain examinations should be returned to civil life. Those who are exceptionally capable could be returned at the end of one year. We know that men with certificates of efficiency, giving evidence of valuable training, would be secure of employment. The men returned to civil life would, however, be called upon to report to the colours for a week or two each year until the term of five years had expired. On the ground of this obligation and of their liability at any time to call for service, they would receive pay, but pay at a nominal amount. We are suggesting \$3.00 a month, or \$36.00 a year. This pay would, for a reserve force of three or four thousand men, amount to a considerable sum, but it is just one-tenth of the amount required to keep a man in the field with the colors.

We could feel assured also that for years after the expiration of the term of five years, these trained men would be the first to report to the colours in time of emergency. This recommendation of the army committee of our Security League has, as said, been based upon the recommendations of successive secretaries of war, republican and democrat.

The present movable army of the United States is something over 30,000 men. There is an enormous waste in keeping this small force travelling up and down a big continent from post to post. Irrespective of the plan for a reserve force, the regular army should be increased to 125,000 or 150,000 men. No smaller force can be depended upon for the arming of our posts on the Pacific and Atlantic coasts, or for emergency service in defense of the Monroe Doctrine. We are making a larger expenditure than is required for the efficient army possessed by Switzerland, and a much larger proportionate expense than that of other states in Europe. We confirm the recommendations of the successive secretaries of war for the abolition of useless army posts that have been maintained purely for district political reasons. These posts were established years back when there was necessity of defending the frontier against the Indians. The Indians have now disappeared and the only defense that is now required, apart from occasional service is helping the states to prevent rioting, is that of our seaport posts. We make a similar recommendation in regard to useless navy yards. Successive secretaries of the navy have pointed out that a number of the yards that are now in commission are maintained purely for political purposes and to strengthen the influence of the local congressman. We want the money that is now expended in a wasteful, and so to speak a demoralizing fashion, to be utilized for a real strengthening of the force.

We do not contend that preparation for war constitutes an assured guaranty against war. We may point out, however, that such preparation as had been made by France (and even France was ten days late in the attempt to protect poor devastated Belgium) has saved Paris, has defended England and has probably protected Europe against the threatened Hohenzollern domination.

Preparedness will, however, not prevent war from all causes, but it does take away the temptation which comes to ambitious greedy nations to jump upon those which are unprepared. If a householder left a pocketbook over night

on the outside sill of his window and the pocketbook were taken, and he made complaint to the police, what kind of rejoinder would come to him from the police captain? It would be called a case of stupidity, folly, contributory negligence. Our unprotected coast cities, out of which millions of money of indemnity could be secured, are, so to speak, left like a pocketbook on an outside window-sill. This means contributory negligence and constitutes a temptation to national crime. It would be a pity to add to the temptations besetting a poor innocent little country like Germany. It is my contention that the pacifist who on the chance that we may not be brought into war, proposes to leave things as they are, is one who is willing to gamble with the heritage of his children. He is risking what is not his property, namely the resources and the liberties of his nation. These resources and liberties do not belong to the present generation, but are simply held in trust for the generations to come. Pacifists of this type are in my mind foolish to the point of weakness. They are good men in the worst sense of the term. They must be guarded against.

The requirement for national defense may be considered also, speaking from the point of view of business, as a matter of "insurance." If I wanted to borrow money and had to make a statement to the banks, or to other possible creditors, the first question asked would be "how much insurance do you carry on your stock?" If a man fails to carry insurance, he cannot use his stock as security. His creditors would say, in substance, if you chose to gamble with your own resources, that is your matter, or possibly a matter belonging to you and to your children, but we do not propose to have you gamble with the resources belonging to us. Can a nation expect to maintain influence and credit and to have its counsel listened to and its policies accepted, if it will not insure its independence against risks to which, as we know from past history and from present history, all nations are exposed. We know from all the teachings of history and from what is going on to-day, that a peaceful disposition will not of itself prove a protection.

Look at Belgium, look at China! Distance does not protect. Again we have China as an example. In the days when the Atlantic was ten times as wide (speaking from the point of view of transportation) as it is to-day, Washington pointed out with great emphasis that if the nation expected to maintain its independence, it must look to its defenses.

We are advocating no schemes of aggression. The United States wants no territories, no powers belonging to other people. Not one cent for aggression, but all the millions that are necessary for defense. We are not speaking of a temporary need. Our policy is not for to-day, or for to-morrow, but for the years to come. We owe a duty to our own generation and to the generations that are to follow. The duty of controlling our own destinies, developing our own resources and maintaining our influence as a great neutral state to help to withstand the bullies and to exert a rightful influence in the adjustment of the real questions of the day.

The Peace Society, of which I have the honor of being an official, has given its approval to a plan for the organization of a federal system of states which will accept as authority for the adjustment of international issues, the decisions of a world's supreme court. Such a court, a development of that which has already been organized at The Hague, must have behind it, for the purpose of giving weight to its decisions and of making possible the enforcement of these, a world's police, military and naval. Each state which is a member of the federation must be ready to contribute to this world's police a quota based upon its resources in men and in wealth. The contribution of the United States to the navy and army that is to be subject to the authority of the world's supreme court must bear its proper proportion to the great resources of the republic and to the hundred millions of citizens represented. The ships and the men (and these must be skilled and trained men) that we should be called upon to have in readiness under such a system must very much exceed the individual and military forces that we now have available. It is not

too soon to take measures to put into shape our contribution to this world's system of government, a system under which we may hope to secure a continued and assured peace. If, however, the nation is willing to follow the policy of the extreme pacifists, including Bryan and his associates, the work of preparing our quota for the world's peace is to be indefinitely delayed. Other nations will have in readiness their ships and their skilled and armed troops. The United States alone will be left to face the shame of being unprepared to fulfill its international obligations and to do its share toward maintaining the peace of the world.

I wish (and I made the suggestion some months back in print) that at the outbreak of the present war, the United States had brought into organization a league of neutral nations, of which it would itself naturally be the leader. Such a league would have been in a position to take action, or at least to make protest from time to time in a struggle with which the rights of neutrals were sure to be infringed. It is all important if bad precedents are not to take shape for future evil that protests should be made at once when an action or infringement has incurred against the rights of neutrals. If such league of neutral states had at once put on record its protest against the unwarranted invasion of Belgium, against such actions as the taking and shooting of hostages, the burning of cities, the imposition on ruined communities of crushing indemnities, the waging of war on unarmed citizens, women and children, by means of bombs, Zeppelins, and submarines;—if protests had been made from time to time against the action of England in interference with neutral trade, we should, as the war had progressed, have been in a better position to protest with dignity and with the influence not of one state, but of five or less, against the crowning crimes, the sinking of the *Falaba*, the *Lusitania*, the *Arabic*. We citizens are ready to give cordial support to what is being done by our patriotic, capable and clear-sighted President. We must show that we are also ready to organize our resources and if the requirement for citizen service comes, to make the necessary sacrifices. We have got to show to the world

that we have the right and the power to maintain our Republic, so that it shall do its part in the maintenance of peace and in the direction of the affairs of the world.

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING MAJOR GEO. H. PUTNAM

Mr. Karsten: In the first place it does not seem to me that the plan of adequate defense contemplates contact with the self-centered individual whom the speaker condemns, the one who sees only what is to his own interest.

In the second place, I wonder if the speaker is not a man who would not find himself in favor of delays and a delaying system because of mention of the word honor. I wonder who, when the nations adopt the idea that it is not necessary to fight in order to protect their honor, would be the authority to decide the question of honor or dishonor.

Third, the speaker said, no country can carry out its ideals without adequate armament behind it. Does he remember the history of the Cross and the impress of its ideals without military force? Even China is spreading its ideals more and more through books, etc. We are certainly not jellyfish in a similar case with China.

My last point is; in the last few months we have heard little for and little except what is against the German Bernhardi. But we understand him as the biographer of the German system. Then we must not have a German Bernhardi.

Major Putnam: There is a distinction between arming for defense and arming for aggression, between a superficial and an exaggerated sense of honor for maintaining one's own field and fighting for someone else. Great Britain was right in carrying out her promise to Belgium. One must carry out the paying of a thing immediately if the one for whom one guarantees, does not do so. Honor was simply in the sense of the fulfillment of an obligation. The only ground on which we could make a stand for our rights was that we are prepared to step in and demand redress. Armament does not necessarily mean aggression. We are in the position of protector to the smaller peoples.

We want to see that Belgium secures restitution as far as possible, that Holland gets protection, that Alsace and Lorraine get the right to decide things for themselves. We are unable to do this unless we are prepared to maintain our own utterance.

Mrs. Mead: We all agree that what we want is ultimate justice; we stand first for justice. The whole problem before the Security League and us is this; in each country is a cabinet, how are we going to persuade that cabinet to do what we want it to do? Is the Security League going to take up and press in Congress that we do justice to China, and so forth? This is far more a method of defense than battleships. What has happened this last year to change the national program? The nation having the third largest navy is not exactly defenseless from a militarist point of view. For whom does the League think we must prepare? If for Japan, would they not recognize that her absorbing interest in China would keep her attention from us? In the possible victory of Germany would there be any danger from Germany within the lifetime of any battleship we might build?

Major Putnam: We are very much in accord with Mrs. Mead. The League people believe that all possible measures should be utilized by the peace influences to adjust the issues of the world without fighting. We want to be heard in that direction in the settlement after this war. We only contend that, before we can be so heard, we must be able to defend our own coasts. We admit that the probability of being attacked is small. It is not because of the risk of the moment that we should try to secure a well-considered, intelligent policy in which every unit of the navy and army should be effectively used.

The ships we have are good ships, but the navy is not properly equipped. We have no armed cruisers, and a small number of submarines of an old type. We should reconstruct our submarine system. We have very few aeroplanes.

The first thing is to complete what we have; the second, to expand it up to the minimum of requirement as recom-

mended by experts; third, when we look forward wisely to the best influence for the resources of the nation, we can not be heard adequately for peace, cannot be listened to, not only in this settlement for 1915 but for years to come, unless we can stand securely on our own feet. With the policy we are looking forward to there is no faintest risk for years to come of any militarist spirit taking hold of this country.

Mr. McCaul: "As a nation we stand for certain principles and make certain claims. We must have force to carry these out." This is radically wrong. You cannot really turn peoples by threats of force. The contention of the speaker is based on a fallacy that fails to recognize that the ultimate power is will.

Major Putnam: Of course will counts and the truth that should be enforced by argument. Yet, in the end, we had to back up anti-slavery with muskets. To support our contentions in Europe we need not use force, but we do say that listening to our points would be the same as listening to Belgium, if we had no means of enforcement.

Mr. Gannett: There is exactly the same motive back of the Security League and the pacifists. The militarists expect to attain peace by military means, the pacifists through other than military and through peaceful means. All agree as to the motive, but differ as to the effect of force. It is not sufficient to say that the army is for maintenance of defense. The motive in England of the building of her navy may have been for defense, but the immediate result was the building up of the navy of Germany. Each nation claims to arm only for defense, but others decide that it is for aggression. Very few people outside our own country will see this, that it is for defense, if we arm. We have seen in Europe that increased armament on one side of the boundary means increased armament on the other side, and we see the result in the present war. The motive is not sufficient, all are working towards the same goal, but what will be the effect of the means adopted?

The expenditure for the British fleet was very different from that for the German fleet, it was needed to protect Britain from starving. That is no war measure, although a naval expenditure. Every million put into English naval vessels was put in for that purpose alone. The German fleet had for its purpose the changing of the territory of the world for the satisfaction of its ambitions, not necessarily wrong ambitions; it was an organization for aggressive war. It is the motive behind that counts.

Major Putnam: It is right to say that up to a certain point Bernhardt, Reventlow and Treitschke were not known to the people. In the '60's, before imperial Germany, it was very different from what it is now. "The eighteenth century was the century of France, the nineteenth of Great Britain, the twentieth is for Germany," is said by many fine people in Germany. "Great Britain must be broken up and we must do it." They have no enmity to France, but must crush France this time thoroughly, she must never again stand in the way of Germany. If France had not had even its little preparedness, if the voice of Jaures' men had carried, there would have been no adequate army between Germany and France, and France and England would have fallen.

Mr. Angell: This recital of the conditions and circumstances of this war, call for protest. During twenty years on the continent the constant assumption in political discussion has been that the pacifist says that war is not coming. This is not true. My earliest entrance into this field was by a lecture "Why War is Inevitable." There was a whole school who thought like this, "Change your policy or you will have war."

It is not true, it is only a half truth to say that there would not have been a war if England had been prepared. If England had adopted Lord Robert's proposal fifteen years ago, Germany would have met it. She had the reserves to do it. She had only 200,000, a little more than in France.

If Bright had been listened to there would have been no war of the Crimea. This war was the result of the last

English war. This war will start all future wars unless other means can prevail.

Adequate defense is not an absolute but a relative thing, it depends upon the forces brought against you. You can not discuss adequate defense merely in terms of armament, you must discuss it also in terms of policy. If it ranges against you a group of the European nations, your one-power standard of navy or army is rendered ineffective. Mr. Putnam has said this country should assume certain obligations towards the world at large. If they are to be protected by military means that requires a large expeditionary force; a very large navy will be needed. All would be necessary, but if, as a result of the activity of the League, a bill is passed for \$500,000,000 without a statement of policy, Japan, etc., will ask, What does this mean?

You will never have to face one power alone. Increase without a statement of policy will inevitably bring against you a group and alliance, as was the case with Germany. In going in for a great navy she made a change in her armament policy, and this change brought about groupings of the European alliance which rendered Germany's own position far more dangerous than was her original position. The same result will come here if America does this without a statement of her political policy. You must combine armaments with policy, or policy indeed must precede your armaments.

America, occupying a very important place in the questions of the world, must define her policies towards China, Japan. Having done this she will then say, We make a contribution of such and such forces to the execution of this policy. If now there grows up in America the simple increase in armaments without a statement of policy, it will defeat its own object. In the case of America there can be nothing but an international policy, we contend. The National Security League fails in this.

Suppose we had the biggest navy in the world, could you change the condition of the *Lusitania*? Would you accept sea law as it now stands? Don't you see that before your military action can become effective at all, you

must have some agreement as to what the military instrument stands for?

Your own statement of policy, the general one of defense, is like the one in the preamble to the German Naval Bill which was in effect a changed policy.

Take the present situation. Your rights have been violated, you are confronted by a definite problem. Could you settle it effectively if you had the greatest navy in the world? No, only by agreement.

If a radical change in your armament policy now takes place in America, you are going to have a group of nations questioning your policy. It will bring an armed rivalry.

Major Putnam: In regard to one portion of this requirement, I have never been a believer in the extreme enforcement of the armament policy. I have thought it might bring us into very difficult situations. We ought either to check present occasions or make adequate preparations. There is no sense in halfway requirements. We pretend to be a world power and do not accept any of the responsibilities of a world power.

We have not set very onerous demands for navy expenditure. We demand that members of Congress, etc., should pay attention to their own boards of experts, that there should be desirable economies in expenditure, with a using of the reserves of the country, so that our citizens could be brought out properly prepared to meet others. There is nothing radically wrong if people are brought together for no more than to make a better militia.

As for the navy, we must have material to give our proportion of the navy to the world's police, if that plan goes through to maintain the world's peace. This would be far beyond what we now have. It is full time we even now began that. Preparation for world police for world peace could not be interpreted by any neighbor into a plan for aggression.

Mr. Sachs: Major Putnam has said that 32,000 soldiers should be increased so that you could turn out 500,000 men. That means sixteen times as many to be turned out.

Germany's addition to her army was only 200,000, and that brought about immediate reprisal. You cannot say that such a departure would not call the attention of the world. We have no quarrel with the remedying of inefficiency, the teaching of responsibility is the end of democracy, but an increase from 32,000 to 500,000 is undoubtedly a radical departure which demands some explanation. Defense is too vague a term. From the moment you think of defending you must announce precisely what you want to do. Our stand in this war has been for humanity, not for any belligerent. Our present stand is right.

Major Putnam: No such immediate increase is possible. We want to increase our army to 50,000 or 100,000 men now. The other process will be slow.

Mr. Trachtenberg: The main premise of the speaker is that we should not offer a policy to the military men, taking it from the democracy. The pacifist idea is just opposed to this. If the democracy of Germany had succeeded in making friends of the democracies of France and England there would have been no war. The army approved it.

We are opposed to student military camps because the army from Washington is sending men to these camps. They want to put the students for six weeks in the hands of military professional men, to give them a military set of mind, in order to have more appropriations for the army and navy. We want a democracy ruled not by military men but by the democracy.

Major Putnam: I agree with the first portion of my friend's remarks. I have no more idea than he of ruling this country as the citizens of Prussia and Russia are now controlled. We are pressing our purpose in a regular constitutional way. We feel the importance of looking at certain things, accepting the reports of experts, not following militarist theories.

Mr. Davis: Nobody has taken up the economic side of this question. The main difference between the League and us is in the question of means. "A man insures his business in order to be secure with credit, and therefore

we should insure our country with an army." Is it not a fact that the smaller countries have better credit, not because of their armies but because of the neutrality guarantees?

Major Putnam: Of course this is true for smaller countries where the armies are not adequate against the greed and aggression of a great power. I was not thinking of financial greed but of every other kind. I am sure that the Belgian bonds are not worth as much as before. Scraps of paper are scraps of paper which are not to be maintained with a world court.

Mr. Suh Hu: Major Putnam has evaded one question put by Mr. Angell, whether or not this country could insure justice in the question of the *Lusitania* if she had a large navy.

What does he mean by adequate defense? China is wanted by all powers except America; they are all our enemies. What shall we do in the question of defense, have an army and navy equal to those of Japan, or to those of Germany, or to all, because Japan is the ally of Great Britain, France and Russia? Suppose China decides to have adequate defense. How far could this defense secure justice and righteousness?

Major Putnam: I do not believe that we can put into force any such navy as would do away with any certainty with the foes of the United States, we can only go a little nearer to it so that we can secure a hearing. Even though we cannot do the entire thing we want to do, we want to go somewhere near it. The first thing necessary to the doing of anything is to protect oneself.

SECTION II

"DEFENSELESS AMERICA"

By Hudson Maxim

What should we do for national defense? Are we in danger?

An American who went to England to reside and was

asked to pay his tithes, inquired what the tax was for, and was told that it was for the salvation of his soul. He protested that he did not know, in the first place, that he had a soul, and if he did have a soul, he did not know that he was in any danger of losing it, and, lastly, if he had a soul and was in danger of losing it, he had no reason to suppose that the recipient of the tax would be able to save it for him.

Those who do not know that this country is in danger ought to know it, and ought to know whether the military man or the pacifist is the proper physician.

Now then, a person who has appendicitis would not go to a farmer to be operated upon. He would not go to a minister of the gospel; neither of these good men would know where to cut for the appendix. Similarly, the pacifist does not know what to do for Uncle Sam to cure his present weakness.

We are all looking for the light. We want the cold facts. Defenselessness as applied to this country is a relative term. If all the other nations of the world were armed merely with pitchforks and scythes, or with short swords, spears and battle-axes, we should be pretty well prepared as we are. But our defenselessness is exactly proportionate to the superior equipment of other nations in guns, gunpowder, and fighting ships, and men trained to use them.

We are in danger because we are subject to the payment of the same penalties to which other nations are subject who are unprepared.

Mars has been misbehaving himself lately. He got a black eye when he sunk the *Lusitania*. Satan got a black eye in the garden of Eden, still he holds down his job all right. He is still on duty at the same old stand. Mars and Satan are walking arm and arm to-day and going to and fro upon the earth.

Recently I sent out ten thousand copies of my book, "Defenseless America," to the young men graduating in the American colleges this spring. Various motives have been attributed to me. Some said that I did it to sell more books, others thought I did it to increase my trade in muni-

tions of war. There were some who suspected me of being a philanthropist, and thought I sent out the books because I was good at heart. Not a bit of it. Our American colleges are hotbeds of pacifism and I sent out those books from pure cussedness to get at the pacifists. I do not mean cussedness in a bad sense, but cussedness in a good sense and in a good cause.

When I wrote "Defenseless America" I wanted to be sure that I had all my facts right, so I consulted some eminent military authorities, among them General Wood. He and several other army and navy officers read the proof of my book. I have not mentioned their names or what they said for the reason of the gag rule enforced by his Excellency the President of the United States and the Secretaries of the Army and the Navy. This gag rule prevents officers and men from expressing their views to the people of the country on the most important subject that ever anybody spoke upon in the history of mankind.

These very men, mind you, have to stand by their guns if war should come upon us. They are barred from telling you of our danger and that we should arm against it. They are prevented from taking sensible measures for saving their lives.

The nations of the world are now gunning for one another and it will not be long before we shall find them in our private preserve.

We have different kinds of prophets. If you read your Bible you will find one mentioned by the name of Jeremiah and another named Isaiah, who told the Jews certain truths that they did not like. They were inspired prophets and true ones. There is another kind of prophet—the scientific prophet. The astronomer will tell you to a fraction of a second when there will be an eclipse of the sun. He will tell you the distance and the size of the stars, and whether they are nearing us or going farther away. In order to make his prophecies he triangulates from a base line the width of the earth's orbit.

If we are going to make accurate calculations about what human nature is going to do in the future, we must triangu-

late from a base line the width of human history. We must reckon upon what human nature has been in all past time.

Had any one of you been present at the creation of the world, and had you been asked by the all-wise God for your opinion as to what kind of a world should be made, what would have been your advice? Would you have voted for a world where everything would be tooth and nail, claw and scale, where all life must live on other life, where half the animal creation is prey for the other half, where the history of the human race should be written in blood, where the cat would train for the hunt by torturing a little bird, or would you have voted for a world where might would not be right—for a world the opposite of that created by Almighty God? If you would have voted as you are now voting to change this world, you would have placed your little mind above infinite wisdom.

This is a very good world just as it is—it is a glorious world. I enjoy life. I enjoy the world. I believe that God made a good job of it, and I am very grateful. To me this world is a great and enduring circus. We should all enjoy it. It is a striving world, because God made it so. He made it so that whatever we get, we must get by striving. If you are weak, you fall. If strong, you stand. There never was a greater error in this world than the belief that weakness is admirable, that passiveness in the presence of wrong is beautiful. In this world everything is feeding on everything, everything is vying with everything, contesting with everything. We must always be on the defensive, actively and not passively.

If a little poison gets into us past our defenses, we are ill. If we get much of it, we die.

Unless we are killed by accident, we are all to be murdered some time by microbes, and we can add to the length of our lives only by true temperance, by proper living, by hygiene, and by taking the necessary steps to maintain our physical powers and our mental powers. Then we shall be able to resist for a much longer period the microbes that flock about us.

There is a conflagration coming, and we should be insured

against it. All our army and navy men tell us that war is coming. They tell us that our danger is very grave.

How shall we defend ourselves? Human nature, for all practical purposes, is a constant. The human nature of to-day is the same that it was in ancient Rome, the same that it was in ancient Egypt, and the human nature for a long way into the future will be essentially the same as it is to-day. Napoleon said, "Circumstances may change, but men never change." Before the outbreak of the great European War, we had been told by the pacifists that human nature had changed so much lately that there was not likely to be any more wars, because all international differences could be settled by arbitration.

Our naval and military men believe that we should increase our army and navy as an insurance against war and to save the country in the event of war, but the pacifists believe in the plan promulgated by Mr. Carnegie. Mr. Carnegie advises, should an enemy invade the country, that he be invited inland and be shown the best roads, and then, if he did not behave himself, Mr. Carnegie would make a speech to him. I have heard Mr. Carnegie speak several times, and it never occurred to me that there was repelling power enough in his talk to drive out an invading army.

No one is to blame for his opinions. A person raised in the Catholic church is inevitably a Catholic; raised in the Protestant he is most likely to be a Protestant; raised a Mohammedan, he is a Mohammedan; raised a Buddhist, he is a Buddhist. The last generation of this country has been raised under the dominating influence of pacifism. Although after trouble comes, they will know that their education has been false, still they must remain victims of their opinion until that time comes.

That pacifist star of first magnitude, Dr. David Starr Jordan, told us, just a little while before the outbreak of the European War, that there was not going to be any such war. He said: "What shall we say of the great war of Europe, ever threatening, ever impending, and which never comes? We shall say that it will never come; humanly speaking, it is impossible."

At the first annual banquet of the Aëronautical Society, at which over eight hundred prominent persons were present, President Taft spoke on his pet Peace and Arbitration Treaties. As chairman of the meeting, I made a little talk on the future use of the aëroplane in war, and predicted practically the same use that the aëroplane has had in the present European War. When Mr. Taft spoke, he took occasion to say that he predicted that there would not be an opportunity for the try-out of the aëroplane in war that I had forecasted, for the reason that there was going to be a shortage of wars. He said that in future international differences were to be settled by arbitration. Now, since that time, we have had the Chinese Revolution, the war between Italy and Tripoli, a continuous performance in Mexico, two Balkan wars, and the present great European War. If that is a shortage of wars, what would be a plenitude?

I am not saying anything to impeach the sincerity and big intelligence of such men as Mr. Taft and Dr. David Starr Jordan. They are men with character above suspicion. Their intelligence is beyond impeachment. But though big men, they are capable of being mistaken. President Jefferson was mistaken when he disbanded our army and navy and brought on the War of 1812, with the burning of the city of Washington.

Some years ago, I was asked by the editor of the *Christian Herald* to write an article in answer to the question, "Can a person who believes in the divine mission of Jesus Christ conscientiously engage in the manufacture of war materials?" I wrote the article. Dr. Talmadge answered the article by agreeing with me. He said that my arguments did not admit of an answer.

If you will read the epitaphs on the tombstones erected to those who fell in our great Civil War, you will find that it was an army of Christians who fought to save the Union. In all the great wars for the emancipation of slaves, some of the best soldiers have been Christian men. If we had slaves in this country to-day, a good many of the pacifists would be abolitionists, and would be shouting for war. The

old reliable human nature in them would assert itself for good.

At the time of the first annual International Peace Conference in New York—they called it the first because it was the only one they ever had—the Economic Club of Boston invited the principal speakers at the Conference to go down to Boston and speak at a banquet of that club. I was invited to speak in defense of armaments.

I opened my remarks by telling them the following story: On the back page of a leading Boston paper, I once saw a four-line announcement that Herbert Spencer, the great philosopher, was very ill, and not expected to live. On the front page of the same paper, under bold headlines, was a three-column article on the physical condition of John L. Sullivan. John L. Sullivan was a fighter, while Herbert Spencer was only a philosopher—hence the difference in public interest.

Let me tell you another story which has some aproposity in it. I was once crossing the ocean, where I made the acquaintance of Sir William Wyndeyer of Australia, who came to me one day saying, "Mr. Maxim, Mrs. — is on board and she has asked for an introduction to you." This lady was the Carrie Nation of England, only she used a club instead of a hatchet. I said that I did not care to meet her. "Come on," said he, "she wants to meet you." So I went. The first thing she said was, "Do you know that you ought to be hung—that hanging is too good for you?" I told her that I did not know that the thing had gotten out. "Well," said she, "hanging is too good for you people who are making things to kill other people. Can't you tell murder when you see it?" she asked. I asked her what she thought of the Armenian atrocities which were then prevalent. She exclaimed, "Oh, I wish I were the queen of England; you would soon see what I think of them." "Well," I asked, "what would you do?" "Why," said she, "I would raise an army and exterminate those beastly Turks." "Well," said I, "you would want some of the things that I have invented for killing folks, would you not?" My remark closed the conversation.

I want to say a few words about the deadliness of modern warfare and the killing capacity of modern instruments of war. The statement in my book that the quick-firing gun is the greatest life-saving instrument ever invented, is strictly true. As the range and deadliness of weapons of war are increased, armies line up farther apart, and spread out over wider areas, and dig themselves into the ground. In ancient times, however, when they fought with swords, spears and battle-axes, they went into the fray like a lot of ravenous wolves, and fought hand to hand.

At the battle of Chalons the United Romans and Goths slew a hundred thousand of Attila's Huns a day for three days. In olden times it was not uncommon for a whole army to be exterminated in a single fight. How is it nowadays? An army of 250,000 Russians withdrew from the battle of Mukden with a loss of only one man. He was drunk and fell off a gun and the gun ran over him.

In modern warfare, instead of every able-bodied man being obliged to go to the front to save his country, as was common in ancient times, not more than one in ten need to fight. The other nine are required in the industries of the country and for making the munitions of war.

This is an age of labor-saving machinery. In war, labor-saving machinery becomes life-saving machinery. In Europe to-day twenty millions of men are lined up facing one another. Had they been armed with old-time weapons, at least half of them would already be dead. Let us suppose that the nations of the world should actually forge their swords into plow-shares; and their spears into pruning hooks, what would be the result? If they were to fight merely with pruning hooks, the slaughter would be at least ten times as great as it is to-day with all our instruments of destruction.

The pacifists all along have been under the impression that if they were able to make out a case against war to prove that war is hell, they have made out their case also against armaments. It would be just as rational to assume that by proving cholera and small-pox to be bad we have

proved that we do not need doctors. The soldier is war's physician. Preparedness against war is war's remedy.

I am no defender of war. I grant all its hellishness and all its horrors, and for that very reason we should be insured against it.

There is much misconception regarding the cost of the present war. It is estimated that the first year's cost to the warring nations will be about fifteen billion dollars. Even this vast sum will be less than five per cent of the total wealth of those countries. Most of the money is spent at home; consequently, I doubt if the total out-of-pocket cost will exceed two per cent of the wealth of the warring nations. There is also a wrong idea concerning the rate at which they are being killed off. The Germans are being born to-day six times as fast as they are being killed.

In an automobile ride like that which I took just after I came to town one is exposed to about as much danger as he would be fighting in the trenches.

Not nearly so many die of wounds received in battle nowadays as formerly, because of the immediate scientific medical attention that the wounded receive. To-day soldiers can be shot up a good deal without serious injury. Many a young man when sent from the trenches to the hospital finds the solicitous attention there a balm for all wounds, and when he returns to the trenches he remembers the kindly anxious eyes of the young woman who acted as trained nurse to him. He does not mind so much being sent back there.

We have heard much about the deadliness of aërial bombs. A little while ago there was much talk about the destruction of London by Zeppelins. Up to the present, they have killed about two hundred men, women and children. How long would it take for a hundred Zeppelins to destroy London, assuming that they should visit that city every day and each Zeppelin should destroy two houses each visit? They would destroy about thirty-five thousand houses in a year. They would not quite keep up with the annual growth of the city, because they build more than seventy thousand houses a year.

The action of high explosives is much misunderstood. When a bomb explodes upon the earth, or upon any other firm or resistant body, the mass of incandescent gases rebounds, spreading out in the form of an inverted cone, so that the action on a horizontal plane is small. In order to do much damage it is necessary to confine explosives.

We hear a lot about the shortening of the French, due to the effect of the Napoleonic wars. No one has thought to inquire whether there might not be some other cause. I think that I have discovered the true cause. When France, Italy and Spain were overrun with the Scandinavian and Germanic hordes during the Middle Ages, they intermarried and inter-bred with the people of those countries, producing a mixed type, bigger in stature and lighter in color. But the stronger dark blood has been gradually overcoming the blood of the blonde type, and with the disappearance of the blonde hair there is a shortening of stature. Still, the average Italian to-day is larger than was the ancient Roman.

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING MR. MAXIM'S FIRST ADDRESS

Mr. Miller: The address of Mr. Maxim gives a splendid opportunity for those who think there should be no increase in the army and navy to ask questions on this point.

Mr. Maxim: Why do we need an army? We need an army as an insurance against war. The pacifists assure us that we could depend upon a citizen soldiery which we could raise by merely calling for them. At the present time we have about sixty thousand effective soldiers in this country, and about as many defectives. We have about forty-six thousand regulars. Sixteen thousand of these would be required to man our coast fortifications, leaving about thirty thousand for the firing line. Now let us suppose that war should come between us and any of the great powers and find us in our present state of weakness. Those whose business it is to know, namely, our army and navy men, tell us that we could be very easily invaded, and that we have no power to resist an invader once landed on our shores.

Several days ago, Ex-Secretary Meyer told me that he was very grateful to me for having written "Defenseless Amer-

ica," and he continued, "Do you know, that the people of this country must get ready, or calamity will come upon them?" General Wood says so. Admiral Sigsbee says so. I do not know of a single army or navy man who does not think so, who does not believe that we are in dire danger. Now let us suppose that war should actually come—what could we do? If the enemy were able to land no more than one hundred thousand men, war-trained, and war-hardened veterans, we should not be able to oppose them. They would be better armed than we, better equipped in every way. We have none of the big howitzers. We have no machine guns worth mentioning, while the enemy would have thousands of them.

We talk about our splendid isolation. There are two kinds of isolation, one with respect to time and the other with respect to place; it would take us several years to get ready to resist any of the great powers. That is an isolation in time equal to as much isolation in space as though we lived on the moon and had to drive here with an ox team.

Do you know how long it takes to make big guns? All the factories of this country are to-day burdened with war orders. The Allies need far more munitions than they can get. A friend of mine the other day cabled me from Europe, asking me if I could get a billion cartridges made for the Allies, a million rifles, and a million and a half shrapnel, and a million each eight-inch and nine-inch high explosive shells. I inquired of one large manufacturer, and found that he was tied up for two years.

If our enemy's navy should be superior to ours, ours must inevitably be destroyed, and, once landed on our shores, we should not make a very good showing with our little thirty thousand regulars stretched along a line of only about twelve miles. The enemy could cut circles around us. Our guns would be of shorter range than those of the enemy. The enemy would blow up our trenches, and kill our soldiers with shrapnel machine guns, while we should not be able even to reach them with our heaviest artillery.

Within two weeks the enemy would be able to capture

the entire area east of the Allegheny Mountains. Now, let me tell you that within an area enclosed by a circle drawn around Peekskill, New York, with a radius of two hundred miles, are located nine-tenths of the munition works of this country—torpedo works, torpedo boat works, rifle factories, cartridge factories, explosive works, the Bethlehem Steel Works, the Cramp Shipbuilding Works, the Fore River Shipbuilding Works, the Army and Navy Arsenal and store houses, at Picatinny, N. J., the Troy Arsenal, the Springfield Arsenal, where the rifles are made, and many others, with New York, Philadelphia, and Boston, and all the other neighboring big cities. After that area should be captured, the enemy would put these works to use, and set us Americans to making munitions for them for the killing of our own countrymen farther west. Not only this, but they might take a notion to annex that part of the country, and then they would conscript our young men and set them to killing their own countrymen. After the invasion, the proud American will be hungry; he will want a job. He will be glad to work for the enemy. This same thing happened to Belgium, and to the people in Northern France. Have you read the Bryce report? You have surely heard about the Belgian atrocities. Those same things are going to happen to us. Some of you young men here are going to have an opportunity of getting killed for resisting some foreigner who insults your wife or sweetheart.

I am telling you facts. These things are going to happen to us right here. Our homes will be invaded and our wives and daughters will be ravished in our presence as a refinement of torture to us while we are unwilling witnesses of the orgies. All these things are coming unless we insure against them. When the enemy comes, officers and soldiers will be billeted to our homes. They will have charge of our family affairs.

Dr. Nasmyth: I want to make the discussion definite. Just how large should our navy be?

Mr. Maxim: How much would a pugilist like Willard have to train to fight another pugilist like Jack Johnson? He must be made strong enough and skilful enough to

stand against his opponent until he knocks him out. If he is not able to do this, he gets knocked out. A nation must be strong enough adequately to defend itself against an enemy.

England is not much to be feared by us, because she already has all the land she wants. She does not at the present need our property, but she does need our guns and our gunpowder and we are making them for her. Again, England does not want any other country to establish itself in this country. Consequently, she wants us to defend the Monroe Doctrine. The English originated that doctrine themselves, and imposed it upon us. England wants us to defend Canada. If we defend the Monroe Doctrine, we must defend Canada. We should not consider the matter of expense, when national safety is at cost. We spend enough on chewing gum to build three battleships a year. We are worth about \$130,000,000,000. We can well afford to match dollars with any other nation in the up-building of an army and navy. With a big navy, and the adoption of the Swiss system of military training in our schools, General Wood believes that we could get along with a standing army of about 250,000.

Mr. Cremer: Mr. Maxim made the statement that human nature had not changed for four thousand years. No longer do people conquer another to convert them to their belief. In the field of commerce, literature, science, the world has been getting together and not in the field of co-operation, in the field of politics. It is our business to get out of the business of making war.

Mr. Maxim: Can you tell me of a war that did not result in good?

Mr. Cremer: Any war that contemplates the wholesale destruction of living men, the grief and lifelong agony of widows left at home.

Mr. Angell: Are you speaking for war, or against war?

Mr. Maxim: I am speaking for peace.

Mr. Angell: Mr. Maxim was speaking for war just this minute.

Mr. Cremer: I started on the hypothesis that Mr. Maxim

and we had the same plan, the conservation of everything that human beings hold dear. Merely a difference in method. Mr. Maxim's method is, to say, increase our army so that no one can attack us. That is the theory of Germany and other nations abroad. The result was that Europe became an armed camp, and it only took a match to throw them into a conflagration. That scheme has been weighed in the balance and found wanting. That is what Mr. Maxim has been advocating.

Mr. Maxim: It is not true that the European War was brought on by over-preparedness. The exact opposite was the truth. Germany was the only country that was prepared, while the entente powers were pitifully unprepared. Even the Germans underrated what they would require after the war broke out. They found themselves short about three hundred per cent. The Allies found themselves short more than a thousand per cent. Had England spent five billions of dollars for national defense—less than what this war is costing her—do you imagine for a moment that this European War would have ever occurred? It would not have occurred.

Mr. Angell: Germany ought to have a navy four times as large and that would not keep the peace.

Mr. Maxim: I asked you a moment ago what great war had not done good. Our great Civil War was admittedly a good thing. It freed the slaves. The North might have bought them, but it did not. Was the War of the Revolution a good thing? Surely the result was good. Look back through history, and you will find many wars that have done good.

But I am not defending war. There are two kinds of wars, good wars and bad wars. Old Mars is a Dr. Jekyll and a Mr. Hyde. Wars of aggression and plunder are bad wars, while those against aggression and against plunder—in short, wars of defense—are good wars. Wars to free slaves are always good wars.

Mr. Robinson: If war is good, why are you speaking for peace?

Mr. Maxim: I am just telling you facts.

Mr. Angell: Which are you for, war or peace?

Mr. Maxim: I am telling you the facts. I am not to blame because of the facts. I am not defending war. I am speaking against war. I am trying to defend this country against war. But I do not expect to save this country from a good whipping. Still, if the Germans, for instance, should whip us, they would do us a lot of good in one way—they would eliminate the graft from the government of our big cities. But I don't want to sacrifice my home and my comfort in order to get rid of municipal graft.

Mr. Earle: If the Germans should come over here and teach us to run our cities better, we could apply to experts instead of building our navy. The greater part of our munition factories are in the East. It would be cheaper to move these than to construct an army to protect them.

Mr. Maxim: The Germans would go over-land in automobiles or on railroads to where the munition plants were located, and it would only take them a few days longer.

Mr. Trachtenberg: Mr. Maxim told a story of the Russo-Japanese War. He said 200,000 participated and the only one who was killed fell off a gun. I fell off that gun.

Mr. Maxim: What a pity that the man was not killed.

Mr. Trachtenberg: Happily I was not killed. I was not drunk. He has told us in his book on the front page that the quick-firing gun is the greatest of life-savers. I came near it many times and was saved by it, saw how it was ticking down every minute hundreds of men. I want to ask Mr. Maxim, does he consider himself a philanthropist, when he talks that way? If the extension of armaments is really a good thing, then we should go in for it. My experience was not so good. I am one of these undesirable citizens simply because I belong to that party which does not believe in giving defense into the hands of these professional army and navy men. All of them are telling us that the conflagration is coming. That is the whole trouble. That is all they see. And Mr. Maxim also thinks that. He has been so much in that business that he sees it coming.

Just as we did not let railroad men fix our rates, though specialists, we elected a public board to fix our rates, and

that is how we abolished the railroad war. We do not want to give the policy of defense into the hands of professional militarists who never see anything but a conflagration coming. If you do, there is certain to be a conflagration.

I want to ask Mr. Maxim why does he think so much of the opinion of General Wood, who knows nothing about army affairs; he is a doctor.

Mr. Maxim: Doctors understand the killing game.

Mr. Davis: Mr. Maxim said before that if England had been prepared there would have been no war. Is it not a fact that German diplomatists have been accused of not expecting England to go in? Who is going to fight us?

Mr. Maxim: If Germany had known that even she was not adequately prepared, she would have spent three times as much for munitions in war preparation as she did spend. Think of what it has cost her thus far because she did not spend more in getting ready. In regard to who is going to fight us, let me say that it will depend on who sees us first, just the same as it depends on what bunco man sees a Jersey hayseed first in New York. The one who sees him first is the one who robs him.

Mr. Karsten: Let's get this clear, Mr. Maxim said, Germany should have been prepared three times as much as she was. If England had been prepared ten times as much as she was, what then? If they both did, what would have happened?

Second, do you think peace best or war best? You advocate peace as good, then war.

Mr. Maxim: It is perfectly true that if the Germans should come over here and conquer the country and mix their vigorous blood with the blood of our people and teach us better economic methods, it would likely be a good thing for the country a few generations hence, but it would not be a good thing for us living now, for they would take our places as husbands of our wives. For you, Mr. Speaker, would be killed by them, and they would kill me in order to get at you.

In regard to the other point, I said that if England,

France, and Russia had fully realized what was coming, and had adequately prepared for it, they could with their wealth and their numbers have so prepared that Germany would not have had a chance of winning. On the other hand, had Germany seen what was coming and made preparations, she would have won with all the ease that she expected.

(The debate between Mr. Karsten and Mr. Maxim became so rapid that the stenographer was unable to take notes.)

Mr. Suh Hu: My impression is that there has not been one single argument in the principal speaker's speech of the whole evening, and I have been very attentive. Since there have been no arguments worth refuting, and since our speaker has promised to give us facts instead of jokes and puns to-morrow morning, I move that we adjourn.

(Seconded, lost.)

A motion was made and seconded to apologize to Mr. Maxim, and was carried.

Mr. Maxim: In answer to the Chinese gentleman, let me say that his assertions are false; that he does not know an argument when he hears it.

Norman Angell: Both parties to the discussion were agreed that they wanted security and the prevention of war. How were those ends to be achieved? History reeked with wars. Had they come about because the nations were "unprepared"? Obviously preparedness has not prevented wars and of itself never could. Peace, a civilized society of nations that is, was not an easy thing to achieve and there was not the slightest hope of it until men buckled to the task, but unfortunately not merely militarist advocacy but militarist feeling and philosophy always disparaged real effort towards conciliation and understanding. How could we at one and the same time maintain our armament, diminish international suspicion and work whole heartedly to international comity and understanding? Either half of the effort without the other was dangerous. The two efforts must be combined and reconciled. We greatly feared that Mr. Maxim though a great inventor was not a very good reconciler. We were

told to leave it to the experts, but experts on what? War was the outcome of bad policy. Were the soldiers also expert on international policy? If not, the problem could not be left to them. The nations as a whole must determine how they desire to live together, and carry their decision into effect, perhaps against the experts.

SECTION III

THE NATIONALIZATION OF THE MANUFACTURE OF ARMAMENTS

By Hudson Maxim

The private industries of a country are the greatest stabilizers of peace. The great bandit nations of history have never been industrial nations. The robber has never been a worker. The government and destinies of a nation are safest in the hands of its workers. Its armaments are safest in the hands of its workers.

When a non-industrial people become conquerors, they become destroyers. On the contrary, when an industrial people become conquerors, they become up-builders and civilizers. The United States in Cuba and the Philippines has been a civilizer, an enlightener, a benefactor. Had it not been for the vacillating, ultra-pacific policy of the present administration, Uncle Sam would have played the same rôle of civilizer of savage Mexico.

Wherever the thrifty and scientific German has placed his finger on this planet, he has brightened up that spot. Cleanliness and thrift follow in the wake of the Teuton. We must not forget that the English are Teutons, as well as the Germans.

Napoleon called England a nation of shop-keepers. Although spoken in derision, it was the greatest praise of an enemy ever uttered. The tight little island is a hive of industry. The glow of the forge and the blaze of the blast furnace illumine the sky and defy the night all over England. It is the excellence of English goods that has made American merchants recommend English cutlery,

English cloth, and everything English, as genuine imported. Sheffield steel in the British sword-blade has made the Union Jack a symbol of good behavior over the earth, and with that flag Briton can wig-wag with Briton from headland to headland around the world.

In this trying time of war, it is most difficult to prevent our reason being warped by feeling; but we all know that though there may be bad men and women in every country, and bad combinations of men and women in every country, no great industrial people is ever bad. A great people may be sorely in error, but they are honestly so, as the South was in error during our Civil War. Yet we know that the Southerners were a great people and a good people, and just as the wide breach between the North and the South was destined to be healed by time, and even the scar obliterated, in spite of the Andy Johnson carpet-baggers that tried to keep the wound open, so, after the present war is over, the great gap between the nations must some time be closed, the wound healed, and the scar obliterated.

When you are thinking about nationalizing the manufacture of armaments and war materials, it is the better part of wisdom to inquire who are fighting the battles of this war, and whose will be the credit for victory, or the blame for defeat. It is not so much the men on the firing line who will win or lose this war, as it is the industrial workers in the factories who are producing the engines and munitions of war and the farmers who are producing the food.

The credit for victory or the blame for defeat may justly be accorded equally, in proportion to their numbers, to those on the firing line and those at the fire of the blast furnace and the forge. The man who makes the sword and the gun and the gunpowder is as much his country's defender as the soldier who uses them at the front; and the farmer who digs the food out of the ground is as much his country's defender as the soldier who digs himself into the ground on the firing line; and as there are at least ten times as many artisans and farm laborers as there are soldiers required to fight a country's battles, we may

rightly consider a nation's factories its main fortifications, and its industrial workers its main army. Just as we must have an army of citizens trained to fight for national defense we must have an army of artisans in private manufactories to supply war munitions for national defense.

England's volunteer soldier army is an army of patriots, or they would not have volunteered, but, unfortunately, England's army of artisans, whose duty is to make war munitions, is largely an army of traitors, in open mutiny against the Government. They mutiny while their countrymen are enduring every conceivable hardship and making every conceivable sacrifice on the firing line.

Their countrymen in the trenches are short of ammunition, and being thus unable to advance, they must fight at great disadvantage and suffer enormous losses. Yet the English workmen go on strike for easier hours, that they may spend more time in the grog shops—strike for more pay that they may buy yet more disqualifying, inebriating booze.

England's worst enemies are not the Germans, but they are the beer-swilling British workmen and the beer-selling British grogeries.

One of the chief occupations in England for pretty young women is to serve as bar-maids. They are parcel of the trade-enticing paraphernalia of the grog-shops, and as they are destined largely to become the mothers of the next generation of British workmen, is it any wonder that there is not in such workmen room for patriotism or a conscience?

Lloyd George, the British Minister of Munitions, said recently that if he could lay his hands on an adequate supply of skilled labor he could double in a few weeks Great Britain's output of machine guns.

If England had only conscripted her industrial workers for the past forty years, as Germany has done, compelled them to practice temperance, hygiene and right living for a period, compelled them to serve their country, without pay, except the acquisition of the knowledge that it is a duty that every man owes his country, then the British

workman would to-day have some love of country, some patriotism, some stamina, some temperance, some manhood.

The beer-soused British workman is a sort of social sediment. He is an underwhelm, a blood relative of England's vast pauper class. He is a greater menace to England than the mailed fist.

I do not refer to the better class of English artisans. I refer to the chronic discontented Apache of labor, whose drunken hand is clutching at Britannia's throat.

It would be more rational for the English to liberate the interned Germans and set them to work, and in their place intern the British agitators. The British labor strike pickets are more dangerous than German spies.

Nothing could be more suicidal than for this country to nationalize the manufacture of armaments and munitions of war, for if this were done, the supreme means, the indispensable means of defending the nation in time of war would be rendered unavailable.

Look at the pitiable plight of France when the war broke out. She was the one country among the Allies in which the manufacture of gunpowder was an exclusive government monopoly. She had no private manufacturers within her own borders experienced in making gunpowder that she could call upon for help in her great necessity. The entire organizing power, energies and resources of the Government had to be exerted to the utmost in actual national defense, and France had to call private American manufacturers of gunpowder to come to her rescue. The private powder makers of her British ally had vastly more than they could do to supply the requirements of their own country. But the manufacturers of guns, projectiles, and other engines and munitions of war had not been nationalized in France. Consequently, their large numbers of skilled labor, their great capital, and their great manufacturing facilities were ready immediately to come to the country's defense. Had these also been nationalized, France would have been helpless.

Had the manufacture of munitions and engines of war in this country been nationalized, we should have been un-

able to help France. We should have been unable to supply guns, gunpowder and projectiles to the Allies. More than a thousand million dollars have been poured into this country by the Allies for war supplies, with the result that the Allies have not been obliged to pay the penalty of their unpreparedness by defeat.

Nevertheless, they are paying a high price for their salvation, for we were more prepared than they, and have had to enlarge our factories for making war munitions many-fold; and as American manufacturers have learned from sad experience that the United States Government is most ungenerous, and that these enlarged facilities will be mainly useless when the present war is over, the Allies have had to pay a price for munitions high enough to pay for both the munitions and the enlargement of the plants necessary to make them. Some of the American manufacturers of war supplies have already multiplied their capacity and output ten-fold, some twenty-fold, and some even as high as forty-fold, while other manufacturers who had never before made guns or projectiles, are now making them by the million.

One of the most unexpected lessons of the war is that certain kinds of war materials can be made in this country, even with more expensive American labor, cheaper and better than they can be made in any foreign country, which means that we shall continue to sell largely war munitions to foreign nations after the present war is over; and another important lesson is that it pays to build and own a navy big enough to keep the seas open for all kinds of supplies that may be needed in time of war. The private manufacturers of the United States will be able, when this war is over, to turn out war supplies for our Government fifty times faster than could the Government and private manufacturers combined have done at the beginning of the war.

We now know that had war come upon us at the time the European War broke out, we should have been utterly helpless. Even after this war is over, with all our increased facilities, we should not be able to get ready to

stem the tide of invasion by any one of the Great Powers in less than from two to three years.

If the manufacture of war munitions should be nationalized, the American Government would indeed be killing the goose able to lay the golden egg of her salvation, for all of the immense capital, skilled labor and stupendous plants owned by private persons would be rendered unavailable and would either have to be duplicated by the Government at a fabulous cost, or else it would require fifty years to get ready to repel an invasion that might come any year.

Even should the Government expend the money necessary to erect the required plants for the production of war materials equal to our needs, the skilled labor could not be obtained for the work, unless the Government actually should conscript the skilled labor employed by present private manufacturers, which would mean the ruination of some of the biggest industries in the country.

If it be the hope of the pacifists to limit the production of armaments by nationalizing the manufacture of them, they would exactly defeat their purpose by such nationalization, for the Government would then be obliged either to discharge its skilled labor and dismantle its plants, or to go into and continue the manufacture of war munitions on a most stupendous scale, for the Government plants could not be employed, in times of peace, for the manufacture of other materials, as are private plants.

Dr. David Starr Jordan believes that armor-plate, guns, battleships, and ammunition should not be made by private manufacturers, but that, on the contrary, these things should be made exclusively by the Government, for he is of the opinion that manufacturers of war materials foment disorder and promote war in order to bring themselves more business.

Long association with the manufacturers of war materials, especially of explosive materials, has enabled me to know whereof I speak, and I do know that such a belief is the utterest nonsense. The manufacturers of war materials with whom I am acquainted are among the staunchest of peace men, and they would no more be guilty of

promoting war to bring themselves business than a reputable surgeon would be likely to string a cord across the street to trip up pedestrians and break their limbs in order to bring himself business.

In the treatment of human physical ailments, we should deem it folly to confound remedy with disease, and to hold the physician responsible for pestilence. No one would think of looking upon our science of sanitation and our quarantine system as breeders and harbingers of pestilence, and no one would think that our laws against crime and our system of police protection tend to foster crime. Yet such is the attitude of many well-intentioned but overzealous persons with respect to our naval and military system and armaments. They consider them breeders and harbingers of war.

An army and navy are merely a mighty quarantine system against the pestilence of war. We must fortify our shores, police our seas with armor-clads, and be prepared to patrol the skies with aëroplanes around our entire national horizon when the need may come.

But it is urged that the people are overburdened with the cost of maintaining armies and navies. Assuming that the burden is great, was it ever less? Was it ever so small as it is now, compared with the wealth of the people? Again, cannot we well afford to bear a considerable burden of armaments as an insurance against war, and as a further insurance that if war comes, it will be far less deadly than it would be without them?

If Dr. Jordan were better acquainted with the manufacture of war materials, he would know that they can be made more cheaply, with equal excellence, by private concerns, than by the Government. Furthermore, he would know that big manufacturers of war materials are obliged to employ a very large force of skilled labor, and that this labor has to be supplied employment when there are no government orders for war materials.

For example, the manufacture of armor-plate by the United States Steel Corporation is only a small part of that company's business. The manufacture of guns and

armor-plate by the Bethlehem Steel Company does not keep it constantly occupied, and it has to furnish other employment for its men when Government orders are not forthcoming. Consequently, it is obliged to make things besides armor-plate and guns and war materials.

The du Pont explosives companies do a far larger business in high explosives and smokeless powders for commercial purposes than they do for Government purposes. The du Ponts manufacture half a billion pounds of commercial high explosives every year.

When the present European War broke out, the du Ponts had, therefore, an army of artisans skilled in the manufacture of explosive materials. They had on hand and available stupendous quantities of raw materials. This made it possible for them to increase their capacity for making smokeless powder merely by increasing the units of their plants. This was done quickly, with the result that their capacity has been multiplied many-fold.

The same thing is true with the Union Metallic Cartridge Company. Their capacity has been increased ten-fold. By September it will have been increased twenty-fold, and by mid-winter thirty-fold, and within a year, if the present war continues, their capacity will probably be increased at least forty-fold.

Such a thing as this would have been utterly impossible for the United States Government.

If the manufacture of war materials were to be confined entirely to government shops, then the Government would truly have to promote war to keep its employees busy. At any rate, the Government would have to maintain a large labor force, making war materials alone, for the Government could not devote itself to the manufacture of automobiles, chairs, cloth, artificial leather, dynamite, sporting powder, and the like, for commercial purposes, as private manufacturers do.

There is another reason why the private manufacturers of war materials should be encouraged by the Government, and it is that, in the event of war, the Government would find the large capital and plants of the wealthy Steel Trust,

the Bethlehem Steel Company, and the du Ponts available for the purpose of national defense in addition to the Government's own resources. This is very important.

The battle of Lake Erie was quite as much a du Pont victory as a Perry victory; for the resources, energy and generalship of the du Pont Powder Company overcame inconceivable difficulties, carted the powder from Wilmington, Delaware, all the way overland to Lake Erie, and got it there on time.

Perhaps the most important lesson that has been taught by the present war is the immensely larger quantity of war munitions and war engines that are needed than were ever thought could be needed before the war broke out.

It is estimated that the Germans failed in their calculations by three hundred per cent.—that they actually require three times as much of war supplies as they had expected, while the Allies missed the mark in their calculations by about a thousand per cent., for they need more than ten times the quantity of war munitions that they had expected they would want.

After the beginning of the war, the first order that the U. M. C. Cartridge Company received from the British Government was for only twenty million rounds of small arms ammunition. England is now ordering small arms ammunition by the billion rounds.

It has been found that the only way an entrenched enemy can be disentranced and driven back is to storm his positions with a tornado of high explosive shell-fire—as Lloyd George, the British Minister of Munitions, expresses it by actually spraying the trenches of the enemy with high explosive projectiles.

Lloyd George tells us that the Germans actually throw 200,000 explosive shells upon the trenches of the Russians in one hour.

If the Allies drive the Germans back from France and Belgium to their frontiers, it can only be done at such a cost in ammunition as to make the mind stagger.

First the enemy must be disembarrowed by actually blasting him out of his trenches, with their complete demo-

lition by means of a continuous and rapid plunging fire of high explosive shells. When this is done, the infantry advances under the cover of an actual canopy of shrapnel shell directed at the farther positions of the enemy to protect the advancing troops, who, on reaching the destroyed trenches of the enemy, dig themselves into the ground, forming new trenches, whose walls are not all of earth, but also of shell fragments and the dead bodies of the foe.

Every rod of the terrain between Arras and the German frontier must be blasted up in this way if the Germans are ever to be driven back thus far.

The pacifists have delved out of the infinite latency a very startling alleged truth, which they are effulging in language of lavish luminosity, to the effect that it is necessary only for a man to have a pecuniary interest or personal advantage involved in order to commit any kind of crime. They have discovered that room for a motive establishes the motive and proves the crime. They have discovered that those things which we call integrity and honor and conscience are no deterrents whatsoever to the commission of the most heinous offenses against one's fellow men, so long as there is profit in it.

They believe that, if only there is money in the game, an inventor or manufacturer or merchant will scheme for the commission of wholesale poisoning, maiming and murder. They believe that the inventors and manufacturers of guns necessarily foster war in order to promote the sale of their wares. They surmise that inventors and manufacturers of smokeless powders and high explosives are capable of standing with the "black hand," capable of being gladdened at the dynamite outrage, at the street riot, at the slaughter of song-birds—anything that will consume dynamite or burn gunpowder.

According to the pacifists, the principal lay of makers of war-materials is to connive with the officers of the army and navy to stir up international dissension and foment war, in order to create a demand for their products. The pacifists believe that army and navy officers are only too

willing to coöperate in the nefarious business, because war brings higher pay and rapid promotion. They believe that it matters not to these "interested parties" how many of their countrymen are sacrificed on the firing line, or how many widows and orphans are made. The groans of the wounded and dying on the battlefield, and the lamentations in the desolated home, are music to the ears of those who supply the war-materials; for, with every shot from a rifle, fifty grains of gunpowder are burned, while bullets enough miss their mark to equal the weight of each man they kill. Consequently, there is substantial profit to the cartridge-maker and the gunpowder-manufacturer for every man killed with a rifle ball.

But it is in shrapnel and the ammunition for the big guns that the greatest profit lies. Field-guns fire away ammunition costing from ten to twenty dollars a shot, at the rate of from twenty to forty shots a minute. This costs a lot of money.

As I have already mentioned, according to Lloyd George, the Germans, in one hour, fired 300,000 high explosive projectiles upon the Russian trenches. Think of the expense of that ammunition, and the profit to the manufacturers!

It is estimated that when the big naval guns are fired, the cost of the smokeless-powder charge, the projectile and bursting charge, together with the wear and tear of the gun, amounts to more than \$2,000 a shot, and the damage done to a warship hit may be millions.

Look at it any way you will, war, according to the pacifist notion, is a real Klondike for manufacturers of war-materials. The peace sophists have been able to put two and two together, with the conclusion that such an opportunity for profit is too strong for human nature to resist, and that, as they have found room for the motive, they have proved the crime.

Of course, their accusation is a pretty severe arraignment of human nature, after all these years of civilization and Christian enlightenment. It is strange how human nature can have improved so much lately, as claimed by the pacifists, and how the spirit of brotherhood and good-

will can have suddenly become so dominant that the peoples of the earth now despise war, and are so afflicted with the horrors of it that, just as soon as the great European War is over, they are not going to fight any more, while still the makers of war-materials remain in the primitive savagery of the stone age.

It seems to me, that, if human nature has so improved as to be an efficient bar to a nation against waging war for plunder, regardless of the advantage and the profit, it ought also to be a similar bar to inventors and manufacturers of war-materials, and to army and navy officers, against precipitating war for pecuniary or personal advantage.

But, according to pacifist reasoning, those "interested parties" are more endowed with the spirit of the hyena than with the spirit of brotherhood. Perhaps, however, the manufacturers of war-materials and army and navy officers were not home when the great improvement in human nature knocked at their door.

If considerations of mere personal profit are sufficient to make the best of us foster war, which the peace fanatics esteem wholesale murder, it is strange that the inventors and manufacturers of drugs and medicines, the proprietors of drug-stores, and the medical profession and undertakers, do not form a league and coöperate in spreading infectious diseases, in order to create a greater demand for their wares and for their services.

Of course, the reason may be that they have not yet thought of it, and it may be wrong for me to suggest the thing to them. Still, it is queer that it has not been suggested to them by what the pacifists have said concerning the conduct of our army and navy officers and of the inventors and manufacturers of war-materials.

Let us see what the facts actually are:

The inventors and manufacturers of war-materials and our army and navy officers, by virtue of the study and experience that qualify them for their business or profession better than others, are also qualified better than others to judge what are our actual needs for national defense.

The education of our army and navy officers teaches them not alone military science, but also national devotion and personal honor. Devotion to duty is necessary in order to keep them in the service, under the altogether inadequate pay they receive. The pay of the American army and navy officers is smaller, in proportion to their knowledge and the value of their services, than that of any other class of men in the country.

If every army and navy officer should abandon the service for a position in civil life when he could get a raise of wages for so doing, there would not be a corporal's guard left in the service.

Whenever a public work is placed in charge of an army or navy officer, there is no *sub-rosa* rake-off, or divvy with civilian contractors. There is absolutely no graft of any kind in their service, and the Government is sure of getting the maximum amount of work for the minimum cost. Not one cent of graft has fallen upon the palms of either Colonel Goethals or of any other army officer in the whole course of construction of that mighty work—the Panama Canal. New York City tried to get Colonel Goethals as Police Commissioner. He has received scores of offers of positions in civil life at many times his present salary, because of the military capacity and honor that make the Goethals sort of service very valuable.

I know many army and navy men intimately. I have had opportunities of hearing their off-guard conversations, and interchange of ideas on all manner of subjects, and have thereby been enabled to see their character revealed to the naked soul, and I have never yet discovered any other attitude or tendency among them than the emulation of exactly that type of honor, efficiency, and manhood which is Colonel Goethals'.

I cannot award this same high praise to the politicians I have known.

An army or navy officer always drives just as close a bargain as he can on behalf of the Government when doing business with civilians, although the economics of the transaction is of no personal concern to him.

When a politician makes a bargain, his first consideration is, "Where do I come in?" His next consideration is, "Where does the party come in?" Duty to the Government is a minor consideration.

It is the demand for a thing that leads to its invention, just as it is the demand for a thing that leads to its manufacture. The demand must precede the production.

When the inventor designs a gun, or invents a new explosive, he does not simultaneously try to invent ways and means of creating a market. He may, on the contrary, be inspired with a spirit of patriotism, and feel that in the event of war his work will be of signal service to his country, both by killing his country's enemies and by saving the lives of his own people.

The manufacturers of war-materials are much more likely to be actuated by honorable motives, and to make large sacrifices from a spirit of patriotism, than are the manufacturers of soap, agricultural machinery or automobiles.

The builders of Ericsson's *Monitor* were not able to get the Government either to approve or to back the enterprise. They were, however, fortunately inspired by a high spirit of patriotism, and by a strong belief in Ericsson's invention; consequently they built it at their own expense.

It was completed just in the nick of time. The terrible *Merrimac* appeared before the *Monitor* was quite ready. She could laugh at forts, and the projectiles from the guns of our wooden navy glanced off her mailed sides like rain-drops off a duck's back. Whether she would be able to run up the Potomac and bombard Washington, was a question only of the depth of water.

The little coterie of bureaucrats in Washington, who had ridiculed the fantastic innovation of Ericsson, were now on Uneasy Street, and sent urgent appeals for the *Monitor* to be made ready and sent to Hampton Roads with all speed. The peculiar craft did arrive on the morning of the second day of the naval fight. The result is one of the good stories of history—a story that has never been quite equaled in fiction.

The *Monitor* had not yet been accepted by the Government when she fought the *Merrimac*; she had not yet received the Government's approval. A country Reuben, who saw a giraffe for the first time at a circus, looked the animal over, and, finding that it did not conform to his ideas of what an animal ought to be, remarked, "By gum, there ain't no sich critter!" Likewise, the naval experts at Washington did not believe that there could be any such fighting-ship.

After that fight, however, the *Monitor* was quickly purchased, and hurried orders were given for more *Monitors*. The patriotism and pluck of the warship-builders saved the country.

At the time of the Spanish War, we were still very largely in the old black gunpowder age. We had only partially adopted smokeless powder. Of course, every other civilized nation on the planet had adopted smokeless powder years before that time. So it was that the Government ordered a large quantity of brown prismatic cannon powder from the du Pont Powder Company. The Government made the price and the du Ponts accepted it—that is to say, the du Ponts undertook the manufacture of the powder at the Government's own price.

However, after they had got well into the manufacture of the powder, they discovered that they could make it for several cents a pound less than they had expected to be able to produce it. The du Pont Company immediately reduced the price of the powder to the Government on its own volition, and right in war time.

In urging the nationalization of all manufacture of war-materials, that is to say, that all such materials should be made at Government plants, the object is to have the work done by disinterested persons who will not be tempted to promote war in order to make a market for those materials.

By admirable inconsistency, the pacifists would, in so doing, place the manufacture of war-materials in the hands of army and navy officers, whom they pronounce the most pernicious of all promoters of war.

Before Congress acts upon the suggestion of the pacifists

to nationalize the manufacture of all war-materials, it would be well to see what would have happened in the past, had the thing been done sooner. We can judge from that concerning the advisability of adopting the measure now.

If it had been adopted at the time of the Civil War, Ericsson's *Monitor* never would have been built, because its building depended upon private personal patriotism and private enterprise.

If the measure had been adopted twenty-five years ago, then naturally, during that period, private invention and private enterprise would have been eliminated, and the Government would not have profited from civilian genius and energy.

Let us see, then, what private invention and private enterprise have done for the Government for the past quarter-century, since the advent of smokeless powder.

Colonel E. G. Buckner, vice-president of the du Pont Powder Company, in an article in *Harper's Weekly*, of June 27, 1915, places the credit for the four most important inventions in the development of smokeless powder—first, to Vieille, of France, who produced guncotton; second, to Mendeléeff, of Russia, who told us how to colloid it; third, to Francis G. du Pont, who eliminated danger in the manufacture; and, fourth, to Hudson Maxim, who invented the multi-perforated grain that gave absolute control over the burning.

It will be seen that two of the most important steps in the development of smokeless powder were made by American civilian inventors. The alcohol replacement invention of Francis G. du Pont and my own invention of the multi-perforated grain, rendered possible the use of a colloid of pure nitro-cellulose as a smokeless cannon-powder. It would be absolutely impossible successfully to make a pure nitro-cellulose cannon powder without these two inventions.

If the manufacture of smokeless powder had been nationalized twenty-five years ago, this Government would not stand, as it stands to-day, ahead of all other governments, in the excellence of its smokeless powder.

When the Government first ordered a pure nitro-cellu-

lose large quantities of solvents were consumed in its preparation. Private manufacturers introduced new processes to overcome this difficulty, resulting in a material reduction in the cost of the powder, which has already effected a saving to the Government of more than \$2,000,000.

It is a peculiarity of smokeless powder that, regardless of however stable it may be when first made, it gradually begins to decompose after long standing, which, until recently, necessitated its destruction. Several years ago, however, Mr. Francis I. du Pont, son of the Francis G. du Pont previously mentioned, invented a process for the successful reworking of a smokeless powder that has begun to decompose, at a mere fraction of the original cost, making it just as good as ever. This invention alone will hereafter save the Government more than a million dollars a year.

When the new army rifle was developed, it was found that the smokeless powder then used by the army, containing nitroglycerin, was so erosive as to destroy the accuracy of the arm when only 1,600 rounds had been fired. The Government obtained from abroad some smokeless powder, which enabled 3,000 rounds to be fired before the gun was destroyed, but after that number of rounds, the rifling was practically obliterated.

The du Ponts invented a new smokeless rifle-powder, with process and apparatus for its manufacture. With this powder, it is now possible to fire as high as 20,000 rounds before the accuracy of the gun is destroyed. This invention easily multiplies the life of the army rifle by six.

As the army rifle will now last six times as long by the use of this powder as it would by the use of any other powder, the value of the invention to the Government is by far the chief value of the gun itself. Consequently, it is estimated that this invention alone represents a value for the guns that the Government now has on hand of more than \$15,000,000.

Not only does our small-arms powder effect a great saving in the wear and tear of our shoulder-rifles, but also

our pure nitro-cellulose cannon-powder effects a similar saving in the life of our big guns. Our big guns, using pure nitro-cellulose powder, last, with equal accuracy, more than twice as long as British guns, which use cordite.

It will be seen from the foregoing considerations and figures that private genius and private enterprise alone have saved the Government very many millions of dollars.

Of course, it may be argued that, since guns and ammunition and all kinds of military implements and engines have been perfected, there is not now room for civilian inventors to be so useful to the Government during the next twenty-five years as they have been in the past twenty-five.

A similar attitude of the average mind would have existed had the same question been raised twenty-five years ago. When our Patent Office was first established, the Commissioner of Patents predicted that within fifty years everything possible of invention would have been invented and that then the Patent Office would have to be abolished for lack of business. The number of inventions received by the Patent Office, however, has rapidly increased, and is still rapidly increasing. More inventions are received now each year at the Patent Office than were received during the first fifty years of its existence. The reason for this is that every invention, either directly or indirectly, creates a demand for other inventions. The inventor is still working in virgin soil, and the room for invention is infinite.

If the manufacture of war-materials were to be nationalized not only would the Government rob itself of the aid of large quasi-government manufactories, but also it would rob itself of the benefits of the inventive genius of the whole people. The value of that genius may be approximated by recalling what citizen inventions have done since the outbreak of the American Civil War.

Breech-loading guns of all kinds, the percussion cap, cartridges for small arms, fixed ammunition for quick-firing guns, the breech mechanism for all guns, the built-up gun, the great improvements in steel manufacture, the revolving turret and the *Monitor* type of fighting-ship, the

steam turbine, the internal-combustion engine, all of the great inventions in smokeless powder and high explosives, and their adaptability to use in ordnance, the submarine torpedo-boat, the self-propelled torpedo, the aëroplane and the dirigible, and any number of other inventions indispensable to modern warfare, have been the invention of civilians.

Of course, army and navy officers have invented a great many important things themselves, and have rendered great service in the development of civilian inventions. But it must be remembered that army and navy officers constitute but a very small part of the population. Even were army and navy men ten times more proficient in the invention of war-materials than civilian inventors, the number and value of civilian naval and military inventions would preponderate enormously over those of Government officers.

We have been assured all along by the peace sophists that, if war should come, the great American genius would rise to the occasion and spring to our rescue, with all manner of destructive contrivances, capable of annihilating armies and sweeping fleets of fighting-ships off the seas.

If the beautiful nationalization plan of the peace sophists, however, were to be carried out, the great American genius would get no opportunity to fructify the prophesied militant cataclysmic ogreism to the discomfiture of our enemies.

No other government has nationalized the manufacture of armaments and war-materials to the exclusion of private manufacturers. On the contrary, other governments strongly encourage private manufacturers, for they realize the vast importance of drawing upon the inventive genius of the whole people, and of enlisting private energy, private enterprise, and private capital in government work.

The French Government for more than a hundred years has made all its own gunpowder, but its chief gun-works are private enterprises. Possibly, if the French smokeless powder had been perfected by private enterprise to meet government requirements, those requirements would have

been more exacting with private manufacturers than with government manufacturers, and the battleships *Jéna* and *La Liberté* would not have been blown up by the spontaneous combustion of bad gunpowder.

If this Government were to nationalize the manufacture of its war-materials, we know, by what has been done in the past, through private enterprise and private inventive genius, that the Government would suffer enormously.

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING ADDRESS BY MR. MAXIM

Mr. Angell: It is not so much a question I want to ask but rather to see how we can benefit from the talks last night and this morning. Mr. Maxim is a most genial talker. He can teach us a great deal, and we should try to see where the real difference is and how to harmonize the fact that an acute, able, very human and likable person like Mr. Maxim is brought to conclusions so far from ours. I think our difficulty is quite sincere, we are both for security, and, I think, both for peace.

Mr. Maxim: I am against a bad war and for a good war.

Mr. Angell: A bad war on the other man's part and a good one on ours. That is the real difficulty. Anyway, we are all for security. Mr. Maxim says the way to be secure is to be stronger, if possible, than the prospective enemy. That is a familiar maxim, to be stronger than one's prospective enemy, so that he won't dare to attack us. That would be perfectly good if the enemy did not also try it.

Go to two nations, individuals or groups desiring to keep the peace, how shall they keep it? Mr. Maxim says they will certainly keep it if each is stronger than the other. We must apply the maxim to both sides. I submit very humbly that you have here an insoluble problem, so long as you confine it to armaments. So long as you say the only measure of security must be that, it cannot in its nature give security. Could preparedness on both sides have prevented this war? They cannot establish a balance; who is to fix it? Each fixes it for himself and

must try to give the benefit to himself, which means trying to be a little bit stronger than the other; therefore the balance goes by the board. By whatever road you may travel you get to that insoluble dilemma, you cannot have peace nor security by merely saying, Let everybody be as much prepared as he can. That does not solve the question. We all wish that we could solve it. We desire it, but we consider that everything that Mr. Maxim has said does not contribute to that. "If you quarrel my job is to give you instruments whereby you can have a better chance than the other fellow." Unfortunately here is the muddle of Mr. Maxim's book.

I appeal here to human nature as does Mr. Maxim. If you put your main emphasis on being stronger than the other fellow, you set up a certain collective psychology, become a militarist in the long run, which makes it practically impossible to solve the moral difficulty by other means. The truth demonstrated by this war is that with full preparedness you get a psychology rendering it practically impossible to settle disputes except by fighting. It is a mechanical thing simply to be stronger than the other fellow and use your strength. For us poor humans it is difficult to see the justice and consideration of the other fellow's view. Militarism excludes this possibility.

I am very glad Mr. Maxim has given due credit to the Germans in all their efforts in this war. In Germany the militaristic doctrine has been given a very good trial. The outcome of all this morality which the Germans have been inculcating for forty years, this conception has, after all this sacrifice and heroism, resulted in the loss of the *Lusitania*. There is the point. There is where the militarist doctrine must unfortunately inevitably lead. Poor human nature—it was not quite good enough. But we did not want to establish in this world of ours a morality which must end in that way. Unfortunately that is the outcome; I think Mr. Maxim admits that. Where you use force there must be force everywhere. Mr. Maxim says the quick-firing gun is the greatest life-saver ever invented. The Germans, however, said the greatest life-saver is poisonous gas. If

you must be effective your instruments must be effective and you must not boggle at the drowning of women and children. The Germans did not boggle, they believe in force.

It is not good enough. We must stop somewhere, must break this vicious circle. We do not know just how we can do it. We are trying to find the way. None of us is infallible, not even the best of us, we realize that reason is a poor instrument when the savage breaks out; that is why we want to control this thing. We do not want to let this psychology of force run away with us. We do not want to discount these facts but to find a solution of this very difficult problem.

I never knew a real, true-blue militarist who believed in national efficiency, who did not also believe in the disparagement of every real effort which may be made to render military effort unnecessary. That is their attitude towards constructive efforts to peace, efforts which only can in the long run solve this problem. I am sure if we must take the two risks between foreign government and standing for the kind of government that has resulted in the *Lusitania*, we will prefer the former. I do not believe this is the choice, but if it is I think we will choose government by foreigners. But we are trying to find another way out of this dilemma. It is a difficult task but we are trying to do it. The essential agreement between us is that we both desire security. Mr. Maxim's way involves great material and moral risks which he is prepared to take. We do not fear the material risk, we do desire to avoid the moral risk.

Mr. Crook: It is a great pleasure to me as an Englishman to hear for the first time in my life the great military inventor, one who, according to his own statement, stands for peace. It was a great pleasure because it has crystallized in my own mind and, I think, in yours the very definite difference between his point of view and ours. I will touch upon this in four points.

The modern type of armament, according to Mr. Maxim, is a life-saver! To us it means that to achieve the destruc-

tion of the largest number of the enemy we ourselves are slaughtered. By these new life-saving implements we have come to a point where our best men, physically, mentally and spiritually, are the main expense in such a war, so that we have to pay in loss of humanity, as never before in history.

I think Mr. Maxim did not speak with full knowledge when he spoke of the British workman. There are conditions at home in my own country which produce men who know simply how to work year by year, who do not even know what it means to have a country to fight for. We can hardly wonder that these men die when they are working eighty hours a week for seven months. When these men take to drink can you be surprised? Especially when they know that this armament is not solely and wholly for their country but is often supplying countries that may be enemies of their own nation? There is one great force in the world that is thoroughly international; it is the manufacture of munitions for private profit. Can you wonder that we are calling for better labor conditions, and demanding the nationalization of our armaments to keep these free from capitalist interests, so that there shall not be a force growing up all over the world tending towards war?

I have felt that the time has come when patriotism is not bound by any particular country, when the boundaries are not of race or blood. The time has come with idealists and pacifists when they must form new alliances, believing that we are prepared to build up our manhood, to stand up and face a radical conclusion and throw off the old type which is still found in the majority. Where is that old type of Christian martyr who was prepared to meet death and to see his sweetheart slain for the ideal of Christ? The right to die and not to kill is the idea of the Peace Conference.

Mr. Trufant: Mr. Nasmyth asks, what is the reply to this statement: "Righteousness must be put before peace, peace must be the handmaiden of justice"? I do not think anyone will doubt that. Justice must be the basis of all our human relations. Justice must be behind all our actions. I have one consideration that comes to me now. My actions come from two sources, emotion and reason. A man's

emotion is automatic before all his actions. We must try to have emotion controlled, that is, by reason. If we think of each and every individual as an individual part, not of one state, but of the whole world then we have a combined sense of enlightened self-interest working for the benefit of all humans, all humanity. I believe that the history of the human race bears out the fact that all reason tells us, that each individual is a part not of the state but of the world.

Dr. Nasmyth: The point is we want real justice, not the enforcement of a one-sided conception of what is justice. Under the present system of international anarchy, enforcing righteousness and justice too often means that each nation tries to be advocate, judge, sheriff and executioner in its own cause. Each nation in the Great War is profoundly convinced of the righteousness and justice of the cause for which it is fighting. Only through the establishment of a world court of justice can we enthrone true righteousness and justice.

Mr. Maxim: I cannot argue with what Mr. Crook said. A man who is willing to see his sweetheart murdered before his eyes is beyond me.

Now as to Mr. Angell. I have read his book. He is in exact agreement with me. He believes we should arm, as I have advised, until that system comes which I was the first to promulgate, an international system. I will read you an extract from the Bible, or rather my book: "What shall the end be? Is it possible to prescribe a remedy for war? . . ."

I do not expect the balance Mr. Angell is speaking of. Until the other nations have lined up with the Anglo-Saxon let us be so prepared that if there is trouble we shall not be hurt. Let me mention some of those in agreement with me. Last winter I spoke with Hamilton Holt, he is in exact agreement with me. I also spoke with Elder. He is in exact agreement with me. Baron d'Estournelles is not in agreement with me. I spoke with Stead, Hill, Angell, all in agreement with me. Cadman said, "I want you all to rise and give a hurrah for Mr. Maxim," after I spoke there. They were good church people, too.

CHAPTER V

A LEAGUE OF PEACE

SECTION I

THE LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE *

By Mr. Hamilton Holt

THE peace movement is the process of substituting law for war. Peace follows justice, justice follows law, law follows political organization. The world has already achieved peace through justice, law and political organization in hamlets, towns, cities, states and even in the forty-six sovereign civilized nations of the world. But in that international realm over and above each nation, in which each nation is equally sovereign, the only way for a nation to secure its rights is by the use of force. Force, therefore—or war as it is called when exerted by a nation against another nation—is at present the only final method

* The League To Enforce Peace, American Branch, was organized in Philadelphia on June 17, 1915, and the articles were signed by one hundred and twenty of the most representative men of the United States. The platform of the League is as follows:

It is desirable for the United States to join a league of nations binding the signatories to the following:

First: All justiciable questions arising between the signatory powers, not settled by negotiation, shall, subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdiction of the question.

Second: All other questions arising between the signatories and not settled by negotiation, shall be submitted to a council of conciliation for hearing, consideration and recommendation.

Third: The signatory powers shall jointly use forthwith both their economic and military forces against any one of their number that goes to war, or commits acts of hostility, against another of the signatories before any question arising shall be submitted as provided in the foregoing.

Fourth: Conferences between the signatory powers shall be held from time to time to formulate and codify rules of international law, which, unless some signatory shall signify its dissent within a stated period, shall thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial Tribunal mentioned in Article One.

For a discussion of the League To Enforce Peace see the October and November, 1915, issues of the *International Policy News*, which may be obtained from the secretary of the Federation of International Policy Clubs, 40 Mt. Vernon Street, Boston, Mass. Information in regard to the League may be secured from the office of the League, 70 Fifth Avenue, New York City.

Unfortunately no stenographic report was made of Mr. Holt's address at the conference. This is an address which he delivered at the Lake Mohonk Conference on May 25, 1915, and it is substantially the same as the one he gave at Cornell.—THE EDITOR.

of settling international differences. In other words, the nations are in that state of civilization to-day where, without a qualm, they claim the right to settle their disputes in a manner which they would actually put their own subjects to death for imitating. The peace problem, then, is nothing but the problem of finding ways and means of doing between the nations what has already been done within the nations. International law follows private law. The "United Nations" follow the United States.

International law is no further developed to-day than private law was in the tenth century. Then if two men had a dispute they could go either to some priest or judge appointed by the king, or else go out on the field of battle and fight it out. Either course was sanctioned by the state. If the appeal was to the field of battle the judge by law was compelled to adjourn his court, go out and sit on the grand stand as it were, watch the fight and render a verdict in favor of the winner, the theory being that God would not let the guilty man win. Yet this infamous doctrine continued for six centuries after the birth of the British Constitution and the jury system. So wars are likely to continue after we have our courts and parliaments. The nations are now in the same state of progress that individuals were when trial by battle was in vogue. They can go to The Hague, or seek self-redress, which is war. Already they have been sixteen times to The Hague and settled amicably sixteen cases, some of which might otherwise have led to war. The seventeenth time they preferred to fight it out. But even so the vote is sixteen to one in favor of the court of reason.

It was consideration of the foregoing nature I suppose, that led the great German philosopher, Immanuel Kant, to say in 1795 in his famous essay, "Perpetual Peace," that we never can have universal peace until the world is politically organized and it will never be possible to organize the world politically until the people, not the kings, rule. And he added that the peoples of the earth must cultivate and attain the spirit of hospitality and good will towards all races and nations.

If this be the true philosophy of peace, then when the Great War is over, and the stricken sobered peoples set about to rear a new civilization on the ashes of the old, they cannot hope to abolish war unless they are prepared to extend democracy everywhere, to banish hatred from their hearts, and to organize the international realm on a basis of law rather than force.

The questions of the extension of democracy and the cultivation of benevolence are domestic ones. But the political organization of the world—that must be brought about by the joint action of the governments of the world and there, and there only can the United States exert any influence outside of its own boundaries.

If we must have a world federation, then what form is it likely to take? James Bryce, the author of the greatest book ever written on the United States, says all the nations in the world, some slowly and some quickly, but all with unresting feet, are coming to adopt the American form of government.

What is the American form of government? Over one hundred years ago when our forefathers joined together to form the United States of America, the State of New York and the State of Virginia each had its separate navy. But, on joining the Union, they abolished their separate navies or their right to say whatever they wanted to say by force in interstate affairs, and in return they were guaranteed home rule and local autonomy by the combined power of all the other states. Thus the United States is founded not on the principle of home rule, but on sacrifice, or the duty of sovereigns to sacrifice a part of their sovereignty whenever the general welfare demands it.

But the inexorable logic of political events, which brought forth the United States of America so long ago, has been working—and at an accelerating rate—ever since. Not only has our success as a democracy and our example to the nations of the world been before humanity all this time, but new forces hitherto undreamed of have come into existence that make for world organization and for peace.

Thus the inventions of steam and electricity, to mention

only the most important factors by annihilating time and space, have actually made the world smaller in this year 1915 than the thirteen colonies were in 1776. Then news travelled no faster than people. Now the President of the United States has sent a cablegram around the world and back again to himself at Washington in less than ten minutes. Then Boston and Charleston were farther from New York than is London or Vienna to-day. Indeed the United States is in closer touch at this minute, intellectually, financially, or even physically, with any nation of Europe or Asia, than was the State of New York with Vermont or Maryland in 1776. But as the United States came into existence by the establishment of the Articles of Confederation and the Continental Congress, so the "United Nations" has come into existence by the establishment of The Hague Court and the recurring Hague Conferences, The Hague Court being the promise of the Supreme Court of the world and The Hague Conferences being the prophecy of the parliament of man. We may look with confidence, therefore, to a future in which the world will have an established court with jurisdiction over all questions, self-governing conferences with power to legislate on all affairs of common concern, and an executive power of some form to carry on the decrees of both. To deny this is to ignore all the analogies of private law and the whole trend of the world's political history since the Declaration of Independence.

Is the time ripe, then, for Tennyson's dream of world federation? Not yet. The Federation of the World must still be a dream for many years to come. There are too many medieval nations in the world.

The immediate establishment of a League of Peace, however, would in fact constitute a first step toward world federation and does not perhaps offer insuperable difficulties. Possibly there are enough nations now in existence who either through the suffering of war or political evolution are ready here and now to organize in advance of the others for peace and disarmament, for I take it that if enough nations joined the League the movement for the

limitation of armaments could then for the first time in history begin.

The problem of the League of Peace is chiefly the problem of the use of force. Force, internationally expressed, is measured in armaments. The chief discussion which has been waged for the past decade between the pacifists and militarists has been over the question of armaments. The militarists claim that armaments insure national safety. The pacifists declare they inevitably lead to war. Both disputants insist that the present war furnishes irrefutable proof of their contentions.

As is usual in cases of this kind the shield has two sides. The confusion has arisen from a failure to recognize the threefold function of force:

1. Force used for the maintenance of order—police force.
2. Force used for attack—aggression.
3. Force used to neutralize aggression—defense.

Police force is almost wholly good. Offense is almost wholly bad. Defense is a necessary evil, and exists simply to neutralize force employed for aggression.

The problem of the peace movement is how to abolish the use of force for aggression and yet maintain it for police purposes. Force for defense will of course automatically cease when force for aggression is abolished.

How can the nations of the League therefore have the protection that force brings and at the same time disarm? Unless they can solve that paradox, they will have to admit that it is a law of nature that war is to consume all the fruits of progress.

Let the League of Peace be formed, then, on the principle of the United States as to the nations within the League and on the principle of England as to the nations outside the League. Let me explain. When the various States joined our Union, the amount of taxes they paid into the Federal Treasury was less pro rata than what they paid towards the support of their own army and navy when they were separate colonies. In other words, the various states in a very real sense limited their armaments when they joined our Union, while in return they got greater

protection. Let the League of Nations agree to follow the same principle. Let the nations composing it agree to arbitrate their differences and then disarm to the point of safety as we did. What is the point of safety? Evidently where the forces of the League are greater than any nation or alliance likely to use force against it. That is the principle of England. England has a navy equal to any two nations likely to be brought against her. Let the League, therefore, use arbitration and a proportional disarmament to the safety point with the nations in the League, and force against the nations outside the League that will not forswear force.

The following analogy will make the problem clearer. Suppose that instead of taking forty-six armed nations struggling to keep the peace of the world by their own unaided efforts, we take forty-six men who have neighboring ranches on the same frontier country where the only semblance of law is the *posse comitatus*. The rights and interests of these men overlap, and each man, carrying a weapon as he does, is quick to resent any infringement of what he considers his rights.

Now suppose some fifteen of the most intelligent get together and decide to keep the peace. How do they do it? Not by agreeing severally with each other to treaties of arbitration. Nothing of the sort. They form a League of Defense and say woe betide any man who breaks the peace. If there are enough of them, and they are sufficiently armed, they will keep the peace; otherwise they may all get killed.

But assuming they are strong enough. At first they will have to carry their weapons as before but gradually the weaker men will ask to join the League in order to get greater protection. Then the combined armament of the League, instead of increasing with the addition of new members, will decrease because the number of men who could possibly attack it will have diminished. As more and more see the better way and join the League, its armament will decrease—always keeping a trifle larger than the equipment of any possible combination of foes—until two

or three armed men will keep the peace of the whole community.

Applying this illustration to the nations, it is evident that if a majority of the eight great powers of the world join a League of Peace—that will be sufficient, because most of the smaller nations will have to join for the greater protection afforded.

But what effect will this have on the outside nations? Will not parties in the outside nations at once see the immense gain of being in the League through the greater assurance of peace by arbitration and the vastly lightened expenses for armaments? As each nation entered, will there not be a pro rata reduction of the forces of the League? The progress towards the ultimate reduction of our present armaments to a mere international police would naturally be gradual, but it would be much quicker than to wait until all the nations become sufficiently civilized to give up voluntarily their armaments all at one time.

This is in outline the League of Peace. Will it be accomplished when the great war is over? No human being knows. But the theory, I believe, is correct.

Already there are several groups in England and on the Continent working out the basis for a League of Peace. One of the groups is so close to the British Government that it would almost seem that England is ready to join in such a movement if launched under proper auspices.

In conclusion, it would seem to be the manifest destiny of the United States to lead in the establishment of such a league. The United States is the world in miniature. The United States is a demonstration to the world that all the races and peoples of the earth can live in peace under one form of government, and its chief value to civilization is a demonstration of what this form of government is. And when we get the League of Peace, we shall find it will not satisfy the world any more than did the Articles of Confederation satisfy our forefathers. As they had abandoned their Confederation and established a more perfect Union, so we shall have to develop our League of Peace into that



Conference on International Relations—Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.

ON STEPS—Frazee, Wisconsin; Reeves, Texas; Hall, Columbia—Campbell, Vanderbilt; Yang, Columbia; Burgum, Dartmouth—Davis, Columbia; Trufant, Tulane; Moses, Wisconsin; Miller, Columbia; Hixenbaugh, Nebraska.

THIRD ROW, left to right—Brown, Columbia; Clapp, Minn. Ag.; Benedict, Vassar; Neuhaus, Vassar; Davis, Harvard; Fitz, Boston; Karsten, Columbia; Cunningham, N. Y. U.; Newman, Cornell; Levy, Missouri; Crook, Harvard; Hudson, Missouri; Rice, Harvard; Coffman, Wisconsin; Garner, Vanderbilt; McCaul, Rochester; Sarbaugh, Michigan; Tomiyama, Columbia; Himstedt, Illinois; Wythe, Texas; Taylor, Illinois; Branine, Kansas; Grutezmacher, Minn.; Earle, Columbia; Lindstrom, Minn.; Lozier, Missouri; Ballinger, Minn. Ag.; Roosa, Syracuse; Robinson, Columbia; Petchtle, Columbia.

SECOND ROW, left to right—Smith, Cornell; Chen, Cornell; Dickenson, Syracuse; Gray, Syracuse; Gabel, Syracuse; Foulk, Michigan; Woods, Wellesley; McCaul, Rochester; Blanco-Morales, Cornell; Norman Angell; Nasmyth, Harvard; Mrs. Mead, Boston; Trachtenberg, Yale; Kliefoth, Wisconsin; White, Indiana; Mrs. Kliefoth; Hoffman, Indiana; East, Illinois; Brown, Cornell.

BOTTOM ROW, left to right—Marks, Williams; Cremer, Dartmouth; Munroe, Amherst; Pringle, Kansas; Brodie, Oberlin; Henderson, Harvard; Aldis, Harvard; Sachs, Columbia; Bell, Princeton; Gannett, Harvard; Nicholson, Harvard; Hu, Cornell; Sorensen, Nebraska; Danahy, Columbia; Charnowitz, Missouri; Schreuder, Cornell; Copeland, Amherst; Coutant, Cornell.

final world federation, which, the historian Freeman says, when it comes into existence, will be the most finished and most artificial production of political ingenuity.

SECTION II

NON-MILITARY SANCTIONS FOR INTERNATIONAL LAW¹

By Norman Angell

However great be America's naval and military power, she cannot defend by that power alone even her most elementary rights, like those which she is now attempting to establish as against the aggressions of Germany. Did she possess to-day the greatest fleet in the world she could not radically alter the naval situation of the present war, since the Western Allies have a sea supremacy as complete as ships can make it. To cover the seas with dreadnoughts would be merely to furnish targets for the invisible submarine.

If she joined the Allies, sending armies to France or Russia, the resultant victory might still leave America without any assurance that the rights for which she had fought would be respected in the future; for sea law, as laid down by her own allies, allows combatants to sow the sea with mines, and puts neutral trade in wartime still under the virtual veto of the belligerent who happens to be momentarily predominant.

So that America, having fought a great European war to secure the immunity of her citizens from death by a submarine torpedo, might find that it was still legal to drown them by floating mines. She might find the radical reform of sea law, which alone can assure the rights—moral and material—that she demands, still strenuously opposed by her own allies, with Great Britain at their head.

Even though she could secure agreement beforehand as

¹ Reprinted by permission of Curtis Publishing Company from *Saturday Evening Post*, July 24, 1915.

to the sea law that was to follow the war, what assurance has she that the agreement would outlive the military alliance on which its enforcement depended? There is a vague idea that she could in some way enforce the agreement by her own naval and military strength, becoming for that purpose the "strongest Power in the world"; but nations no longer fight as units—they fight as groups.

This war, curiously enough, has demonstrated that a nation can no longer depend either for its security or for the enforcement of its views of right on its own strength. What would have been the position of any one of the allied nations—France, England, Russia or Italy—if it had had to depend on itself alone? What has made it possible for them to defend themselves is an international agreement; their national lives depend on treaties, strange as that may sound. War has become internationalized.

THE GAME OF MILITARY ALLIANCES

If, therefore, America intends to vindicate her rights—perhaps even if she intends to secure her mere safety on land—by military means she, too, must do what even the most powerful military states of the past have done: enter into the game of military alliances; but, for America's purposes—the establishment and enforcement of a decent sea law, for instance—the alliances have to be permanent. If she merely, like the European Powers, demanded a certain disposition of certain territory—its transfer or evacuation, as the case may be—the demand could be fulfilled before the armies demobilized; but, in the case of demanding future adherence to a law, how can that be secured by a military alliance unless we can be sure the alliance can be permanent? As soon as it breaks up the means of enforcing the law has come to an end.

Now unhappily one of the very few things that history teaches us, with any certainty, is that these military alliances do not outlast the pressure of war conditions.

No international settlement that has followed the great wars ever settled or endured. The military alliances on which they were based have been unstable and short-lived.

As for destroying a common enemy, like the Germany of to-day, those same facts show that the destruction has never lasted more than a year or two; at the end of which time the common enemy, the outlaw, generally became the ally of one of its policemen against all the rest; and the whole process of alliance shuffling begins again *da capo*.

The usual conclusion from all this is that the problem is insoluble. We indulge in a sort of fatalistic dogmatism: War is "inevitable"; "we shall always have it and it is useless to try to prevent it"; "it is the outcome of forces beyond our control"; "man is a fighting animal . . . as long as human nature . . ."—and so forth.

All of which obviously gives not the slightest help in this question of protecting America's rights and interests. It is merely a noisy way of running away from the problem. The question under discussion is not the inevitability or otherwise of war; it is whether we can make war effective for the purposes for which it is waged—can so organize our relations with our allies that it shall achieve the ends for which it is fought, which heretofore most wars have not done. If we say that this is utopian; if we are really to accept the doctrine that things must in the future go on exactly as in the past, that human effort can change nothing—then what the political fatalist in effect urges is: "Wars like that now being waged against Germany have always failed of their object. Therefore, let us help to wage this war in such a way that it also will fail of its object."

Men do not and cannot act or think in that way in any of the affairs that matter, least of all in things on which depends the whole future of their nation. If they did so argue it would mean that they deliberately surrendered their freedom to decide either their own fate or that of their country, and knowingly became the mere puppets of vague forces of impulse and ill temper. Men who give up the problem in this way merely proclaim that they desire to be relieved of the fatigue of thought by action of some kind, preferably entertaining and spectacular action—action which at the same time is some satisfaction to temper and impatience; but the fighting, however gloriously in-

effective, must finish sooner or later, and then once more we are brought face to face with the problem: "How shall we get what we want?"

I have said that war itself has become internationalized and depends on agreement of some kind. Indeed the use of force effectively in human affairs generally depends on agreement and coöperation. You cannot, for instance, have piracy without agreement and coöperation. If every member of the crew said: "Don't bother me about rules and obeying the captain. I've got a pistol and I mean to make my own rules and act as I see fit"—why, of course, you could not form even a pirate crew. Success in piracy depended a great deal on the morale and discipline of the pirates—on the mind of the captain; his fairness in dividing the booty; the capacity of the crew to hang together.

The savage who happened to be born with a longer reach than others of his tribe was the bully of the whole until two weaker men put their heads together and agreed to co-operate, and so, by taking him front and rear at the same time, brought his tyranny to an end, replacing it by their own; which continued until three weaker men were able to act as one, and so on, until finally we got a combination of the whole community in the policeman.

What neutralized sheer physical force here was a thing of the mind, a moral and intellectual thing. Force, indeed, is not a thing that acts by itself in human affairs; it is an instrument of the human will, and that will is the creation of discussion, ideas. An Englishman says: "Force alone vindicates Belgium's rights." But what put the force in motion? What decided England to come to the rescue of Belgium? It was tradition—the tradition of the sanctity of treaties; a theory—the theory of international obligation. Without these mental and moral things Belgium would have been left to her fate. If mere physical force ruled the world it would be ruled by the animals of which we make our food.

It is a curious thing, by the way, that the great monsters of creation, like the Dinosauria, have disappeared before the smaller and weaker beasts.

HOW TO ENFORCE INTERNATIONAL LAW

The line of advance in this matter, therefore, is not to insist that we can do without agreement in international affairs, but to see that the agreement is of such character as not to contain the disruptive elements which military alliances have obviously in the past possessed, and to see that any concerted plan, military or otherwise, is effective to the end it has in view.

What is the minimum that we must ask of any combination designed to insure the security of America and the protection of American rights and interests?

I am taking here, first, the problem of the protection of American rights and interests in the world at large—the problem at this moment presented to our Government for solution—because, paradoxical as it may sound, if those rights are protected in the right way a large part of the problem of merely defensive security will be solved, as what follows may help to make plain.

American rights, so far as they are affected by other nations at all, depend mainly on a civilized sea law. Sea law may not sound a very far-reaching thing, but, as the sea is the highway of the universe, to civilize sea laws means to internationalize the world. In order to frame a sea law we must have an international legislative or deliberative body; to secure proper interpretation of it involves an international court; to compel respect for the court's decision means finding some method of enforcing it less ridiculously ineffective than taking part in a war in which both sides are setting such law as exists at defiance.

That will carry us very far; but you will not protect American interests or right with less. An international legislative body, an international court, a means of enforcing the court's decision, sound like a big order; but nothing less will give us security in our rights, protect very wide and vital interests, and render this country safe from the military slavery that has now brought the populations of Europe under its lash.

Of the program just indicated the greatest difficulty,

the feature which involves the greatest danger in its execution, is the devising of means to enforce an international law—the finding of the “sanction,” as the lawyers say.

Yet the first essential for any society, whether of individuals or of nations, which desires to preserve rules necessary for the life in common of its members, is some means of restraining any individual member from taking the law into his own hands. Every society enacts that no one shall be judge of his own case and executioner of his own decision. Any society, national or international, which permits that necessarily becomes a mere welter of rival forces.

I may quite honestly believe—and it may be the fact—that Brown still owes me a hundred dollars on a disputed account; but if I break into his house at night and take it I shall very rightly be convicted of burglary, and, if in his defensive struggles I kill him, of murder, even though it should be proved that Brown really did owe me the money. Nor would my plea that my culture was far superior to that of Brown have the slightest influence on the verdict—or it would not if America were a law-abiding country. So our first job is to compel a party to a dispute to submit it to impartial inquiry at least. He who does not do that is an aggressor, whatever the merits of his case may be.

Yet the alliances of the past have not managed to secure even that degree of submission among the nations. The nonmilitary alliances—I refer notably, of course, to those arising out of The Hague Conferences—have been as ineffective to this end as the military.

The outstanding defect of both these kinds of alliances is not far to seek. If a treaty is to be enforced merely by the military power of the signatories, those signatories will be few in number. The practical difficulty of arranging the military coöperation of, say, Switzerland and Venezuela is just an indication of one of very many considerations that stand in the way of the formation of military alliances composed of many nations. As a matter of fact, these alliances in the past have seldom included more than four or five Powers; but when they are composed of few members the defection of a single one may suffice to bring the whole

thing down—or some circumstance giving to one an increased power will lead it to try to dominate the others.

Where, on the other hand, a large number of Powers form the alliance, but make no provision for carrying their agreement into effect against any one member who may violate it, such agreement is apt to become a mere pious expression of what the nations ought to do if they were good.

Our problem is to find some effective means of compulsion that shall include the following conditions: 1—Be of a kind that will permit the coöperation of a large number of states, big and little alike; 2—Shall not by its nature set up the very conditions out of which grows the evil it is designed to arrest.

Military force alone does not fulfill these conditions. The reason for this failure on the first head has already been hinted at. Its danger on the second head is illustrated by the history of Germany during the last generation or two.

WHEN REMEDIES BECOME DISEASES

In the early part of the nineteenth century Germany played a rôle, in coöperation with others, which was a real contribution to the comity of nations. She was content with a Europe that "none should dominate, but all should share." As her military effectiveness increased, however—and especially after the victories of 1870—the dangers inherent in high military effectiveness became apparent. The means became the end. Might was not an instrument used by right; it became very nearly right itself. A curious psychological and moral change involving a profound modification in German tradition took place. She was not content with being a partner; she wanted to be a master. The remedy that had been applied to the disease of Napoleonism and militarism became, itself, the disease.

Whether German militarism is the predominant cause of the present war or not does not matter. The point is that in military efficiency of a high order certain tendencies are set up which make any nation subject to them difficult to deal with as the member of a society. No race or nation seems

to be immune. A Government having behind it a great and efficient military organization, rightly proud of what it believes it can do, is apt to be a little impatient of discussion; to get tired of "talk" when it feels that it has it within its power to settle the matter out of hand.

And, as the military tradition of "acting, not talking," grows in strength, there comes a moment when the break occurs. And yet, when the fighting is all over, we have to go on with the talking nevertheless. This everlasting discussion of the other man's view is obviously a tiresome and irksome thing; but it is the price we pay for civilization, and we always have to come back to it.

Can we not devise some method of compulsion that shall be free from the special risks—mechanical, psychological, moral—which military compulsion, the world over and history over, has always revealed? A means that in its first stages, supplementing military means, may, as it becomes effective, progressively replace it?

The proposal that follows has certain obvious disadvantages, and I do not doubt that a critic convinced in his own mind of these disadvantages will deem that the plan thereby stands condemned; but it is not necessary to prove any proposal free from disadvantages in order to justify its consideration. All that it is necessary to prove is that those disadvantages are less than those attaching to any possible alternative method. When, therefore, you object that the proposal here indicated has such and such defects, just ask yourself whether military force—war in the ordinary sense—has not those defects in still greater degree.

OUTLAWING A NATION

The plan here outlined will not work perfectly; it will be less imperfect than the present means—almost as imperfect as the means we employ within the state for punishing crime or compelling observance of necessary rules. It will be expensive of employment, just as the maintenance of law courts and police and prisons is expensive. It will hurt innocent parties, just as when we send a man to the peniten-

tiary we punish his wife and family far more severely, probably, than we do the culprit.

All I claim for this extension of the meaning of war is that the methods which the circumstances of the modern world have made possible will be much more effective than merely military coercion, because in the last resort history proves such coercion in certain contingencies—notably such contingencies as those that face America now and will face Christendom at the end of the war—hardly to be effective at all.

Above all, will the method here suggested stand out from purely military methods as tending by its use to undermine the motives—moral and material—which create the danger of military ambition and aggression? The older and purely military method does not so undermine those motives and impulses; its employment tends to develop them, to spread the very disease which it is its object to cure. Military conquest of a military aggressor generally ends merely by transferring the danger from one area to another.

The nature and possibility of the plan I want to outline can best be indicated by imagining that it had been devised at once of the many treaty congresses of the last hundred years. We can then in some measure judge how it might have borne on recent events and answered our present needs.

Imagine, therefore, that such an international congress—representing, like the later international congresses, most of the civilized world—had agreed to coöperate in the enforcement of treaties—and enforcement in some way is essential—by these means:

Should any nation, party to the treaty in question, refuse to submit a difference under it to at least impartial examination and report, all other nations, party to the agreement, would automatically cease communication with the lawbreaker. Boycott or nonintercourse would be proclaimed against him and maintained by the whole group. This would not prevent certain nations of the group from carrying on military operations, as well, against him. Some of the group would go to war in the military sense—all in

the economic sense; the respective rôles would be so distributed as to secure the most effective action.

Let us see how the universal boycott, apart from the military action, works, and how it works as an aid to the military action. The effect of the boycott would be that, from the moment of the offending nation's defiance of international law, his ships could enter no civilized ports outside his own, or leave them. Payment of debts to him would be withheld; his commercial paper would not be discounted; his citizens could not travel in any civilized country in the world, his passports being no longer recognized.

Thus, the outlaw nation could neither receive from nor send to the outside world material or communication of any kind—neither food nor raw material or manufacture, or letters, or cables. Money due to him throughout the world would be sequestered for disposal finally as the international court's judgment should direct; and that rule would apply to royalties on patents and publications, and would, of course, involve precautionary seizure or garnishee of all property—ships, goods, bank balances, businesses—held by that nation's citizens abroad.

In other words, the outlaw nation would be in a state of war of a new kind with the civilized world; but it would not necessarily involve military operations with the whole world. Whether it did or not would, of course, largely rest with the outlaw nation itself. There is nothing now but its own caution that prevents any one nation from issuing declarations of war to the whole world at the same time. We may assume that a nation so placed in a state of nonintercourse with the world would not gratuitously desire to add to the not trifling difficulties of this situation by insisting that every party to it must fight it by its armies and navies as well as by its economic forces.

This point is important, because critics invariably start their objection to the proposal by pointing out that the acts necessary to create a state of nonintercourse provoke a state of war, which calls on a nation so treated to move its troops or its battleships.

So, under existing precedent and conceptions, it does;

but with new methods and new conceptions would come new precedents and a new meaning to a state of war. If a nation cares to assume that it has received a declaration of war from the whole world, it can, of course, if it deems its dignity demands it, move its troops against the whole world.

BOYCOTTS AS WEAPONS

As a matter of military fact, of course, it could do nothing of the kind. It would have to choose, to say the least, which part of the world it would attack first; and would desire, if it could, while dealing with one particular nation, to be free from attack by the others.

So there is not necessarily any more likelihood than at present of a minor state—like, say, Spain or Sweden—finding itself suddenly involved in military operations. We know unhappily that such a risk exists now for a small state, even when it is not a party to such an arrangement as that which we have in mind. Belgium and Luxemburg show us that little states, obviously innocent of any intention or possibility of aggression, may now become the victims, merely by reason of their position, of the military quarrels of larger states.

But, you may say, this condition of nonintercourse is exactly that in which Germany now finds herself, and it is not at all effective.

To which I reply: 1—That Germany is not yet subject to a condition of complete nonintercourse, since from the beginning of the war she has been receiving her mail and cables and maintaining communication with the outside world, morally an immensely important factor. Nor is it entirely moral. Large supplies have, despite the naval blockade, come to her through Scandinavia and Holland—proving how important, even from a purely military point of view, a great state's relations to lesser states may be, and how important is the economic coöperation of those states. 2—That, though of slow operation, it is the economic factor which in the end will be the decisive one in the operations against Germany; as the ring tightens and a necessary raw material, like cotton, is absolutely excluded, the time will

come when this fact will tell most heavily. If the nonintercourse had been world-organized the effect would have operated from the first. Incidentally, of course, America and England, between them, control the cotton of the world. pressure would be most decisive as a deterrent to aggression, not so much by what it might be able to effect during a war as by what it would effect afterward.

It is essential to get this clear.

The parties to the treaty here indicated would, in addition to the terms just described, agree that, however a war entered into in violation of treaty might end, the condition of nonintercourse should be prolonged after the war. It would continue until due penalty had been imposed on the offending state, and in such a way as to render its offense, so far as possible, barren of benefit to itself. Such features as the sequestration of any patent royalties, rents on the property of its nationals, would go on until the state or states that had suffered most by the act of aggression had in some measure been indemnified.

Assume these principles to be applied to the existing situation: The contracting states would notify Germany—and Germany would have been aware of this penalty years ago, which is perhaps the most important consideration of all, as we shall see presently—that whether the military operations of the Allies compelled the evacuation of Belgium or not, German property throughout the world—ships in port, royalties on patents, all other debts due to German citizens—would be sequestrated and, under order of court, ultimately realized and the proceeds paid into a central war indemnification fund for the relief of those who have suffered by Germany's aggression.

Further, that, failing the fulfillment of certain conditions by Germany, the world would be closed to her after the war for a period of years, that period to be succeeded by one in which, though intercourse might be established partially, a supertax would be imposed on all tolls or dues paid for mail, cables, harbor charges, and so on, by Germany throughout the world, such surtax also to be paid into the same indemnification fund.

Now it is evident that for such a threat to have a preventive or deterrent effect it must be devised beforehand and applied fairly successfully in minor cases. And it is certain, of course, that if the military superiority of a prospective aggressor is such as to render considerable and rapid territorial conquest possible, he could compel such a method to fall as heavily on his victim as on himself. To put an embargo on Germany in occupation of France is to include France therein. Even so, it is not certain that it could not be applied; for in that case France and Belgium would regard the disadvantages to themselves as the price of their resistance to the conqueror and would probably themselves coöperate therein. Peoples similarly situated have in the past applied successfully a commercial and social boycott against a conqueror.

But is it likely that the deterrent effect would be inoperative? Would the people of any nation, desiring to extend their influence in the world, look with favor on a policy that would lead to closing the world, perhaps for long periods, against their influence?

PENALIZING AGGRESSION

If Germany had known, during the last decade or two, when Pan-Germanism and culture-spreading had taken its most dangerous form, that the result of military aggression would be to close the world to German influence, would aggression have become a popular policy?—always assuming for the sake of the argument that Germany is the aggressor. *Would not the prospect of such a penalty on aggression reverse and neutralize the motives that provoke aggression?*

If the center of militarism and unrest in Europe has been in Germany, certainly that unrest had its origin in the German desire for national self-expression, for expansion, for the imposition of German influence in the world. But if it had been known that the fact of using Germany's military machine in defiance of the common will of Christendom implied the closing of the outside world to her trade, her communications, the travel of her people, the dissemination of her literature, the distribution of her products, would not

Germans inspired by dreams of German domination have been likely to consider whether German influence would not have a greater chance of free play by peaceful methods than by the closing of the outside world thereto?

Imagine the world absolutely closed to Germany for a period of ten years, her trade absolutely shut out, all communication with her ceased! How would German influence, whether commercial, intellectual, or political, stand at the end of that period? In any case it would not be a prospect that the Pan-Germanist or Imperialist would face as likely to advance his desires. There is at least a chance that even he would decide, on the strength of evidence now available, that Germanism stood a greater chance of survival through peaceful penetration than through military means. Had he to choose between reduction of armaments—coupled, of course, with some guaranty against attack by other states—plus an open field in the world at large on one hand, and continued armaments and a closed world on the other, there is at least a chance that he might choose the former.

WHEN MILITARY FORCE FAILS

Now it is difficult to bring home clearly even a vision of how this thing would operate, because mankind has never used this instrument of exclusion in just this way. Two groups of countries go to war; the armies of one are destroyed; and a year after peace is made they trade with one another and both with the world at large just as before—trade between France and Germany was multiplied by three in the interval between the wars of 1870 and 1914. But, with efficient organization, the most telling elements of boycott are those against which no military force can prevail. Here is a form of defense against a common enemy in which every man, woman or child of every country that feels itself threatened can coöperate. Even bayonets cannot compel a world to drink German beer or buy German goods.

Germany herself has, during forty years in the case of Alsace, and longer in the case of Poland, employed ruth-

lessly all the means that unquestioned power placed in her hands, and tried to Germanize those two provinces; and, though she was dealing with peoples without means of military resistance and with but rudimentary organization of the nonmilitary means, her efforts, by her own admission, have completely failed.

This much is certain—that, confronted by an organized group of nations representing in fact the outside world determined to enforce a boycott, Germany could not challenge all at once and compel by military means all, at one and the same time, to admit her ships and facilitate her trade. She would have to begin with at most one or two and concentrate her military effort on them, and in order to be successful would have to secure some sort of peace or understanding with the others.

Lastly, just a word as to objections commonly raised :

“It is too complicated to be effective, and likely to hurt us as much as our enemy.”

Well, I think most men of affairs would have argued that way a year ago; but the experience of the war shows that centralized action, like that of a great state, or, better still, of a group of states, utilizing the devices of the modern world—instantaneous communication with all parts of it, and so on—can coördinate the immense economic forces of our commercial and industrial civilization far more effectively than most of us a year ago believed to be possible.

In the first days of August both Great Britain and Germany were confronted with the need of redirecting the currents of trade and intercourse of all kinds. Intercourse between two great groups—the British and the German Empires—had been suddenly severed, and very many thought that the disorganization so created would produce catastrophic effects paralyzing both—incidentally the present writer did not take that view. The respective governments, however, immediately used the national resources at their disposal to rearrange the fabric of credit and trade. The British Government, for instance, guaranteed commercial paper and the collection of certain foreign debts. It

practically took over marine insurance. It even took charge of certain industries and became the distributor of certain raw materials.

Very much to the astonishment of even those who had the arrangements in hand, it was found that a great centralized government could effectively exercise the necessary control over very great areas, stretching, in the case of the British Empire, from Calcutta to London, from Cape Town to Vancouver, and from Vancouver to Sydney; and in a few days make such readjustments as would enable life in these immense areas to go on with relatively small disturbance.

The experiment proved two things: First, that nonintercourse can in large degree be very quickly established; and, second, that its effects can be controlled—that they can be prevented, for instance, from falling unduly on one class or section.

Now we may urge that this proves too much, since it proves that a nation like Germany can escape in large part the damage from being cut off from the rest of the world. That point I have already dealt with. In the long run she cannot stand it and maintain her position of dominance in the world. The rest of the world—those enforcing it—can stand it much better.

Every League of Peace—every combination for the restraint of disorder—assumes that the lawbreakers will be in a minority; that those coercing outnumber those to be coerced; and, though the method, like all methods of restraint—police and courts and prisons within the state cost money—involves sacrifice on the part of the majority enforcing it, it is less burdensome because shared by a greater number.

In other words, the states enforcing nonintercourse are still free to maintain their communication with one another and so to readjust their social, commercial and industrial life more easily and to greater advantage than is possible within the limits of the embargoed nation.

“Embargoes of the past have not been effective.”

This objection generally is based on the ill working of the

Continental decrees of Napoleon and his rivals and the futility of our own decrees of "nonintercourse" during that period; but these embargoes were enforced with sailing-ship navies and so loosely applied that smuggling became an immense industry. Those conditions are as obsolete as the old smuggler who formed a part of them; but even if the embargoes had been complete the effect would have been relatively small, because at that time the volume and importance of the foreign trade of states and communication between them were small. In the old days a nation could live within itself. In our day it cannot.

THE PART AMERICA CAN PLAY

Perhaps the one nation that could come nearest to it would be our own. The United States is indeed the one country of the world against which it would be most difficult to employ effectively the method of boycott. That fact is, of course, a considerable disadvantage and tells somewhat against the value of the method. On the other hand, however, the vastness of the resources and the weight of the economic forces that give us this immunity also give us a strong position for initiating this plan, for organizing it and rendering it effective.

What are the steps for America to take?

America stands at this juncture of international affairs as the natural and most powerful exponent of neutral rights. She should, therefore, secure practical agreement—not necessarily by formal conference—between herself, the South American states, and possibly also the neutral states of Europe, as to the international law for which they would all stand in such matters as the use of the sea. On the basis of this America might then devise with them an agreement as to their economic relations with the rest of the world in certain situations: an agreement covering not only such things as the furnishing of supplies to European or Asiatic combatants in wartime but also covering certain peace contingencies as well.

Presenting thus a solid front to the actual combatants, the neutrals could certainly secure a place at the settlement

when it comes to discussing those matters that are now subjects of difference between this country and Germany and Great Britain.

Obviously the combatants will need the neutrals after the war; and if America went into the conference as the central figure of a combination composed of the neutral states she could in large measure dominate the situation, so far as future international law is concerned, and place the international relations of the future on a very different foundation by leading in the organization and application of those forces I have dealt with here.

All this, of course, calls for a little imaginativeness and inventiveness; but America has never lacked those qualities in other spheres. Will she show them in this new field that she will shortly be obliged to enter—the field of international politics? Or will she be content with the old futilities of the older world?

SECTION III

THE HAGUE CONFERENCES, PAST AND FUTURE

By Dr. Andrew D. White

The first Hague conference was called by the Emperor of Russia and it has been generally supposed that it was called in his desire for arbitration. But that was not the fact. The Russians came without any scheme of arbitration. What the Russians expected was to cut down the expense of war, to arrive at some agreement by which the ever-increasing and fearful expense and piling up of debt for the changes in munitions of war and the paraphernalia of war, might be diminished. When the conference came together no one thought anything could be done, and felt that to accomplish any good result would require more study than the length of the conference would permit. The question of arbitration was the principal one discussed.

Our government was especially earnest on that subject, and the American delegates had particular instructions

with regard to arbitration. Notwithstanding the feeling that nothing could be accomplished, when the heads of the delegations came together a change was experienced. This was one of the most interesting things I have ever witnessed. There were a great many men from the various countries who were of great distinction. At the head of the German delegation was a very distinguished diplomatist, but one of the most conservative men I ever knew. His opposition to arbitration was deadly, and he fought it all the way through. The result of the deliberations was contrary to the opinion of those who merely observed the conference superficially, for a great deal was accomplished. Of course the most important thing accomplished was the establishment of an international court composed of judges to be named by the executives of the various governments, to be ready at any time to do duty at The Hague as judges. It named jurists from various countries, from which any two powers might select a court, and these jurists were to come to The Hague to sit. There have been several arbitrations as a result which accomplished most happy results.

There was also established the institution of seconding powers; that is, when a war becomes inevitable, when it has got to the point where nations will not use other means, then seconding powers are to be named, and these powers are to take charge of the preliminaries, and the moment one of the nations in question is at a disadvantage to act just as do the seconds in a duel, and call the honor of the parties satisfied if it is possible to do so. This was thought to be a good scheme. But since then wars have come on, but the method of submitting disputes to the powers does not seem to have been used in time.

Then there was a commission of inquiry. When wars are threatened the questions are largely fought out by demagogues and by ambitious journalists. It was thought to be much better to have each side appoint a commission to find out what the grievances really were, and then make recommendations to see if a basis of settlement could not be reached. This seemed at the time to have been a very advantageous method of settling disputes, but for some

reason it does not seem to have succeeded. The plan of arbitration, however, has succeeded.

There was one thing for which the American delegation has been blamed, but I do not think quite justly. We did not agree on our protest as to the use of explosives. Our instructions were that we should vote as a unit. But our government, instead of doing what most of the other governments did—appointing naval and military attachés as advisers—appointed General Crozier and Admiral Mahan as members of the commission. As a result we could never get unanimity with regard to any proposition of explosives. Admiral Mahan would say: “You send torpedoes under a great ship with a thousand men on it, why should you not drop explosives from above?” So there was no agreement with regard to them.

The second conference of 1907 tried to establish a court that should sit continuously. But all of the smaller nations thought that they should be represented on such a court, believing that their sovereignty was as real as was the sovereignty of the United States or Germany or England. That, of course, would have meant an enormous court, and on that point the proposal failed. There was also a proposal to establish an international prize court, but this failed of establishment. There was also considered at the second conference the matter of torpedoes and mines. This question was not considered to any extent in the first conference. By the time of the second conference, however, it was seen that this was a serious question, and attempts were made to meet it. One attempt was to make an agreement that there should be no floating mines which would last longer than a certain short time, so that they should not endanger the commerce of neutrals on the high seas. That proposal failed, however, because no one could foresee exactly what ought to be done.

About a year ago an attempt was made to call a third conference, but the whole matter failed to awaken any general attention, and the war came on in the meantime.

Through the munificence of Mr. Carnegie a permanent building in which the sessions of the court of arbitration

are to be held was erected at The Hague, Mr. Carnegie believing that there should be an outward and visible sign, for when people see a courthouse they must believe that there is a court within.

As to a third conference, my belief is that the present war will lead to the establishment of a great international tribunal and that the potentates will try to oppose it, and if they persist in opposing it, they will be compelled to step off their thrones. I do not believe that the people of the world will longer continue in a position which permits a monarch, however enlightened, or a ministry, or a clique, or a party to plunge their respective nations into such a catastrophe as we are now witnessing.

There are certain things which those devoted to peace must consider. If you take the map of the United States and spread it over the map of Europe, you will find that with the exception of Russia west of the Urals, it will cover more territory than that of the nations now engaged in war. Yet there is in the United States a tribunal which settles amicably all the difficulties arising among fifty sovereign states, which are just as distinct in their local governments as are the governments of the countries of Europe. To my mind there is no reason why such a tribunal could not be established at The Hague. But the question then remains, how are the decisions of such a court to be enforced? My hope is that the time will come when the decisions will enforce themselves, just as the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States are enforced, a display of force seldom, if ever, being necessary. The present war curiously shows how amenable the nations are to public opinion, each nation striving to secure the approval of its actions of public opinion. But in my opinion there would have at first to be a display of power. That is the difficult point. But since the present war I have come to believe that the world is now ready to take measures to carry out these decisions, and that might be done by much less force than each nation is now expending.

With regard to our own policy, I should like to recall the old proverb, "You go more safely through the middle

course." We should adopt the policy, not of no navy or no army; not, on the other hand, the extreme of over-developing the army and navy. I think there should be a fairly adequate provision so that the other powers which do not take as high a view of peace will see that we are a nation which, in case of need, can uphold in common with other neutrals, the rights and privileges of neutrals. The great trouble is that the rights of neutrals go for nothing. The *Lusitania* is an example, as is the conduct of England with regard to our ships. There should be a "rational readiness" for war. Not a warlike spirit, but readiness in case the mandates of the central tribunal are violated by one or two powers.

I hope that we shall not become involved in war, and believe that we shall not. My hope is that there will be in a few years a great tribunal sitting at The Hague or elsewhere, which shall decide the questions arising from the present war between the various nations, for this war will be fruitful of the seeds of future wars—that is one of its worst features. I believe that the people of the world will not much longer leave in the hands of a few potentates the question of peace and war, but will allow their differences to be settled by peaceful methods, just as our questions are settled by our great tribunal at Washington.

CHAPTER VI

DEMOCRACY AND WAR

SECTION I

THE DEMOCRATIC CONTROL OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS¹

By Prof. Samuel P. Orth

IT has been said that if there had been a referendum of the question of war or peace to the various nations involved, there would have been no war. This is not borne out by the facts. The armies of Europe are not the mere puppets of the rulers; there is a large background of feeling. The English government would not have declared war had it not felt sure of a strong middle class back of it.

America has had the greatest experience of democracy as a form of government, though this was not a new ideal, but America began its career in war—the Revolution. That our forefathers considered war a basic idea is evidenced by the fact that they made the President Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. Our present existence and form of government are based on war.

If we look back in our history we find that most of our wars have been Jingo wars, desired by the people, and though we are a nation of peace, yet in the last century we have had quite as many wars as Prussia. Instances are the War of 1812, the war with Mexico, the war with Spain. The Civil War is in a class by itself.

Then, too, most of our Presidents have been military heroes, all but two since the Civil War up to the time of Taft. Cleveland was elected because the Democratic Party had no military hero to offer at the time. Taft and Wilson belong to a new era, another generation.

¹ This is a brief summary of Prof. Orth's address. He became ill shortly after the Conference and was not able to revise his address for publication.—
THE EDITOR.

A possible alternative to war is arbitration, and yet we, a democracy, have repeatedly refused to use this means; six times we refused to arbitrate the question of the north-western boundary, seven times refused the Bulwer treaty, and many times refused to arbitrate the question of the Alaska boundary. Not so many years ago we refused to arbitrate the question of the *Maine*, and more recently that raised by the building of the Panama Canal. As a matter of fact England has resorted to arbitration as a means of settlement more often than have we.

Then, too, land aggrandizement is supposed to be an imperialistic manifestation, yet the United States has, since the Revolution, increased the extent of its area four times. At the close of the war for independence our western boundary was moved to the Mississippi. Then came the purchase of Louisiana and the Floridas, with war as a means of settling this matter only narrowly averted; next arose the difficulty over Texas, which we "accepted" while we took California, Nevada, New Mexico, and so forth, and then secured legal vindication for our imperialistic act by paying for them; then followed the extension of our Alaskan territory to the Arctic Zone, the taking of the Hawaiian Islands, and the accessions through the war with Spain.

Democracies are subject to all the tremors of human nature, and since a democracy is the government of ordinary *men*, not an ordinary man, we find it one day an electorate, swayed by intellect, the next a mob, moved by its passions, so "when danger threatens, a democracy lends itself easily to the war fever."

Finally, in a democracy leadership counts for so much, a leadership which, however, is temporary, and in this lies the hope as well as the danger.

The one line of development where democracy does definitely lend itself to the hope of ameliorating war is in the establishment of open diplomacy.

In the last analysis, it is not the form of government which determines the question of war or peace, it is the spirit of the people behind that government.

I

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING PROF. ORTH

Dr. Nasmyth: We have heard Professor Orth's analysis. It has run counter to a great many accepted theories. Many of those who have not been able to maintain neutrality have been hoping for the defeat of Germany because it would lead to democracy. Many of the people in Germany have been hoping for the defeat of Russia because they think it would lead to a greater degree of democracy in Russia.

Mr. Gannett: I have listened with interest and shame for my country to what Mr. Orth has been saying, and almost with conviction; and it has reminded me of a horrible memory of last summer when I went through what I could almost describe as Hell on earth—in Rheims, while troop trains came in and went out, and the station was filled with crowds shouting "Vive la France," "Vive la guerre" and "a Berlin." And yet my friends who were in Germany on that day say it was not different in militaristic Berlin. And in Paris it was the same scene; a man with a flag was a signal for a parade.

We do not challenge democracy when we mention these things. You must prove the comparative flaws in democracy when you challenge democracy, show that they are more certain to appear in a democratic form of government. What form of government is more certain to bring about the conditions we desire? When McKinley led the country into war was he more popular than Wilson is to-day?

Prof. Orth: I do not mean to make an arraignment of democracy. In the question of government, I am inclined to think more and more, as I said, that we have insisted too much on the form of government and not enough on the spirit behind the Government. I believe in democracy with my whole heart, not because it is democracy, but because it does what I tried to point out, it leads to that supreme thing in life, self-control. When we achieve the point of self-control, the law is easy and obeying the law is easy.

The question of war is to my mind a question of counting one hundred before you strike once, and as I tried to indicate in my allusion to Mr. Wilson, there is the indication of a large degree of self-control which we have developed in the interval since the *Maine*. When we speak of European countries we go into a large circle of facts to which we are quite alien, inherited tendencies and traditions which are so inherent there. Syndicalists are taking part in the trenches.

I do wish to say this, and it is evidently the issue which you have in your mind as against my proposition, it is the spirit of the people rather than the form of government that counts; where that spirit is in the people you are very likely to have a democratic form of government.

Mr. Trachtenberg: I think the speaker has given himself away when he says that wars are concocted in secret and accepted in the open. This is an indictment against aristocracy. I have had a little experience in war, I took part in the Russo-Japanese War. I remember that the Government concocted this war. This war was the result of particular interests on which a few men combined to get Korea. People did not know anything about it. But the advanced students knew there was something the matter with it, and they found that there was no reason for that war, and they enlisted in the army to speak against it. They had partisans in the regiments and spread their secret proclamations.

I do believe that if you had told the people the reasons for this present war you would not have had the war. The fact that war is now concocted over night shows there is something the matter with it. Why did they tell the German Socialists that Russia had crossed the border, to oppose objections? The same thing is true about the Russians. You will find that the majority of the Socialists are opposed to the Government, if a few leaders are for it. Democracy is learning now the real reasons for the war. We can always depend on the people if they are given a chance. If they had a chance I believe they would avoid war.

Prof. McDonald: I feel that we have been unfair to Prof. Orth. Prof. Orth did not have a thesis. I feel that the

Chairman really implied a thesis that Prof. Orth did not have. The speaker succeeded in showing that democracy in America has easily run itself into the war fever. I believe that the case is absolutely unimpeachable. The history of democracy in the past shows it. The Spanish-American War was a people's war. Having had occasion to go through the diplomatic correspondence I was very much surprised to find that our government administration, headed by McKinley was not influential, that our State Department (Mr. Sherman was an old man, only a figurehead), as shown in the diplomatic correspondence, did nothing to meet Spain half way, that the cause of the Spanish-American War was not moral—the war fever was started up most treacherously by the Hearst papers, democracy responded to it in a most discouraging fashion. Somehow, somewhere there was another influence, our State Department was not working heartily for peace at all, but permitted itself to be forced into war, did not have the strength to meet Spain a quarter of the way. The Spanish-American War was on the whole a democratic war.

Then, just another thing about the *Lusitania*. I quite agree with Prof. Orth as far as the newspapers were concerned, there was a feeling that demanded war, and I am quite sure that there was something deeper than the papers. New England was aflame, but I beg to assure you that Indiana and Illinois were not aflame. The people of the Middle West were not stirred. Now I am not so sure that this failure of the people of the Middle West to be aroused is to their credit, but it is an indication that that portion of the democracy is not so quick on the trigger as it was. I feel that Prof. Orth, when he said that the country was ready for war, was speaking from the newspapers in his and this section. In the Middle West there is a humorous saying that if New England should go ahead and cut herself off, the rest of the country would not know it.

Even if we admit that democracy in the past has been subject to these tremors, and it has, there is no question that arbitrators in the past have taken their lives into their hands when they have gone into arbitration courts and have dared

to decide against the prejudices of the people. It is absurd to say that democracy in the past was a guarantee against peace, but the democracy of the past is not the democracy of the future. We have had progress, and my hope is that we shall see more progress in the future. I do believe that democracy is going to work for peace, is defensible on the future rather than on the past. Fundamental in any democracy is the teaching of self-control, but it is very slow. Some of us have confidence that progress will be made, and it is in that hope that we believe that democratic control of various forces will ultimately make for peace.

Mr. Sorenson: The people sometimes want war, not because they want war for its own sake but because they have been told of the advantages that war might bring and the economic ends that they could secure through war. When it comes to the question whether people want war, they do not want it for its own sake. Is there a taxpayer who wants to pay extra taxes? Is there a father who wants his son to go to war? Perhaps it is desired by the high school boy and by some college boy with a painted dream of a charge up the hill, perhaps by some diplomat, perhaps by an emperor. This number is small and their power in the democracy has little weight. It is less in our country in that the glory of war consists of dying, of firing on a friend, of having one's name sent back misspelled. Hudson Maxim declares that war at its best is horrible, etc. The people do not yearn for the thrills that war brings. In Nebraska an armory was to cost \$20,000; we have the initiative and referendum and this matter was referred to the people. The people by a vote of 4 to 1 turned it down. People may be talked into war, our great work is to teach them that they may know the economic futility of war.

Mr. Angell: Supposing that Prof. Orth had been stating the militarist position, we should have accepted everything that he said and urged that he had made the fundamental plea for the need of democratic government, because the object after all is concerned with men, the final object of government is to make better men. If it is true that men can not control themselves, then they have no opportunity

to learn except through self government. If the objective is the improvement of men, the greater do you make the case for the discipline of self-government. Militarists get up and say, after all man is a fighting animal. The strength of our real case is, not to deny this; if it is true that civilization is only skin deep, then we must thicken that crust to keep the savage in, and the thinner the crust the stronger the need for thickening it. It has been said that men act from reason when they are wise, then we respond by urging the need of strengthening our reason.

The point is what are you and I going to do about it. We get a false angle in discussing this question. We are apt to talk of people as beings who do not live in our enlightened plane at all. We are the people, and the real question is, "Do we shout for war?" Talk always in terms of your own responsibility. It is your responsibility if you shout for war; by believing that it is your responsibility you then reach the true democracy. If other men do the same thing, then we should have a real human society, and we shall not have it in any other way.

Dr. Mez: Being a German I am rather pleased with the lecture of the evening. After all we are not the only wicked people. Being a pacifist, on the other hand, who has heard that more democracy is necessary to establish peace and do away with war and the war system, I find myself challenged by that proposition that, after all, democracy in itself does not prevent people from going to war. I thought of Kant's thesis that the first and essential condition of peace is a republic of men, democracy, and I thought over what Norman Angell has said in his books. Norman Angell shows that one of the main uses of a conference is to adjust ideas. Actions are based upon the ideas we have, not on any tested institutions. And whether it is true that we should have democracy or not, we will find that the main thing is, of course, not democratic government, but a change of ideas. The main duty of the peace movement is education, is a change of ideas. Only within a democracy can this change take place more rapidly. Democratic form of government is a better foundation, and Kant's proposition

finally proves true. After all the spread of democracy is one of the most important questions for us.

In spite of the interesting views of the history of the United States, we know that the United States have had less war than Turkey for instance. We have much less war talk in this country. Even in the case of the *Lusitania*, if only one man stood between the people and war, that was at the bottom of the democracy. This was true because the people had the power of electing that man, and that was possible only where a democratic institution was present.

Mr. Sibley: I want to say a word on behalf of the New England attitude of mind. Just after the sinking of the *Lusitania* there was a page of newspaper comments and individual views in *The New York Times*. They were substantially of the same tenor, namely, to the effect that the rights of American citizens must be protected at any price. Over in a corner were three or four lines from Senator Hitchcock, "For my part I would not go to war to protect the rights of citizens sailing on a belligerent ship, therefore, I have nothing to say." That set me to thinking a little and I decided to try it on the dogs. The next day I went among my neighbors and I asked that question thirty-one times. I found two who said they would and the rest said they would not. I followed it up for about a week and I found the number sufficiently large that I came to the conclusion that if a vote had been taken in New England at that time, a vote for war could not have been secured. And I have a very clear feeling that if, after a week from the time the *Lusitania* was blown up, had the American people been asked to vote on that issue, a vote for war could not have been secured.

Miss Wood: The next step is to have some arrangement by which such a vote could be taken, so that the whole responsibility should not rest on one man. Would a referendum be possible?

Mrs. Mead: There are Bryan's treaties. I do not care to speak about woman's side of things; it is just a question of numbers, the truth is the same. In regard to this matter it seems to me that suffrage can do nothing until we do

have treaties. These thirty treaties are of tremendous importance. It is only when we have treaties that we give some delay. The voters in Europe had nothing to do with the war, they were helpless. We ought to insist more and more upon some such way of using the referendum and giving the people a chance to vote.

Dr. Levermore: We need to define the term democracy. As I look at it democracy is a word that represents an idea almost without boundaries until we have carefully furnished definitions. Among other things it means a complex of social forces and a social atmosphere, and it is democracy in that sense that we have been considering this evening. It is democracy in that sense which our eloquent speaker had in mind, because he drew a very serious indictment of our national spirit, the complex of social forces. It is well for us to hear how far short of our ideals we and our views have fallen as we go through the generations. But there is constant change and there always must be. In that sense of democracy we can find fault with what we have done in the past and with what we have done in our own generation, and yet it is perfectly true that in that sense we may hope that we have moved powerfully in the right direction, because in that sense democracy has changed almost totally in the last fifty years since Darwin.

Go back into the Middle Ages, and Voltaire made an effort to secure fairness for the Huguenots, who had been persecuted to death, and after seventeen or eighteen years public opinion came to his support enough to wipe away the stain of that injustice. That was a great triumph for that age. Compare what that meant with what happened here only a few years ago, when in 1894 a little coterie of French officers thought it was a simple thing to keep a Jewish captain out of their midst. They had him tried for treason and sentenced. Now a few generations ago, unless a Voltaire had arisen somehow, that would have made scarcely a ripple, now it was impossible. The process took time, and time is all that is necessary, and therefore in that time fingers began to point first from all over France, then from all over the world, and behind the fingers came the

words, You have done a gross injustice. All the liberal forces in France united to overturn that act, and all the nations joined in, and three republics shook from top to bottom, and in six years educated public opinion proved that the social atmosphere of democracy could not be vitiated, and back from Devil's Island came Dreyfus and was restored to the army. That is the democracy which we are presenting, that is the democracy which here succeeded in influencing the popular spirit until it moved in the right direction, issuing dictates which no institution and no Government can venture to defy. In that sense we have no democracy. That is the third idea of democracy, the hope of the world.

Prof. Orth: I was very much interested in regard to the question about a census. The proposal of what Senator Hitchcock said in the *Times* was certainly very clever. Of course people would not vote for war as the question was put. The phraseology was such as to put a damper on anything of that sort. The census of opinion in Ithaca, however, found that a number of professors were ready.

If these social forces are doing some work the old conception of democracy has completely changed since I was in college. It was behind the Spanish War. I can remember very well the election of Mark Hanna to the Senate. Some of the things done were crudely democratic, they can not be done now because there has been a tremendous awakening of the social conscience which will not be put down. If in my time anybody had said that a college professor could have been made President he would have been laughed at. The social conscience of a new element, the college element, has entered the political field, and we are here to consider it. It is toward self-control, and when that sort of thing comes about also in other nations, and when we feel toward other nations as toward our neighbors, then democracy will have come into its own.

The fundamental thing is not the institution of democracy but the change of ideas. This is the Norman Angell proposition of all others.

The great obstacle to this change of ideas is inertia, and

democracy is particularly valuable in overcoming this inertia. This is the great value of woman suffrage. If we know just what we are being subjected to, if we can see just where we are being led, then we are overcoming inertia, we are presenting enlightened public opinion, we are creating the only, perhaps, sure guarantee of peace, a democracy with a will to peace.

SECTION II

THE SOCIALIST INTERPRETATION OF THE WAR

By William English Walling

I

Up to the present war every Party that claimed the Socialist label, was still in the hands of the Marxists. I shall confine my attention then, to the Marxian Socialist view of war and peace, allowing for the natural and inevitable prejudices of those Marxists actually at war. All the points I shall make are either those of the German Marxians, or applications to present conditions of principles accepted by them. And by Marxians I mean not the orthodox or doctrinaire Socialists who often claim exclusive right to the title, but those Socialists who base their reasoning wholly on practical or concrete considerations. Millions of persons, business men or practical men of affairs who are not Socialists take this same standpoint. It is only when Socialists hold such a view that we call it Marxian.

It is true there are other types of Socialists, two of them of more or less importance. I refer to those labor unionists in politics who profess Socialism as an ultimate and very distant ideal, without any influence on practical affairs, and also to a certain school of radical political democrats and social reformers who take a similar view.

Moreover, the position of these Socialists, or I should prefer to say, members of Socialist parties, may be summed up in a word. They are believers in the panaceas of political democracy, disarmament, and the *preaching* of pacifism. Their position on war and peace differs in no essential prac-

tical way from that of Mr. Bryan or Mr. Norman Angell. I shall describe this position at the appropriate point, but not as being the Socialist position.

That it is not Socialistic follows not only from the fact that it coincides completely with the view of anti-Socialists, but from the fact that it has been specifically denounced as "bourgeois pacifism" by all the great Socialist writers from the beginning. The Socialists have always been the most strenuous and uncompromising advocates of peace. But they have always laid weight on the complete contrast between their pacifism and that of the non-Socialist pacifists. The bourgeois pacifists with their Hague tribunals, peace congresses, and so forth, wished to end war without dealing with the economic causes of war, the economic conflicts between the nations. While favoring The Hague tribunal and disarmament, the Socialists laughed at such movements as being ludicrously insufficient to counteract the overwhelming power of the economic forces making for war.

In the third place the Socialists have never opposed all wars. Not only Marx and Engels in their day, but Kautsky, the leading radical thinker, and Bernstein, the leading moderate thinker of to-day, point out that all Socialist Parties have always believed in national defense *as a duty owed to the international movement*. Jaurès showed himself to be especially alive to this duty, knowing full well that an attack on France could come only from one quarter. And the British and Australian Labor Parties have also always taken the same position.

Only in two countries has there developed any important Socialist tendency towards "peace at any price" and belief in non-Socialist remedies against war. In Great Britain the Independent Labor Party, the Socialist branch of the Labor Party—which contains scarcely a tenth of the larger organization—has a strong bourgeois pacifist *minority*. At its last conference in April, however, a resolution denouncing all wars was lost by one vote. Similarly the National Committee of the American Party voted last month that peace must be maintained "at any cost." But since this action has been affirmed neither by Convention nor by refer-

endum it is not yet binding upon the Party. I shall deal then with the main current of Socialist thought, that which contains everything that is distinctive in the Socialist contribution towards a constructive discussion of peace.

Socialists are overwhelmingly against "peace at any price" and I have given enough evidence of this to convince anyone in a volume published last month. Even the British Independent Labor Party is not for peace at any cost. It demands an indemnity for Belgium. *Socialists cannot favor anything "at any cost" unless it be Socialism; perhaps not even that.*

The American Party also demands, as part of the peace terms, plebiscites in all disputed territories. Now Edward Bernstein, who is undoubtedly an honest, able, and courageous pacifist, warns all non-German Socialists that, however just and Socialistic a plebiscite for Alsace-Lorraine may be, it should not be made a condition of peace. Why? Because the German government and the majority of the German people would not consent to it and the war would be prolonged. How then can a party like ours which demands such a plebiscite as a condition of peace, favor "peace at any price"?

Even non-Socialist pacifists are not for peace at any cost. For example, Ponsonby, one of the leaders of the British union of democratic control, says that that organization is not a "stop the war" organization but demands reparation and guarantees of future peace.

What then is the Marxian position?

Let me begin by recalling to your minds one of the most fundamental elements of Socialist policy. Not only Socialists but many others—perhaps the majority of the community—believe that there are two forces in existence today, the further development of which will result—before the lapse of any great period—in the establishment of industrial democracy. Socialists believe that these same forces will draw the nations together, and put an end to war. But this is only one-half, the brighter side of the Socialists' view. For they believe further that until these forces have reached maturity there is no possible hope of

permanent peace. What then, are these two forces, and how near is their development to that degree of maturity when they may be relied upon to put an end to war?

Industrial democracy depends upon the evolution of democracy *plus* the evolution of industry. Neither of these two forces working alone can establish a permanent peace. Both working together are bound to do so. And they *do* work together—for the whole history of modern society for the last century is the history of the gradual development of industrial democracy.

A government, like an industrial establishment or a trust, is nothing more nor less than an economic unit. With the exception of a few centuries, when the Mediterranean afforded a suitable area for a primitive sea-power, European history down to modern times was largely the history of the development of small city-states. These states were the leading economic units of Greece and again of the middle ages. With the invention of gun-powder and the use of expensive cannon only the largest, richest, and economically most advanced of these cities continued to count, and they were able singly or in coöperation to extend a sure protection for the first time over considerable agricultural areas and trade-routes. Thus arose the modern nation, corresponding to the large modern competitive industrial establishment.

But, as Kautsky has pointed out since the beginning of the present war, "the violent competition of great concerns led to the formation of trusts and the destruction of small concerns, and just so there may develop in the present war a combination of the stronger nations."

Already this process has been proceeding for centuries. Most of the smaller nations have already been swallowed up politically, or have become economically dependent on the larger nations. But this is only a part of the process. Even more important has been the formation of groups corresponding to the great competing industrial *combinations* which immediately preceded the establishment of the *trusts*.

Are we then confronting the formation of a trust of the

stronger nations? The division of Europe into *two* combinations, *two* armed camps, the system of the balance of power dates from the period of the Reformation four centuries ago. This is not the trust period, it is the stage of maximum or cut-throat competition between two large combinations that immediately precedes the trust. But if we have had this system for four centuries, what evidence is there that we are leaving it now? The evidence is of the most positive character. For we are confronting a revolution in the art of warfare as important as that invention of cannon which brought about the Renaissance and the Reformation and introduced modern civilization in Europe. *Armaments and munitions of war have become infinitely more important than armies, no matter how disciplined or large.*

This is a revolution, the consequence of which it will take a generation to measure. It is obviously an industrial revolution, since victory now depends primarily on the degree of industrial development and on the total sum of the industrial resources of the two parties. But it is also a democratic revolution, and above all it is a revolution that positively guarantees a league of peace after the present war. It is democratic because large armies and military discipline, which spell autocratic or semi-autocratic government, now become of secondary importance in war, while, on the contrary, democratic government produces the maximum of initiative and the maximum of wealth—provided it does not tolerate an exceptionally large class of parasitical and idle rich. It is true that England, France and America have tolerated the development of such a class. But there is no reason to suppose they will continue indefinitely to do so—especially in view of the lessons of this war.

But, above all, this new importance of armament and ammunition ensures a trust of the nations. When Germany tried in vain the other day to bid against the Allies for the control of our armament factories, there was sounded the knell of the system of the balance of power, and the foundation of the trust of nations was laid. For London, Paris, and New York financiers already control the over-

whelming majority of the world's capital, trade, and industry—and, therefore, of the world's armament and ammunition, and of the world's military power. And this process, like the formation of the industrial trusts, is cumulative and does not work backward. British and French capital has outbid Germany for the support of American capital because it was more powerful and the new combination which includes America, having still greater power will have still greater attractive force. Nation after nation is being drawn into the circle, and the common economic interests bringing the nations together are being rapidly increased by the new war debts.

War is now almost wholly an economic struggle and America is at war, fighting on the side of the Allies. So purely economic is this war that it is generally admitted that if we sent an army into the field we should weaken the cause of our Allies, for we would have to take away so much armament and ammunition we would otherwise furnish them.

But how does it come that Germany, which had developed as rapidly as the United States and more rapidly than France or England, did not find herself in this trust of nations? There are, of course, several reasons, but the most important is the fact that the German capitalists had invested by far the larger part of their capital at home. That is, the proportion of nationalistic as compared with international capital in Germany was far larger than in other countries. C. K. Hobson in his "Export of Capital" estimates that while Great Britain has recently been investing nearly a billion dollars abroad every year, and France nearly half a billion, Germany has been investing only from two to three hundred millions—that is, an average of a quarter billion dollars—and Kautsky says even this amount has rapidly fallen in the last few years. Owing to the more rapid international development of German industry this was inevitable. German capital, then, like American capital, was distinctly a junior partner in the field of foreign investments, and was, of course, treated as such. But, nevertheless, German capital as a whole, accumulated more

rapidly than French or English because of her more rapid internal progress.

But now came the German Government and demanded for this junior partner an *equal* share of all new foreign developments, and alleged as the ground for this demand for "compensations" in Morocco and elsewhere that very expansion of her home industry which was already giving her greater home profits than England or France!

Another difference is to be noted. The capitalists of England, France and America as *financiers* are for the most part neither unpatriotic nor patriotic—they are first, last and all the time capitalists. If they are not internationalists they are not nationalists either. They transfer a considerable part of their capital freely from one country to the other. Of course the same tendency exists also in Germany, but there it has been checked, not only by the great domestic demand for capital but also by the paternalistic or State Socialist policy of the government. This is very well defined by Norman Angell as the proposition that "nations are economic units—competing business firms." Angell denies that this is the case. He is right as to British, French and American capital. But the case is different with German capital. And in so far as Germany is not yet a national economic unit it is the fixed purpose of the German government and a very large part of the German people to make it one.

Nor will the premature development of political democracy afford any cure for this economic nationalism. On the contrary it would only intensify it as long as the State Socialist policy is continued and the German government persists in its effort to unify German capital and to mobilize it against all non-German capital. For the increase of democracy and of the accompanying policy of social reform and governmental ownership, will increase somewhat the people's share in the profits of this nationalistic capitalism—whatever they may be. *In other words, the cause of peace—and so ultimately of democracy also—has far more to hope from international capitalism than from nationalistic democracy or nationalism in any form.* When I ex-

plain that by nationalism I mean the cultivation of national as compared with international production this is a self evident proposition. Any force that makes for the relative increase of international economic development as compared with national economic development is making for the economic world federation—and this economic federation, and not merely political federation, which would be a mere empty form, is the direction of economic evolution.

But why is not *any* form of democracy—even if it leads temporarily to aggressive economic nationalism or national egoism—further on the road to complete democracy than any form of capitalism however international? For the reason that so-called “democracies” which are ready in times of peace to snatch the bread and butter from one another’s mouths, and are prepared also to butcher one another to defend this “right” in case of war, are not really democracies at all, but mere predatory groups like the so-called democracies of Athens or Rome, ready to reduce the rest of the world to beggary or to slavery, if they only obtained what they regarded as a fair share of the spoils. *There is no democracy except international democracy. Any people that puts its own claims above those of other peoples has no right to call itself democratic.* Doubtless all nations will long continue to take the selfish and predatory view. Very well, if genuine democracy—world democracy—is showing little development to-day we must place our chief hope—as long as “democracy” continues to be anti-democratic—in the other aspect of the evolution of industrial democracy, namely the evolution of industry, and this as I have shown, is at this very moment reaching its culminating international phase.

II

In the light of this view of the economic evolution of the nations what becomes of the leading panaceas against war?

We may divide the most weighty and plausible of the peace propositions into five groups:

The establishment of political democracy in the leading

nations and the democratic organization of foreign and military affairs; the abolition of secret diplomacy.

Pacifism; which chiefly takes the form to-day of the proposition that wars do not pay.

Changes as to armament—more armament, less armament, or disarmament.

Political internationalism—the organization of a league of peace or a league of neutrals, international legislature, courts, or police.

Economic internationalism—the elimination of the economic causes of war, that is the elimination of national economic conflicts.

Let me take up these panaceas in order.

First—Would democracy put an end to war? The enthusiastic support given their governments by all the peoples at war, show that this panacea is groundless—at the present stage of democratic and industrial development. It is true that the Socialists everywhere opposed the declaration of war—but a large group of Socialists in every country took a position on the questions at issue that would inevitably lead to war. In every country whose territory has been expanding something like half of the Socialists and the overwhelming majority of the rest of the population have been expansionists. This is true of the Socialists of France and Germany and of the corresponding Labor Party of Great Britain. In Germany before the war only the revisionist minority led by Suedekum, Heine, Legien and the labor union leaders took a nationalistic position. Now they have been joined by the majority of the newer leaders such as Lensch, Canow, and Haenisch—all of whom declare imperialism to be a necessity of economic evolution. The British anti-war Socialists are able to make a public showing only because they have secured more or less control over one small party. The importance of this may be gauged from the fact that six out of forty labor members in a parliament of six hundred members belong to their group.

The reason why those working people who put their immediate interests above their ultimate interests—that is the overwhelming majority in every country, including a large

part of the Socialists—are nationalistic in practical affairs and *not* internationalists—was very clearly pointed out by Mr. Roger W. Babson in his economic analysis. As Mr. Babson said, perhaps one quarter of the population of England is dependent directly or indirectly on dividends from foreign investments, and the proportion of the German population dependent on foreign trade is also a very high one.

It is true that the majority of Socialists are convinced that the *ultimate* interests of the *peoples* of the various nations do not conflict. But this pre-supposes either Socialism or at least a world federation. On this point there is no higher Socialist authority than the Austrian leader, Otto Bauer, who was appointed by the International Socialist Bureau to report on the subject of imperialism to the International Congress that was to have been held at Vienna last year. Bauer declares that one of the worst features of the present capitalistic system is that the *immediate* economic interests of the people of the various nations *do* conflict.

Second—what shall we say of modern pacifism? “Does war pay?”—is the question asked by Norman Angell. Certainly we cannot give a categorical answer. Obviously defeat in war does not pay. Obviously drawn wars do not pay, nor a slight advantage obtained at tremendous cost. But how many Germans doubt that the war of 1870 paid—at least if the balance were struck in the first half of 1914? When the final balance is struck, say in 1916 or 1917, doubtless the war of 1870 will be found not to have paid. But we must not be too wise after the event. Germany calculated that this war would pay on at least two mistaken assumptions. She did not expect Italy to enter the war, and she thought the war would be over because of her superior production of military supplies before the importations from the United States began to count. It looks now as if the second like the first of these calculations was a fatal error. *Wars may pay but wars usually don't.* That about sums up the situation if we look at it from the standpoint of a single nation and fail to look far enough ahead, say a generation, to gauge the ultimate result. But the masses

of mankind still take a national point of view and still put their own interests above those of their posterity. *Moreover, in view of the fearful pressure of daily need upon the masses of men we cannot blame them for doing this, nor expect them to act or think otherwise until this pressure is removed.*

At their present economic level the overwhelming majority of the working people, while opposing war, like nearly everybody else, support their governments in demands that lead towards war whenever these demands promise materially to increase the amount of employment in the home country—even if at the expense of the working people of other countries. *Only in proportion as capital and employment are first internationalized, will labor become international.*

In case of a victory of international finance will not the present war have paid Great Britain, France and America? The answer depends on the question whether we expect a trust of nations, a pooling to a greater or less degree of the majority of the world's capitalistic interests, a real or economic league of peace. If we do, and if Germany could not have been persuaded without war to accept the place allotted to it by this combination—then certainly the war will have paid, first, from the point of view of this capitalistic combination, but ultimately from the point of view of permanent international peace and industrial democracy.

Third—let us consider the question of armament and disarmament. Primarily weapons are a means and not a cause of war. As far as they are a cause this cause might supposedly be moved by the nationalization of armament manufacture—*provided the export of arms were not forbidden, for this, as I have shown, is the chief if not the sole hope for the establishment of permanent peace out of the present war.*

Any measure that strengthens one nation as against the others is nationalistic and may lead to war. We saw the other day the peril of the shipping bill. Shipping ought to be internationalized, not nationalized. *The international shipping trust made for peace, the nationalization of shipping would make for war. The gravest and most dangerous*

of all forms of nationalization would be the nationalization of armament—unless provision were made at the same time for steps towards internationalization. If governments are to manufacture armament then more than ever arises the necessity that the league of peace shall undertake to provide the smaller and poorer nations with arms in case of war. Otherwise there will be no Holland or Switzerland, and there would be no Servia to-day and no Russia—unless as another vast subject race.

Armament must not be nationalized, it must be internationalized. And armament is being internationalized rapidly and effectively to-day—by the international financiers.

But we cannot cure war by treating its symptoms—armies and armament. The causes are economic. Of course when the economic forces making for peace become preponderant, the first steps taken will be steps towards disarmament. But they will be due not to a disarmament agitation but to the industrial and military victory of the economic forces that make for peace over the economic forces that make for war.

Fourth—Let us consider the international political remedies, international tribunals, legislatures, police, leagues of peace, etc., up to a concert of Europe and a federation of the world. Undoubtedly this is the line of future progress. But all these are empty forms except when we decide what these courts, police and legislatures, are to *do*. How are the conflicting economic interests to be settled? Anybody who discusses peace without discussing the economic *concessions* each country would be compelled to make wants peace without paying the price. Of course the sum total of these economic concessions and gains would mean a net gain all around. But certain interests lose. Certainly such a great gain as peace cannot be secured without paying for it and at a high price.

Fifth—This brings us to the elimination of the causes of war, which are almost exclusively economic in their nature. What is demanded is very clear:—the neutralization of canals, the open door in backward countries and colonies

and gradual and reciprocal reduction of tariffs. The program is sound, but where is the power to bring it about? Certainly it does not lie in aggressive nations like Germany which acts as a "single economic unit," and the people of which feel that it does not yet have its due share. Certainly it does not as yet lie among the masses of any nation, since these still show every readiness to sacrifice their future for immediate gain—to postpone international peace and industrial democracy for an immediate national gain.

The hope lies in the "trust of nations." The victory of this combination will bring about steps in disarmament, form an invincible league of peace, establish international tribunals and provide for the freer movement and development of capital, goods and labor all over the world.

III

In view of these facts, how is the present war to be terminated? Kautsky has courageously declared (since the present war) that the victory of one side or the other was desirable for the cause of peace and democracy.

Kautsky applies this principle under three heads as follows:

First, "Probably the defeated nations will be compelled to disarm, and this will indirectly affect also the armaments of their antagonists. In this *compulsory disarmament of the defeated* it must be our business as Social Democrats to protest against any humiliating or degrading forms that it may assume. But the thing itself is most earnestly to be desired. Social Democrats in all countries will support disarmament, and the diminution in the menace from their neighbors' armaments will give them a firm basis in so doing.

Second, "Another point to be considered is that of commercial treaties. The existing treaties will be destroyed through the war, and new ones will be concluded. Under the pressure of war much that was hitherto unattainable may become attainable. It is possible that the victor may find it to his interest to *force free trade, or something approaching it, on the defeated nations*. Or several nations

may constitute themselves into a tariff union. *This would mean progress* if it is not used as a means of drawing free trade countries into a protected area, which latter must be fought against.

Third. "It would be a sad backward step if any of the great national states which are at war were to use a victory in order to annex foreign territory and thus become a nationalities state instead of a national state. This is not to say that any changes in the map of Europe would contradict this principle. Where nations are now under foreign rule, the overthrow of such rule would be beneficial in the above manner. If, for instance, Russia being defeated, the inhabitants of Poland, the Baltic provinces, and Finland were to claim the right to manage their own affairs without external coercion, that would be quite in accord with the laws of democracy. The same would apply to Egypt and Persia."

In view of the censorship, Kautsky is naturally unable to state explicitly what would follow in case of German defeat. But he makes his implications so clear that not a single reader can miss them. He means to say that although—in case of German defeat—there might at first be no radical changes of this character in Russia, complete self-government would be established in Alsace-Lorraine and in the Polish parts of Prussia. This would also allow Alsace and Lorraine to return to France if they voted to do so. For the Socialists, believing in large economic units as they do, are no fanatical advocates of dividing the world into small independent nationalities. That is a movement fostered by shopkeepers, craftsmen, and certain professional elements. *The Socialists, on the contrary, believe in nationalism, solely in so far as it is on the road to internationalism.* All small nationalities wishing independence, Socialists believe, should have their wish—provided they have democracy at the same time. With this provision Socialists believe that from the moment national independence is achieved, the masses of the people will desire either a federation of small nations, or as Kautsky thinks, a single federated nation composed of several nationalities. So we see that as the Balkan states

become freer the tendency to federation becomes stronger—favored as it is by all the Socialists. Until national independence is established Socialists support nationalism, after this point they regard nationalism—i.e. the effort to intensify national as compared with international development, as wholly reactionary and as necessarily leading in the direction of war.

The same principles apply to the Socialist view of the *economic* development of nations. Tariffs or any other methods aimed to build up the truly infant industries of China or India they would regard as leading to the ultimate advantage of the whole world. But when a nation has become a heavy exporter of industrial products, it would regard a high tariff as an evil so great that even its compulsory and one-sided removal as Kautsky advocates, would be a vast international gain.

The chief economic cause of war to-day is the competition of the nations for the profits of the development of new countries. It has to do less with trade and tariffs, than with the export of capital and of expert services. Only the political independence and economic development of backward countries can finally remove this danger. But even before this takes place, the international financiers may reduce it to a minimum.

Tariffs are not so much a positive as a negative cause of war. If, when the nations of continental Europe and America had attained a similar economic development to that of England when she reduced her tariffs in 1850, they had similarly reduced theirs, international trade might already have several times its present value. Not only would the trading interests that make for peace be far greater than at present, but there would be such a specialization of industries, such as economic interdependence, that war would have become by now utterly impossible. The tendency is towards the specialization of certain industries in certain nations, which leads to interdependence and integration—a process most clearly seen between this country and Canada, and which is likely to lead to extended reciprocity treaties—I mean genuine reciprocity treaties—after

the war. As Kautsky points out, there may at first be two competing groups of such treaty-bound nations, that is bound at first by treaties but later by the solid bond of common ownership. These treaties might develop slowly indeed, if only the middle classes were consulted. But their rapid development is ensured by the growth of that international financial control of governments which I have called the trust of nations.

Only two roads of national economic evolution lie open, the road to increasing economic *independence* followed by Germany and to a lesser degree by certain other countries, and the road to increasing economic *interdependence* long followed by Great Britain, later entered upon by France, and just recently by the United States. The two roads lead in the opposite directions: there is no compromise, and when once long pursued there is no turning. Great Britain depends for her food and partly for her military supplies upon other countries. If Germany were in the same position there would have been no war. Even the natural specialization in the production of copper, gold, rubber, and petroleum has been a serious obstacle. Add to this a high degree of specialization in manufactured products, and war would be physically impossible.

Now let us examine Kautsky's idea of one-sided *disarmament*. Let us assume that our league of peace resting on a firm and lasting economic foundation, and drawing nearly all the nations into its folds, proceeds to the partial disarmament of the defeated in the present war. This would mean chiefly that strategical considerations would play a large part in the new boundaries—certainly where they coincide with racial lines. So Metz would pass to France and perhaps Strassburg also. Similar measures would be taken on the Belgian, Polish, Silesian, Roumanian, Servian and Danish borders, the latter including an internationalization of the Kiel Canal.

This is all in accord with the program issued by Munich Socialists at the beginning of the war—but it is only half the program. Kautsky's point is that it is thoroughly worth while to begin with half. The Munich Socialists also

desired the neutralization of the Suez Canal, and Socialists and pacifists generally favor the neutralization of all canals and oceanic passages. And we have just seen that Kautsky, together with all Socialists, desires the independence of Finland, Poland, the Baltic provinces, Persia and Egypt. But Kautsky is doubtless right that the independence of Alsations, Poles, Danes, Roumanians and Servians would strengthen rather than weaken these other national movements, just as the neutralization of the Dardanelles and the Kiel Canal would aid the movement to neutralize the Suez Canal. And, similarly, by one-sided disarmament, the movement to decrease armaments would be greatly strengthened within the financial league of peace.

Nor are such steps towards disarmament the only means of coercing recalcitrant nations. As Sidney Webb, the leading Socialist thinker of Great Britain, points out in a recent interview, economic nonintercourse might be equally effective, including "refusal to lend capital, to allow export or import of goods or any postal communications." This policy includes above all, of course, an embargo on arms, as concerns offending nations, while an equally essential part is that arms *shall* circulate freely among the nations of the league of peace. Up to the present the only Socialist action against the export of arms has been the resolution of the national committee of the American Party passed last month, but not binding because not yet submitted either to a party Congress or to a referendum. Moreover, dealing as it does with international affairs it must obviously be referred to an international Congress. And no international Socialist Congress has ever taken any action along these lines.

So much for Kautsky's position. The greatest living Socialist authority has thus contributed the two leading constructive proposals that we have had since the war—the idea that the war may lead to a combination of empires and the idea that a one-sided peace—if along intelligent lines—is desirable.

Kautsky's only failure has been that he has not put these two ideas together. It is taking no liberty whatever with

his thought to do this, and perhaps the only reason Kautsky himself has not done it is—the censorship. Socialist thought leads us to respect and to welcome—as a half-way stage to that combination of *all* empires, that ultra-imperialism which Kautsky predicts will bring permanent peace—a one-sided and dominating combination of nations. Before monopoly come the trusts. Kautsky has outlined the dangers and advantages for Socialism that will accompany this stage of ultra-imperialism, the advantages preponderating—and I have reproduced his arguments in my recent volume. These advantages come also with the intermediate stage, which I have called “the trust of nations.” And the first of these advantages is that it establishes permanent world peace.

Kautsky’s view is the complete opposite of that usually held by pacifists. We are usually warned that if any advantage is taken of the war, even for the cause of peace, that if force is used to exact anything important from the defeated nations, the only result will be more force, more wars in the future. Kautsky points out, on the contrary, that—although the peace settlement may be wholly one-sided—if the exactions made are along the lines of *permanent peace*, they may be used as an opening wedge by the democratic and peace parties of the victorious countries to introduce the same conditions on the other side also. There is only one condition—which Kautsky was unable to discuss because of the censorship. If the victorious countries are to take steps towards disarmament, the enfranchisement of subject peoples, and such international economic reforms as lowered tariffs, they must be democratic or semi-democratic in their constitutions. If they are autocratic or militaristic, military victories would lead merely to a thirst for more military victories. So a victory of the Allies that depended *chiefly* upon the efforts of Russia, could scarcely lead to those one-sided but revolutionary steps towards peace which Kautsky has in view.

But then, such a purely Russian victory is practically impossible. Not only are there three democratic powers among the Allies to one autocracy, but these powers furnish

the bulk of the Russian armament and ammunition, or at least, the money for them. Even on the Eastern front the money and equipment of London, Paris and New York is doing more of the fighting than the Russian armies.

As to the probable effect of a *German* victory on German militarism, we have the testimony of the greatest statesman German Socialism has produced.

Writing in his Memoirs less than five years before the present war, August Bebel said :

“My view is that defeat in war is rather advantageous than disadvantageous to a people in our unfree condition. Victories make a government that stands opposed to a people arrogant and exacting.” Bebel never withdrew this opinion to the day of his death.

This view of Bebel’s has been a widespread one among the German Socialists. Non-German Socialists are, in overwhelming majority, of the same opinion. The Socialist view then, is undoubtedly that a *victory* of Germany would mean a victory of German militarism and a step not towards those half-way measures of peace expected by Kautsky, but towards further militarism and further wars.

But what from the Socialist standpoint would be the probable result on Germany of a German *defeat*? It will be asked whether in case of German defeat, the foundations of permanent international peace described by Kautsky, will not have been laid at the cost of Germany and of the German people.

Again Bebel answers our question. In the same passage from which I have quoted, he continues :

“Victories make governments that stand opposed to a people arrogant and exacting. Defeats compel them to approach the people and to win their sympathy. If Prussia had been defeated in 1866, Bismarck’s ministry and the rule of the aristocracy, which has weighed like a nightmare upon Germany to this day, would have been swept away.”

The German people, in this view, will ultimately gain by defeat. Why, then, are the German Socialists, even those who have shared this opinion, and are opposed to the present war, united in the effort to avoid defeat? It is true that a

large part of the German Socialists do not desire to see Germany victorious over France and England. But all desire victory over Russia, and all are willing to lend such aid to the Government that Germany shall not be worsted by the Allies as a whole.

The explanation is not far to seek. The whole cost of German defeat must be borne by the present generation. No matter how great the future gain, we can scarcely be surprised if all sections of the German people draw back from the payment of this staggering cost, all are hostages of German militarism.

It is generally known that *Vorwaerts*, the daily organ of the German Party, has fearlessly and ably opposed the war from the beginning and has managed with remarkable skill, to express most of its views indirectly in spite of the censorship. Yet *Vorwaerts* points out that "a defeat of German militarism in war can only take place by a defeat of the German armies, the masses of which consist of German workingmen; and German workingmen can no more desire defeat than French or English." Yet the time may come when not only they, but the overwhelming majority of the German people, may—as Bebel suggested—be grateful for defeat, although if the account were squared during the present generation, the benefits gained, however great, may not yet seem worth the cost. This is practically admitted by *Vorwaerts* when it quotes with approval an interpretation of Bebel's expression written by a leading Austrian Socialist, Friedrich Adler, since the present war, to the effect that Bebel was not referring to the position that the Socialist Party should take during a war but to "the objective effect of events."

That is to say, the Socialists cannot desire defeat or work for it, even though they acknowledge it would prove beneficial in the end, even to Germany.

But what now are the *immediate prospects* of the weakening of German militarism inside of Germany as a result of defeat in the present war?

First—what may we expect from the German people themselves, and secondly—how may these tendencies be

aided by conditions imposed by the Allies as a part of the terms of peace?

It seems that at first the hold of the military party on the Government will not be weakened as an immediate result of the war, no matter how serious the German defeat may be. The physical and mental discipline of the people has been too efficient for that. But not a year will have passed before the extremely serious problem will have to be met of *paying for the war*. And every additional year that passes the internal conflict over the question of the distribution of the war burdens among the various social classes, will become more and more critical.

The landowning, military, and official aristocracy now in control of the Government, as Kautsky points out, are already advocating the further indirect taxation of the masses of the already overburdened consumers, particularly through the extension of governmental monopolies. The Socialists, who are bound to have the support in this matter of the Radicals, the Centre, and all the popular parties, demand the heavy graduated taxation of the wealthy and well-to-do; and a strong beginning in this direction was already made in the preparations for the present war in 1913.

Of course the wealthy and well-to-do will take the side of the militarists and the Government on this issue. But it is hard to believe that the overwhelming majority of the German people will long allow themselves to be saddled with the interest of the huge war debt; and it seems vastly more probable that they will demand and obtain that radical democratization of the German constitution which is necessary to protect them against such an outcome. And if they do obtain a ministry responsible to the Reichstag, equal election districts, and equal suffrage in Prussia, we may be sure that the pacifist forces in Germany will be greatly strengthened. I do not mean that this democracy would fail to be nationalistic; I have given reasons for believing that it would be extremely nationalistic. But it would deprive the landlord aristocracy of its power, and place it in the hands of the capitalists, among whom international in-

terests would soon come to dominate over national interests—as in other countries.

Now is it possible that this industrial and democratic evolution of Germany can be hastened by the terms of peace? The British Socialists have demanded the democratization of constitutions as part of their peace program, and Bernard Shaw has expressed the plausible opinion that such constitutions if proposed, not by conquerors, but by an international conference, might prove acceptable. For example, a constitutional monarchy, as above outlined, might be proposed to Germany, as it was clearly already favored by a majority of the German people before the war. Doubtless the Hohenzollerns, the aristocracy, and the military party would oppose it to the bitter end. This would, of course, mean a further prolongation of the war, but that might be worth while if it promised to bring about this magnificent result.

Since the German Capitalists realize that this would mean taking the power out of the hands of their agrarian and aristocratic rivals *immediately*, instead of waiting many years and running the risk of a revolution, many of them may publicly or privately acquiesce in the change. One of the first results of a semi-democratic constitution like this, under the pressure of war taxes, would probably be the division among the peasantry of those large estates that are the economic foundation of the military caste which—even with moderate payments to the Government—would go far to pay the interest on the huge war debt.

This would be a step in economic democracy corresponding in momentous magnitude to the political step of establishing a democratic monarchy. And it would be even more important. It would be a revolution similar to that which took place in France in 1789. For the military aristocracy could never come to life again after such a blow. Not only would their income be gone, but also that impoverished and oppressed agricultural population, which is one of the chief props of the army and of the Prussian autocracy, would have disappeared.

With some such treatment of the domestic German prob-

lem, peace would be secure from every angle. For Austria will have been vastly weakened, if not partly disintegrated, by the war, and for the rest will probably pass through a similar evolution to that of Germany. And Russia is becoming more dependent both in peace and war on the financing of London, Paris and New York, a dependence which, if it does not lead directly to a modern capitalistic Government, for example to a semi-democratic monarchy, may lead to a similar result by the road of revolution and repudiation of the national debt.

IV

The Marxian view then leads us to believe that world peace may be established as the result of a league of *enforced* peace. But this will not be that merely political league advocated the other day at Philadelphia. It will not be initiated by philanthropists or self-appointed international statesmen. It will not grow up out of a league of neutrals with the United States at the head. It is already being organized in New York City by the actual heads of American finance and American capitalism. And it is already growing up under the leadership of the United States, as being the decisive factor of an economic league of peace already in existence and already in the process of enforcing its decrees, namely, the present financial alliance of Great Britain, France and the United States, together with other smaller financial powers.

And what is the attitude of the consistent Marxian to this consummation? Precisely what it was to the trusts, when through industrial warfare they practically put an end to industrial warfare in certain industries. Socialists—as is well known—considered this process as marking a tremendous progress. Yet they have hardly been accused of being friendly to the trusts.

So those Marxians who are blinded neither by the war fever, nor by the horror of war, must regard this colossal international economic warfare as marking a revolutionary advance if it puts an end to international economic war.

They will not be accused because of this feeling of any friendliness towards the existing Governments of any of the Great Powers. Their hostility, as we see, continues everywhere during the war, and it will become greatly intensified after the war, when the struggle over the distribution of the war burdens begins. In the Socialist view of the trusts there was no endorsement either of their motives or of their methods. Nor is there in this view of the financial powers—now beginning the economic organization of the world on a world scale—any endorsement either of motives or methods. But there is a full recognition of the incalculable value of their work to that international or world democracy which we believe will one day relieve them of their power.

Nor is there any alternative way. For no merely political international organization, league or federation can be made to work. For how shall such a league be constituted? If the largest and smallest nations are each to have one vote—as seems necessary—how can it be governed by majority rule? Or how can the league of peace enforce its decisions on a large minority without war or constant threats of war? Even if these questions are ultimately soluble it is admitted by the leading advocates of such international organizations that they cannot be solved to-day. That is why such eminent exponents of international organization as Professor John Bassett Moore do not think of going further than to demand merely that no *one* nation shall be allowed to violate the international law. This is the rock upon which the very idea of such an organization, the very movement to that end, will be wrecked and abandoned long before the peace negotiations take place.

The financiers' enforced league of peace knows none of these difficulties. Of course it has troubles of its own. But these troubles are in process of being overcome.

In closing I would like to point to one consideration which in itself is almost evidence enough that we have already entered upon this road that knows no turning. Just consider this. America is receiving orders for hundreds of millions in arms and munitions. Many new plants are being

built and even more are being converted temporarily to these purposes. *After the present orders have been filled all these plants will seek more orders. When the Allies' credit gets low they will be in a position to demand loans as a part of new orders.* And such loans will be readily granted, for they are being granted to-day.

We do not need to wait until after the war for a league to enforce peace. That league is already in existence. All that is needed is that the Government should continue quietly to recognize the economic fact. And all history shows that where economic evolution leads, Governments have no other course open to them but to follow.

SECTION III

IS WAR A CAPITALIST PLOT?

By Norman Angell

The great ones of the earth keep on telling us somewhat piteously, yet vociferously, that they are impotent. If ever progress is to be made the worker himself must make it. But how? What is his line of action?

Several ideas which find favor with the worker need some examination. There is, for instance, one persistent idea which is this: that war is the work of capitalism, that all efforts to destroy the war system will be futile so long as the capitalist form of society remains, and that a precedent of any useful work against militarism must be the abolition of capitalism.

That point is quite obviously important from the point of view of action and policy.

Some years ago I remember reading an amusing story connected with an outbreak of plague in one of the Chinese provinces, which I am sure convinced the Socialist colleagues of Dr. Sun Yat Sen that cholera is a capitalistic interest, that indeed the real cause of cholera is capitalism, that the real way to tackle it is to study Karl Marx, that it will only properly be dealt with when the Socialistic

State is finally inaugurated, and that then, presumably, it will disappear of itself.

The story in question, so far as I remember, and my recollection is not perhaps as clear as it might be, was something to this effect: the plague having broken out, the Provincial Viceroy started as well as he might to take preventive measures; introduced European doctors and medicines, quarantine, isolation, the closing of low-class restaurants, etc. It so happened, however, that some years previously the Coffin Trust had been formed in this province. The Trust had not been paying very large dividends and the plague had promised a rich harvest, and these measures of the Viceroy were looked upon as an unwarranted government interference with a great national industry. What was to be done? What the Coffin Trust did do was to make a present of a large block of shares in the Coffin Trust to the Viceroy, to advertise very largely in the newspapers of the province, and so on. With this result: a wave of intense patriotism immediately began to sweep over this particular Chinese province. It was discovered that these measures which the Government had begun to enforce were all of foreign origin, and that only those tainted with an anti-national bias, the friends of every country but their own, could prefer such methods to the good old Chinese remedies of powdered tiger's liver and the parading of the ancient dragon, which everyone knew infallibly scared away the devils which caused cholera. The growth of national feeling was astonishing. "Chinese medicine, right or wrong," became the popular cry. All those who did not agree were known as pro-foreign-devils. The revival of patriotism was such that a great many were prepared to prove to you that in reality cholera was a good thing. Certain dignitaries of the Temple—the Coffin Trust were largely subscribers to the Temple—described it as a great school of character, and one said that a world without cholera was a dream, and not even a beautiful dream—that cholera was a very ancient institution especially associated with Chinese history; while one great Chinese Encyclopedist, whose work, although only half-way through the

alphabet, had already run to two thousand volumes, wrote learned articles to prove that cholera was a great vehicle of civilization, that it ensured the survival of the fit. A great Chinese national poet—I forget his name at this moment—wrote poems so stirring and tender about Chinese maidens watching over the cholera patients that every young Chinese immediately burned to catch it; while a certain great economist was prepared to prove that cholera was a great stimulus to Chinese trade, that in the national industry of coffin-making—to say nothing of grave-diggers and attendant trades—over sixty per cent went in wages. At a time when so many splendid Chinese industries were either going or gone, thanks to the wickedness of certain parties in notorious alliances with the foreign devils, it was essential that the country should rally as one man to the defense of their ancient rights against pernicious innovation.

The result, of course, could be anticipated: the Viceroy yielded to popular opinion, the famous Anti-Foreign Medicines Edict was promulgated, restaurants which were known as centers of infection were re-opened with great patriotic rejoicings—and the Coffin Trust paid enormous dividends.

I may perhaps have varied the story a little. As I have told you it is a long time since I read it, and I cannot lay hands on the original. But in essence it was that the Trust had a vested influence in cholera, and used its influence to protect those interests, and thus, as I have said, the Chinese Socialist is prepared to prove to you by this historical incident that cholera is a capitalistic interest, and that there is no hope for China's ever fighting that scourge until capitalism has been abolished.

It is no good pointing out to him that in European States, organized on quite as capitalistic a basis as China, these things would not be possible, because the attitude of the general public towards things like sanitation and rational medicine would be such as to render the maneuvers of the Coffin Trust quite innocuous; that the Coffin Trust was able to exercise this influence because they had merely to apply

the match to a powder magazine of blind prejudice, mob passion, and ignorance; that this powder magazine was none of their making; that it existed before they set to work, and that their office merely consisted in throwing the match; that while a few provincial dignitaries so suddenly converted to good old Chinese traditions did, it is true, receive the peacock's feather, which I understand in China corresponds to something between a knighthood and a peerage, the immense majority of the Chinese people and press took up the cause of national medicine *con amore*, and that the mass of those who yelled so lustily and chased pro-foreign-devils from their midst did so in all sincerity and had no interested motive whatever, and honestly believed that things a good deal worse than cholera awaited them if they had any association with such abominations as European medicine. Nor would it have been the slightest use to point out to these Chinese Socialists that, far more dangerous than the Coffin Trust, was precisely this powder magazine of blind prejudice and false ideas which would still remain, even though they achieved the Socialistic State; that indeed when they had realized such an ideal, maneuvers like that of the Coffin Trust would still be possible so long as elements which made them possible remained, that even under Socialism there would be vested interests—the Chinese doctors or the Chinese servant girls might become a very powerful vested interest—more threatening still, maybe, under a Socialist than under an individualistic régime, where so many factors of a non-political character escaped Government control that, in short, the disturbing thing of the whole incident was not the use of the Coffin Trust money, but the prejudice, ignorance, superstition, and blind passion which made its successful use so easy; that while those remained, it would always be possible for a dozen or a score or a hundred unscrupulous men to shape such forces to their special advantage, as against the general advantage of the community, whatever might be the outward form of government or society; that the Socialist organization of such elements would give no better results than had given, say, constitu-

tional and parliamentary government in certain Hispano-American Republics nearly a hundred years ago, where the introduction of the best political forms had not the slightest effect until certain other factors—as it happens some quite outside politics and mainly economic in character—began to be operative.

You see I am pretty dogmatic about this Chinese Socialist, and the view he would take as to cholera being a capitalistic interest, and the impossibility of abolishing it except by the introduction of the Socialist State. And I will tell you why I am thus so certain; it is exactly the view taken by the German Socialist, and by most European Socialists, even by many English ones, and there is no reason to suppose that the future colleagues on the left of Dr. Sun Yat Sen would be wiser in these matters than their European confreres. Only it is not cholera which happens to be the capitalistic interest in Europe, but, we are told, war.

The attitude that the European Socialist—more particularly on the Continent, but to some extent in England—is apt to assume is this: while the general interest is certainly not served by military power, certain special capitalistic interests are, and until those interests are held in check by a complete re-organization of the form of our society, these special interests will always triumph, and so meanwhile the matter is not worth discussing. Peace is at the bottom a Socialistic thesis. Swallow the whole box of Socialism, and you are sure to get this one particular pill.

What is the quite evident and simple truth in this matter? It is *that a relatively infinitesimal group of financiers is able, by manipulating a mass of ignorance and blind prejudice, to profit at the expense of all other financiers whatsoever.* It would be truer to say of a plague that it is a financial interest than to say of war that it is one; those outside the “trust” may escape the plague; very few financiers outside the armament and concession group would escape the damage of war.

What is “international finance”? Is it a small band of Frankfort bankers with Hebraic names living by the ex-

· ploitation of people less unscrupulous than themselves? That is a picture lending itself to dramatic and sensational treatment, but it does not happen to be true. All bankers, merchants, investors, those who insure lives, who have holdings in stocks, or shares of any kind, are financiers in the sense that they are interested in the security of wealth and the better organization of finance. Even when we use the term "financier" in its narrow sense we imply generally a man whose fortune is based upon the general prosperity; if the world as a whole did not make and save and invest money financiers could not make it—their occupation would be gone. And more and more is it true that modern finance, whether in the large or in the limited sense, is bound up with general security and prosperity; the more that becomes evident the less is the incentive to oppose any special interest to the general one. In a prosperous China, Chinese would not invest in the Coffin Trust; they would find a better way to use money than making an investment the dividends of which depended upon the foundations of all wealth being threatened. And the same is true of investments that depend for their success on war.

It is true, of course, that wherever you get conditions in which, on the one hand, the general interest is very ill-conceived and uninformed, subject to gusts of blind prejudice readily and easily stirred into life, and where, on the other, you get a particular interest well conceived subject to no such influence, you will get the particular interest controlling the general; five or fifty or five hundred men manipulating as many millions to their own personal advantage. But no mechanical reshaping of society could ever prevent such a result if you get these two elements in juxtaposition. And that is true, not merely in the domain of finance and politics, but in things like religion or medicine. It is the story of priest-craft, quackery, demagogism, through all the ages.

There was a time in Europe when massacre and cruelties of all sorts, credulity, and quaking fear of the unseen, passed for religion with great masses of the population. And while that was true a camarilla of priests could make

playthings of nations. And the relation which that sort of "religion" bore to morals in Europe in the past, the wicked rubbish that too often passes for patriotism bears to politics to-day.

I could perhaps help to make some of the points of it clear by summarizing an actual controversy with a German and an English Socialist in which I happened to be engaged last year—and exactly typical of one I am now engaged in with a French Socialist. A writer in *Die Neue Zeit*, in answer to my contention that conquest of foreign territory can bring no possible benefit to the mass of the conquering nation, replied in effect that in the event of, for instance, the German conquest of India:

" . . . The German bankocracy would divert from England to Germany the millions of the profits of exploitation which are to be made in the future by the further capitalistic development of India. . . . It is true enough that in the conquered country we no longer employ the simple method of direct exploitation; but in its place, capitalist exploitation everywhere flourished. The only question is, to the capitalists of which nation shall accrue the surplus value which is to be obtained from the population of any particular country? For the modern bourgeoisie, this is the upshot of all 'national questions' and 'national contrasts.' . . . Norman Angell will never succeed in convincing the capitalists and their hangers-on that they have nothing to gain by extending the area of their dominions, since they desire it in order to ensure that an ever-greater proportion of the surplus value of the world shall flow into their 'national' coffers."

This criticism is, of course, based upon utterly false premises. And it is curious to note that this failure of an eminent European Socialist to realize the facts arises from the hypnotism of conventional conceptions which are, at bottom, the negation of Socialism.

First, as to facts. My critic says the German bankocracy would, in the event of the German conquest of India, divert from England to Germany the profits of the capitalistic exploitation of the possession.

Does he seriously mean by this that the stocks and bonds of Indian railroads, mines, etc., now held by English capitalists would, in the case of the German conquest of India,

be confiscated by the German Government and transferred to German capitalists? But he must know that such a thing is impossible, that the dangers of financial panic involving all capitalists, German and foreign alike, would be such that the whole influence of German finance would be thrown against such a measure. When England conquered the Transvaal, how many mining shares did England "capture"? Not sixpenny worth, and the dividends of the mines continued to go to the owners of the stock—Russian, German, French, American, Turkish or Hindoo.

Or does the phrase that I have quoted mean that the German "owners" of India would, after the conquest, prevent British capitalists from investing money in India? That, of course, is equally absurd. After a war Germany would be more hard up for money than she is now, and would take it wherever she could get it; and in order to get it she would have to give security, which she would give in the shape of bonds and shares. In all human probability she would, if she wanted to carry on capitalistic exploitation of India, have to come to London and Paris for the money, which means that the profits of the capitalistic exploitation would go to those centers in the just proportion in which they found the money. There would be no "division" by mere virtue of conquest.

What is evidently in his mind is that the destination of capitalists' profits is determined not by the source of the capital, but by the nationality of the Government of the territory in which the exploitation takes place. I am sorry to use strong language, but such a notion is childish and preposterous—none the less so because it is due to a confusion still dominating the mind of the older type of politician in Europe. In order that there shall be no doubt as to this conclusion he adds this, that in war the real question is: "To the capitalist of which nation shall accrue the surplus value to be obtained from the population of any particular country."

It is a necessary corollary, of course, of the first confusion; Kautsky would imply that the area of capitalistic exploitation is determined by the political dominion of the

capitalist Government; that a German capitalist cannot invest money in a country unless his Government conquered it. And this is written in a country and of the country which has given us the type of capitalist represented by the Rothschilds, Cassels, Sterns, Oppenheims, Mendelssohns, and Bleichroeders—men whose activities disregard completely national and political divisions; and written also of a country whose capitalists operate in an astoundingly enormous degree in Brazil, Argentina, China, Egypt, Turkey, Russia and India!

I have never yet been able to understand why a certain type of Socialist habitually distorts or closes his eyes to the truth in this matter. Why should he not admit frankly what is the obvious fact—his cause would gain by the admission—that capital is a good deal more international than labor, and the capitalist at bottom much less affected by nationalist prepossessions? The laborer cannot labor (except in a very indirect sense) simultaneously in half a dozen quarters of the globe, under half a dozen governments. The capitalist can and does so set his capital at work. Most large capitalists, especially since “geographical distribution” of capital has come into favor, exploit by their operations a dozen different countries, and the “flag” under which the dividend is paid is a matter of complete indifference to them as long as it is paid.

Certain German Socialists would have us believe that German capitalists, apart from other sections of the German nation, would favor the German conquest of India as aiding their capitalistic exploitation of the country. Well, this is simply not true. The German “bankocracy” would look with no particular favor on the German conquest of India; they realize that the country would not probably be a better field for investment—quite open to their operations, as it is—than it is at present. Indeed, the German “bankocracy,” as a whole, shows no particular desire to invest in such German colonies as the Fatherland has conquered; it prefers to send its money to Brazil, and even China and Turkey.

It may be urged that German manufacturers would gain

by having an exclusive market. But even Germans are learning—as the French are learning (some recent reports of the French Colonial Ministry are instructive on this point)—the lesson of English exploitation; that an exclusive colonial market costs more than it brings. And be it noted that the old policy of colonial commercial exploitation—that only policy which can give color of reasonableness to conquest—was practically abandoned as unprofitable in England by a Government completely under the control of capitalists, and before the democratic era.

Of course it is true that there are groups of capitalists that profit by war and conquest—armament manufacturers, officials, etc. Well, the spectacle of the Labor member of a dockyard constituency urging increase of armaments because his constituency will profit thereby is not an unknown one. Does this mean that the “democracy” are in favor of armaments?

What is the truth in this matter? That the forces, both economic and psychological, making for war cut clean athwart class division. Large sections of the *bourgeoisie*, both by interest and temperament, are anti-militarist, just as some sections of the democracy are militarist. Many of us have seen a pro-Boer aristocrat running for his life before a howling mob of working-class “patriots.” In Australia and New Zealand the democracy, in some respects the most advanced in the world, is not anti-militarist either in practice or in spirit; they are, for the most part, truculently militarist, and it is under a Labor Government that has been enforced the first compulsory military service under the British flag, and such feeble protest as we do find comes from *bourgeois* sources.

Why run one's head against these obvious facts? Capitalism in its economic theory is just as international as Socialism; in its practice, it is a good deal more so. The definite repudiation of the doctrine of Universal Brotherhood, a repudiation embodied in legislation of a rigid, harsh, and sometimes cruel character, has come first from advanced democrats—I refer to the anti-alien, anti-Negro, anti-Chinese, anti-Japanese legislation of Australia, Can-

ada and the United States. The capitalist classes opposed such legislation; the working classes imposed it. I am not discussing the respective motives or saying that the working classes are wrong. *Je constate*. In this, as in so many other respects, it is capitalism which is non-nationalist, universal, cosmopolitan; Socialism or organized Labor which is racial, nationalistic, exclusive. And, incidentally, it is the Socialistic, not the capitalistic, attitude and legislation which augurs ill for the disappearance of conflict and armaments.

Surely good sense and good strategy dictate that the Socialist should make common cause with such of the enemy as believe themselves to have common interest with him in this matter; to refuse to do so is to consolidate the strength of the enemy, and to weaken his own. It is as though Keir Hardie and other Socialists should refuse to associate themselves with the campaign for Women's Suffrage because some Conservative ladies of title are in favor of it.

Into this matter of the fight against armaments, the quarrel between Socialists and capitalists does not enter at all. And if a very superficial reading of class antagonism leads Socialists to take the view that this is a capitalistic matter in which they are not interested, that it is merely part of the general fight against capitalism, and that it is not worth while, so long as the present régime lasts, to interest themselves in the matter, well, the proletariat as a whole will pay very dearly for its error.

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING NORMAN ANGELL'S ADDRESS ON
"IS WAR A CAPITALISTIC PLOT?"

Mr. Walling: I am not going to point out in the few minutes I have how deeply the Socialists whom I represent are in accord with the economic pacifists like Norman Angell on a good many points. So I will emphasize only the points of difference because of the lack of time to point out the points of agreement. Mr. Angell has a feeling that his point of view of peace is better than the Marx view. I do not admit that.

The economic and the materialistic are very different facts. If the French want art in their lives, that is economic, and they will fight for it. Economic means that a thing has a dollar and cents side, not that it is materialistic. We take such economic facts into consideration always, they are not materialistic, not psychologic.

Mr. Angell spoke of the friendly relations between the Labor and the Independent Socialist party in Great Britain. That is the only socialist organization in the world that is only half Marxian. About half of them do not take the Marx view. They passed a resolution unanimously that no member of a labor party must justify this war. We all agreed to that. Then came up a question. Many of the Independent Socialist Party so voted, but many said there must be the question of the individual conscience. Let him do what he thought. The question was put, that no Socialist could support any war under any circumstances; it was defeated by 121 votes to 120. The majority were not willing to justify war but were willing to let members go out to support it; the minority were not willing to say that, in Socialism, it is right for any one to fight under any circumstances whatsoever.

Now as to the capitalistic plot. What is the capitalist relation to war? When I spoke of capital I spoke of expert services. Very decidedly a large element got places in colonies, financial if not political colonies. In the case of Russia and France, they have made large loans to Russia but have stipulated that the material must be bought in France and their people must go in and build up the factories and so forth. I am speaking of large groups of professional classes. More important than that is the expenditure of foreign investments at home. I understand these figures Mr. Angell has in mind, started out with these; undoubtedly a large part of foreign investments is in countries in no way dependent on Great Britain. These investments lead to profits expended at home, considerable increased expenditure of the aristocracy. This is a very strong financial influence in England. This it seems to me is a little illusion, the financial interest and a very

strong one which benefits by foreign investments in dependent countries like China and India. These expenditures at home increase servants and shopkeepers, and this increases the power of the aristocracy. The fight to abolish the voting power of the House of Lords is due to the parasitical classes dependent on the parasites. The first one profiting from foreign investments is a poor parasite.

The best way to deal with the problems is not to deny them at all. There is an element working for war, but there are many more millions on the other side, and these millions can be profited in better ways. We can not deny that it will be a very large loss if Britain should lose India and her other colonies. Keir Hardie does not want the Hindoos oppressed, neither does he want them to have economic independence. You can not take democracy and carry it round the world, it has been said. They are the Indian race, who must always be dependent on the white people. It is the same with Bernard Shaw. He is said to be antimilitaristic, but does not he favor a certain form of conscription? He says so; says he was in favor of more armament, was in favor of a very strong stand on the part of the British government, saying, if you take France we will fight. This school is not the school of Marxian Socialism. In his book Bernard Shaw says the Empire must be preserved. I disagree with Mr. Shaw in this, and with this school of Social Imperialists in Germany; it does not seem to me that this opening of trade in the world has to be done through empire. British Socialists and a large part of the German Socialists who are pacifists are Imperialists, not pacifists. "We believe the British Empire can be preserved through peace, therefore, we are for peace." In Marxian Socialism we are not arguing about whether the British Empire is to be preserved or not, if the Empire is of the first importance in a man's mind then he is for war. The imperialistic side is going to hold him to war. The business man and the statesman will say to-day that if they are in a corner they will fight. The pacifists will go along like so many sheep and follow. They may make a few remarks but it will have no effect on

the situation. But if they had taken an anti-imperialistic stand, then they might have made a beginning with the British people.

As to the interests of France in the present war. I do not believe that it is affected because of Alsace-Lorraine. A few years back it would have been, but, since the Morocco controversy they have been more interested in foreign investments than in Alsace-Lorraine. They figure in this way, Germany has the better of us and we may never be able to change that. But outside of Europe we have the political and financial advantage. They had billions loaned in Russia and were afraid they might never get it back. Russia was increasing her armament in pace with Germany. Russia was on the road to bankruptcy, said France. Something must be done to Germany and Austria to prevent this going on in the future. Financial men argued, we must do something to stop the race in armaments. Perfectly human motives why they did not take a larger view.

The working man is making \$700. At that rate with five children you can raise only three, two die. If you let your figure be reduced to \$500, perhaps three will die. This is an indication of the sort of position people find themselves in and why they take the short rather than the long point of view. When people's interests are not directly touched they may take a broader point of view.

There are one or two other points. The cost of Alsatian annexation. This is another place where we absolutely agree with Mr. Angell. In my recent book¹ you will see that the first quotation is from Marx: "If the German Government is mad enough to annex Alsace-Lorraine, they will have another war in the course of nature. Of course France will not stand for it. There will be another war, and that will be of all Europe against Germany." Many Germans say that even if they go down to destruction, still for forty-five years they have been having a splendid time. You know, of course, this debt is being paid in 1915. Germany has been paying the price of conquering Alsace-Lorraine in the necessity for a larger armament. She should

¹ "Socialists and the War," New York, Holt, 1915.

not have taken these provinces, not because it did not pay to take them, the only reason it did not pay was because other nations did not let it pay. That is the big illusion. The point was not that Alsace was not worth having, it was worth having, for strategical reasons also, but it was not worth having because Germany had raised against herself all the peoples of the earth. American capitalists, ninety-nine per cent. of them, are giving just as much money as France or England in the war. What is going to Germany? The German Government thought, "Let us collect the German war loan in America." They raised three or four million marks in Chicago, enough to keep them going about five months.

(Mr. Walling had to leave at this point.)

Mr. Angell: I feel that it would be taking a mean advantage to reply to a man who has gone out of the room. I am not going to reply to him. His talk was very vivid and human where he made his point of Alsace-Lorraine.

I want to indicate the principle which underlies what I have been trying to do here. If you do not have a principle in these complicated things of social policies, you can not get anywhere. The man who has his eyes close to the small things does not see the horizon. If we do not have a principle in these complex things the nation is turned first in one direction, then in another. We must arrive at some means of weighing the various factors entering into these considerations.

Mr. Hugins: It is a curious thing that two men such as Mr. Angell and Mr. Walling should stand here and practically agree and yet reply to each other. It always struck me as odd that people who do not agree with Norman Angell do not understand why he is wrong, we who agree with him do not always know why he is right. Mr. Walling speaks of some of the little illusions which he does not agree with, certain financial methods by which England gave the illusion that colonies paid a profit. I believe this is true. Many actually believe there are some gains from war. Mr. Angell said a moment ago, "If I had written a book which had taken account of all qualifi-

cations I would have had no attention." What kind of book did he write? A book in which he dealt with the futility of aggression. He said, nothing is to be gained from war for aggression. He took the credit side of war.

Mr. Angell: Balance it with the debit side and see what remains.

Mr. Hugins: Then Mr. Walling does not understand it.

Mr. Angell: If war were waged by shopkeepers alone and they only paid the cost and then came home and derived profits—but that is not the case at all. It took in the whole nation as a unit waging war, and the question is, "Does that unit derive benefit?" and I say no.

Mr. Hugins: I do not want to argue with you, because I think you were right, but for a particular reason. As soon as a person admits there are no gains for war, we must construct a balance sheet. The credits go to the capitalists and shopkeepers. Then put the debits. As soon as you admit these gains you must then find out which are greater. Many people in Europe do not take that view, they believe that concessionary capital interests in foreign countries are large. Would this be a small matter for the capitalists of the country? I think this has been a matter of misinterpretation. Mr. Walling agrees with you, but argues with you. In the popular mind and not merely in such minds, but in the minds of the German economics professors these gains are likely to be very large. In "The Great Illusion" you have not taken these gains and shown exactly to what balance they come out, have not taken the cost of the army and navy and totalled that and put it against the debits.

Mr. Angell: I have not made that balance in figures. But I have given the result which applied to the particular thing. For instance, the stealing by England of the Dutch colonies; did the transfer of these colonies make the English people rich and the Dutch people poor? It did not in the run of years. The standard of living is noticeably higher in Holland than in England, consequently, this conquest has not been of benefit to the world. If I had permitted

myself to argue with my friend at Monte Carlo who offered to sell me cheap a system that would break the bank, we should never have gotten anywhere or I should have found my hard-earned money on the tables. The fact is what you have to judge from, and the fact was and is that there have been hundreds of system makers at Monte Carlo. It is perfectly true that you do get classes benefited by war, do get foreign forces that take that view, but they are using us for that purpose, and we must judge whether it is of benefit for us as a whole. I am perfectly willing to admit the profit for them, but let them wage the war. There is no profit to us as a whole.

Mr. Fleming: I am much surprised to hear Mr. Angell admit that in his "Great Illusion" there were little illusions. If a work is to live, if it is to have any influence in shaping the thought of the world, it must contain no illusions, not even little ones.

Mr. Angell: If the speaker infers that the final book has been written in which no mistake can occur he is asking a great deal. May I just add the hope that none of you in taking up this course will start on the assumption that "The Great Illusion" is a sort of Bible, in which no possible mistake could occur, and that nothing in it needs revision. I consider you as humans with minds that are bent on investigation, but starting with one great message that will remain true to the end of time.

Mrs. Mead: Fifteen years ago I preached a very unpopular doctrine in Boston, anti-imperialism. Many did not know the difference between a dependency and a colony, between imperialism and expansion. I wonder if some people here have made this mistake. We have no colonies, as England has in Australia and so forth. People must go out from the mother country to build the new country in order to make it a colony. It seems to me it would be well for us to understand what we mean by imperialism. It seems to me to be the domination or control of strong people over weak people without any intention or plan ever to give them independence. I feel that this is a distinctive point. Our country has never taken the imperialistic position,

never meant to keep the Philippines. Roosevelt distinguished in imperialism between the taking of Louisiana and the taking of the Philippines.

Mr. Trachtenberg: I was not surprised to hear that the British democratic party was with Norman Angell. "The Great Illusion" was the first attempt to present the peace movement from the economic standpoint. Norman Angell says that war is economically wasteful. His admission is what makes me agree with him at once, certain classes profit by war, the masses lose by it. The trouble is that though they make that thesis, they do not carry out the propaganda. They still speak to the business man more than to the trade unions. Why not go to the masses of the people?

I want you to know that Mr. Walling's Marxism does not represent the whole Socialist movement. In the larger sense it is the capitalist system which has brought on this war. Regular economic forces are at work. In the trenches of Germany, France and Russia the Socialists are thinking and discussing with others. Socialists all the time should fight against war. Only eleven men were against the budget in Germany, now forty-two men are against it. There is now a sort of renaissance in the Socialist movement, and before the war is over that will gain control, the constructive view of Socialist fellowship. If they want to realize their ideal they must be international and as soon as you pacifists talk internationally you will realize peace.

SECTION IV

THE REACTION OF INTERNATIONAL POLICY ON SOCIAL PROBLEMS

By Prof. Alfred Hayes

Of course the effect of war, of international policy, on a nation, on its internal concerns, is essentially involved in the whole discussion you have been having. I remember hearing Dr. Eliot speak on the subject of the choice of a profession, and he said it was quite as important to

think of the effect of the profession on you as of your effect on the profession. I suppose that is so of war or international policy in general. We believe in social solidarity, in the unity of history, and unity of mankind. You are all familiar with the kind of political discussion by which it has become a kind of truism that the old *laissez faire* doctrine of leaving groups of a community to take care of themselves ignores the fact that we have a poor individualistic scheme of things, the weaker the elements in a community, the larger the difficulties. The industrial groups, the women, brought out the knowledge that this involves persons who have reached a time of life where they can not work. Nothing is much more tragic than that in the industrial classes. We fear all these groups, the effects upon others, and the realization of that is responsible for the great change in our political ideas and the efforts that are being made to combat the social problems of the time.

I spoke with one of the professors of economics here a few months ago about the effect of the war, and his great feeling was apparently not so much for the loss of life and the pain and grief of the persons involved—I assume that he felt that too—but he said, “This will put back the whole social problem for a generation. The first thought in that connection is of course the economic one. If Great Britain must increase her loan to five billion dollars it is obvious that she must postpone her ambitious schemes for social betterment, which are dependent upon the raising through taxation or otherwise of the means to carry them on.”

Of course thoroughgoing Socialists or those who believe that the sources of taxation have hardly been more than touched, that the utilization of larger sums than before can be secured, believe that even these tremendous war burdens do not necessarily preclude some betterment of the social program. Still it must be evident that when things are struggling for life the putting of more reserves into munitions of war, the sinews of war, must in the end interfere with social betterment. Not only economically but, of course, politically, and, as you might say, psychologically you have this reaction. It may be illustrated by the situa-

tion in Great Britain; as to what happened to the Liberal program as soon as the war came on. The Home Rule Bill had been just about made a law, the Liberals had been fighting for a score of years along with the Nationalists to bring that about. But when the war came they said, "We must bury national differences, must get together as a united nation."

Those of us who are somewhat radical in our political views can not view with much satisfaction the shelving of the Liberal program when we feel that all over the world the greatest wrongs and injustices remain scarcely touched, when our feeling is not that the community is moving too rapidly in the effort to limit abuses but is moving exceedingly slowly, that the Liberal Party is half Whig and half Radical and we see in it a situation that will strengthen the Whig element, not only strengthen it but actually bring about the state of to-day, a coalition government made up of Whig and Tory families, with hardly a sprinkling of radicalism. What would a real Radical think of the general social progress to be gained by a government that must act harmoniously when it has united these elements as the result of the necessity of carrying on an international program.

I feel that one of the essential defects in the peace movement is just that, the fact that it is made up of all grades of political thought, so to speak; and unless the members of the peace conference will take an important step on the theory of law and thus come to know what justice is and what right is, they will be always at sea and at loggerheads about the necessity of war and the results to be attained by it. As long as you believe that the *status quo* is just, as long as you can echo sympathetically Mr. Nicholas Murray Butler's proposition that it is just, do you not ignore considerations entirely different relative to the rightness of any existing order, either international or national? You have had that truth threshed out by Mr. Walling and Mr. Angell; it is not necessary to go into it. While I do not take the view of economic determinism I do believe that the economic

elements have a big place and that your international policy must regard them.

I was talking to a young preacher of New York City and I said, "What do you think of the Mexican situation?" He said, "Well, I am afraid the United States may intervene." I asked, "Why are you afraid of that?" "Because if we do intervene there is no chance of the breakup of the big estates." By which he means, of course, that we are too much governed by the worship of the *status quo*, for instance. They believe that, with our Constitution, our idea of property and Bill of Rights, it is hardly conceivable that, if we intervene, the United States will sanction the confiscation of the great estates in Mexico. That is, a way to have that brought about is to have a war come on and have force bring about the amelioration of the situation. You see there is action and reaction in the problem. You see, your international policy depends upon your internal ideas of right and government, the kind of government you have at home. That is the view to which we are to attract your attention this morning, the international policy will shape itself and fit your internal organization.

Here is another proof that we are satisfied with the present governmental administration. I said, "Can it be that they are satisfied with the administration, with a little group to select the diplomatic and other officers?" He said, "Yes, they believe that the aristocracy ought to be the officers, they believe that to carry things on by military means is essential." The slow development of democracy is not entirely due to external things, internal difficulties have made a strong government desirable, as well as external ones. Would not we say that the whole course of history shows that where there is danger of war, the international policy has strengthened the internal phases, has brought kinds of organization which are supposed to result in strength and efficiency, in other words, autocratic, monarchical, aristocratic form of government, from the belief that "a strong executive is a government that has a single head," as Montesquieu has said? Everywhere to-day our democracy

is on trial in that respect. They say we can not develop a navy and an army quickly in a democratic government. We see this in the suffrage question, our foes are constantly saying, "Government rests on force, women can not bear arms, therefore, no suffrage."

Just one phase of this same proposition that your internal ideals are shaped and internal development is controlled and guided by the general attitude. That is, if we were free from this kind of interference, if we had an international policy which had reached the ideal stage of confederation or organization sufficiently strong to deal in legislation involving non-justiciable problems, we should be much more free to solve our internal problems. I have mentioned non-justiciable problems because I think that peace conferences must pay more attention to these; as long as they content themselves with the idea that any proceeding of law can deal with and solve all international problems they will fail. Law does not deal with political questions. No body of judges can solve problems of territory or free trade or immigration, and these non-justiciable questions must be dealt with.

If you can get a democratic world organization that will really deal with non-justiciable problems, then the internal development will have a free hand and the day of domination or preponderating influence of the backward nation or the aristocratic, militaristic elements in a community will have ceased.

My point then is that a theory dealing with the necessity for social amelioration, for fairer methods of distribution, can look only with distrust upon any government which is made up of all elements in a community in order to secure strength, and that whenever you divorce politics in its proper, wider sense from your foreign phase, from your diplomatic service, from your service generally, you will have a government, an administration not sympathetic for the average person.

You may here and there under the other kind of government get a Socialist professor into a German university, get him into the diplomatic service, but I believe that a radical

movement, I do not mean radical in the improper sense, a liberalising, democratic movement would have a tremendous impetus if we could realize a saner international policy.

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING PROF. HAYES

Mr. Angell: We appreciate extremely that Professor Hayes has raised just the question he has. During the ten days of this Conference quite frequently speakers have gotten up and assumed that the solution of the international problem is very simple. A speaker the other night said, it is a very simple thing, you have just got to confederate the world; it is very simple to federate the world. He took the analogy,—I am not disparaging him, we got many useful suggestions from him,—but his analogy of the thirteen states won't hold water. You had, after all, in this federation a common groundwork of tradition and law and outlook and largely of race, which you have not in the world problems of the federation of Europe. Professor Hayes among other interesting points has raised this possibility, important for us to consider; are you going to federate the world on the basis of the *status quo*? At the Congress of Vienna one hundred years ago they had such schemes. That federation was not successful, because based in a large degree on the political and social *status quo*. If we had had a world government look what you would have fixed on mankind, the degree of freedom accorded to the peoples. If fifty years before that, what would have happened to the American Revolution? If we had had world government at the time of the wars of religion, what would have happened then?

Here are problems to face. How much of the *status quo* can we accept in the world federation? This involves a question of far-reaching importance for all of us, because the schemes on which we are engaged are not merely a matter of mechanics, not merely a way of devising a splendid world government on paper: because it has worked well in America, therefore it must work well in Europe. That is a most important point for us to discuss; are you going to accept the *status quo* territorially and internally for a basis of future world federation?

Prof. Hudson: It seems to me that this subject of the reaction of international policy on social progress divides itself really into two main divisions. The first is the subject which Professor Hayes dealt with so admirably in the beginning of his discussion, what does it mean that a large proportion of our energy should be consumed in wasteful international policy? He dealt with the reaction such waste involves in social reconstruction.

Another attack may be made on the subject suggested by the remarks of Mr. Angell. What attitude is the jingo element to assume on changing the *status quo*? What method is he likely to want to employ, believing as he does in his methods in international relations? That seems to go back to the question, how bring about social progress? If a person is a believer in using force is not he likely to believe in the policy of using political force in developing the interests of the principal party in the state? This was shown in the Chicago strike. I am not willing to accept the *status quo* for any national field nor for any international field. Our question is largely, how that *status quo* is going to be changed, if the jingoes are going to state it in international fields, also in intranational fields. We are always between capital and labor, the inevitable result of the present position.

Mr. Trachtenberg: What do we mean when we say that Germany, Russia, England are united? One can see that these nations are not united. Of course we can not get access to the real sentiments in these countries but we know that they are not really united. The proposition before us is should they be united, even in such a crisis as the present war? In Russia they are told that if this war is successful it will mean much for freedom because the Allies will force Russia to capitulate and give better conditions to the people, but a large party in Russia does not believe it. This party wants the defeat of Russia but the success of the Allies. Should I, so to speak, unite with the Government or with those who want Russia defeated? I do not believe that the Russian people will succeed if the Allies do. The alliance with the French helped, with their capital. to crush the

Russian revolution. The Jewish massacres were maintained on funds secured from France. I do not see that the Finns, Poles and Jews can be united with the Russian Government. The press here does, because in sympathy with the Allies. I maintain that it is the duty of every radical and liberal to see that these people shall not be united.

The only hope for Germany is in a revolution in the trenches. I believe this is a war of anti-democracy. Every American should support the movement of democracy in Germany. If we discuss this proposition we can not divorce this big political question from the social question. If we are going to have a world government to unite the governments as they are it would be a bad thing for the peoples.

Mr. Ballinger: The world federation is the only way which can be taken. This federation will not necessarily mean the *status quo*, it will be a loose federation; internal problems, such as Trachtenberg spoke of, such questions can be disposed of and worked out in other ways with the world federation just as well as not. They are questions within the countries. Such a world federation as we have in mind would not necessarily be at all a hindrance to the settlement of these questions. Therefore, they should not stand in the way of our advocating such a federation.

Mr. Angell: Supposing that after this war you make an international settlement and, for the sake of illustration, you give Servia considerable territory of non-Servian population, of Bulgarian population. After the settlement you get an agitation among these Servian Bulgars co-operating with the Bulgarian portion, and these people and the Servians wage a war of liberation; what is the world going to do about it?

Mr. Ballinger: That would not be a matter for the world federation to try at all.

Mr. Angell: As long as Bulgaria makes difficulty between two countries?

Mr. Marks: Then it is a matter for the Court.

Mr. Angell: But the world court would give a judgment in favor of Servia. Would not Cuba have had to remain with Spain before such a court?

Mr. Marks: The country would have to give up a certain amount of its sovereignty.

Prof. Hayes: It does not seem to me that such a case could be included in the work of the court. This is the very crux of the matter. I do not see how any court under any system of law could say that a portion of the territory of Servia would become a portion of the territory of Bulgaria.

Mr. Marks: Could not the judicial body in its legislative capacity deal with this question?

Prof. Hayes: The question is, what organ for change could you have? Territorial readjustments and governmental readjustments must come; they may come through force or through peaceful revolution provided you have some organization for peaceful change. Take, for instance, the militant suffragists in England, they say, "These men will not give us the vote." Let us assume that is true and men never will make a governmental change, just as with the Russian Czar and the bureaucracy. How shall we bring it about? We can not work it even internally any longer. Suppose the world federation says the Japanese shall have the free right to come into California. That itself calls for enforcement in the federation unless there is some organ of change. You have suggested a semi-legislative body. If you could work out a legislative organ that will be really democratic, not with a selfish nationalism, forcing things on the weaker nations, that might do.

Mr. Newman: There is a bit of fallacy in this supposition; you are supposing that the international court is going to give an unjust decree. That makes it look confused, to start with that supposition. There probably will be some unjust decrees, as may happen in the Supreme Court of the United States. There may be some possibility of appeal.

Mr. Angell: It is a question of legality rather than justice. If you have agreed that the court must act by a definite law, as frequently happens, the judge says, "I am very sorry that the law is so, but I must administer the law." If you had brought the case of Spain and Cuba

before the international court, they would have said, "The administration is monstrous but we must abide by it."

Mr. Newman: But if there is such injustice it is up to the legislature to make conditions better.

Mrs. Mead: There is an answer, Mr. Angell, to your question in the fifth paragraph of the Minimum Program.

Dr. Nasmyth: There is no arrangement in this program for enforcing decisions. After the report of the council there is no necessity of the nations to accept this report.

Mr. Wolf: There are numerous cases of arbitration where the decision was not based entirely on law but on the equity in the case, as, for instance in Venezuela. Many cases illustrate this. So they would be largely influenced by what they considered the justice of the case.

Mr. Clapp: There is a great deal of danger in these special boards. Suppose the larger nation had more representation and a question came up involving the territorial rights of the larger nation. The tendency would be for them to give weight to their side. Unless there is some understanding previous to the case involved, there may be great injustice to the smaller nations.

Mr. Angell: This is not the tendency. If you have the law on the subject so uncertain the nations will show a growing disinclination to submit the case to a court having no definite laws to guide it. Imagine America taking a strong stand on a matter like Japanese immigration and then submitting it to a court where the principle of that thing has not been indicated at all. Do you think America would like this?

Mr. Wolf: The United States has submitted some 71 cases to arbitration, and many of these might possibly have caused wars.

Mr. Angell: Yes, but no cases involving something like freedom of immigration.

Mr. Wolf: There were cases in which several American countries accused one another of fomenting revolution. These were decided by the court.

Mr. Cremer: If the powers of this international court are not definitely stated, large and small nations will not

bring questions affecting their nationality to the court. Especially in this matter of nationality, the first article of the Minimum Program should be adopted. In questions involving nationality a law should be made requiring that all such questions should be submitted to the people for plebiscite. This would be more expeditious, for, as shown in various plebiscites already taken, the people seem satisfied with the decisions reached. This should be in the world constitution.

Mr. Lozier: That proposition is all right when the transfer is to be made. How get the plebiscite of Alsace-Lorraine, if at the time of the formation of the federation you have a nation with other nationalities in its borders? How change that?

Mr. Angell: If discussed before the present war France would have said, "We will not give in unless Germany is ready to submit Alsace-Lorraine to plebiscite." Germany would say, "That is our own affair." You will not keep the world federation until you get practical agreement upon certain principles like the right of a population to decide its own fate. That did not affect the federation of the United States. We are apt to overlook that question. Our work is not yet done. We will not get a federation next year, only a step towards it. There is difficulty in the legislative body. Your international legislative body would be formed by delegates of various nations. There can not be too many because of the difficulties. Suppose you had had twenty years ago delegates from Spain discussing the question of Cuba. They would have stood as a block for the retention of Cuba, that would not have helped Cuba. If to-day Catalonia formed some idea of independent rule they would have no representation in the world federation.

In our analogies we all talk a great deal of the federation of the American colonies as the model or line indicated for future federation of the world. But here the intermediary processes did not include the fundamental differences in standards of social and moral values. There is another great political organization which does include these differ-

ences of view, not founded on political organization at all, that is the British Empire. It contains states practically independent, states not independent at all, has no constitution but maintains peace within itself well and effectively, is so elastic as to give opportunity for the development of spirit, so that in a very short time a state may show development from a position of almost complete military submission up towards an independent position. There is no such thing as a British constitution but there is an understanding, a certain political morality, if you will, which enables the British Empire to maintain peace within its parts with independence to each.

Prof. Hayes: I will say I like Mr. Angell's optimistic note in helping us out of this Slough of Despond. The parallel of the British Empire has a good deal of force. I thought he was going to give the Catholic Church. That would help so far as governmental organization was concerned; it would be a gradual working out of a kind of representation which should involve various elements. That seems to me the weakness in suggesting our present organizations, our parliament. It is true in our courts of law that the judges move the law, as in equity. Perhaps Mr. Angell over-estimates the definiteness of the law, even in a single nation, so it is quite true that in arbitrations there is considerable leeway. That would not be an adequate organ, first, because that leeway is not broad enough to cover all kinds of problems presented, the more difficult ones. And second because it might be no representative way at all if you are going to bring about vital changes in such problems as territory, immigration, social arrangement, etc. For purely international purposes the representation must be fairly representative. We go so far in international law as to say nations are equal. That is absurd, in any real sense they are not equal. The advance towards this body which will work out the result must be along a difficult and laborious road. We have served our purpose to-day if we have shown that it is not easy, it is particularly difficult, if you will think about the method to approach such a problem instead of ignoring it. This

is only one aspect of our main theme. We must find the means of securing relief from the international difficulties which bear so heavily upon the social progress inside a nation and make the development either of sane governmental organization or adequate treatment of our social problems so extensively difficult.

SECTION V

METHODS OF EFFECTIVE PRESENTATION

By Norman Angell

Those who have read the little handbook of mine will know that I have tried to keep distinct two divisions of our task: one, to know the subject, to get it into our own head; the other, to get it into the head of the person with whom we are talking.

Our problem is not merely to know our subject, but to know it in such a way that we are able to make plain to others as well as to ourselves where current ideas are wrong; not merely to know the truth about international relations, but to know why that truth has not been recognized. This involves not merely a knowledge of certain definite facts in economics and politics and history, but a knowledge of how men's minds work on this problem: why they have been led astray, in what manner they can be corrected. To get at the truth does not suffice. That is one part of the object. What is for us an equally important part is to get at it in such a way that we shall be able to bring it home to our fellow men. Unless we can do that all our labors and learning will be sterile so far as practical human affairs are concerned.

What I shall deal with here are certain simple rules concerning the presentation of the case and particularly a few hints which may be of use in dealing with questions and objections.

When we come to examine the deep underlying causes of war it will be found—as I think I can show—that these

are due not so much to any lack of good-will or good intentions on the part of mankind as a whole, as to a number of very widespread mistakes and mental confusions which are to be found to some extent among the people of every country. The study of these mental confusions can be dealt with most clearly by dividing them into three different sections:

1. Those arising out of a crudely fatalistic view of politics: the assumption that it is no use trying to correct false ideas, because men are not responsible for their ideas and because their "fighting instincts" render war "inevitable"; or that man's conduct is not influenced by his ideas since he is not guided by "logic"; that war is not, like law or churches, or any other human institution, the result of human effort and opinion, good and bad, but is imposed by outside forces which men cannot control.

2. Those due to what has been called the One-sided Aberration—i. e., the failure to realize that in all matters connected with the relations between men the action of one party makes only half the operation, and that we must necessarily misunderstand the operation as a whole unless we think of the acts of the two parties together, as that defense necessarily implies attack, sale purchase, inferior superior; that to annex a province and its inhabitants is not to annex wealth, since the inhabitants own the wealth; the tendency to consider a problem of two parties—war—in terms of one, as when we are told that the way for a nation to be sure of peace is to be stronger than its enemy, an "axiom" which, stated in the terms of the two parties, amounts to saying that for two nations to keep the peace each must be stronger than the other.

3. Those arising out of misconceptions as to the nature of government and the place of political authority in the modern world, as that one country can "own" another—as when we talk of England owning Canada, or a country owning the source of its raw material, although Englishmen would no more own the cotton fields of Louisiana by annexing that State than they now own the wheat fields of Canada; or when we assume nations to be trading cor-

porations, or economic or intellectual units that can be controlled or "removed" by the military power of other similar units.

It may be shown, I think, that nearly all the mistakes, the bad arguments, and the confused reasoning that cause war among civilized people can be fitted into one or other of these three broad divisions.

Any ordinary conversation on a subject of some complexity will reveal the difficulty of getting at the real basis of a particular opinion. It is a common experience that most arguments on any subject begin not at the real point of difference between the two parties at all, but at some point a long way therefrom, and it is only when one or the other has been pushed back bit by bit and is finally entrenched that it is realized what this underlying difference is. And, generally, the argument is sterile until that underlying point is reached. Even when a combatant does not see clearly himself what the real point of his own case is, he has nevertheless generally a strong instinctive sense of the strength of his reserves, until their weakness has been exposed. He will not yield until he realizes the weakness of those reserves. One of the first objects, therefore, of a debater who means business should be to come at once to these fundamental reserves hovering vaguely somewhere in the recesses of his opponent's mind, engage them, and show their weakness. It would save a lot of battles and of useless fighting if the abler and stronger of the two combatants could at the start point out to the other that these final reserves upon which that other is in reality depending are, as a matter of fact, of no avail. Perhaps that is not the most useful illustration. Put it this way: in testing the strength of any structure begin with the foundations. If they are shaky, it does not matter how strong the upper stories may be. If you begin with the upper stories and leave out the foundations, all your tests and demonstrations may be useless, and an infinite labor of inspection and examination may have been wasted. The whole might have been saved by beginning at the bottom.

Now the foundations of our problem have been already

indicated. Can men be brought to see their best interest and be guided by wisdom and reason? That is the main question.

Very rarely does either party to our discussion realize what that question involves, nor how essential it is that for any useful discussion we *should* realize its relation to the whole problem.

To raise it at the beginning enables us to start from a point of agreement. As I have said, all parties are agreed that if men were perfectly good and moral and wise, there would be no war. If no nation robbed or wronged or angered another, and men were too tender-hearted to take pleasure in the excitement of killing, obviously there would be no war. At the back of every militarist mind there is the impression that to work out the principles of peace we must imagine an unreal man—a man that does not and cannot exist on this earth. Though the militarists may agree that war may properly be deemed “the failure of human wisdom,” as Bonar Law called it, as much could be said of the law courts or the policemen, since if men were perfectly wise and good neither would exist. And what the militarists—all of them—have in mind is that, as human wisdom will always in some measure fail, war will always go on. And the absence of war in some circumstances might conceivably mean an absence of righteousness, just as the absence of the law courts and policemen might—and generally does—imply an absence of civilization; although if men were angels, neither would exist.

This, then, is the all-important question: “Can the wisdom of men as a whole be so far strengthened as not merely to enable them to realize abstractly the folly of war and to devise means of avoiding it, but to use those means and be guided by this wisdom, and not by their passions and impatience?”

That man has fighting instincts and always will have them, that he does not act on “reason” nor be guided by “logic,” that wars are the result of forces beyond the control of the makers of theories, is a position which the aver-

age man regards as so impregnable that the great majority hardly think it worth while to defend any other, and with a superior smile deem it sufficient to give us a glimpse of this majestic fortress and then invite us to amuse ourselves with the futile battles outside it.

And so far his instinct is correct. Not only is the question I have put to you an important question in deciding our attitude to life and politics, not only is it the question which must be answered if we are to make any progress in this discussion at all, but it represents practically, as well as philosophically, the most important phase of the whole problem. I suppose I have answered as many questions from the general public as any man who has had to deal with a discussion of this subject (our public lectures have been mainly a matter of answering questions), and I do not hesitate to say this: that if our notions on this point were less hazy and defective than they are, and if one other mental confusion (which I have touched upon elsewhere) were cleared up, all other difficulties whatsoever would disappear. If in these two matters—one upon which I have just touched and that upon which I shall touch directly—the bulk of men could think straight, we could dispense, in the problems of war and peace, with any special knowledge of economics or history. Just those things which are of common knowledge, without the help of special book-learning, would amply suffice to render European society as secure from political wars as it is happily now secure from religious wars or from a massacre of St. Bartholomew.

Let us return, then, to the question which I have already put before you: "Can the wisdom of men as a whole be so far strengthened as not merely to enable them to realize abstractly the folly of war and to devise means of avoiding it, but to use those means and be guided by this wisdom, and not by their passions and impatience?"

In answer to this question the militarists say: "Men do not act from reason, from an intelligent realization of their interest, but from temper, passion, their fighting instinct, blindly."

Well, suppose that were absolutely and fatally true, and men were "bloodthirsty, savage creatures," as the editor of the *Spectator* says, fighting from the lust of destruction, what would be the conclusion to be drawn from it? The conclusion, say the militarists, is that you should give them as many destructive arms as possible, so that their capacity for damage while in their condition of blind rage should be as great as possible.

Is that the right conclusion? Or is it not the conclusion rather that, if man is really that kind of animal, it is the duty of all of us to keep destructive weapons out of the hands of such an irresponsible creature, and to use such lucid intervals as he may have to persuade him to drop them?

If to that some one replies that the conclusion is not that *all* parties should be highly armed, but only ourselves, he is, of course, assuming that the British alone are a reasoning people. This is an instance of that failure in reasoning dealt with in the next section.

So much for the bearing of that proposition on the question of armaments. But if you apply the same test to the same proposition in reference to another conclusion drawn from it by the militarists, you will get still more notable results.

Some people say: Men don't act from reason or logic; wars are in the nature of men; all your theorizing is "talk." At the crucial moments men are swept off their feet by forces which they cannot control.

Again, suppose that were absolutely and completely true, what is the conclusion to be drawn?

Well, it is evident that if that were absolutely and completely true, all learning, all accumulated knowledge, all book and churches, codes, Ten Commandments, laws, would have no effect on human affairs, and that in so far as their practical work is concerned they might just as well be swept away.

As a matter of fact, among great masses of men—in the Eastern world—pure fatalism is predominant. "Kismet, it is the will of Allah." It is an attitude of mind associ-

ated either as a cause or an effect—for the moment it doesn't matter much which—with the crudest forms of Oriental stagnation; it marks those who, at least as far as this world is concerned, have no hope. It is, indeed, a statement of the proposition that it does not matter how a man uses his mind or moral effort, since his conduct is determined by impulses and forces that are stronger than his own will, whatever moral or intellectual effort he may make.

Now, this has only to be pointed out to be evident. It is certain, therefore, that the proposition in the crude form in which I have expressed it—the form in which it is most generally made—cannot be absolutely and completely true.

You will note this, therefore, that the militarist has not asked himself in any clear and fresh and real way what his own proposition means, what even the immediate and necessary consequence of it must be. Otherwise he would not believe in it. To say that reasoning and the effort to know the truth do not affect human conduct is to condemn all those activities which mark the man from the beast. To say that man is always in danger of losing his head and of acting in opposition to his own best interests is not an argument for furnishing him with the instruments of destruction.

It is essential in any discussion to realize, and have your opponent realize, how much of his case is involved in his proposition. In order to do that one may outline and support a counter-proposition; then see how near one can get to reconciliation. And the counter-proposition which I think one could fairly set up against the fatalistic doctrine which we have been discussing might be outlined somewhat as follows: Human wisdom is a very frail thing indeed; yet, however we achieve it, whether by instinct, intuition, "putting two and two together," or what you will, it is the ultimate foundation of human society. Its very frailty, therefore, is an argument for all that may tend to strengthen it and against anything which may tend to weaken it.

So much for the first of the three sections into which I

have divided our subject. Now for a word or two as to the second section—the “One-sided Aberration.”

The problem of war and peace and all that relates thereto—the relationships of nations, the defense of our country, the preparation for war—are all problems of two or more parties; yet they are almost invariably discussed as if they were problems of one.

There is an outstanding illustration of this in a favorite saying of Mr. Churchill's. He laid down this rule:

“The way to secure peace is to be so strong that victory in the event of war is certain.”

Now that is a classic instance of a problem of two parties being treated in terms of one. For if we apply the principle to the two parties here is the result that we get:

If two individuals, or nations, or groups of nations, want to keep the peace each must be stronger than the other.

Now there is no one fault of reasoning which so marks the discussion of this subject as that involved in Mr. Churchill's rule—the fault, that is, of discussing a problem of two or more parties in terms of one.

A characteristic illustration of the same thing was that contained in several of the early criticisms of “The Great Illusion.” The *Times* and the *Spectator*, to say nothing of the *Daily Mail* and other popular organs, said in effect this:

“Mr. Angell writes as though armaments were mainly concerned with attack or the motives leading thereto; whereas armaments are for defense. The nations maintain their armaments for the purpose of defending their territories, not for the purpose of invading others.”

Now, if armaments are for the purpose of defense they are for the purpose of repelling attack, and are therefore pretty intimately concerned with the question of attack, the motives which may lead thereto, the advantages which may be gained thereby. The propositions of these wise critics amount to saying this:

“The nations of Europe will shortly be engaged valiantly defending their homes against the armed hosts who resolutely refuse to attack them. This Armageddon will

be particularly murderous and the battles particularly appalling because each army has for years been training itself to leave its neighbor alone. They will all defend themselves heroically to the last man against the attacks which nobody will consent to make."

And exactly the same order of reasoning is that of Major Stewart-Murray, who says:

"The peace of the world depends upon the armed forces of the nations."

Which is just the same as saying, that if the nations had no armies the wars between them would be appalling.

Now, it may strike the student that all this is of a simplicity so great as to be almost childish, certainly not to be worth one of the three broad divisions into which this great subject is arranged.

But it is a commonplace of the treatment of those things that matter in human affairs that mistakes are not due to a lack of special knowledge but to the failure, in arriving at an opinion, to keep in mind at one and the same time the several elements of the same facts—the facts themselves being generally equally available to the learned and to the unlearned. The educated Roman or Greek who was quite skeptical as to the witchcraft and augurs had no larger knowledge of the physical science than the sixteenth century judge who did believe in the supernatural power of witches. The difference between the two types of mind was in clearness of thought.

G. K. Chesterton has talked somewhere of the half-witted persons who think with one lobe of their brain at a time instead of the two lobes at once. That would indicate the kind of failure of reasoning with which we are dealing. Defense, for instance, necessarily implies attack. There cannot be any defense unless some one attacks or intends to attack. War, defense and attack, like top and bottom, father and child, front and back, superior and inferior, sale and purchase, friend and enemy, are all double facts, as opposed to what may be called simple facts. It is impossible, that is to say, to conceive the whole without the two parts. And yet, as we have seen, although they

are bound together, although the one necessarily implies the other, we do not keep the two elements parallel in our minds. We vision first the one element to the exclusion of the other, and then the other to the exclusion of the one. We cut a living fact in half and then regard each half as a living thing. This was borne in upon me strikingly once when in my younger days I encountered in argument two amateur economists. One argued at great length and in great detail on the assumption that a market was a place where things were bought and not sold; the other argued at equal length and in equal detail on the assumption that a market was a place where things were sold and not bought. To neither did it really occur—and, indeed, neither was fully capable of understanding—that a market is necessarily a place where things are bought and sold, and that there cannot be a purchase without a sale nor a sale without a purchase.

It is this failure of reasoning which Novikow called the "One-sided Aberration." I have attempted to indicate in the introduction to the "Foundations of International Polity" that it is this confusion in thinking which lies at the bottom of most failures of the social sense. The social sense, after all, resides in a capacity to see the mixing of the two parties in a social relationship, and, of course, all social relationships reside in the mixing of two or more parties.

There is scarcely a feature of our subject in which confusion is not occasioned by this one-sided aberration. Thus we find it even in a serious, and, on the whole, fair and carefully reasoned review in the *Quarterly Review*, in a long plea for the moral utility of war. The author begs us to remember that but for war Greek culture would have gone down at Marathon before the attacks of the Persians. The true statement is, of course, that but for war the moral possessions of the Greeks would not have been threatened.

In the same way Admiral Mahan said that the utility of armaments had been shown by the war which Britain fought against Napoleon and her success therein. She was

able by virtue of her arms to carry on her trade in relative security, which but for her force she would never have been able to do. Again, but for war—Napoleon's war—Britain would have been even more secure than she was and her trade far greater than it was.

Again, we are told that the unification of Germany was only made possible by the fact that by the strength of her arms Germany was able to resist the intrigues of Louis Napoleon, which would have prevented German unity. Yet, if war had been out of the question, if Louis Napoleon had not threatened the use of his force, Germany would not have had to go to war in order to be free to manage her internal affairs in her own way.

By turning things upside down in this way, pacifism has always been represented as the enemy of nationality. Whereas, of course, it is war which is the deadly enemy of nationality. If political groups had given up settling their differences by arms, as the religious groups have done, Finland, Poland, Alsace, Ireland, would no more be suffering from the oppression of military masters than the Protestants in France are now suffering from the oppression of the more powerful Catholics. So long as military force entered into the settlement of religious differences, any group was in danger of oppression by a more powerful one. But so soon as there was a realization on both sides that military force should be kept out of it, then all parties became secure in their religious possessions.

Which brings us to a conclusion we have touched upon elsewhere, but which in part also belongs here—namely, that defense, resistance, the determination to see that the other man's force is not used against you, is not, properly speaking, the adoption of a policy of force, but the refusal to let force control things. The pacifist no more urges that a nationality should submit to oppression than he would urge that Huguenots should deny their faith because a more powerful party threatened it. The man who does not believe that military force should be used in the settlement of religious questions, who is opposed to the employment of force in those questions, puts the blame upon the man

who uses it, not upon the party who resists it. We all see now that war in the domain of religion is monstrous. Imagine some one, however, arguing this way: "War in the religious domain bad! War in the religious domain unjustifiable! Why, it is glorious; it is the mother of all the virtues! Just look at the Huguenots defending their faith; just look at those dying at the stake rather than deny their faith; do you mean to say they should not have fought?" Of course, no one means that they should not have fought, but we all mean that they should not have been compelled to fight. It is a noble thing to see a man go to the stake for his faith, but it is a vile thing that he should be compelled to do so. The resistance to the Inquisition was magnificent; the fact of the Inquisition was an abomination. No sane man to-day would ask that we return to the massacres of Alva in the Netherlands or of Cromwell in Ireland; that we should tear out the eyes of children, crush the feet of a man to pulp for being mistaken on some point of theological dogma, disembowel girls in the street in the name of Christ—no one wants to return to these things, no one pretends that these are noble things, or that we are not the better for having got rid of them. It was the resistance to these things which was noble. Yet if there had been no resistance there would have been no war. That does not make us justify war, because equally there would have been no war if those things had not been inflicted.

Yet although this simple distinction is clear to us in the kind of warfare that has passed, that between the religious bodies, we seem quite incapable of making the same distinction in the case of warfare between political bodies.

Our opponents praise "war" as a good thing because the resistance to it on the part of an oppressed people is noble. It would be just as sensible to praise the Inquisition as a good thing because the resistance to it implied noble qualities on the part of those who suffered.

Surely the truth is that alike in political and religious matters force should neither be used nor submitted to. As Novikow says, a man's first duty is not to defend his

country; his first duty is not to attack any one else's. All our trouble comes from the failure in that duty.

It will be realized from the foregoing that through this type of misconception comes all the argument in favor of war as "the mother of all the virtues." The Ruskin view of war being valuable as developing noble qualities is practically never urged save by those who have this fatal capacity of dealing with one half of a fact at a time, and forgetting the other half while so doing.

The half of the fact which, for the purpose of making the argument, the defender of war on moral grounds overlooks is this: that he himself is in favor of peace.

Even the most rampant Jingo clamoring for unlimited armaments will tell you that he wants them in order that the peace may not be broken. The German Emperor, Mr. Roosevelt, Lord Roberts, Lord Charles Beresford, Mr. Blatchford, Mr. Strachey, Mr. Whibley, every mortal man who need be regarded in this discussion, tells you that he is in favor of peace; that he wants to spare his country the horrors of war. And every one of those I have mentioned has argued in favor of war (which he wants to prevent) and against peace (which he wants to promote).

Of course this failure to see the two elements of the same fact at one and the same time is particularly noted in all those questions which arise out of the desire to annex territory. There is, for instance, the idea that when you annex a province you annex a market, overlooking the fact that you annex at the same time the people who are supplying and will continue to supply that market; or that when you annex so much "wealth" or property, you annex at the same time the people who own the wealth and the property.

There is a story which I sometimes tell at lectures, and which other lecturers may find useful as illustrating the truth that some luminous and outstanding test fact will give us an indication of the value of some of the most abstruse theories. I was once standing watching the gambling at Monte Carlo, and while doing so a shabby individual came up to me and showed me weird and puzzling

columns of figures, which he said represented an infallible system he had discovered, a means whereby I could break the bank and win a million francs. Now, I know if I had attempted to investigate those figures and argued with him about them I should have been lost, for they dealt, of course, with the laws of chance, and the laws of averages, and things about which philosophers will quarrel till the end of time. But there was not the least necessity to do that, because there was an outstanding fact which gave me the measure of the value of the system. Its owner wanted to sell it for twenty francs. As I told him, in the face of that fact I was not interested in his figures.

This, perhaps, is one of the best illustrations of the truth that most of the errors on this subject arise first, from defective reasoning, and, secondly only from lack of knowledge. No special study, for instance, is necessary in order to know that an army always takes the best men physically of the population; so that if a nation is much at war, its best men get killed off; and that the same thing is taking place in the case of the nation with which it is fighting. And as the effect of victory is to incorporate the beaten—i.e., presumably “inferior”—people into the victors’ population, the net effect of warfare must be the survival of the unfit and the steady worsening of the nation. All that was needed to arrive at this result was to think about it. Yet that even famous authors have not thought about it at all is proved by the fact that men have written learned books in defense of war as a means of the survival of the fit, and have not troubled to give a word of explanation as to the process just indicated. They have simply accepted carelessly current words about the survival of the fittest, allowed their minds to form false pictures on the strength of those inaccurate words, and on the false basis so formed have erected their fantastic theories.

The third division which I have made in this attempt at creating a “grammar” of our discussion, I shall not now attempt to deal with.

I am going to leave just for a moment that side altogether and go to instruments. What is the most effective

instrument? What is the value of the lecture? I want you to consider this parallel: you travel to and from a place and talk to 500 people. If you had written a letter, even a paragraph, to the *New York Times*, it would have had a chance of coming before 150,000 people. I do not know what proportion of people read those letters. Just think, here on one side, as the result of twenty-four hours' labor, a talk with 500 or 1,000 people; on the other, without going from your room, at an effort of writing a letter (a bad letter in an hour, a good letter in a day), you will easily reach 50,000 to 150,000 people, which means two months of lecturing at least. It means as many people as you would reach in six months of lecturing here and there.

You may say that answers the question of the relative value of the lecture and the letter. You have ill understood the purpose of this talk if you think so. There are psychological factors which render the lecture more effective, especially with Americans. Go into a village where a lecture is an event, and you will have made an impression infinitely greater than a letter in a newspaper would. You may perhaps lead them to start study circles, which would not have occurred from the mere suggestion of a letter. They go home and talk about the lecture. That goes far beyond the effect of the mere printed word. You get the immense benefit of the discussion, and any lecture which is to be effective, I believe, must have an element of discussion. It should become as far as possible a conversation with the audience.

In our Conference in England we had a never-ending discussion, What is public opinion? Where does it live? That was never answered. I do not know what are the factors of public opinion. I always tell Y. M. C. A. people and clergymen that they must capture the saloon. Our "Public House" in England is much more a national university than Oxford or Cambridge. If you can get the habitués of saloons discussing your work, it is beginning to have some effect. If you find with the saloon and all that it represents that your propaganda is being passed over,

there is something wrong, and you must hammer at it until you teach that very important public forum.

Of course dissemination is the most effective method of the mouth to mouth method. Remember in choosing a man to talk that there are men who are centers of "fermentation"—clergymen, teachers, editors, barkeepers, and so on. These men disseminate ideas. If you can get hold of these it is very important. If you can get your barkeeper to talk about your ideas you are carrying on very useful propaganda. If you can put the case into two or three phrases that will stick you will be sure that he will pass it on.

I have talked enough. Just this last word: No people can be a real democracy, so long as it is the victim of a force which it does not see and can not control. But such is our democracy, and most others.

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING ADDRESS BY NORMAN ANGELL

Mr. Danahy: I am from the School of Journalism at Columbia University. Probably there the psychology of government and the presentation of news to the public is considered as thoroughly as at any other institution in the country. The people are influenced by what we make them believe is good for them. You may ask why 750,000 people buy the *New York Journal* every day. Because 750,000 people are made to believe that the editorials are what is best for them, exactly what they need, and to that extent they are influenced by its news. Why do 300,000 buy *The Times*? It is more than commonplace. It appeals to the capitalist and the industrial leader. They are made to believe that the arguments in *The Times* will give them more than they possess in the financial world. Why do 18,000 buy *The Post*? First, because it is not commonplace, and then because they believe the intellectual arguments are best for them. *The Post*, of course, is late in getting out news, therefore, it has less of flavor but more of the deep stuff behind it, and 18,000 intellectual people believe it is what is best for them.

We have not merely to start on an equal plane with the militarists, we have got to combat them. We have to combat ideas which they have been studying up for so long. I believe the idea brought out by Mrs. Mead is the proper means, to put out a series of pamphlets to appeal to the man on the street. We have got to make him believe that the arguments put forth by us are arguments to his advantage. That is the only way that exists now to overcome the idea that pacifists are mere idealists and not practical.

Mr. Angell: How shall we circulate them?

Mr. Danahy: In writing letters to the papers, make them uncommon in what they contain but common in the way they are expressed; then they will make an appeal.

Mr. Angell: The problem is how to distribute the pamphlets.

Mr. Danahy: When the members of this conference go back to the schools to speak let them distribute them then.

Mr. Trachtenberg: I should like to state one of the methods of reaching the masses of the people which is used by organizations for years with great results, the house to house method. The Socialists would not have been able to reach the people in Germany except for this method. There are a certain number of people with an honest and sincere opinion as to how things should be done in this world. The trouble with the pacifists was that they would only talk about it in a superior fashion. If you want to make your pacifism worth while, do away with your banqueting for peace, and have soap box orators for peace; speak on the street corner and have a house to house canvass. The Socialists give up their time for this. Every Sunday they go out to distribute literature and speak. They leave these pamphlets perhaps ten times, and for nine times these will not be touched but the next time they are picked up and read.

Mr. Angell: Is your propaganda effective in America?

Mr. Trachtenberg: Yes.

Mr. Angell: In the noise of the street crossing crowd how can you get their attention long enough? For in the

pacifist propaganda we are dealing with the second thought, not only the first thought.

Mr. Trachtenberg: It is peculiar how Socialists are able to reach the people with this method. We have not yet used the house to house canvass. Make the people see that they pay for the militarist system.

Mr. Hugins: I want to raise a question regarding the place of the extremist plea and the place of compromise in our argument. Shall we take the extreme views or shall we compromise? For instance, if we combine, we may make too much of a concession and lose our conviction. If we take the extremist point of view, advocating disarmament, abolition of nationalism, and so forth, I think, perhaps, it will be more effective.

Mr. Angell: Both are good if well done. If the extreme view is well stated, with arguments behind it, it will arrest even the man who disagrees.

Mr. Hugins: If we are not entirely plain to the other man's point of view, the extreme position is more effective.

Mr. Sachs: We talk too much here of Norman Angellism. If a thing is a law, all right to attach a name to it, if it is a truth, it becomes universal. We must put the idea on the basis of common sense and smuggle the theory in, let the other person have the argument. If a theory is wrong there will be some experiment which will refute it. Put your man into a hole by citing the opposite case. Do not attach labels to it.

Mr. Blanshard: I want to agree with the speaker who said that in order to put the idea before the laboring class we must take the extreme position. I have been working both in a church and in the socialist movement, and I have tried out various methods to impress the laboring man, to dramatize the idea. One of the most valuable things to impress the laboring man with the idea against war is to attack the flag. It seems a very queer thing to do this. In Boston we have succeeded to some extent in doing this, and then we have substituted the red flag of internationalism and the white flag of peace. That reaches men's

minds. We had a little child come up to the platform with each country's flag, then with the flags of international socialism and international peace, and everybody went home that night with some concrete idea. I agree with the radical movement of men in politics.

Mr. Moses: The way in which to present the subject to the laboring man is to have the basis of reasoning sound but not to put it for them in a reasoning way, cover it up by instances, figures and imagination, but not in an essentially reasoning way. However, make sure for yourself that the reason behind it is true.

The best way to get hold of the West is to get hold of the organizations. That is where we must make our appeal. Get permission to speak before the local unions, the business men's clubs and so forth. Do not try for one class of society but work on all classes.

Mr. Gannett: I quite agree that we should appeal to the fit, but what is the criterion of the fit? Perhaps it was meant that we have here the cream of the United States. That was wrong. I am inclined to believe that the university professors are only in some ways fit, in other ways they are most unfit, not a class to be converted to new ideas, and ours are essentially new. These professors have gone through too much school to get them out of that bias of education. We do not want the kind of people who have been brought up in that way. Find out who are the fit bearers of the new ideas, those who think in terms of fifty years hence. These are the ones we must get, but we must not do what is so often done, simply get distinguished names on the board of directors. We have got to come down to the common people, not in the universities, but the man in the saloon and on the street corner. We need dynamic symbols of peace, something more than a smooth, reasonable appeal. The man on the street is not going to listen to intensive, economic discussions. We must have these but we must put them into a few concrete sentences, with an appeal having reason behind it and having emotional force. The appeal to the larger patriotism counts.

Mrs. Mead: The first rule of the man on the soap box

is the rule given by Hale several years ago: Have no preliminaries, make no compliments, but begin. Begin at once.

Take Mr. Angell's statement made some time ago, "Sometimes we can teach more economics to the boy of twelve in an hour than his father ever knew." We can do no better than begin with the boys at school, thirteen or fourteen years old. I have found it perfectly possible to express every idea of pacifism to them and make them understand the whole thing. Use their own knowledge and their figures. You can get at the unsophisticated mind, and it is the most fit mind. Nothing has horrified me so much since coming back from Europe as to find the absolute failure of the college man to think; they are people who have shown themselves incapable of comprehending all these problems. Get them into the mind of the child and then get them into the mind of the father.

Miss Brown: The pacifists can take a leaf from the suffrage book in the matter of speaking in the street. Their progress and the rapid popularization of their idea has come from the soap box speaking. Most of us have realized that it is effective. Marching after the suffrage parade one sees people who have never been interested in the subject before, trying to see what they are doing. The slogan "Votes for Women" has been effective.

Mr. Welsh: There have now been advanced at least three different methods of reaching the public. This very fact shows that we must reach them by different methods. When dealing with the laboring man we must make our appeal along the line fit for him. We must start in the schools, it is true, but there are specific things to deal with right now which must be given to the man in the street, the armament question, etc. In speaking about the fit we must realize that we must also give credit to the other man. Large capitalists think they are for peace and are working for it, and they will admit that war is not advantageous economically, but they are militarists in their ideas. The cashier of a bank said to me, "I am in sympathy with the peace party, but at the same time I do not know if my

beliefs would coincide with those of the peace party." The trouble with the peace societies of every country is that they have said that it is consistent to go on raising a regiment and yet to go on preaching for peace.

Mr. Angell: The American Peace Society is full of admirals and colonels and Lyman Abbotts.

Mr. Welsh: That is it. They insist they are for peace but they are really militaristic. We must convince the man in the street with other arguments. The laboring man is one who goes out and is shot down, and can not pay to have someone else fight for him.

Mr. Coffman: One of the best suggestions made to-day was that of introducing peace philosophy into the schools. One force against peace in the schools is the way history is taught, primarily the way it is written, bringing out ideas of the glorification of war. I propose that the books should be written by men who see the consequences of war and the advantages of peace. We should rewrite the history books.

Mr. Frazee: It was suggested by Major Putnam that we can make a very universal appeal, the appeal to people's pocketbooks. In Wisconsin this year there was a great deal of opposition to the universities, the Republican ticket got in on the argument that the university was not any good. They went out among the people and said, "Look at the great tax for these." Use this argument with the people, show them the tax for the army and navy. Drive this home, touch the people's pocketbooks.

Mr. Angell: Do they feel through their pocketbooks?

Mr. Welsh: Yes.

Mr. Davis: We can get something from the Suffrage Party as well as from the Socialist Party. They have united meetings in New York and central places for meetings and central organizations from which to draw speakers.

SECTION VI

FURTHER REMARKS ON METHODS OF PRESENTATION

By Norman Angell

There is very little difficulty in presentation to the educated man. However wrong he may be you can deal with him by using elaborate argument, books, articles and so forth. As a result of it all he may be just as wrong as before but his wrongness is a cultivated thing to be undermined only through calculated labor. But where you are dealing with people whose minds though far more open, are less capable of continuous study, you must employ other methods. Two questions only touched upon yesterday are vitally important: the use of slogans, and the use of the word "peace." Mr. Mackaye's talk gave us a hint of many reasons why the word "peace" is undesirable, why we should avoid it whenever possible. I have already given my ideas as to the direction in which we can get away from the danger attached to it. If we talk of America's foreign policy, the best action for America to take in the foreign field, if we approach the subject scientifically from that standpoint, you will get over the disadvantages of the word "Peace." We do want labels: America's Foreign Policy; The Foreign Policy Club; The International Polity Club. International Polity may be all right for the university but I doubt whether it is good for the general club of business men. The business man asked to join one wonders what International Polity is. Probably "American Foreign Policy Club" or something of that sort is better.

Slogans are very important indeed and very few good ones have been devised. In fact they never are devised, they "just come." Once you have a good name for a movement it does not matter much if in the beginning it was a derisive name, like Tory and Quaker.

These are two problems. Let me suggest a third. What

are we going to *do*? We talk to an audience for an hour and a man gets up and says: "All very nice but what are we going to do about it? What do you want me to do as a citizen?" You say, "Well, form an International Polity club." "What has that to do?" "It has to talk." That does not sound very definite or inspiring to the practical man. He wants a law to be passed, or at least asks for some definite end toward which he can strive. Our movement unfortunately differs in this respect from certain large movements in the past like slavery in this country and Free Trade in England. People are always ready to urge a "Law" to be passed, an act of Parliament to be changed. With that quite definite objective before them the voters can get busy. Now, we should have something definite to do, an act to be passed, something that we want the Government actually to accomplish. If we have that before us you will find that the effectiveness of our propaganda will be enormously increased. We cannot carry on a propaganda in a vacuum. It should be attached to something already in the talk of the people, some policy already under discussion. In the case of America we have such attachment, or can make it. American rights have been violated by both combatants in this war. The United States is already involved in negotiations in Europe, has already taken a stand about sea law.

If America stands for her rights effectively she stands for internationalism, a sea law must be international if it is to be observed at all; we must have something like an international legislature, international court, international police. There you have a situation in which to create a definite policy for America.

Show the people that ultimately you want them to do something. You must show them that what you are talking about is only preliminary to an act. If that is clear then you can get interest and activity, such as you would not get otherwise.

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING ADDRESS BY NORMAN ANGELL

Mrs. Mead: The Woman's Peace Party has a scheme that we might follow to some extent. They have a State Chairman in every congressional district. This is a very definite task for us. This summer we must try to get into every congressman's hands as much literature as possible, must start equipping a bureau, and so forth. We must start with the congressmen, we can not do much with them after September, they are making up their minds now. There is a tremendous amount of work to be done this summer. Organizations are sometimes organized reaching to the most invisible influences. You get a jingo editorial in a paper. Then you must watch that paper, and when a jingo article appears, explode it with a letter to the editor. There must be ten such letters, of the same tenor, organize the thing, and even if the letters are not answered, they have an effect on the editor's mind. If he knows that for every one person writing, twenty think that way, it immediately arrests his attention. Nothing is read more carefully in a newspaper office than the letters of the public, they form the barometer of public feeling, of which the editor takes account. As to the Congressman, I do not know how that plan would bear on him, possibly by sending marked copies to him, or by having an organized plan of writing to congressmen.

Dr. Flick: In every American city there is enough machinery to do the work; the teachers and schools are almost universally interested and there are organizations of business men, nearly every city has a Chamber of Commerce. These have big meetings, and the program committees are glad to take up any new idea, they would be only too glad to hear addresses along this line. Again, in nearly every city there is an organization known as the labor bureau or lyceum or Socialists' club; these organizations would also be open. I believe there would be no difficulty at all in working through them. There are clubs of all kinds, men's and women's, thus many of them, par-

ticularly those dealing with current topics, could be persuaded to introduce into their programs this subject. Then there are our various church organizations and societies, a number of churches have men's clubs, these are all looking around for some fertile field to investigate; I believe they would be open to this work.

The question is how to utilize the machinery already existing, that is the most important problem. The best scheme occurring to my mind would be something like this. I have noticed for several years that whenever a peace committee is appointed in a city it is almost invariably made up of municipal officials who may or may not be interested in peace. They never constitute such a committee to work. We should have a live working committee, not a large one, to take upon itself the duty of coördinating the various organizations existing in every city, especially for permanent progress, and have all of them work on a series of resolutions to be sent to the congressmen. It seems to me if that could be done here you would have an opportunity of getting at this problem in a very practical way.

Mr. Danahy: There are certain don'ts as well as dos to be considered in this line. A suggestion was made yesterday that you can reach certain groups by attacking the American flag. I believe that internationalism can be best brought about by true patriotism, bringing in a true morality with national and international morality. The only way to express this is by true patriotism; the welfare of my country for itself and for other countries. There are certain movements which have overlooked this; it seems to me we can best achieve the idea of internationalism and pacifism by keeping away from these movements.

Mr. Trachtenberg: We have got to present to the masses of the people the moral appeal against war. What are you going to offer to the people instead of that? It is claimed that the American army won its greatest victory when it cleaned out Panama and made it a fit place to live in rather than a place that was killing thousands. This is our message. Tell the laboring man that the real service is not to die for one's country but to live for it and work

for it. Many and many will do so. When the Y. M. C. A. got the idea of sending boys to work among the immigrants they had more boys than before. There are hundreds of students going to different sections of the city to do educational work. This is what you must do.

First of all you must have a moral equivalent of war to offer the people, and second, you must go to the people in such a way that they will trust you. They do not do so now. Put yourself into it. I want to see the peace movement a self-supporting proposition, have every person a member paying dues, then it will become a big national movement; it is an academic movement now. Organize peace organizations in every city and have the members pay dues.

Mr. Karsten: I think our greatest work can be done among college students. We can admit that there are a great many fields in America, one as big as any, is among the average college freshmen. In numbers, in originality, in initiative, they are a bunch of sheep to be led, and we are here to lead them. After all the American college student is not like the European student. Nobody in the street thinks of our boys as anything but rah-rah boys. We must establish ourselves as something bigger, we will find that we have to put into the college student the national interest, we must get out and propagandize. The greatest field for us is to go out in our own colleges, go home and start groups of active hard-workers for peace. We have the easy-going attitude on this ourselves. But war is still the greatest crime in the world, and preparedness for war is simply part of that process that we have before us in America. There is the greatest opportunity if America takes the leadership in peace, and it is up to us college men to fight for peace, not only through ourselves but through all college men.

Mr. Moses: If we confuse the issue of pacifism with all others we are not going to get it across. I think nothing whatsoever can be gained if we confuse the issue, as will be done if we allow the issue to be confused with socialism or cosmopolitanism. The world is not ready yet for

brotherhood. It must be carried out as a political issue solely on its own merits.

But how are we going to reach this theoretical man in the street? I do not know, in the first place, exactly what is meant by the soap box method. If it means addressing a crowd in the street, I do not know how it will succeed in the East, but it will not succeed in the West, and we must consider all parts of the country. As to the matter of a vote, the West must be gotten hold of, if you want to put a thing across. The way to get the West is not to take the soap box method, the crowd you will get will not be of any benefit, it will not be the kind of crowd you want to have connected with the movement. There are other means of reaching them by work through organizations, chambers of commerce, and so on. Give them the sort of arguments that strike home; for the business men talk on economic results of war; for the farmers go to the farmers' coöperative societies, and for the laborers go before their unions. This method has this advantage, you will be able to make the particular kind of appeal to the particular kind of people.

Mr. Blanshard: I object when you say that the peace propaganda should not be tied up with any other movement; the best way is to tie it up with all peace avenues, schools, churches, business, socialism. I uphold Christianity, business means of prosperity, socialism, and the common man on the street. And the soap box method through socialism is the best method of reaching the man on the street. Socialism gives a man an alternative method of war, it offers the laboring man an alternative combat, keeps life from becoming humdrum. Through socialism, because it does have a somewhat constructive method of patriotism, the laboring man can be best brought to peace.

Mr. Brown: We have the wrong kind of patriotism. It goes back to the point brought up yesterday, that we have the wrong kind of teaching of history. Fortunately something is being done, but the present generation was trained in the old-fashioned way. George Washington was there shown not as a constructive statesman but as a leader

in battles. That is the trouble, the books are books of war, just as the statues are most of them soldiers on horseback. I do believe that it is one of the great defects of our present system.

Mr. Petchtle: Between the Democrats and Republicans it is not going to be a question of having a constructive policy for peace but simply if you are to have more armament at the present time. At some time or other you have got to have a party standing for peace. This stirs up the people. Put the movement on a sound political basis. This will give some progress that will be seen.

Mr. Blanshard: In regard to schools; intercollegiate peace oratorical contests and peace essays have been quite successful, some of us should have constructive contact with the high schools, should start such a system there as exists in the colleges.

Mrs. Benedict: The first point expressed by Mr. Angell is what to call this movement. This is very important. "Peace" is a very poor word to arouse enthusiasm with. I should like to hear some expression on the name.

Mr. Sorenson: How would it be to call it "rational foreign policy"? That would mean peace. That would not bring up in the mind the Sunday School or Wilson and his policy towards Mexico and Germany. Speak to any passing man about it and immediately he will talk to you.

Second, what is the object of our propaganda? The National Security League in the next Congressional campaign will have a tremendous campaign for a large navy and a larger standing army. They will ask every congressman to pledge himself to so many battleships and a larger army. There you have something definite. Ask them why. Then make a plea for a more rational foreign policy. There should be considerable study about the matter of this appeal. There is no doubt but that we should try to see all classes, but make the appeal different to each one. Speak to everyone from his own point of view. The laboring people are against anything which has to do with war and large armaments. There is the economic

argument of increased taxes and so forth. There is the soap box method.

One more point as to newspaper publicity. They measure a movement by the amount of newspaper space you get. If you get much space people are interested and ask questions right out. There are several ways to get newspaper publicity. Get acquainted with the editor and turn things over to him. After a while he will take a peace story. In order to get a story into the paper you must put it into news form. There are other ways of getting into the paper. Suppose you write a letter to a Congressman about large armaments, the paper will print your letter, not as a letter but as a story.

Mr. Hudson: As regards combined work, how are we going to get from the college campus to the slum district? In my school a man running for office must have behind him certain men who will appeal to the students. The peace movement has got to have behind it certain men to appeal to the man in the slums. We can not have only college professors or presidents of universities. We must get some man who will go down there, who is in sympathy with them. Get them behind our movement, and I think that is the chance that we can get the most effective use of our propaganda movement.

Mr. Wythe: In talking to a congressman we must try a different line of talk than that to the man in the street. In methods of presentation we are chiefly concerned with the present crisis. The building up of the army and navy is the issue now. We must not use claptrap methods to appeal to the man in the street. It is true that he does not know these economic causes and technical names, but present these to him, using his knowledge, and you will come nearer to converting him than by any other means. It is not necessary to show to this man his need of military preparedness. What is the best defense? Show the man that the best defense after all is not to build up the navy and have a large army. I believe that in the present crisis the best way is to go out in a dignified manner and present these direct arguments.

Mr. Nasmyth: Under the head of effective methods comes the matter of style. I wish Mr. Angell could give us some suggestions on that. In order to get anybody to listen to you, you must present a thing attractively. "The Great Illusion" is more effective than "Arms and Industry." People see because it has so many concrete examples.

Second is the matter of strategy. A fight is a thing which attracts attention, interest is aroused immediately, it gets your hearing. The armament campaign furnishes a very good opportunity for a fight, but it will be fighting the wrong thing if we fight the two-battleship program. We will be just where we were before even if we defeat it. The essence of our fight is not against armaments but for great constructive things. It is a question whether we should make a head-on attack against armament increase or make a flank attack to show they will not get what they want, but must add some preparedness of policy, some constructive measures. Another question concerns righteousness. Is it righteousness if it is our national view of a case which is going to be enforced, if we judge our own quarrel? The same question arises with patriotism. We must do it all indirectly, develop the finer elements of the social instincts and create a higher, international patriotism. The last question for discussion is of the value of alarmist methods. The militarists have been alarmists heretofore. It is true that all armament rivalry inevitably makes for war; we shall but point to verities if we are alarmists on this subject. But this policy helps to bring on these very things. The jingoes in Germany and England had a large part in bringing on the war itself. What is the mean between these two courses, the alarmist policy which tends to bring on the very thing itself, and the good in the alarmist policy of attracting attention to the vital dangers involved and helping to overcome the greatest danger of all, inertia.

Mr. Angell: This discussion has followed the lines that one always finds such discussions of methods follow, the advocate of each method feels that his is the one and only method and all others ought to be suppressed. I believe we have got to use all methods. We must not be exclusive.

Some are afraid that the soap-box method means the exclusion of real propaganda with business men. It does not. In the cases that have mattered that has never been so. In Christianity we have principles preached in cathedrals by popes; but also by the poor wretch shivering in the ranks of the Salvation Army. If our movement is as catholic, as human as we hope, one method need not exclude the other. I always find that there is a tendency to assume that one does exclude the other. One or two points occur to me. We want to make use of the student to preach to the world at large. Then he must know something of his audience. Mr. Gannett brought out the essential thing there. If you are to teach the student, let him go out into the world. Let him take up the line for which he is most fitted: thus, the student of law talks to lawyers, the student of economics talks to business men. Because he is talking to special publics, he will not cease to be interested in the whole problem. Though he may not teach his audience at first, he is teaching himself—completing his own education.

SECTION VII

THE NEED OF DYNAMIC SYMBOLS FOR PEACE

By Percy MacKaye

I speak to you not as a critic in the usual sense of that word, but as a worker in the particular things about which I shall try to speak.

Your Chairman has introduced me as a poet and has referred to my poetry. I will pardon him for that, but my job has been a much more technical one, writing for the theatre. It seems to me best that I should, this evening, speak of my own work in these directions because I can speak more directly about these things. There is much of very great value quite outside of anything I have done or will do, but I will get down to speaking of my own experience.

What I would like to put before you is a method of presentation of the ideals of peace, and I shall immediately

use the word "art." The usual connotation of that word seems very far from the concern of the man in the street and the concern of nations, and it is, I think, because art as we know it, and as it has been for generations, is largely an individualistic concern. You will find many different classes of those who are interested in social matters. You will find, I think, a very much larger percentage of artists among philosophical anarchists than among socialists, for the reason that a considerable number of anarchists were first artists, but under a condition of art which is purely individualistic. The usual connotation of art and artists for the man in the street is of a man or woman with a palette in a studio, removed from his concerns, and he says, What has that to do with me? It has a great deal to do with him, for art is a method, the most dynamic method in the world, of expression, and fills the tremendous need of the world to-day to get at the most fundamental way of expressing these social things.

I will not repeat my article, but I may say this much about it, that one of the chief points is that militarism and the militarists who organize war have always recognized art. Peace in later years has ignored it, and, therefore, we are seeing that this method of education, for that is what it is in the larger sense, has so prepared the citizens of the world for war that they may be touched off as by an electric spark. Now, what I suggest in this article is, let us fight the devil with his own fire and use the dynamic method and influence of art to express the great realities of peace. To come back, therefore, I will speak of the art of the theatre as the appropriate technique of peace, but peace meaning—what? The simple *status quo*? There is nothing very inspiring in that. Any intelligent person wants to change that. What shall we mean, then, by peace?

Well, let us see. We shall mean a permanent condition of social happiness, a condition of social justice and joy, but we know we have not got that. How then shall we express the realities of peace if we have not peace? Why, the realities of peace are the struggles for social happiness or justice and joy, therefore, peace in its reality is militant.

We will express the magnificent militancy of peace, and if we do that adequately we will have scored against militarists over the whole world, and especially I think we shall have helped to clarify the ideas of the man in the street. I am the man in the street, you are, when we are there, and we know that he is tremendously interested in a fight, and it is the psychology of that fact that has intrenched the militarists where they are.

Dr. Nasmyth was present in Boston when I was expressing to a meeting there some of the ideas underlying the projects for which it was being organized, the expression of peace through a theatre masque which I shall probably write. I was telling my two friends here of the difficulties I felt to-night in approaching my subject. There is so much that I want to say that I do not know where to bring it in, and I do not know that many of you have much of a background for what I have expressed elsewhere in books. I will refer you to a book of mine on the Civic Theatre, written previous to the St. Louis masque and the Bird masque of mine. The whole matter that I am concerned with is the relation of art, in the things I have spoken of, to our democracy. The essence of what our Government was founded for was self-government, a Government, as Lincoln said, "of the people, for the people and by the people." The Civic Theatre idea, which is related to all that I am saying, is the idea of a theatre not merely municipal, not merely national, not merely a part of our Government, but participated in by the people—of, for and *by* the people.

A little over a year ago I should have said that I most firmly believed in such a theatre and such an art; in fact I did say so; but after my experience in St. Louis last year, I know it is the most practical idea in the world. I will tell you a little about that experience.

In the first place let me explain the appropriateness of using this art of the theatre for community expression. All of you have doubtless taken part in amateur dramatics. The art of the theatre, and I am using the expression in its larger sense, is an expert method in coöperation. In my own line I have written small comedies having only five

characters and a masque cast for 7500 people, but in both of these, and in all my others, I suggest some great fundamental truth at work. We can not give an harmonious performance of the smallest play without coöperation, and harmonious coöperation. In a dramatic production each person takes his place in relation to every other there, and if it is done harmoniously it becomes beautiful. Therefore, it is a method not to be ignored in the great field of social service. Why has it been ignored? In the greatest eras of the world it was not ignored.

“The Trojan Women” is just one slight expression of the vast community art which existed in Athens, and it existed there because it was the expression of the solidarity of that community above a certain plane. Below that were the slaves, but above that it was the expression, one might say, of democracy. Again, in the Middle Ages expressions of it were the great cathedrals of Europe and their rituals; also in a more special sense the great court rituals of Europe. Then came the era of the world which has banished from social service those whom we are accustomed to think of simply as pleasing entertainers, namely the players; but mind you, they are of that art which everyone is told to honor; and they have conserved in the playhouse, cast out from community life but kept to entertain it, they have conserved, within that, one of the most expert sciences, a science which now lies at the disposal of social service, if social service will take it; a science of social engineering, if it will be recognized and used for that purpose. And if this inspiring opportunity is taken and developed, then in the future can be done much nobler things than in the past, and that is saying very glorious things. If we use this medium for the expression of the community spirit, of the people educated and uneducated, all sorts of people, why, not only will it create great art (there are many who at the present moment do not care about that), but it will have such a reaction on democracy as will amaze people.

This opportunity was used in St. Louis. The idea there began in the mind of one intelligent woman; so will these ideas probably begin; so will intelligent women be at the

back of our social movements. Miss Charlotte Rumbold of the Playground Association sat on a hillside just outside the city one day and said to herself: "This glorious hillside, with its lagoon at the bottom, is like a great amphitheatre, yet it has hardly any relation to this great city, except as some people may occasionally come here for an afternoon. We ought to do something here; we ought to have an expression of the city." So she went to work, associated with herself some very harmonious working and intelligent people, all engaged officially or unofficially with the government of St. Louis, and they decided to have a pageant. They sent for various persons who might be efficient in doing this, and finally they entrusted the chief directorship of the production to me. I associated with myself three other artists, and we began work in the late autumn, a year ago last autumn.

Here was a matter of organizing a great modern city to express itself. How could it express itself? It might be organized, the people might play together, might have a great picnic together; but it was up to me as the one chosen to say how to work it out; and I attempted to work it out by trying some of these ideas, and I decided upon the art of the theatre to do so. I had in my mind's eye in the late autumn and early winter, as I wrote the masque, what were to me very thrilling inner visions of what might be, but when I was on that vast stage which we had, it was so far beyond my dreams that I was staggered.

The use of this art for community purposes is manifold; it is not merely a spectacle, the show, the play when it comes, but far more important is the preparing for that. There is the democratic issue, there is where it becomes the art of the people. I worked out a masque technically, then, for the special problem. In the first place we had this great amphitheatre for about 100,000 people; we actually put 80,000 there and it would have taken care of 200,000. At the foot of this was a little lake; over this we built a stage, leaving a strip of water of 125 feet between the stage and the audience. The width of the stage was 1000 feet. On

that stage actually took part, actually became artists for the time being, more or less, a small city, 7500 people.

Now then, how were they to do anything? How could 7500 people get up and express the city? Only the art of the theatre could do this and solve the problem harmoniously. If you have a great tabernacle meeting, or a church meeting, a Billy Sunday meeting, one man gets up with a message to many thousands of people, but how are the people to express their own ideas to themselves? I worked out a certain technique of masque art, symbolized in mass psychology. There were only about a dozen speaking parts among 7500 people, a dozen great spokesmen for all these masquers. We had to catch and fix the eye, so there had to be crests for these great waves, so to speak. For this, on the stage, there were mounds of varying heights, so that one could place the people physically in effective great masses, and there the spokesmen spoke to each other. For instance, at the central part of the masque there was a little child, the infant St. Louis. When the message of coöperation, handed down from the stars, was spoken to this child, he says to the vast figure, the spirit of the mound-builder's civilization—a marionette worked from within (the voice from the stars being technically worked out—a deep male voice of an opera singer, with choir boys, so that it was a composite), the child says: "I hark and will remember"; and this little child's voice was heard by tens of thousands of people.

Out of that St. Louis experience, I have come to think of the great need of our having places where thousands, tens of thousands, if not hundreds of thousands of people, can gather together. That reminds me of what Mr. Norman Angell said this morning of the mouth-to-mouth method being excellent. Why do we not have it? Because we have not yet a democracy. When we have the instruments of democracy, we will have a Civic Theatre and a well-thought-out place where tens of thousands of people will hear what is now the soap box orator. We have engineers for certain practical purposes to a certain extent. When social workers

adopt engineering methods they will have better results.

New York City has five or six millions. Where can they meet? One place, at \$1000 a night, can hold 9000 people. These five million people have no big place of their own to meet in, and when they have things of vital importance to say to each other, all they can do is to say these things at the street corner. This is not effective, but it is the only means. What are some of the other possible methods?

First the press, the most influential thing in the world to-day probably. We have the press but you realize what that is, the press. Someone spoke this morning of going from house to house with an important message, with propaganda, and that was because going individually to this person and that person and so on, they can say something back to you, and it is a human relation, and moreover the whole expression of the human being is infinitely better than the printed word. See what the press does. It has met thousands of people, but it reaches these persons situated in perhaps a hundred different places, never *in mass*, but each individually; they are never all conscious of each other. We shall never have a democracy which is a real democracy until the community which is governing itself actually meets together as we are meeting to-day, meets together and feels itself an entity as a community. That can be accomplished by the theatre and the art of the theatre.

I would like to leave with you the sense of the vital importance of this method, of the great potentiality of this method. You will not see it working out much in actuality except as in St. Louis. What were some of the democratic reactions in St. Louis? In organizing, there was the organization of committees and sub-committees of all sorts, involving between 500 and 600 persons. They reached out and touched thousands. Everywhere there were recruiting stations in different parts of the city, much as one would recruit soldiers. These civic soldiers were recruited, if you will, in a manner so that never one was turned down, because there was opportunity in the vast manifoldness of this

art of the theatre to use every single human being, man, woman and child, who wished to express himself. There were groups of women, groups of children. It mattered not if a person were crippled, every person was welcomed, took his place, and had to do well in that place. They were eager to do well in their places. They had to attend rehearsals, compete within the groups for leadership, and compete in artistic creativeness. For instance there were needed two or three examples of sculpture. You remember I told you that the scale was so large that at first you saw only this vast sitting figure, a sculptured figure. We needed a sculptor for that, and for two other great figures, the elements of Heat and Cold. An expert might have been sent for, a professional, but we thought we would see what talent the community had. It turned out in their competing that two young ladies of St. Louis created this figure of the spirit of the mound-builders. A young man who had been a farmer and wanted to be a sculptor turned in the others. He is now a sculptor.

There was a young man in the life insurance business who became a very distinguished artist on that occasion. Let me say that the part of Gold, in order to be noble and as conceived, would have to be done by a splendid athlete, a man who understood wrestling technically, and he ought to be able to recite poetry with knowledge, and then, more than knowledge, with passionate magnetism. He must have a splendid person and stature, and ought to combine, in other words, the attributes of John L. Sullivan when a young man and of Forbes-Robertson for his command of eloquent speech. The remarkable part is, and it is perfectly true, that this young man in the life insurance business—did it. He was perfectly magnificent. In picturing the theme of my masque, which was the social development of the city, the struggle first was with the world of natural forces; then with the earth spirits of the various elements, gold, silver, copper; then the struggle with the actual earth, then with war, poverty, and so on. This all took place, and you saw a dramatic conflict, a struggle, a fight, and the fight became fascinating, but it was the fight for the existence of ideal-

ism. These combats had to be right out in the heart of the theatre. In the combat between St. Louis and the earth spirits, that was brought out by a wrestling match, a wrestling match between St. Louis and Gold; but on that vast scale two individuals in this huge place would seem to be swallowed up, so it was group action. We had about 80 wrestlers; we were using the athletes of that town not merely as athletes but to express something. These splendid athletes were almost nude, and during their wrestling match there were thrown upon them all sorts of fascinating lights. The various arts of the theatre were used to make this whole struggle more compelling, and Gold had to take his part, you see. He was in this case a wrestler so expert and convincing that the audience watched intently the wrestling match between him and St. Louis on the highest mound, with the lights focused on them. When he downed St. Louis there was a hiss all over the place; when St. Louis downed him, all the people murmured.

There were many reactions from this whole thing. In the beginning of the organization one of the members of the Committee went to a union of waiters on strike; they had been out on strike for nearly a year, or rather they were not out on strike but had been put out of the hotels because they had formed a union, not because they had kicked, but because they had formed a union. The member of the Committee came to the secretary of this union and asked them to come into this pageant. He asked what it was for. "All for the good of the city," was the answer. "I have heard of this pageant, I have heard that you expect quite a lot of people to attend, many thousands. Where will they stop, at the hotels?" "I suppose so." "You want us to go into a pageant that will fill the pockets of men who have put us out simply because we have formed a union. No, thank you." "Will you do one thing: send a representative to the mass meeting to-night where this masque is being set before the people?" And that night I read my masque to the mass meeting. It was a most extraordinary experience. In the usual job of writing for the theatre I write my play at home, either send or take it to a manager, or start off

some conference in the office or some rehearsals in the theatre. What does the community know about it? Nothing at all. In this case I read the masque, and before it was acted I read it to several audiences in mass meetings. I read it at the Catholic College, at the Baptist Convention, at an I.W.W. meeting, at a university gathering, at a meeting of general citizens, to every kind, every class of society, and the reactions from doing that were simply marvellous. It shows what artists might be in a community if the community wanted artists. I read it that night to the mass meeting, I was in my real element of work and read the masque, which was then in its early shape. In this meeting a member of the Committee brought me together with the man from the waiters' union, and he was rather non-plussed, and said, "I do not know what to make of it. I guess this is for the city, all right, and we will go in." The hotel men went in, every class was represented. Briefly, within a very few weeks of the time of the production the waiters were back; nobody knew just how it happened; but it was all settled and they were back on their jobs. This shows one little relation to labor and capital troubles.

One other thing about the St. Louis masque. This theme of the masque, a theme which was coöperation, socialization, finally expressed itself in the scene of Poverty, and the figure of Gold kept recurring and recurring in different forms through these various struggles. Finally when there comes this procession with the dirge of Poverty and the problem confronts St. Louis, he cries out and says (in words to this effect): "This is too much for me alone; let us all get together; let us form a league of all the cities of this country, all the cities of this hemisphere, let us come together and coöperate to solve this problem." Then there was a pageant of the great cities, and there came New York, San Francisco, South American cities, Canadian cities, with all their symbols and regalia. But this is the point: if that had been just a big show, it would have been pleasing, pleasing to the eye, but when New York and the rest actually entered, each of these representatives of these cities was a delegate appointed by the mayor of his city, and by day he

sat in conference with the others to try to solve the problems set forth in my masque. Thus we were dealing with realities. The argument against the pageant is that it has not usually dealt with realities.

I spoke in my article of drab methods and of dynamic and colorful methods. I do not mean to remove all drab methods, such as this conference, I do not mean that we are all to walk in motley and make up our faces in such a conference as this, but we can not appeal to all imaginations, all minds fully, unless we adopt also these colorful and dynamic means.

Here is another illustration in an entirely different way. There was a masque which I wrote on bird conservation, acted in just a little town, twenty miles back from the railroad; but because it put together great vital causes, it has gone from coast to coast in influence; and that work of technical poetry affected the tariff; it affected the law in regard to bird plumage. In fact, I met a man a little while ago who said to me, "Are you the man who wrote a bird masque or something?" "Yes." "It put my business on the blink. We do not hurt the ostriches. I know you did not mean it to be against the ostriches, but people misunderstood. So after your masque had affected my business for months, I finally had to get a motion picture man to make a film in defence of my business and so we showed people that we do not hurt the ostriches and then we began to sell again."

In St. Louis I told you of the coöperation that came about there. Ben Greet, who was at the performance, said all he could think of was a sort of Oberammergau exaltation, yet not hysterical in any sense. It was a revival, giving everyone a religious feeling, but it did not go up in smoke. This is what St. Louis got, and they admit it: a new charter, one of the most progressive charters in the country, came about because of the elbow-to-elbow attitude, bringing people to know each other in a way never experienced before; the finishing of the municipal bridge; a permanent choral society, where there was none before (one of the

best in the West). They have also the nucleus for a fund. The pageant cost \$122,000, they took in \$139,000, and they are using the \$17,000 as a nucleus for a great big theatre in the public park. These are some of the tangible things which have resulted from that pageant.

This method of symbolism is being developed. We see the appeal of a thing like that in concrete form in the Salvation Army. It is that which has undoubtedly given it its tremendous growth, and has made it so widespread. We see it also in the Boy Scouts; the symbol is there and the people respond quickly to the symbol. This matter of symbols, the psychology of symbols, that is a great subject in itself. Mr. Norman Angell this morning mentioned a very important thing when he mentioned Pears' Soap. That was a very pertinent remark to make, a psychological truth, that the reason one buys Pears' Soap is not because one wishes to wash with it, but because the idea had been put into one's mind. I would like to make a distinction for you, I hope I have sufficient definiteness behind it, a distinction between label and symbol. A bad symbol becomes merely a label, but a living symbol, if sufficiently suggestive, and set before the mind through education or advertisement or otherwise, reveals and interprets the response to the label.

For instance, you will see that response in the matter of the flag. The matter was brought up of the various flags and the international flag. I would like to put this suggestion before you, that the flag may be a simple label or a symbol. It may be something that, when the American flag is brought out into a Broadway play with a hurrah, or on various inflated occasions, may make many thinking persons rather contemptuous of the flag. But we must not get away from the fact that the flag is also the symbol of great realities. In the case of our flag we must not let it stand for nothing; it must be the symbol of our democracy. If it have that true symbolism, it will have no conflict at all with the international flag. If ever we are to be asked to love the international flag, we will come to love it through

our national flag, because of its symbolism. There may be many flags, but we know that the reality of the American flag is the democratic symbol.

It was mentioned this morning that there were the white flag of peace and the red flag of social revolution at a meeting with other flags; but in the very nature of the case we have different experiences associated with these flags, actual experiences, apart from the symbols, and we can not expect the same emotional response to them as symbols. Therefore, I think I will put this suggestion before you: one reason why there is a much greater response to the national flag than to the international flag is because as yet the national flag has related to it much more of actual social experience.

In summing up my part, I would like to emphasize more explicitly some of the suggestions of the method of the art of the theatre for propaganda. Before I do that just two minutes on something else. I speak out of the gropings of my own work. I was very busy lately in New York City about a celebration which we had hoped to have on the Fourth of July. It has been postponed to the Autumn, but it will be a new phase of this matter of the civic dramatic art. The problem is to work out an appropriate ritual of citizenship, for an occasion which will be called Citizenship Day. Frederic Howe, the Commissioner of Immigration, with others, is back of the idea. There are several million persons—I had no idea how many until I had looked into it—there are several million persons in this country who, no longer citizens of Europe, are not yet citizens of the United States. Many of them have not very much knowledge or wish to become citizens. The only inducements in the naturalization papers are that if one is not a criminal, has not forged, and does not do various other inhibited things having various other labels, one may become a citizen if one so wishes. Such are the officially printed inducements; yet this is a matter of citizenship, for which, when a flag is raised, the newspaper editorials will ask all to have an emotional regard. So we hope to work out some sort of significant and beautiful beginnings of a

ritual of citizenship in New York. I am telling you these things because I want you to know, to feel that there are definite things to be done by myself and many others. There is also this very thing in regard to which Dr. Nasmyth has had a meeting in Boston, a masque of peace. We probably should not call it that, yet it will be a masque of the peace movement. It is now being organized and will probably be done in many of the great cities in this country, with the participation of all the people in those cities, so that they may get at the ideas lying behind the peace movement. The ideas underlying this conference should be behind this masque.

Let me take up the matter of the method of the art of the theatre for propaganda. I would like to suggest to you that as a method it has this advantage, that in a very compelling way it arrests attention. That is, it takes great masses of people and holds them attentive to the message you wish to give them. Its exposition is probably more dynamic than any other, more immediately influential on great masses. Also it is a method of interpretation through the living actor, through methods of lighting, and of many effective symbols. I have touched upon the matter of its efficiency and coöperation. It also results in the creation of associated works of art, and it has this wholesome, psychological effect, that it enables a dynamic idea to be put into effect, to be put into action. It does not stir people all up to a tremendous boiling point and then let them explode. It gives them a definite outlet, a creative outlet for that pent-up emotion. It is advantageous, therefore, in attention, in exposition, in coöperation, in creation of art, in action and in interpretation.

In emphasizing this method I do not mean to do so at the expense of others, but to complement these and increase their efficiency. In my article, if you care to look at it, I prefer there to speak as an engineer. If we can only get another connotation of artist into the public mind, that he is not a person just playing around a subject, but that a real artist is a man dealing with practical technique, that he is a man not only of creation but of action, and if we

can popularize this method, we shall, I think, when it is adopted everywhere, help to defeat the instincts for destruction by the instincts for creation. There will be an increasingly less need for soldiers in the land as we increase our artists. This is the point. I hope I have said enough about St. Louis to make clear that every person is potentially an artist; all children are naturally artists, only we must prevent them from becoming something else. We must keep them and organize them as a militant army of social service. A nation of artists means no soldiers.

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING MR. MACKAYE

Mr. Blanshard: The question of the moral equivalent of war seems to fall naturally into line with Mr. MacKaye's remarks. Does it not seem that it is possible to have a man go to his factory in the morning and get inspiration for his state, as well as in going into the masque, if that industry is made large and unselfish enough? If this thought of Mr. MacKaye could be carried out into industry we could get community inspiration as in the theatre, and each union would then be a living masque. Are you a Socialist, Mr. MacKaye?

Mr. MacKaye: I am a dramatist.

Mr. Jennings: We were all agreed this morning that there are a number of methods to be employed in the system of propaganda. There seemed to be little conviction as to whom this propaganda should be taken, but it seems to me the point has been made thoroughly clear that it should be taken to all the people, not only hotelkeepers but waiters, not only manufacturer but workman, etc.

Miss Brown: Being a school teacher I feel that we must begin with the young. This thought came to me since reading Mr. MacKaye's article this spring. Thinking of a way to use this idea, I wondered why we have not used more the idea of ritual on the one hand and secrecy on the other. The Masons have apparently a very elaborate ritual. Now, would it not be possible among school children to have this nation-wide citizenship league, which would be secret and have symbols and rituals, have a dramatic presentation of

peace? It could become very strong by beginning early and training a citizen army of peace, using the universal feeling for symbolism and the strength of the idea of secret organization.

Mr. MacKaye: I think I know a way you could get the equivalent of secrecy without the harm that might come.

Mr. Burgum: We may have a variety of methods and a variety of mediums; the essential thing is that we suit our methods to the plan we are using and to the people to whom we are presenting our plan. I do not think that we have taken that sufficiently into account. The religious work should be left to The Church Peace Union; the study of international relations should be left to the polity clubs, which deal with the more educated class in the community. There are two other methods which should be tried. We should reach the mass of the people. We might reach the people in two ways, two distinct ways. There is the soap-box method and there is the method of the masque. The first method we must employ and must continue to employ, and in this connection we must have slogans. Already we have them, but they are philosophic; they have no part in the interests of the common people. There was a point made this morning to change the textbooks; it would be better to change the methods of teaching. The fact may be made all the stronger if the professor changes his method of approach.

Dr. Mez: We use one of these methods in the international organization of students. Put all the flags together, we have banquets with all the flags peacefully on the table together. They are set as symbols. I should like to hear from the speaker what he would think of a peace museum, a collection of all those things that are connected with the peace movement, an artistic production of the ideals of peace, actual pictures of the men and women prominent in the peace movement, and cartoons where the horrors of war show what war really means, its graphic expenditure and cost, a battleship on one side and a university on the other to show the actual costs of the instruments of modern war, then a scientific allusion calculating the cost of

the maintenance, the number of unemployed in England, etc.

Mr. MacKaye: This is very important and has a strong relationship to the masque. The masque, when we come to look back upon it, has sprung in a sense from the exhibit. It seeks to make dynamic what has been static in the exhibit. It seeks to enlist the emotions of persons to go and understand the exhibit. This is illustrated by the masque on birds and the Natural History Museum in New York. Every museum should have a theatre as well as an exhibit. There is not a single exhibit, not a single feature of a museum which can not be dramatized.

Mrs. Mead: We need to use our influence with the artists to create the idea of the peace movement. The idea should be to have a city of peace. When I was in Munich ten years ago, a student of Macmonnies brought a photograph of a group of peace and war: Mars, a woman and a pale victim. Mars was the very kind for girls to fall in love with. We should have a laboring man for war, and why always a woman for peace? This is not the right idea of peace and war. I am greatly concerned about the group which is to be placed at The Hague, in the Court building. It is to be at the head of the stairs. I have never yet seen anything in sculpture which, however artistic, is worth while. There should be a statue of Peace on the Canadian border.

Mr. Nasmyth: I would like to have Mr. MacKaye's expert opinion of some of the things which can be dramatized. We want to show not the extravagant self-sacrifice which comes in war, which defeats its own ends, but the self-sacrifice of social service, which comes in man's struggles with nature, in the life-saving service, in all those things of the common day around us, all that is wonderful. This field of hazards and self-sacrifice is commonplace because it has never been dramatized and held up before us as a real vital force, making for civilization and progress.

Mr. MacKaye: Here is the crucial point of what I should have treated. It is the staggering problem of the artist in this world of new growth to devise symbols which

shall truly symbolize realities. My own opinion is that that will not, and cannot, really come except out of that which we are seeking, namely, out of that community art which we are seeking. As far as community dramatic art is concerned, it so happens at this stage of the game that I am one among a very few who are engaged in civic drama on a large scale. And so, as far as my own ideas are concerned, touching on one or two of your questions, here are a few words that Professor Irving Fisher of Yale wrote about this article of mine and that applies to what was just asked. He mentions one development from very crude but from very real beginnings: "When Col. Waring adopted a white uniform for the street cleaners of New York City, some people were inclined to smile, and some were puzzled to understand the purpose in view; but, after the first street-cleaners' parade, there was a chorus of approval. Street cleaning suddenly seemed to assume a certain dignity, when our attention was turned from dirt to cleanliness and from the forlorn individual sweeper at the crossing to the mighty host of the Defenders of a City.

"Since the general public always fails to catch the higher overtones in common life until some bright symbolism reveals them, we may well pay heed to the suggestion of Mr. MacKaye that the social service of to-day should be clothed in brighter garments and expressed in clearer symbols. Its real splendor will then be recognized through the splendor of its expression.

"For years social reformers in Saint Louis advocated the pressing need of a new charter for their city; but almost nothing was accomplished until the vivid symbolism devised by Mr. MacKaye in the Pageant and Masque of St. Louis, fired the imagination of hundreds of thousands of citizens, and, through them, aroused the dormant civic pride of a whole city. The result was that a new charter was adopted within a few weeks after that memorable festival.

"The average man, without the dramatist's vision, would never have dreamed of such effects from such causes. But recently, a year after the event, the Mayor of St.

Louis publicly testified to these effects and the great practical benefits resulting to his city from the Pageant and Masque.

"It would, of course, be incorrect to say that dramatic accoutrements constitute the main realities either in war, or substitutes for war; they simply magnify the appeal of these realities to popular imagination.

"The armies of Peace have a nobler kind of work to do than the armies of war, and their work often requires as much courage and self-sacrifice. Yet they do not fascinate as war fascinates, for the reason that they are, as Mr. MacKaye says, 'drab.' As he points out, they have no bright uniforms, flags, ballads, brass bands, or other forms of dramatic interpretation.

"We have plenty of statistics, surveys, reports, and other data of science, but the art of marshalling these data is lacking. Until science is clothed in art, it will not appeal to the multitude."

This may also interest you, that I received the other day from Lord Bryce: "In your interesting and suggestive article on 'A Substitute for War' in the *North American Review*, you have touched upon a deep problem which has long occupied my mind, and doubtless many minds: how is the world, and especially how are the poets and balladists, to get on without War as a theme?

"Doubtless they ought to set themselves to consider what charms of imagination and embellishments of art can be used to make peace and its ways and emotions as attractive as warlike deeds have been since the war of Troy and the battle of Deborah and Barak against Sisara the captain of the hosts of Jabin, king of Hazor.

"A great task! May you, and other poets of America, which has a truer and warmer feeling of peace than any other country, prosper in it!"

It is interesting to get the reaction of so experienced and fundamental a mind as Lord Bryce's on that. You ask what might be made of such things as the life-boat service in England. In the masque that I intend to do I expect to take two or three actualities of that sort, some of

those who in our country are coöperatively concerned in social service, which implies social sacrifice, and devise for them appropriate symbols and organization.

Mr. Angell: I have an overpowering sense of the vastness of this thing. There is an immense problem here and Mr. MacKaye has frankly admitted how difficult it is to get at it through expression. War is itself action, a pageant; peace is not. War is not only action, but action in common, together in masses; peace is not. War is itself an end through expression, a drama, with all the elements of drama; peace is not. There is the problem. You do not have to translate war into a pageant; it is one: peace is not. You do not have to appeal to the emotions by making a drama of the man going into war, he is riding to death, dying on the field. To get this same feeling from peace there has to be dramatization. I think the danger in Mr. MacKaye's plan is this. If the masque makers were all MacKayes, it would be good; but they are not. I wonder if the imagination of MacKaye, and others like him, would not be able in a different way to get at the fact and feeling of life in common. In England, a coast guard goes out at night and risks his life for a matter of \$2.50, and does it as a matter of supporting his family. All our young athletes should be doing that the winter through. The life-saving organization should be made up of the finest athletes throughout, with splendid uniforms, colored insignia for the various services, plates in the churches and in the houses of Parliament when drowned, all this kind of thing. And what can be done for these can be done for other services in the various countries. All that should be organized and formed into an army of civilization, visible with its fine uniforms, and so forth. This is only a suggestion. If the art of the MacKayes could be applied to make these things visibly dramatic, then the drama would not merely take the form of the pageant but would appear in the things themselves.

Mr. MacKaye: This is exactly what I mean. I would not get away from that reality for anything. There is danger of getting the shoddy thing, but that must not make us set aside the hope of achieving the real thing. I have

seen German officers on the streets in uniform, and when the little children come along they are told these are the great men of the earth. This makes a very deep impression, and when they grow up they still believe it. It is exactly that thing that I would have these realities stamp out in life, so that a hundred years from now, if this idea could be developed, we should look out on a very different idea of the world of peace.

This idea of pageantry will return to the people from the theatre, for it came from the people originally. Reveal reality by means of the right symbol, colorful symbol, beautiful symbol. This is exactly what I seek to do in the masque which I am about to attempt, the masque on the conservation of life. What I would like to do would be to devise appropriate symbols, uniforms, hymns, etc. The people will probably not at this stage desire to wear the uniforms in daily life, but they certainly will on festal occasions, and these festival occasions will so begin to educate the public that they will not be afraid to express themselves. People are very much afraid of being distinguished in a crowd, but they are not afraid to wear khaki. So get them used by festival occasions to this very important fact of revelation instead of repression.

CHAPTER VII

THE PHILOSOPHY OF FORCE

SECTION I

HUMAN NATURE AND WAR

By Norman Angell

DURING the course of this discussion several of us have said that men are guided not by their interests but by what they believed to be their interests. Even that is not true. Men are not so guided. Take a simple fact. In England we have a soap which is largely advertised in the street cars, everywhere, Pears' Soap. You go into a chemist's shop and say, "I want some toilet soap," and the chemist's assistant says, "What kind of soap?" and you reply, "Pears' Soap." Why do you say that? Because it is best for you? Nothing of the sort. But because you have seen the name so often you can think of nothing else. That was the object of the advertiser: To hypnotise you by perpetual repetition so that, when you go into a store, you cannot think of any soap but Pears' Soap. But he did not appeal to your interest.

If any of you have assisted at an election in England you will have noticed numberless placards, "Vote for Brown." No reasons, for the most part, are given; just "Vote for Brown." When the befuddled rustic gets into a voting booth he has no idea that he is just voting for Brown because he has seen Brown's name 70 times and Smith's only 30 times. Yet that may be the case.

You may think that I am going to proceed from this to say we should adopt that kind of method. I am not; I only cite these things to show that often men do not act from their interests or even imagined interests; and to

recognize that fact is the first step to overcoming it—to making our control of conduct more conscious, more rational.

You will find, even in such things as the factors that enter into fixing the prices of stocks and shares, a large element of the unconscious. Any stockbroker will tell you that the interests of the sellers and buyers—or even what they regard as their interests—are by no means the only and sometimes hardly the main factors. There is the purely “psychological” one, the tendency to do what others do merely because they are doing it. Or an issue of good stock fails because there happens to be an election, or a “cause célèbre” occupying the attention of the public; fifty things other than the conscious calculation of profit and loss may enter into the determination of the price.

Take again a man’s management of his own income. He may have the desire as strongly developed as any one to be as rich as possible. But he may also read a paper whose proprietors have an interest in keeping a certain stock before the public, so that while he is under the impression that he is buying such and such a stock because he has judged it to be the best, he is really buying it because he happens from fortuitous circumstances to have heard a great deal about it.

That brings me to another factor in the formation of modern public opinion which is not a conscious one at all. Why do you buy one paper in preference to another in the morning? Half the time you do not know. It may be the type arrangement, which somehow you have come to like so that any other arrangement “puts you off,” as we say in England. Or it may be because in the past you liked a particular paper’s sports page, or its dramatic criticism. Buying the paper for that reason you read the political articles as well, and so, without knowing it, begin to form political opinions like those of the paper. You did not know perhaps that your political opinions had such an origin; but it is just such factors which enter into the formation of the ideas.

Now do you see what I mean by saying that many of

the factors that shape our opinion are not conscious factors, or the result of discussion at all? And if we are to cease being the mere puppets of a force that we do not understand, the servants of masters whom we do not even know, we must examine these things. To look this unknown master in the face is the first step to our freedom.

Two results are involved: first, the formation of our own opinion and our own conduct, and secondly, our ability to influence the minds of others.

THE OBLIGATION TO BE INTELLIGENT

I do not doubt that the insistence which I have laid upon the fact that mere good intention will not put an end to war has irritated very many whom I highly esteem. But if the reader has followed me so far he will realize that this glorification of intention which comes of an inner impulse and is not a matter of close reasoning and clear thinking is also part of the tendency to shirk the labor of the mind. It implies a belief that while men must labor with their bodies, while that is the primitive curse imposed upon all mankind, they need not labor with their minds. That, while it is a moral duty not to be idle in body, there is no moral duty not to be idle in mind; in a word, that there is no moral obligation to be intelligent and to know our jobs. Now, not merely do outstanding facts of history show pretty clearly the failure of mere good intention—the association of a desperately low standard of civilization like that of the early Christian centuries in Europe, or in certain of the Eastern countries to-day, with a great readiness for self-sacrifice, marked by the hermit and the anchorite of early Christian times, by a self-torturing fakir in the modern Orient—not merely do we see the most frightful cruelties inflicted by men of the very best intentions on themselves and on others, as evidenced by the torturings of the Inquisition, but this notion that any improvement of intention will abolish war implies that the mass of mankind who accept war are morally inferior to those who oppose it. I do not believe that, but let us suppose it is true. Here are two instincts: the instinct

of the jingo who, hearing of outrages upon his countrymen in the Transvaal or elsewhere, clamors for war; the instinct of the pacifist who feels that war would be the greater evil of the two. How are we to show to the other man that our instinct is right and his is wrong, save by a mental process of comparison and analysis of facts, etc.? I remember in this connection, by the way, lecturing once in a German university, and during the discussion which followed my lecture one skeptical German professor spoke in the following sense: "I am not sure that I have understood everything that Mr. Angell has been telling us, but I have strongly the intuition that he is right." And on the other side of the room another skeptical German professor shouted out: "And I have strongly the intuition that he is all wrong." Now what part can mere intuition and instinct play in the reconciliation of the two?

I sometimes wonder whether the philosophers so fashionable of late, engaged upon the glorification of instinct and intuition, have ever played such a game as tennis or golf. If they have, they must know this, that one's instincts and intuitions are very frequently wrong. In tennis you cannot get a ball over the net until you learn to check the instinct, a very strong one when one first learns, to run into the balls which you receive. It is the same with a dozen games that one could mention, one has to check impulses which are at times tremendously strong before one can do so simple a thing as catch a ball or understand the management of a bat or a golf club or a racquet. And society is a little more complicated than any of these things. The general relation of head to heart in such a thing as the understanding of a problem like this is the occasion of infinite confusion.

I have illustrated one confusion thus:

On the other side of the street you catch a glimpse of a man wanted by the police for the revolting murder of a little girl. At once your sentiment is excited to an intense degree; it blazes up in wild clamor and you give the hue and cry, and the crowd catch the man. And then you see that on his left hand he has five fingers: the murderer had

only two. Now, because your mind is capable of certain purely logical processes—and thanks *only* to that—the wild current of your sentiment is immediately changed, and you are now mainly concerned to see that an innocent man does not suffer a threatened lynching. You are just as “sentimental” as before; the engine of your heart is beating as vigorously, the emotional power is just as great but it happens (to state the thing in mechanical terms) to be turning the wheel of action in an opposite direction because certain levers, which are your mental perceptions, have been shifted by contact with certain facts. Most militarists and some pacifists say: “The engine alone is what matters; provided only that that has plenty of power you can throw away your steering gear as an encumbrance, and the driver can shut his eyes.” Well, it is because mankind has often been guided by that idea that history is so largely a record of bad accidents.

For note this: in an age of simpler enthusiasms the steering gear in this case might not have worked so well. In an age when most men believed that any ordinary murderer would not hesitate to call in the ever-convenient witch to remedy so trifling a matter as a missing finger, the simple logical mechanism by which you recognized the man’s innocence might not have worked; you would have wanted to see whether God indicated the man’s innocence by allowing his arm to be boiled for half an hour without injury. And goodness of heart, the affection of the crowd for their own children, their detestation of so abominable a crime as child murder, would have cost an innocent man his life and fair name.

So in the problem of war. The good-hearted fellow who reads on his way to work that the Boers are “murdering girls in the Golden City” will, if his previous knowledge of these things is still in the witchcraft stage, shout with the loudest for the execution of “Kroojer.” He would make part of “wildly, unreasonably sentimental” crowds. But I doubt if you could, when in that condition, “breathe into his heart the sentiment of Peace.” If you urged his duty to his brother Boer he would want to know about his

duty to the sister Englishwomen being murdered in the Golden City.

But if previous to his hearing of these stories—if, during the ordinary course of his education by discussion and reading, at times when he is not shouting in a crowd—he had formed certain definite notions which so bore on the likelihood of these things as to cause him to suspect the story to be either a mischievous fake or silly rubbish, he might still, it is true, be just as angry, but his anger would be directed, not against Boers, but against wicked politicians and lying newspapers. Again, the levers of the mind would not have affected the force of the emotion given out by the heart, they would merely have changed the direction of the resulting action. Without the chauffeur on the car—who is in this case the mind—the energy generated in the engine is just one of the blind forces of Nature; never wholly beautiful while blind (we may deem the instinct of motherhood, for instance, wholly beautiful, yet it may lead a tiger to tear a living child in pieces to feed its cubs), but worthy almost of worship when they take to themselves the eyes of free will and intelligence.

The whole attitude of the pacifist "intuitionalist," as of the militarist, assumes that ideas are not the children of other ideas, that opinions have not a father and a mother, but that, like Topsy, they "just grewed." If we are to stop the evils which are caused by certain ideas we must make some inquiries as to their parentage.

ARE WE GUIDED BY REASON?

It is necessary again and again to urge that we no more assume that men will act rationally than we assume that war is impossible. Even an exceptionally clear-sighted and well-informed critic was once guilty of the confusion involved in the following remark: "Mr. Norman Angell is convinced that mankind is guided by reason." Mr. Norman Angell is convinced of nothing of the kind. About nineteen-twentieths of the time mankind seems to be guided by the negation of reason. I am convinced that when mankind acts wisely it is guided by reason. The

trouble is that most of the time it doesn't act wisely. What I am convinced of is that its only hope lies in wisdom, and that that is the thing we must nurture and cultivate.

I have referred in my books to such well-known changes in the attitude of men as are connoted by the cessation of private and religious warfare. Men used to fight duels, and they have ceased or are ceasing to do so; men used to believe that misfortunes were brought upon them by witches, and to put to frightful tortures the old women whom they believed to be guilty; men used to take delight in the struggles and wounds of combats between gladiators; witnesses and prisoners in courts of justice used to be tortured; zealots for some other faith than that of the majority used to be burned. What is it which has caused men to cease doing all these things if it is not the gradual increase of the knowledge of facts and the application of reason to those facts? There was an eminent Catholic in the fifteenth century who said this: "It would be impossible for us Catholics to sit at table with a heretic, because he carries with him a certain odor which is personally intolerable to us." Was not that impression instinctive? The odor has at all events disappeared in consequence of certain books appealing purely to reason. It is from the collection by whatever means of a myriad facts that instinct grows, and it is by the application of reason to those facts that instinct is corrected and made to contribute to man's advance.

This whole section of our subject may, therefore, be summarized thus: The foundation of the militarist's case—whether avowed or not—is the theory that man, by instinct and necessity, must, in things that matter, fight; that this instinct, "human nature," will always defeat "theories." This necessarily implies that men do not and cannot control their own actions; that such changes for good as distinguish the modern man from the man of the Stone Age, the Anglo-Saxon from the cannibal, are not the result of thought, of changing ideas, of gathered experience, of comparison, of knowledge, of the organization

thereof, of science, but that all this has been done for man by some outside mechanical force, that it is a gratuitous gift which he does not deserve because it is not the result of any effort on his part. The militarist theory also necessarily involves the conclusion that public opinion is something quite outside ourselves, and involves also, of course, a complete failure to realize that when we talk of public opinion *we* are public opinion; when we talk of nations being irrational, we are the nations; so that even in our Church service war, pestilence and famine are classed together. War, like earthquake, "descends upon us," there being no recognition that, after all, while we do not make the earthquake we do make war. Thus, also, the persistent idea in the mind of the militarists that pacifists are trying to prove the impossibility of war; whereas, of course, they are trying to prove the folly of war, and human folly is by no means an impossibility. We have at all times to shout this distinction at the top of our voices; war will always go on if men are foolish enough to wage it. In almost every discussion you will find your opponent is trying to make it appear that the dispute is as to the possibility or likelihood of war. Of course, if war were impossible we should have no earthly reason for worrying about the question. If war is likely as the result of human folly, that is one of the strongest arguments that exists why we should concern ourselves with preventing it by correcting human folly.

Further, the belief that men cannot control their own conduct is a denial in varying forms of moral responsibility: if the forces of blind instinct will always overwhelm the efforts of man's intelligence, then not merely is it no good making moral or mental effort, but he cannot be blamed for being overcome by something stronger than himself.

Finally, if, as many people say, men are not affected by reason, argument, accumulated knowledge, does it not follow that those things in the shape of learning, education, books, churches, and the rest are useless? If that is not the conclusion, what is the conclusion? And if we assume

that men are likely to fight blindly and without reason, are we to conclude from that that they should be rendered as destructive as possible by being armed as much as possible?

As to the bibliography of this part of the subject, it is my impression that formal logic and scholastic philosophy is almost less than no good for our purpose. Although the old conflict between Determinism and Free Will is involved in the questions raised in this chapter, I believe that to tackle those problems after the fashion of the schoolmen would be only to confuse our minds, and that we should keep our feet on the ground by discussing those things in the terms of our own subject rather than in the scholastic terms. In formal logic one should, of course, be sure of terminology (in order to avoid it), and Jevons's little book is perhaps the best for that purpose. Better than the usual form of treatise on logic is a book like J. M. Robertson's "Letters on Reasoning," which I can cordially recommend as distinctly helpful.

On the philosophical aspect of the subject treated in this chapter, however, there is one book which no serious student should on any account fail to read, and that is the first half of Mill's "Essay on Liberty." That is, in the view of the writer, one of the very few books that really help a man to think as distinct from the books that merely furnish him with facts. I cannot sufficiently emphasize the necessity of thoroughly absorbing the first half of that masterpiece (the second half does not so much matter). As a word of warning, I would say that certain literary mandarins who include this book in their "superior person" condemnation of Victorian literature do not know what they are talking about.

In the matter of historical reading on this phase of the question there is no one incident more worthy of study than the fact of the cessation of religious warfare. Here is this great fact, this great change in European society. In the fifteenth or even in the sixteenth century in any part of Western Europe, a man was exposed to the risk of persecution, death, massacre, and war on account of his

religious beliefs. It was not merely a fact of politics which might pass over a man's private life, as does often a fact like an autocratic or monarchical form of government as distinct from a republican one, but it was a real and ever-present danger pursuing a man as it pursued the Huguenots and the earlier heretics, into family life, threatening him in mind, body, and estate with terrors so formidable that we in our day can hardly conceive them. To abolish this peril, to wipe it away, to give to European society security from it, was one of the few real steps that have been made, one of those few things that can be definitely marked as "progress," one of the few real transformations. And it came about within a period of two hundred years or less, and the factors were, as we know, first and last those of public opinion, those of a changed mind and a different idea of human relationship, and of the place that force should occupy in human affairs. Mere machinery, constitutions, treaties, played no part among the causes of this change; they only followed as the result, followed generally a long way in the rear of changes that were purely intellectual and moral.

SECTION II

THE PHILOSOPHY OF FORCE:

RIVAL THEORIES OF SOCIETY

By Dr. George Nasmyth

The sub-title, "Rival Theories of Society," gives the key to the subject of our discussion. There are in the world to-day two opposing theories of society struggling for mastery. On the one hand is the theory of the militarist, that society is founded upon force; and on the other is the theory of the civilist that society is founded upon coöperation and justice. At the basis of all discussions between the issues of militarism and democracy we find these two opposing social philosophies, and corresponding to them two opposing theories of the state.

I think it can be shown that the question of the use of

military force resolves itself inevitably into a question of what kind of a government we wish to live under; that it is connected by an inevitable chain of cause and effect with our theory of the state. When once we begin to rely upon military force to spread the institutions in which we believe, whether it is the French republic spreading its splendid vision of the rights of man or modern Germany spreading its Kultur, certain unexpected reactions occur which finally result in profoundly modifying that society and those ideals.

In order that military force may be effective whether for defense or for aggression, it is necessary that the control shall be centralized. A democratic form of government is incompatible with military efficiency, and must give way to autocracy in reality if not in form, when a nation once begins to concentrate its energies in military directions. Conscription, censorship of the press, and the abolition of free speech are the next logical steps which contribute toward military victory. In the end, even an attempt to crush militarism by force leads to enthroning militarism in those countries which make the attempt, and the result of the employment of this instrument of military force, whether you begin with a democracy or an autocracy, is the same final state of highly centralized government making absolute claim to all the lives and rights of its citizens, and employing through the inevitable chain of mutual hatred and reprisals all the methods of military frightfulness,—the killing or starving of non-combatants, the bombarding of great cities and the sinking of *Lusitanias*. In other words, in making a choice between militarism and democracy we are choosing the kind of society in which we wish to live.

We could find no better illustration of what I mean by this than the social and moral story of Prussia—indeed, of Europe—and the meaning of the war which began in August, 1914.

Until a generation or so ago German thought and moral influence were undoubtedly working towards ends which Christendom as a whole pronounced “good”: Kant and

Fichte, Goethe and Schiller, stood for moral values upon which Christendom as a whole was agreed.

But as an incident of the protection of German society from outside aggression—as a mere detail of military protective measures—certain political and military protective devices were introduced into the German state; a certain tool was adopted. At the time of their introduction these changes were not expected to alter the “ends” for which Germans lived their lives; nor was it anticipated that they would lead to any reconsideration of moral values.

But the introduction of those changes—that tool—has recast the moral values of German society from top to bottom and seems in a fair way to recast the moral values of European society as a whole—including our own. In other words, the danger which Mommsen foresaw for Prussia is a danger which now menaces all Western civilization. A generation ago Mommsen said:

“Have a care lest in this country, which has been at once a power in arms and a power in intelligence, the intelligence should vanish and nothing but the pure military State should remain.”

Those things for which Kant and Fichte, Goethe and Schiller stood have been rejected or profoundly revised by this kind of process:

At a given stage of political development in Germany, German rulers urged that in order to protect the moral and intellectual heritage of Germany, such and such measures had to be taken. They were taken and then developed. It was then seen that their use and development made it necessary to discard or sacrifice the moral and intellectual possessions which it had been the original object of the measures to protect.

I am not discussing for the moment whether the tool used was good or bad; I am only pointing out that its use—whether for good or ill—transforms all social and moral values, even the most fundamental. I want to make clear that force is not merely a tool:—that it is a root of moral ideas, that its use colors all human values and determines the nature of society.

The importance therefore which any social instrument may assume makes it necessary to submit it to close scrutiny. What follows is an attempt to submit one such instrument, force, which mankind has used in the process of evolution—to critical examination; to probe scientifically the philosophy upon which the use of this tool is based.

The philosophy of force is the theory of society which is based on the belief in the effectiveness and inevitability of the use of force in human association to advance those ends, economic, social, and moral, for which men live and strive.

From this belief in the effectiveness of force follow the four articles of the militarist creed:

1. War is inevitable;
2. Therefore we must prepare for defense;
3. The preparedness must be "adequate" or it is worse than useless;
4. The best defense consists in attacking first, at the most favorable opportunity.

Granted the first article of the creed, the others follow logically. Thus the belief that war is inevitable makes war inevitable.

Now there are three kinds of force which must be distinguished in order to reason clearly on this subject:

1. Military force used for attack—aggression;
2. Military force used to neutralize aggression—defense;
3. Force used to prevent attack—police force.

The whole problem of the use of force in human relations centers around the first kind of force. If there were no aggression, there would be no need for defense. In proportion as the motives for aggression become attenuated even the need for police force is reduced to a minimum.

The crux of the problem is to destroy the motive for aggression—to undermine the belief in the effectiveness of force. This may be done:

1. By intellectual processes, showing that the supposed advantages that can be gained for a nation by military

force are illusions, as Norman Angell has done in "The Great Illusion."

2. By political processes, organizing the world into a League of Peace, so that any nation which declares war or becomes an aggressor in the future, will find all the other nations arrayed against it. It is possible that in joining such a league the United States would agree to use, not its military power, but non-intercourse and economic pressure.

Democratic institutions cannot even be defended by military force without fundamentally changing their character. The only real defense of democracy is to be found in replacing the system of international anarchy by a system of world organization. Lincoln said, "The United States cannot exist half slave and half free," and the present crisis has shown us that the world cannot exist half democratic and half militaristic. This is the deeper meaning of our study of the philosophy of force. Although it is a false theory of society, it is nevertheless the dominant theory in the world to-day, not only among militarists, but among the immense majority of the "practical" men. Our task is to undermine this false philosophy by hard intellectual work and to establish in its stead, not another philosophy equally false, but a true theory of human relationships. If the International Polity Movement had a watchword it might well be "The Truth Shall Make You Free."

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING THE ADDRESS BY DR. NASMYTH

Mr. Robinson: What about strikes and militant suffrage methods?

Dr. Nasmyth: Sensational lurid methods may be effective to draw attention to abuses, but violence is suicidal as a means of enforcing one's will.

Mr. Fleming: From that point of view, I want to relate a little experience I had. On Saturday nights a crowd of boys helped to get out the Saturday night paper, and along about 12 o'clock, one night, a big bully came up to a small boy who was standing in line waiting for his paper,

and attempted to dislodge him from his place. The little fellow resisted as well as he could but he seemed to be getting the worst of the argument when one of the fellows went up to the big boy and swore at him and threatened him. As a matter of fact it is extremely improbable that he could have carried his threat into execution but nevertheless the big fellow was absolutely cowed, and took his proper place in the line at once. Now what would have been the effect if the small fellow had gone up to the big one and had politely asked him to desist from his efforts to push the little fellow out of the line? It was the show of force that dominated the big fellow and made it possible for the smaller fellow to protect the little one.

Mrs. Mead: Was not that domination of the small fellow over the large one a question of the force of mind over matter?

Mr. Angell: All this talk is very good, but what are you to do when you have a hostile fleet in the harbor of New York City and a hostile army prepared to disembark on the western coast? That is the militarist's question.

Mr. Fleming: I think that we really ought to prepare for war.

Mrs. Mead: We ought not to forget our geographic position. I especially refer to the fact that we are the only nation in the world which is protected by two great oceans and also the fact that we are the only nation that has one protected border line. It seems to me that the other forms of defense would be unnecessary under these conditions.

Mr. Angell: The pacifist proposes to prevent war, not to cure it after it has taken place. That is our answer. The real effect of the militaristic propaganda is to disparage effort at a real international understanding. We should say to the militarist:

"The alternative is not between armament and disarmament. It is between defensive measures without sound foreign policies and defensive measures with sound foreign policies. We do not ask you to submit to force—that would be to recognize force. We believe in defense—but

we want to know what we are going to defend. We insist upon a formulation of policy.

"And finally the security you can give us by armament alone is only temporary; it does nothing to lessen the causes of war. Nations no longer go to war alone; they go in groups. To attain real military security we should have a navy and an army very much larger than the combined armies and navies of all the large nations. You do not advocate enough. To be logical you should ask for an army of 35,000,000 men and a navy of a hundred dreadnoughts." That should be our answer to the militarist.

SECTION III

THEORIES OF SOCIAL DARWINISM. IS THIS WAR A STRUGGLE FOR EXISTENCE?

By Mrs. Ruby G. Smith

Social Darwinism is based on an analogy between the biological laws governing organisms and the laws governing human society.

Social Darwinism assumes that more people are born than can survive because of limitations of food and room; to quote Malthus, "Food and room only increase in arithmetical ratio while humanity multiplies in geometrical ratio." Therefore, a struggle for existence ensues among men in which there is a premium on those who are fittest while the unfit are eliminated by selective death, resulting in a survival of the type of the superman.

As applied in its broader international aspect, social Darwinism argues that war is necessary between nations as a selective agent by which the unfit nations are to be eliminated from this planet—with the aid of gun powder—so that nations that are the fittest may alone survive and eventually inherit the earth as a race made up of super-nations.

Before pointing out the fundamental fallacies of this theory of Social Darwinism quotations from some of its advocates should be given.

Ruskin.—"War is the foundation of all high virtues and faculties of men."

Nietzsche.—"The survival of the fittest (that is the strongest) in the struggle for existence is to bring forth the superhuman."

Moltke.—"War is one of the elements of order in the world, established by God. The noblest virtues of men are developed therein."

Ernest Renan.—"War is one of the conditions of progress . . . man is only sustained by effort and struggle."

T. Roosevelt.—"By war alone can we acquire those virile qualities necessary to win in the stern strife of actual life."

Admiral Mahan.—"The old predatory instinct that he should take who has the power, survives . . . and moral force is not sufficient to determine issues unless supported by physical."

Heraclitus of Ephesus.—"War is the father of all things."

Bernhardi.—"War is a biological necessity of the first importance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which can not be dispensed with." . . . "Without war, inferior or decaying races would easily check the growth of healthy budding elements, and a universal decadence would follow."

Treitschke.—"It has always been the weary, spiritless and exhausted ages which have played with the dream of perpetual peace."

Homer Lea.—"National entities, in their birth, activities, and death, are controlled by the same laws that govern all life—the law of struggle, the law of survival."

Exponents of Social Darwinism can be dealt with collectively because all agree in making use of certain fundamental fallacies and false analogies. Society, the material with which these "red in tooth and claw" philosophers deal, is in itself the direct result of a limit to the struggle for existence set by mankind. One of the most accurate of Darwin's interpreters, Sir Thomas Huxley, defines society thus,—"The first men who substituted the state of mutual peace for that of mutual war, created society. In establishing society, they obviously put a limit upon the struggle

for existence." "The history of civilization, that is, of society, is the record of the attempts which the human race has made to escape from war." "Society differs from nature in having a definite moral object. The primitive savage fights out the struggle to the bitter end, like any other animal; the ethical man, member of society, devotes his best energies to the object of setting limits to the struggle."

Moreover certain definite things have been done by mankind to ameliorate the primitive conditions of struggle and thus the first premise of Social Darwinism proves false. The social Darwinian says first "The total number of individuals the earth can support will remain stationary because of limitations of food and room, humanity multiplying in geometrical ratio, food only increasing my addition." Contrary to Malthus and his disciples, all foods except water and certain minerals, namely all animal and plant foods are subject to the same laws of multiplication that govern mankind. Moreover man, by the application of that intelligence wherein he differs so vastly from the rest of creation, has *enormously* increased the food supply by the breeding of better varieties, by the substitution of cultivated crops for a state of nature, and by the development of commercial exchange. Relatively speaking, these processes of increasing the food supply are only in their beginnings, as witness our incomplete trade with South America and the fact that there are many plants and animals not yet touched by the experimenter and grower, while truly intensive agriculture is not practised anywhere as yet. When these devices are exhausted, synthetic chemistry promises to supplement our food supply.

Regarding the supposed necessity of the struggle for room, there is admittedly a limited amount of room on this planet. But as yet all the deserts have not been made fruitful, as they can be with water; and plants and animals have not yet been adapted, as they can be, to conditions on lands now lying fallow for lack of suitable crops. Additional land has already been made available for human life through the drainage of swamps, the filling in of lowlands, the levelling of hills, the irrigation of desert sands, the construction

of subways, the dredging of harbors and the building of extensions to our seaports on piles and wharves. When one contemplates the sky-scraper of New York, which may multiply ground space by forty or more, it is not too much to hope that should earth become too densely populated for present solutions, man's ingenuity will prove equal to the occasion and that without the use of 16 inch guns!

Room and food supply are *not yet* limiting factors. When they become so, they can be controlled without massacre in ways here suggested and in other ways yet undreamed of.

Having suggested the fallacies in the first two premises of Social Darwinism, let us examine the next conclusion, namely, that "a struggle for existence is the law of nature for men." Struggle, as a stimulating competition in the intellectual, economic, social and moral life of humanity, is certainly present to help toward the attainment of the best in human nature. But the physical struggle for existence among men is no longer a struggle to the death except when man is in a state of *war*. The Social Darwinians say that struggle is the *universal* law of nature. The truth is that even where life or death struggle prevails among plants and animals,—except in exceptional cases like the depraved cannibal spiders,—the struggle is not *within* a species, as between the individuals of that species, i.e. intra-specific, but is inter-specific—one species against others. And all the scientists classify all the races of men as varieties of a *single species, Homo sapiens!* Even the plants that cannot move out of one another's way except at fixed intervals are provided with many ingenious devices for seed distribution to avoid an intra-specific struggle for room and food.

The truth is that the advocates of Social Darwinism entirely overlook a factor in biology that is as important in evolution and survival, if not more important, than the law of struggle. I refer to the *law of coöperation*.

The successful lives of the species of animals and plants that obey the law of coöperation, testify to its efficiency as a real factor in the survival and progressive evolution of species. One of the most successful of those plants whose

watchword is coöperation, is the dandelion—a European immigrant, accidentally introduced on the Atlantic coast in imported grain; it has succeeded in securing “a place in the sun” from Atlantic to Pacific. The reason for the dandelion’s conquest of America is that every blossom is a community of coöperating individuals working for common ends. This law of mutual aid, utterly ignored by the Social Darwinians, is really in extensive operation in nature. The fishing pelicans, the flocks of migrating birds, the engineering feats of the beavers, the herds of many mammals, and the community life of ants, bees and wasps—most successful of all insects—are but a few illustrations of the existence and effectiveness of the principle of coöperation in nature.

Coöperation, i.e. mutual aid with division of labor and interdependence, is as real in nature as struggle.

The final step, in the unsound but plausible logic of the Social Darwinian, claims that war results in a survival of the fittest within each nation and of the fittest nation among struggling nations. They call war “the national struggle for existence.” It might more truly be called the national struggle for degeneration. Dr. Jordan’s famous essays on the biology of war in “The Blood of the Nation,” “The Human Harvest,” and “War’s Aftermath,” set forth clearly the fallacy of the theory that war is biologically beneficial. Illustrations from the tragic story of the last ten months in Europe illumine Dr. Jordan’s biological explanation of the fall of Greece, Rome, and Spain as world powers, because of the destruction of the best.

The specifications for war service began everywhere in Europe last summer with the familiar, historical qualification—young men between the ages of 20 and 40 without blemish so far as may be—a rallying cry comparable to the old Roman order,—“Send forth the best ye breed.” We have witnessed in less than a year the destruction of a wealth of spiritual power, for every nation mourns a “roll of honor” including distinguished names in all fields of human endeavor. We have heard of the exodus from the English, continental and colonial universities,—of the brave young life so much needed in the human struggle toward truth,

and already, in less than a year, the age standards for military service have been *lowered* with the exhaustion of the first picked men.

Before the invention of weapons of war, *some* premium was placed on fitness and the battle was often to the fittest. But gunpowder—in “killing the unknown by the unseen,” as Mr. Angell has dramatically phrased it,—has eliminated any selection on a basis of fitness among the enlisted. All fit to serve are sent to the slaughter, while those unfit remain to father the future races. True disciples of Darwin hold that all progress in human evolution is based on moral and intellectual factors. For only in these qualities is *Homo sapiens* markedly different from gorilla or chimpanzee!

Intellectual and moral evolution are therefore man's true field for specialization, as those are the qualities that distinguish him in his “sacred kinship to all that breathes.” The moral and intellectual struggle against poverty, disease and ignorance *can* yield the beneficent influences of war without its *corrupting* evils, for war is always degrading in the main and only incidentally elevating through its sacrifices, as Channing pointed out long ago.

Social Darwinism is therefore *distorted* Darwinism and its principles are being dramatically denied by the accumulating evidence that modern warfare is not selective but is mutually destructive of the fittest of all belligerents.

If the pacifist wants a biological slogan that is more true of the human species than the militarist's “struggle for existence,” let the motto be “coöperation is a law of nature,” especially true of human nature in its progress toward its highest evolutionary possibilities.

As a constructive measure for action, I suggest that peace organizations conduct a campaign to have the biological truth about war included in the nature study, historical and biological programs of the secondary schools, and in the biological, historical, and philosophical courses at the Universities. For the biological aspect of war is one that calls for vigorous educational remedies.

CHAPTER VIII

MORAL AND MATERIAL FACTORS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

SECTION I

IS THE GOLDEN RULE APPLICABLE TO INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS?

By Prof. Nathaniel Schmidt

WHETHER the generally recognized principles of private morality are also applicable to the relations between nations is a question of more than academic interest. In a very real sense the future of human civilization depends upon the answer. We should beware, however, of answers that are too easy, that fail to recognize actual conditions and the gradual growth of morality, consist of insufficiently considered formulas, or are based upon a philosophy of life at variance with the facts. The principles of individual ethics whose validity we do not seriously question represent a long development due to the persistence of custom established by expediency and tested in the process of history, the reaction of new ideas and higher ideals demanding a trial, and the compromise between both which indicates the usual line of progress.

The constant modifications of our laws show a constant change in our morals. If the laws to-day take no cognizance whatever of things for which the death penalty was once inflicted, while men are prosecuted for things which once were left to private discretion, the reason is that the moral emphasis has shifted. The fact that we no longer burn witches, hang thieves, stone adulteresses, kill prophets, torture witnesses, and return fugitive slaves, but punish

those who would enslave their fellowmen, employ little children in factories, run sweatshops, conspire in restraint of trade, rear their fortunes on fraud and oppression, endanger the health of the community, and interfere with the citizen's right to life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness, is not a sign of indifference to morality, but of a finer sense of justice.

Though it is the nature of morality to strive for perfection, for the realization of the highest ideals, both legislation and education must deal with conditions as they are, choose the methods that will lead to the best results, register and accentuate the upward tendencies, attach themselves to the actual stage of development to bring about what is feasible. In one respect there never was a time when good men and women differed so radically on even fundamental questions of personal ethics. From another point of view there never was a more encouraging gravitation of free and intelligent opinion toward some basic principles of morality. Persons of equal honesty, highmindedness, and integrity of life reach different conclusions as to the right of self-defense, divorce, and private wealth. There are those who find all morality summed up in the Ten Commandments; there are others to whom some of these commandments have a very dubious moral significance. Nor can it be said, in spite of loud and somewhat perfunctory affirmations, that the so-called Golden Rule is very generally accepted. To some it seems too exacting, to others not definite and convincing enough. Whether one who does unto others whatever he would have others do unto him is really a righteous man depends upon what it is he would have others do unto him. If, for instance, he refrains from telling the unwelcome truth, protesting against wrong, protecting innocence and repressing violence, even at the risk of inflicting pain, because he dislikes such treatment of himself, he may not serve thereby the cause of righteousness, nor will he be a better man by trying to perform for another a service for which nature did not fit him because he needs and desires that service from another. There is gold in the rule, pure gold, but it must be extracted; and

it is important that men should learn how to distinguish between the spirit which abides and the outward form.

When the old world of thought went to pieces, and the surpassing glory of the new conception of the universe destined to take its place was but dimly seen, or not at all, when men spoke of the iron chains of necessity, the evolution of the highest things from the lowest, the ceaseless struggle for existence, a nature red in tooth and claw, thousands felt like orphans crying in the night, and other thousands with ghoulish glee broke through the restraints of conventions whose value they thought they could discount because they discerned their natural growth. The sanctions of morality seemed to be gone, the motives for righteous conduct appeared to have been removed, and the thoughtless cried: "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we shall die." It would be folly to deny that this antinomianism, which follows in the wake of every emancipating gospel, has had something to do with the materialism, characteristic of wide circles, the mad desire for comforts and luxuries, the craving for sensual pleasures, the indifference as to the methods by which they are gained, the contempt for the weak, the scorn of pity, the reversal of all moral values. The storm which swept away so much that was obsolete and moribund threatened to engulf many of the noblest things of life as well.

But the mind of man soon found in the conception of a law-bound universe, not only surcease from ancient sorrows, relief from tormenting doubts, the joy and freedom of a larger faith, but also a sense of vaster responsibilities. His conscience recognized that whatever the origin of morality may have been, however its standards may have changed, however imperfect and relative his knowledge of the right may be at any time, it still felt the force of the categorical imperative, approved one course of conduct, condemned another, knew justice from injustice, kindness from cruelty, the love of truth from a penchant for falsehood, courage from cowardice, courtesy from disrespect, loyalty from treachery, good from evil. And in the life of all civilized nations there is, in spite of all differences, a

practical consensus of opinion as to the absolute necessity of an adherence on the part of all citizens to certain fundamental ethical principles, and the desirability of infusing into all their relations the spirit of good will toward men which is the essence of the Golden Rule.

It would not be misrepresenting the human race to say that in the past neither the Golden Rule nor the theory that a nation can do what it pleases has ever been entertained by any people. Ordinarily it has been thought that a nation should keep its treaty obligations, to which the gods were witnesses, and would not be justified in lightly breaking its plighted troth, but also that the interests of the state are paramount, and that, if they are seriously endangered, the pledges may be set aside. Before the outbreak of the first Punic war many Roman senators regarded it as wrong to break the treaty with Carthage and take the side of the Mamertines; others urged, and perhaps rightly so, that the integrity of the Roman republic was at stake, and that in self-defense they must take the offensive. It has often been held that a nation should be just, and if it could afford it and it was expedient, merciful; but it has never been seriously held that, if a nation should ask of another a slice of its territory, or a part of its revenues, the latter ought to give what was requested. There has always been a mixture of the two feelings that foreign nations should be treated squarely, in war and peace, and that they cannot expect to be treated as if they were one's own nationals.

In recent times the theory has been propounded that a nation has the right, and even the duty, to be selfish, mean, greedy, deceitful, treacherous, false, and cruel: that it is an end in itself, not bound by any other law than its own will, the highest object of the citizen's devotion, having the right to demand the sacrifice of his life, and the duty of obtaining for him all it can get, and keeping all that it takes: and that therefore there can be no question of its following a moral code, least of all the principles implied in the golden rule. The novelty of this theory lies chiefly in its frankness and consistency. All nations have at times

acted as though this were their underlying conception. It is not improbable that this order of ideas, as well as the frank presentation of them, has been influenced by the first immature interpretation of nature from the standpoint of evolution which neglected to observe and correlate a vast multitude of facts pointing to helpful coöperation, self-sacrificing love, and intelligent good will as large factors in nature's life.

The theory is palpably false. For a nation is after all only an aggregate of individuals. Whether they are seven, seventy, or seventy millions, they cannot, dare not, must not disengage themselves, when they act together in a corporate capacity, from the principles of morality which they recognize as individuals. They know that it is possible for them thus acting together to be just, fair, truthful, loyal to their obligations, courteous, and kind, and they also know that this is their duty. Neither the electors at the polls, nor their chosen representatives, nor the government that acts for them can conceal from themselves the fact that whatsoever a nation soweth that it shall also reap. A nation is not an end in itself; it is not independent of others; it is not supreme. It is a branch in humanity's vine, a member of its body, an organ intended to fulfill its function for the good of the whole; it is dependent upon other nations as they upon it; beyond the nation there loom up in majesty two greater things demanding loyalty, humanity and the moral law. The nation may have the power to take the individual's life, but it has no moral right to demand this sacrifice in the interest of corporate greed, jealousy, vengeance, ambition, or hatred. It may have the military strength to exact what it covets, but the right that might makes can only be provisional, and at bottom illusory. A nation must not allow the interests of its individuals to suffer, but none of these interests are even jeopardized by righteous conduct. True patriotism seeks to make the object of its devotion, the fatherland, the nation, not only strong and free, prosperous and happy, but also just and unselfish, generous and kind, as it is itself. If the essence of the Golden Rule is a due regard for others,

a scrupulous performance of one's duty, of what justice, loyalty, good will and love demand, then this rule is as applicable to men when they act together as when they act singly, when they constitute a nation among other nations as when they are but individuals among other individuals.

This principle certainly implies the ultimate abolition of war, and the substitution of judicial arbitration of international difficulties, but it does not necessarily involve the abolition of force. The rule suffers no infraction in a community because of the restraints put upon the diseased, the insane, the disorderly, the criminal: nor would it be sinned against by nations, if for the protection of mankind there were, not only a supreme court, an international parliament, and a federal executive, but also a sufficiently powerful international police force to carry out the mandates of the court and the legislation of the parliament; or if in the present deplorable condition of anarchy, before the establishment of international law on a firm basis, nations seek to protect themselves as best they can, provided there is no aggressive purpose.

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING ADDRESS BY DR. SCHMIDT

Mr. Nasmyth: I am sure we all wish to thank Dr. Schmidt for the new vistas opened up, and also for the marvellous spirit of neutrality he has shown by not mentioning recent events. This was an address covering a very wide area, and perhaps it would be most profitable to concentrate in the beginning of the discussion on the subtitle "Moral and Material Factors in International Relations."

Mr. Robinson: My first question deals with the subject of international relationships. I would like to ask whether or not enlightened self-interest is inconsistent with altruism.

Dr. Schmidt: From my standpoint, of course, enlightened self-interest is practically identical with altruism. If I know just what is best for myself and I know just how to act, of course I know that I never realize myself except in relation to others. But I may say that the appeal to en-

lightened self-interest is never so strong as to self-interest alone, if you can only fully move somebody to believe that it is for his interest. I have not any desire just now to go fully into that subject, I simply want to throw it out as a sort of historical hint, whether the theory is true or not. Many people believe that way does not pay.

Mr. Robinson: Karl Marx was strongly against nationalism. There is a good attempt, however, marked by modern social schools as a development of nationalism.

Dr. Schmidt: There is a distinction between love of one's nation and nationalism. Love of one's nation is love that seeks to make one's nation strong and free and intelligent. Nationalism is interest in territorial expansion, consonant with greed of land, it seeks power over others. It is not national selfishness but intelligent self-interest to make my nation, not the strongest necessarily, not the most powerful, but the wisest, the noblest, the most generous, the most truly civilized. I agree with you that the Socialists in France and Germany are many of them temporarily for nationalism, and are putting too much emphasis on the nationalist side.

Mr. Kliefoth: I wish to take exception to the speaker's main theme. I maintain that we are slowly moving from an age of loose interpretation to stricter interpretation. The Golden Rule means exactly what it says. I can not conceive that when God laid down that commandment for humanity he had any exception in his mind. In my own mind he meant exactly what he said at that time. We are slowly moving to an age of non-resistance. It does not imply doing nothing, it implies the working of peace,—a peace of activity, of coöperation, of stricter interpretation of things according to principles. We are also told, to do something for one's country is the best interpretation of this early principle.

The turning of the cheek is the great thing the world is living for; Belgium had that chance. If it had thrown up its hand and said, "We will not let you invade us, but we will not resist," the world would have received that lesson. The world is waiting for a martyr nation, then the rest of

us will slowly take courage. Tolstoy was living for exactly what peace means, whatever we may say. The past has been an age of loose interpretation, we are living in an age of appetites. Appetite is the great obstacle of the age. My point of difference with the speaker is that we may not aim directly for strict and positive interpretation of opportunity for humanity.

Dr. Schmidt: I have nothing to say. We simply differ in interpretation, that is all. I honor a man for the fervor of his convictions. I am interested in getting different points of view on every great movement, every great moral utterance, even if I can not agree with statement. Behind even the statement with which we disagree there may be something of strength which we can not afford to lose sight of. When we commit ourselves to any form of very radical philosophy, we incline to lose patience with every other form, and I think for the world's peace nothing is so important as to learn to read other's minds, learn to interpret generously, kindly and with sympathy and insight for other man's point of view.

Mr. Angell: I always feel in this conference that I ought to try to intervene just at the moment where the subject in hand most concerns the ultimate object of this conference. Now, the object is, how to put it over, that is, how to affect national and international will in the matter of better world organization for the object which we all have in mind. One emergence from this discussion is this, what form of appeal will be most likely to affect the national and international will to do justice, the will to peace, which must precede action. Shall that appeal be to conscience, not very clearly defined, or shall it be to self-interest, enlightened self-interest, to reason? What form is that appeal to take? Two or three things have been said here that, perhaps, will give it. I just want to point them out.

The speaker dealt with the categoric imperative. I believe that we all agree on this, the categoric imperative does not tell us where our duty lies, simply tells us that we should do our duty. That distinction is very important, because if you mix up the two you are bound to go astray.

A man is apt to waver unless he gets that distinction clear, that the categoric command of his conscience to do his duty is not a command to listen to the opinion with which he does not agree concerning what duty is. It was so that a fact in human affairs like the Roman slave was maintained. The Romans were quite persuaded that it was an element of human society, there was nothing in their categoric imperative to prohibit it. Or you got such things as the persecution of heretics by the Catholics. The categoric imperative merely tells you to do your duty, not what it is.

There is also a moral obligation to find out what our duty is. From that point you have a moral obligation to rationalism. That is, if you ask, "What is for the welfare of the world in general?" then you have two problems. That is the link between morality and the kind of analyzing, rationalizing process to carry out the character we are trying to give to the pacifist movement of our type. This introduces another point not clearly brought out. We talk of many interesting things, insist on having our nation noble and right. What is a noble nation, what are nations founded for? Some say nobility assists us in being stronger; that it is better than social well-being, than comfort, than thriving business. You can not put up one idea as against another. You can not establish or limit what states are for.

The first test you must apply to this idea is whether it is possible as human action. We can not all be masters, only half or less than half; we can all be partners. That action was illustrated by the plea for non-resistance. That speaker referred to the way the individual should allow himself to be butchered; should the nation? A practical argument for non-resistance is that it avoids butchery. There was no massacre in Brussels, it was not defended: there were great massacres in Louvain because it was defended. The case for non-resistance is not that we are prepared to be butchered, but that we would avoid butchery altogether.

One point most concerns us, "By what process of appeal can we best reach the human mind, in what way prove our-

selves to be right?" Can we do it by a somewhat ill-defined appeal to intellect and conscience, or by a more definite appeal which will include definition of what human welfare is and of what men in their human relations touch it?

Dr. Schmidt: I have no desire, no purpose whatever to divert discussion away from the particular channel in which Mr. Angell desires to have it go. If I had known what has just been said, I might have hesitated to make an appeal on so many different lines. However, the human mind is so complicated that one can not always tell what appeal is strongest. The difficulty is, men and women are so complex that one could never tell which saying, which idea, which sentiment finds lodgment here or elsewhere. I have a feeling that the most generous attitude is that of welcoming any argument that can have an effect in leading men's minds towards peace. I have a feeling that many minds in America are responsive to an appeal that comes from a long acceptance of federation. Consequently, for them, the appeal towards a world government is very strong. Others are very strongly influenced by an appeal to sense of right and wrong. I did not merely discuss the categorical imperative, I spoke of the perceptions of right and wrong which have come to us and are on sure foundations. I did not intend nobility to mean strength. The appeal to self-interest may be very strong to some minds, the appeal to right to others. The appeal to love is a strong appeal to dozens of men and women, and I feel that that appeal may be well made. I am quite sure there is another appeal.

If non-resistance means that you are going to let the aggressor walk in and change everything you have, if it means that you shall stand with hands tied and let the country and institutions you love be changed by the invader, I feel very doubtful whether such non-resistance will be the best thing for America. I feel sure, on the other hand, that a people that is not ready to maintain its own dominion, its own independence is not worthy of keeping it.

Mr. Gannett: There is a certain fallacy laid down by Professor Schmidt in his last remark. Finland will some day regain her dominion and rights, and she is not an inferior nation.

Dr. Schmidt: I am very glad indeed that Finland was mentioned. There is no country in the world which has shown greater bravery, courage, loyalty than Finland in connection with Sweden, and in the struggle with Russia to maintain her rights.

Dr. Nasmyth: What is usually called non-resistance is a misnomer. It is spiritual militancy, a mobilizing of all the spiritual forces of a people. I will suggest also that we are getting a little off the subject for to-day.

Professor Schmidt pointed out a very important development since Darwin. Before that time we took our morality from authority; then came a period of rationalism in the physical sciences, but we have not rationalized the social sciences or morality. There is a special question this discussion ought to hold to. When two men or the people of two nations have contrary convictions that certain things are right, how can we determine which conception of morality should prevail? Can we get a scientific basis for international righteousness?

Mr. Danahy: I believe the best means is by a strict interpretation. How can we ever hope to attain to a strict national morality when we have such a loose interpretation of our own morality? Does not Professor Schmidt believe that before we can attain national or international morality we must reach some such individual morality?

Dr. Schmidt: My contention is that we have reached such a plane of morality that it enables us to live together peacefully in a community. There is a conception of morality in states and nations far in advance of that morality manifested between nations. We want to apply at least that minimum of morality which we have in life within the nations to international relations.

Mr. Call: Is it possible for us to have a rational basis for our morality which we can establish scientifically and then, with this as a basis, march out to practical and con-

structive effort? I do not know, but I think we can establish such a basis.

I have a suspicion that the most fundamental law ever laid down is that life exists that there may be more life. I was born and brought up on a farm. I know what a dandelion is and that, if well-regulated, it will grow up high so that the wind can blow its blossoms and make more dandelions. I have peculiar dandelions on my lawn, they do not grow high but down below the grass, because they realize that I have a lawn-mower. It has been proved that the weed is a plant the virtues of which have not yet been discovered; I discovered that the burdock is a plant with virtues; they consist in the fact that it is a thing of beauty and a joy forever. The supreme teaching of life is that life exists to have more life. The supreme teaching of Jesus is the same.

If this is true then it seems to me that we are near the basis of all morality. To be moral in order that there may be more life, this is true of individuals, true of nations, true biologically.

We are told that there is a struggle all the time going on in life, that the conflict is inevitable and continuous, that it always will be, that there always will be war. The interesting thing about this is that this law of life does not agree with that view. There is no interracial or fratricidal war in the whole history of life except with the human animal. You are an aggregation of cells. If they are at peace with each other you live and grow healthy, if at war you grow cancer. The law of life is peace, therefore conflict is the law of death within the species. The law of life is that nations should live at peace with each other as do human beings.

The principle is that there is life that there may be more life. If this is the principle upon which we must base our morality, then what is the application to nations? The application that seems to me obvious is that nations must live at peace with each other if nations are to survive; interracial and fratricidal wars must stop because counter to the rule of life. The principle of the golden rule is the

place to enter, but if we ask ourselves what are we going to do about it, we must go down to the minimum program, we must have a substitute for international war. What is the form to be? We must take for use the substitute of federation, which has worked so successfully in the case of the forty-eight states, an international legislature and an international court; but the speaker also intimated, and I am astonished that you have intimated, that we must have an international executive in the form of an international police.

We have already begun international legislation. The war over in Europe is going to be settled by the belligerents. Then there will be another Hague Conference with both neutrals and belligerents to perfect the machinery begun. We have the beginnings of the international court and the international legislature which you have asked for. We are going to take things as they are and carry them on. But you say we must certainly have international police, and you draw analogies from this country. Let me remind you of some facts. The fact is that the Supreme Court of the nation has no power to enforce its decrees against a state, but the fact is that the decrees of the Supreme Court of the country are enforced against the states, and why? Because the Supreme Court, made up of nine men at Washington, has handed down decisions of such insight and balance that the states have said: "These are our men, they have handed down a decision and of course we must abide by it," otherwise it is rebellion, and to abide by the decision is the best thing to do. However, we need some thing, and if, after we have organized our court and become a union, it is not able to enforce its decrees, then let us organize a police, but at this stage of the game bringing it into our minimum program confuses the issue.

My friends, the application of what I have been trying to say to what has been said is that the Golden Rule contemplates wisdom, insight, rationality. If I can see that you are going to short-circuit a lot of what you are doing here and are coming to a real minimum program, then I would recommend that you start with the principle that life

exists that there may be more life, which is the science of the Golden Rule.

Dr. Schmidt: I wish to express my appreciation of the very interesting addresses on the biological and political sides. Two things I must express. One is that I cannot feel that it is impertinence on the part of the neutral nations to interfere by their protests in the nations' little game on the other side. I cannot believe that it is impertinence, on the other hand I go so far as to say that this is the first time that neutrals have awakened to the fact that neutrals have certain rights that belligerents have no business to interfere with. It is the best day for humanity when neutrals take the ground that those who broke the world's peace are the offenders.

The other thing is that, after all, while our states have, as a rule, peacefully accepted the findings of the men of the Supreme Court, there was a time when the findings of that Supreme Court were not accepted by the states. Still it is wise now to have a minimum program.

SECTION II

DOES MIGHT MAKE RIGHT?

INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND ETHICS

By Suh Hu

I am more interested in the sub-title of the topic than in the topic itself. The sub-title is "International Relations and Ethics." But before I take up that question I shall first dismiss the main topic in a few words. What does this epigram mean, "Might makes right"? It certainly cannot mean, Might makes rightness. There is a distinction between right as meaning what is right or rightness, and right in the sense of a right or rights. It cannot mean that might makes what is right or rightness, because, if that is true, we should condemn all those who martyr their lives for new truths, who fight against the existing orders which are always supported by the powers that be. We should

condemn any revolution which seeks to overthrow the established régime.

But there is a great deal of truth in the other sense, that might makes rights; that it gives us a right to something. The property right, for instance, is held by some as originated in occupation. The origin of property, according to this theory, lies in force, in might. We cannot here enter into a discussion on the various theories of the origin of property. But we can say this much: that a right implies a claim on the part of the owner to ask society to protect him in the possession and enjoyment of that right, and that society recognizes the validity of that claim. So in a sense it is true that all rights, like the property right, imply some kind of force or might which society uses in enforcing them. But in another sense it is false; for if a right implies a promise of society to employ its might for the protection of the rights of the individual, it is because society recognizes in those rights something useful, something important to the welfare of society as a whole. We cannot expect society to recognize our right to kill, because a right to kill implies something detrimental to the well-being of society. So a right always implies a utility, a social good, a common good. And it is this social utility, and not mere force, which makes a right what it is. After all, when we interpret the sentence, "Might makes right," we must interpret it in the proper sense, that, although a right is always protected by social force, that protection is always based upon the intrinsic utility of that right.

As I said, I am interested in the sub-topic, "The Relation Between International Relations and Ethics." The question is, what rôle can the moral philosopher play in the betterment of international relations? I think he has a very important rôle. Those of you who have heard the discussion on the sanctions of international law, led by Prof. MacDonald some days ago, will remember that he pointed out several sanctions: 1st, military force; 2nd, economic pressure; 3rd, public opinion. The last-mentioned is the most important of all. For are we all obedient to national laws because we are constantly compelled to be so by the

police force behind them? Certainly not. We obey the law every day of our lives without ever thinking of the police at all.

A year ago Lord Haldane, Lord Chancellor of Great Britain, came to address the American Bar Association which met at Montreal. His topic was entitled, "The Higher Nationality." He pointed out that the final sanction of law is what Hegel calls *Sittlichkeit*. The Chinese call it *Li*. Rousseau called it the general will. It is public sentiment, morality in the highest sense, literature, social institutions, and everything that makes up the *Sittlichkeit* which constitute the force behind the law and without which no law can exist. If laws are always dependent on police force, how can we live in peace at all? International law, in the last resort, must find its sanction in public opinion, in the creation of that public sentiment which G. Lowes Dickinson calls the "Will to peace," of that general will which makes us feel unconsciously obedient to national or international laws. That is the final and most effective sanction. The rôle which the moral philosopher can play is to create that sentiment behind international law.

The question is, how can we create this final sanction of international law? In my mind there are two ways in which the moral philosopher could contribute most effectively to this movement. In the first place, the moral philosopher could point out the end or object or purpose of international institutions and policies. Armaments, war, peace and diplomacy,—all these things are not absolute in themselves: they are only means to some end. It is the task of the moral philosopher to point out what should be, what ought to be the true end, the true purpose of these institutions and policies. Let me give an illustration. Law has long been considered as something absolute. But in the 18th and 19th centuries many thinkers came to doubt the absolutism of legal philosophy. They began to ask, what is the purpose underlying law? So Bentham in England and Jhering in Germany began to try to find out what is the "*Zweck*," or purpose of the law. Law thus lost its absolute character, and became a means to an end.

But what is that end? The Utilitarians pointed out it is utility, social good, the greatest happiness of the greatest number. They tried to apply that test to every law or institution and justify or condemn its existence on its conduciveness or hindrance to the greatest happiness of the greatest number.

What is true of national institutions is no less true of international institutions. In international relations, we are sorely in need of some rational test by which we can judge the governmental policies. Take armament, for instance. Is it conducive to the greatest happiness of the nation? If so, let us devote our whole energy, and our resources to armaments instead of internal improvements. To find some such criterion is the great task which the moral philosopher can do. For, after all, when we sit down to think, it will appear that the greatest trouble past and present in international relations lies in the fact that there has been too much irrationalism. But if we have some criterion by means of which we can test wherein the true interest of your nation lies, you can apply it to every policy and criticize intelligently. That is the first contribution which the moral philosopher can make.

In the second place, he can point out the tendency of moral progress, by which I mean the trend of development which mankind has followed in the past and will follow in the future. If the history of mankind teaches us anything at all, it teaches that the human race has constantly enlarged its conception of "my neighbor." In the beginning of the eighteenth century Bishop Butler preached a sermon on "Who is my Neighbor?" He defined "my neighbor" as "that portion of humanity which comes under my immediate notice, acquaintance and influence." If we apply this definition to present-day conditions, you will find that the whole world is my neighbor. That is the tendency which history teaches us. Those of us who have faith in human progress, can not believe that the national state is the highest ideal of humanity. It is the task of the moral philosopher to point out and teach a new philosophy which shall show the world that patriotism is not the highest idea of

humanity, and it is possible for mankind to strive toward that ideal which Lord Haldane happily called a "higher nationality." It is his duty to teach mankind not to exalt one's own nation at the expense of the rights and property of other nations, but to develop one's own country for the benefit of that higher nationality. It is his duty to inspire mankind to work for that ideal state in which, to use the words of Emanuel Kant, "every state, including even the smallest, may rely for its safety and its rights not upon its own power or its own judgment of right, but only on this *foedus amphictionum*, on its combined power and on its decision of the common will according to laws."

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING ADDRESS BY MR. HU

Mr. Angell: I was greatly interested in Dr. Suh Hu's paper, and he did there raise some very fundamental questions. We have to thresh them out.

First, there is one little point that I would like to call your attention to and leave it at that. That is this, in the discussion of this question many of us are apt to make this confusion because we desire to show that there is no conflict between morality and self-interest, we argue that the motives of moral action must necessarily be calculated self-interest. This is not the case at all. It may be entirely to a man's interest to educate his children properly. His motive may be simply that he likes to do it. That very often is the motive. The motive of an act has nothing to do with the fact that morality and self-interest are one and the same thing. The utilitarians made something of that error because they tried to show that the basis of action should be general interest, tried to show that men necessarily acted from calculated self-interest. This is no necessary part at all. We may perfectly well admit that men do act from motives quite other than self-interest and yet put forward the claim that self-interest is in no way contradictory of morality.

Then comes the question, What is self-interest? Your interest is the interest in another sense, the French sense interest, of doing things. Even when we consider what our interest is we exclude those non-material things, companion-

ship, good opinion of our fellows, and so forth; these are real definite human interests, if you include these you will find that the reconciliation of interest and morality is identical. Even when you have proved that, it is not a necessary part of the utilitarian case to say that we necessarily act from motives of self-interest. I have talked higher metaphysics long enough.

Dr. Mez: At the present time, this very moment, it is for me, as a German, a very great thing to be with Norman Angell discussing the peace problem. I do not know if you can realize my feelings when I cut loose from the other side of the Atlantic, from those who have coöperated with me in the Cosmopolitan Clubs. Several have been killed. Then, what it means to be coöperating with men like Norman Angell. This fact is very impressive to me, all must be very grateful for the opportunity in present events to have him with us. It was a great thing to get him across the Atlantic, when the militarist says that fighting is the thing to do for civilization. Perhaps one of the best practical teachings of our Conference is that Mr. Angell has not killed me, but of more importance is it that I have not shot at Mr. Angell. Fighting could never be the cause of human progress.

Dr. Nasmyth: I cannot help wishing that there were 6,000,000 Dr. Mezs on the German side and 6,000,000 Mr. Angells on the English side.

In England we needed no occasion to get rid of formality. We met in the barn of William Penn. We were there from July 7th to 17th. We had tents outside. We also had four sessions a day with breakfast at 7, discussion from 8:30 to 10:00, another until luncheon, then one in the afternoon, and another after dinner until about eleven o'clock. Then we carried it through most of the night. We tried to get away from the discussion by changing around sleeping quarters.

All of it comes down to the question, what are we going to do about it? We have treated the problem lightly sometimes, sometimes as a huge joke. I think that was the thing that hurt us most about Hudson Maxim, that he could treat

it as a huge joke, a spectacle. Even we must sometimes treat it in lighter vein. But the other side is there.

Here are millions of young men just like those in our own universities giving their lives for a great idea, the highest they know, their fatherland, their country, ideas of liberty and democracy they think, and yet for ideas which, looked at from a distance where we can get a perspective, we realize are false ideas, a wrong aspect of force, a desertion of some of the great laws of civilization.

As I have travelled through the universities this past year I have found a tremendous response to this appeal, if young men are willing to give their lives for a great ideal as they see it, are we not willing to sacrifice some of our time and energy to build up a true theory of human relationships and coöperation and justice which shall forever make that kind of thing impossible in the world. In the last chapter of Mr. Angell's pamphlet on "America and the European War" you will find that expressed eloquently.

Europe is now so torn that it can not do constructive tasks, and the great task of reconstruction is going to fall to the share of America. I was at Williamstown and the President took me to the historic monument where five students got together and said to one another, "Here is the great world of Asia waiting for the light of western civilization to go to them. Can not we go to them and give them these things which we believe are best for civilization?" They gave themselves to this work and there the great foreign missionary movement was born. If from a group of five men who had seen a vision, who had been gripped by an idea of something to be accomplished, such a tremendous movement as that could rise, which is changing the face of the earth, is it not possible that even from a group such as is here in our Conference, influences may go out which will have a part in reshaping American foreign policy, give her that heritage of leadership which may be awaiting her in the organization of the world, not of the old kind of military power, but a leadership which will be welcome, because it is of service, of life, of those great words of President Wilson, "brotherhood, justice, humanity."

These are the things for which America stands. It is worth while sometimes to read the speeches of Washington, Jefferson, and so on. They were not founding a nation just like others, but a new kind of nation in the world, a new plan from which even the nations of Europe should gain inspiration and help. We forget these things sometimes. It is worth while to go back and see the great vision of the founders of our Republic and believe that the body of young men and women are pretty thoroughly agreed on the fundamental principles of this international problem. This could have an almost irresistible influence in bringing it about that on this question there is no reason why the whole level of public opinion and discussion should lower itself to the point of calling men undesirable citizens, and so forth, and call these arguments. This shows how low has fallen the discussion of this problem. We need to raise that plane, to bring to bear upon it all the intellectual force, the rational force, the power of the human mind and spirit we can, because it is the greatest problem before the generation.

I went to Europe some years ago to learn more about physics than any one else knew. But studying there in German universities, I could see this thing which was giving the revanche feeling in France, militarism, not giving autonomy to Alsace-Lorraine, the building up of armaments. That situation grew on me and other American students there at that time, gripped me so deeply that I was impelled to give up my other work and get started at the bottom again. This is merely an illustration of the fact that the problem is so tremendous that when started it must create and have influence.

I do not believe that we can have a true theory of human society and hope to build men worth while, while we have this theory of force in our international relations. We cannot hope to get the attention and work of men on the real problems of society, on the abolition of poverty, vice and ignorance, until we get rid of these false ideas.

We have had a wonderful opportunity in these two weeks of intimate association with Mr. Angell, who, I believe, will be counted as one of the men of genius of this century, a

man whose professional influence, political thought, and ideas will receive more and more attention as the results of this war begin to be borne, and people begin to return to a sense of the remedies involved, and this opportunity bears with it responsibilities, "unto whom much has been given, from him much is required."

I can see men going out from here leavening in colleges, labor unions, schools, and getting articles in magazines and newspapers, and even writing books, springing from this Conference, until we shall look back at it five or ten years from now as the starting of a tremendous influence in beginning this work of the organizing of the world. We feel gratitude to Mr. Angell to-night and thank him for the interest which has come into our lives with the study of this great constructive movement of modern history.

CHAPTER IX

ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF WAR

SECTION I

IS EQUALITY OF COMMERCIAL OPPORTUNITY A NECESSARY CONDITION OF PEACE?

By Dr. John Mez

I HAVE heard Mr. August Schvan speak on this subject. He thinks that Universal Free Trade is among the essential things for the establishment of permanent peace. "Unless you have universal free trade," he says, "you cannot have peace." Others, for instance various bodies of Socialists, think that Equality of Commercial Opportunities would be sufficient for securing peace while they admit that Universal Free Trade would be an *important asset* toward bringing about peace, though, perhaps, not the most important nor even an essential one. Many others again believe, indeed, that there might be peace without universal free trade. But how are we to decide?

There are comparatively few countries with free trade at present. England, for instance, is a free trade country, but she is at war with Germany, and many other countries have protective tariffs against each other and are still at peace. Now we know, of course, that England is not fighting Germany because of her protective tariff. Nor has the present war been caused by any lack of equal commercial opportunities (excepting perhaps the case of Austria and Serbia where during the summer preceding the war there was a continuous quarrel about the trans-Serbian railroad and the free access of Austria to Saloniki and the Aegean Sea). But as a matter of fact no war in history, as far as I can find out, has been caused through griev-

ances about some protective tariffs and it might perhaps even be said that all the three thousand wars of the past, including the present, might have been waged even if free trade relations had existed throughout the world.

But the important question for us to decide is not so much whether wars are caused through the lack of free trade but whether peace can never be established unless we have universal free trade. The discussion of this question will again prove, in my opinion, that the whole problem of pacifism is not so simple as many of those believe who have a certain formula and think that by adopting it the whole problem could be solved.

You all know why some people believe that free trade would be an important asset for universal peace. Wars in modern times unquestionably have economic causes, but there are also others, political, religious, historical, racial, etc. The underlying causes of war at present, however, may be to some extent economic. Norman Angell puts the economic aspects in the foreground. The maintenance of great navies and armies is constantly justified with economic considerations more than with any others, but we must keep in mind that there are other reasons as well for arming a nation.

To maintain great armaments on account of some existing protective tariff walls in foreign countries or on account of the mere possibility that in territories or colonies owned by other powers, some day the trade of one particular nation might be excluded by high tariffs, is of course absurd. To believe that by military force you could do away with tariffs of other countries or prevent them from adopting the protective system, is one of the "Great Illusions" Norman Angell has dealt with in his book. Those who believe this perhaps have in mind that by conquest any such exclusion of trade might be prevented, but conquest on a large scale is not probable under the present conditions.

After all, the protective system has not at all prevented foreign trade and exports during the last decades, although it may have interfered with foreign trade to some

extent, but there are other difficulties that interfere with the expansion of a country's foreign trade. One nation may often be unable to increase her export of a certain article not because of protective tariffs but on account of home conditions, high wages, lack of raw material and many other reasons.

In the dispute between Austria and Serbia there certainly were some economic grievances, but suppose that all economic causes of war had been removed, as between Austria and Serbia, do you believe that thereby peace could have been kept between those two nations when there were so many other differences? This case of Austria and Serbia shows very clearly that economic considerations, questions like trade opportunity, etc., are mostly mere *excuses* for maintaining armaments and the war system, but they are not the real, and still less, the sole *causes* that lead to war. The causes of war are not merely economic; the question would then be very easy to settle.

I should like to bring in a new notion as to the two distinct elements in war, as I see them. One element or one cause of war is the disputes between two nations that may lead them into war as to some difference over boundary lines or racial prejudice or similar grievances. One way of abolishing war, therefore, would be to do away with all these differences. The second element or cause of war is the philosophy of force, the futile attempt to settle those disputes by the application of physical force instead of by methods of reason.

Now I think the peace movement cannot expect to remove all occasions for disputes between nations, but will always have to work for the substitution of disorganized force and international anarchy by organized order, justice and law.

The way to prevent war, therefore, would certainly not consist in abolishing protective tariffs throughout the world as the only thing to be worked for in the peace movement, and it certainly would be wrong to believe that wherever there is a protective tariff this is a cause of war.

There is another important aspect in connection with

this problem, I mean the practical question. If we stand for free trade as the best and the only means for establishing universal peace, what will the business man, especially of the United States, say? He certainly would oppose any such scheme. This question has caused considerable discussion in the past.

Another question is whether equal treatment of all nations should be demanded by the peace movement. Of course, preferential tariffs are an economic or trade advantage for one nation as against the others, but as we know from history, there never has been a war waged on account of such preferential tariffs or trade privileges that some nations have enjoyed, and the ill feeling and dissatisfaction that some nations may have felt on account of unequal treatment in foreign countries has never really led to war. The establishment of free trade or the demand for commercial equality of all nations throughout the world is therefore, in my opinion, but a secondary matter in pacifism. But, of course, personally I strongly favor free trade and certainly free trade will be an immense force towards the peace of the world. Wherever in the past peace has been established *within* a nation—like within Germany, or Italy or the United States of America—free trade always was an automatic accessory or, in the case of the German Empire, the one great force that had been working in preparing the political unity of the German States. In the case of Germany it is true that free trade relations had existed before the political union was effected, and we are certainly entitled to say that there will never be real peace unless the nations come into closer relations, of which a free interchange of goods, the export and import of their products, and even the interchange of population without preventive barriers between them is a most important factor that will work for their common benefit and promote the idea of universal peace.

Finally we have to realize that protectionism is very closely connected with and a part of the whole mediæval conception of the absolute political, commercial and general autonomy, sovereignty and independence of the State.

If we are looking forward towards a supernational law and order to prevail in the relations between the fifty nations of the world (and everybody who believes in peace must necessarily believe in an international executive and legislature), then we must hope for an abolishment of the protective tariff walls that still exist to the detriment of the people of the world at large and their substitution by universal free trade.

Pacifists have many reasons to believe, reasons that cannot always be proved, that free trade is a very important asset for universal peace. The protective walls have fallen down between small states. The United States of America is the greatest free trade area of the whole globe. In the same way that groups of small nations which formerly were fighting each other, to-day are united in the political alliances, leagues of nations and empires, there will be established increasing areas of free trade, as they have been established in territories up to the size of the British Empire, Germany, or the United States of America. In my opinion, free trade is a thing that *must* come. It will come with the realization of the true interests of mankind. It will promote the tendency toward universal peace, but I do not think that it is the *only* thing by which we can possibly achieve peace; nor is it so absolutely essential in my opinion that we could never hope for peace without free trade—because it is quite thinkable that there still may remain some tariff restrictions as between different parts of the globe when we shall have abolished war.

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING DR. MEZ

Mr. Gannett: Dr. Mez has put before us an interesting proposition; two methods of settling war: removal of causes of friction between nations and acceptance of causes of friction as unavoidable at present at least. The question, therefore, is, must we have free trade and remove these supposed economic causes of friction, or is it possible to go ahead and attempt to have some other method? In this connection I want to suggest one thing more. If you look through "The Great Illusion" you will not once find the

words, tariff, protection, or infant industries, and only once in his later book. Now the question is, has Mr. Angell neglected these factors and are preferential tariffs and the protective system such vital causes of friction that they really spoil his whole case?

Mr. Hugins: I would like to suggest that Mr. Norman Angell of course has not neglected this idea of free trade and that free trade is not necessary to peace. The great difficulty that I see is in what we mean by peace. If peace is simply the cessation of military activity it is one thing, if it is the cessation of commercial and military hostility it is another thing. For only the first free trade is not necessary. My contention that it is not necessary comes directly to the point of "The Great Illusion."

One country will set up trade tariffs against another country, will cause them commercial loss. They will want to rectify that condition. The old theory is that you can do that by military force, but we have come to the conclusion that you can not cure that by military force, therefore, we will have to change our ideas and find some other force to do that. In fact we have found that war is futile to bring trade equality. Take the case of the United States. Suppose we should want to protect one of our industries against England. England would want to change that condition of inequality, that would not be the cause of war. She might possibly retaliate against that restriction with a retaliatory tariff, but even then we would not go to war about it. Then what would happen? We would in the long run either find that it was to our advantage to keep that tariff, or if it proved to be to our disadvantage we would take it off.

I think the same relationships would hold for the world. We have got to find some other means to cure this condition besides war. If you use these tariffs it would cause a feeling of antagonism between nations and cause war because of other reasons. It is not the idea of average nations. They realize that a great war does not help, and they will find other ways after considering their best interests.

Dr. Mez: It does pay. If we conquer all the colonies we have nothing to fear in the future, Great Britain can not erect tariffs against us. If we conquer it we do not force Britain by war to erect walls against Germany, but we make that part of the globe German. That is the reasoning of Germany.

Mr. Hugins: Is not the question, If by conquering territory you get preference there and have the right to establish barriers there?

Dr. Mez: Of course it is an illusion, but that is the belief of the Germans. They think if the British have not attained great results then the Germans would manage it better.

Mr. Hugins: The country which owns, so to speak, these colonies can not erect these barriers because the colonies would not stand for it.

Mr. Angell: Germany thinks she could manage better than England or Spain.

Mr. Hugins: Is that right? Does it really make any difference in trade relations? Is that idea of the difference in management sufficient so that Germany would go to war about it?

Mr. Angell: There is no knowing. It is a great illusion.

Mr. Davis: The idea of Germany that she can control the colonies better than England is another of her egotistical ideas of controlling the world. There is no reason whatsoever why Germany should feel so.

It is not necessary for the idea of peace to do away with the protective tariff, but it is necessary that all countries should be equally treated. All countries should be subject to the same tariff. It may engender a feeling of hatred not to be done away with by arbitration. It is not necessary to have a preferential tariff.

Mr. Danahy: Would it not be easier to admit that England can manage the colonies better than Germany?

Dr. Mez: It would be more difficult to convince Germany that she could not do better than England than to do away with the protective system in the world.

Dr. Flick: The crucial point in the discussion is that nations do not go to war on account of trade desires, those are only excuses for war. One real cause of war is love of power, love of dominating and imposing ideas on others. Everyone of us has that love of power. Each one wants to go out on the floor and be the most influential speaker there, we want to feel that we can go out into the world and do something. Even though the consensus of opinion is that one nation is not so fit to govern colonies as another, each feels its own power to do this. Thus the real cause of war is the desire for power. Can you get rid of that?

Mr. Cremer: Mr. Davis says that free trade is not necessary for peace but non-discriminating tariffs are. Take as example whether we should prohibit the exportation of arms. If we did we would then be discriminating against the Allies. I think the same thing applies in the case of discriminating tariffs. If Germany puts larger tariffs on cutlery this is discriminating. By this tariff she imposes a discriminating tariff against England. We have had it where it discriminated against the United States and South American countries.

Mr. Wythe: It may be true that the words tariff, protection and free trade are not mentioned in Norman Angell's books, but they are suggested so strongly that right in the margin I wrote that protection and militarism are based upon the same fallacy. There is the same idea of nationalism and the false idea of the advantage to be brought to the country.

Each country can produce the thing to which it is best suited, but on the other hand war is still possible, and the nation says, we may go to war ourselves, and if we go to war we must to a certain extent be self-sufficient, as in Germany at present. On the other hand say we are a peaceful nation like the United States, but the other nations may go to war. We can not then get supplies from the lands which are fighting, we must have things ourselves. Therefore, the countries will say, "We have to a certain extent to be self-supporting and must, therefore, help infant industries to get a start." We must educate people

very gradually. We must let this grow gradually until the nations become so interdependent that they see the folly of war and to a certain extent develop the international mind.

Mr. Knight: Dr. Flick says the will to dominate is based on the will to power. The desire to be greater than the other man does not necessarily mean the desire to possess the other man. There is a great amount of fact not seen by all these arguments. There is the territorial division of labor in regard to agriculture and manufacture. No nation has all resources in itself. But agriculture makes the limitation of a nation. To be a great nation it has to build up a large population, and it can only have a larger population by building up its manufacturing industries and exchanging these things for agricultural products from other countries. There is no limit to manufacturing, but there is to agriculture. It is true that in a good part of the world, particularly in the tropics, there are vast agricultural resources where there never will be vast manufacturing industries. We assume that these tropical sections always are going to be the subject of exploitation. Political control of these backward parts of the world, it is assumed, will always give a preponderance of agricultural products. The desire to control these indicates a legitimate desire for power. There is a conflict of interests between nations. The question is over the control of those backward nations of the world that have not been spoken of.

Mr. Hugins: I think equality is a condition of peace but not a necessary condition. I think the protective tariff is not in itself the cause of future wars, while the open door policy of the East in China is not necessarily a preventive of wars. There is a great deal of talk about the open door policy in the East. Very few understand it. The so-called open door policy is something like this, that the spheres of influence of the various powers in China shall not discriminate against each other. So in her recent negotiations Japan claims that she is not violating the open door policy by her demands and will not in future. I

believe that can be done. In Korea the door is still open in a sense. Those who could go will do so.

Mr. Rice: I think that when we say whether or not it is a necessary condition of peace we are rather up in the air. We cannot really hope to banish the possibility of war. There is always the possibility of war, even if only of civil war. But is equality of commercial opportunity necessary to prevent international war? If I understood correctly, Mr. Wythe came to the conclusion that one was dependent on the other and the other on one, and you must banish both in order to abolish one. If war is dependent on the tariff and the tariff on the war system, then we must find some other solution. Therefore, we cannot hope to improve conditions, to make more peaceful conditions in the world unless you find some way of solving the problems when they arise. If Mr. Wythe's statement is right the only way to improve things is to find a method of solving disputes. The question before us has got to be answered in the negative, that equality of commercial opportunity is not a necessary condition of the greater likelihood of peace, although it may be a necessary condition of absolute peace. If we only make the improvement of solving questions as they come up, then the nations will be less bound to make themselves self-supporting.

Miss Gabel: How will free trade bring equality? In fact I see how this may prove an inequality between larger and smaller states.

Dr. Nasmyth: I would just like to add a word that the distinction between preferential tariffs and protective tariffs was not very clear in some of the discussion. Protective tariffs have come to be realized as not accomplishing their objects. Minds are turning away from them, because if you try to prevent goods from coming into the country you get in exchange for your exports gold, which raises prices, so that sooner or later imports come in over the high tariff wall. Preferential tariffs are different. Morocco is an outstanding example of this. In the Algeciras Act it was guaranteed that all goods could come in on equal conditions. Then it became apparent that Morocco would be-

come a French colony, and German goods would come in under a duty. England has another system, but France has this preferential system. This is an injustice much more flagrant than the protective tariff. There are two ways to attack it. First, because it will inevitably lead to war. It may not be an occasion for war, but it is a strong irritation which any incident may cause to flame up. So there was the long continued tariff war between Austria and Servia, which made the people all ready for any event. This is one reason why the preferential tariffs should be given up for the open door. Another recent line of attack is that it forgets the great fact of the interdependence of nations, it forgets that Germany will have less money to buy French goods, showing that a general system of preferential tariffs all around will lead to a lower plane of civilization. We can try to make the nations pass some such self-denying ordinance as the open door all around.

Dr. Mez: Dr. Nasmyth says that nations would be more inclined with free trade to follow these lines. It would be highly desirable to have more free trade. I did not make the point clear during my remarks whether free trade is a desirable thing, but that is not the question. We have not gotten the point clear yet.

One important outcome of our discussion is that we do away with the pacifist folly that there is one solution of the whole peace question, free trade, equality of commercial opportunities, open access to ports and to the Suez and Panama Canals. Wars are due to the ideas we have, to our reason and our thinking, and what we think and what the nations think is always the most important thing, more so than any outside institution like the protective system. Of course it is closely connected with the maintenance of war. It is not only due to population that we have high tariff but to our armies, with these taxes on things imported. But I do not think that we can find the clear reply that free trade is a necessary condition of peace. If we have established peace then it is almost inevitable that the protective system will disappear, there will be much more equality of trade than at present.

I do not see that we came to the point as to whether free trade actually is a necessary condition of peace and whether, if we have established free trade, we will have peace.

As to whether the populace in New York cannot boycott German goods so as to punish Germany for actions against us, there is a difference between the German Government and the German merchant, who suffers in his pocket book. The Government does not suffer in that way.

The important thing is that the protective system is an undesirable thing and that free trade is a better thing from our point of view. But free trade cannot be the whole solution of the peace problem.

SECTION II

CAN THE VICTORS RECOVER THEIR COSTS?

By Dr. John Mez.

One of the great arguments of "The Great Illusion" is the one dealing with the "indemnity futility," the futility of the belief that war indemnities are a benefit to the victor. Norman Angell shows that the war indemnity of 1870, one billion dollars, has not been a real benefit to Germany, although many in Germany and France thought it very beneficial. This induced a number of economists to say that Norman Angell can not be taken seriously. But if we go into the matter closely we see that this paradox of receiving money and not benefiting by it is absolutely true, and has been true in all cases as proven right down from the ransom levied by troops of Cæsar.

Wherever a war indemnity was imposed it was never a real benefit to the receiving nation. To prepare the balance sheet first of all, we should put in all the costs necessary to secure these alleged benefits of war on one side, and then the actual gains on the other side. If we do this carefully enough, count in all the military preparations before a war, the losses in life and property, etc., we see that the costs in-

volved are very much greater than the real increase of wealth resulting from the war indemnity. We have here one of those great illusions, one of those wrong beliefs and wrong ideas that make for war. We *are* capable of changing these ideas and should be working for a better understanding and better thinking on the comparatively simple issue only hidden by the main belief that the money paid from one country to the other, must benefit the receiving nation immensely. There are economists who believe that war is one way of increasing one's wealth. Thus de Molinari says: "Since men are unequal in strength the stronger can seize upon the product of the weaker men's work with less expenditure of labor and energy than they would have to employ if they themselves were to produce." I quote this from Novikov's excellent book, "War and Its Alleged Benefits" (Chapter V): "This has never been so, or rather it has been so in appearance, but not in reality. War has always cost more effort than has direct production."

Of course war has always been a means for obtaining something and if it is not true as some people want to make us believe that wars have been waged for war's sake alone in the past. War has always been waged for things that make for an increase of the enjoyment of life. To get as much enjoyment of life as possible with the least effort, that is the true character of human nature. And, from the first, men have always tried to get some benefit by their fighting, an increase in wealth, but never got it by this means. You can lay it down as a principle that it is wrong to believe that you can benefit by the application of physical force. Even in the time of slavery this imposition of force on another to get his work out of him was based on an illusion. We cannot benefit and we have never benefited by those means. The cost involved is always greater than the gain. There is a better means that we want to establish all over the world, federation and co-operation of nations, law and a mutual policy. One thing does pay: work, and labor. To work for one's wealth, to produce and consume, to buy

and sell, these methods are true economic methods for conquering the world, never war indemnities.

The war of 1870 raised an exceptional case, the circumstances connected with those five billion francs paid to Germany was exceptional: first, because the war was very short, France was not exhausted; secondly, because France was perhaps the wealthiest country of the globe at that time; thirdly, because other circumstances arose in Germany that made it appear that Germany did benefit immensely by the war indemnity; the increase of German wealth, however, was not due to that indemnity but to the unity established, the building up of new industries, new railroads, a new common ground for these states. It was exactly the war system which had prevented German unity before 1870, and the development of the country had, therefore, been kept behind other countries. When unity was established, Germany had a comparatively rapid growth. Many believed that this was due to the war indemnity.

If we go into the question of what that money was spent for we find that not a single German citizen got one cent out of it. The Government got it and used it partially for building government buildings, the Reichstag, barracks in Alsace-Lorraine, for buying new materials, stores, cannon, etc., for payment of the expenses of the war and laid down a reserve of something like one hundred and twenty million marks of gold bullion, all as a war fund of the German Empire. It was always kept there. The people of Germany did not get anything out of it.

It may be said perhaps that they had less taxes to pay because the Government got the money. There is something in that. They probably would have had to pay more taxes without this money. But there is another question: What about the extra taxes the German people have had to pay for military purposes to guard against a war of *revanche*?

In another case, in the Russo-Japanese war, there was a good deal of talk of war indemnity during the peace negotiations, but Japan did not receive any. She asked for

an indemnity in order to obtain better peace terms as far as territorial possessions were concerned.

In the Boxer rising in China, China had to pay \$400,000,000. This amount was a tremendous burden on the people of China, but I doubt whether it paid the costs of the expeditions of Europe to China. One country, the United States, refused to accept the full amount of money and preferred to take Chinese students into this country and welcomed them instead of accepting the money of the Chinese Government. This was more beneficial to the United States than the acceptance of the Chinese money would have been. The other countries accepted the money, but of course they could not "profit" by these war indemnities. If at present Germany had been able to crush France in a month or two, the same thing might have happened as in 1870, 20,000 killed on the German side, 30,000 on the French, the cost would have been comparatively little, the war indemnity might to some extent have balanced the actual expenses of the campaign. In 1870 seven hundred million francs paid the actual costs of Germany but in the long run she did not benefit if we count not only the actual costs but the preparations and the increase of armament following the war. There has always been a distinct economic loss.

Norman Angell sums up a chapter on this by saying, "I do *not* urge the absurdity that it is impossible for one Government to make a payment of a large sum of money to another, or for the Government receiving it to benefit thereby, but that the population as a whole of any nation receiving a large indemnity must suffer from any consequent financial disturbance in the credit of the paying nation; that if the Protectionist doctrine is just, they must suffer great disadvantage from the receipt of wealth—i.e. commodities—which has not employed the home population, and from the rise of prices which checks their exports; that those are factors which must be taken into consideration in estimating the *real* advantage to the *general population* of any country which may succeed in extorting bullion from another as war plunder.

“Those who wish well for Europe will encourage the study, for it can have but one result: to show that less and less can war be made to pay; that all those forces of our world which daily gain in strength make it, as a commercial venture, more and more preposterous. The study of this department of international polity will tend to the same result as the study of any of its facts: the undermining of those beliefs which have in the past so often led to, and are to-day so often claimed as the motives likely to lead to, war between civilized peoples.”

Norman Angell bases his argument on actual facts as they were to be found in Germany and France. Economic conditions in Germany and France a few years after the war were such that in France money was obtainable at 3 per cent., and Germans had to pay 4 per cent. There was a big financial crisis in both countries in the seventies, but France recovered much more quickly than did Germany. Bismarck was perfectly astonished that his purpose of bleeding white France, of doing away with it as an economic power, degrading it to a second rate power, was not accomplished.

There have been many statements made in Germany showing that the indemnity was of immense harm to Germany; because of the protective system, the rise of prices (because the value of money made them rise); that this rise of prices was an impediment to the moving of exports to foreign countries, because it necessitated a rise in the wages of the workers, and of course there was an additional burden resulting from the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine (and the war indemnity); that Germany was forced during forty years to maintain armaments stronger than ever before.

Another effect of the war indemnity was the maintenance of the war spirit in France, leading to the alliance with Russia and England and immediately leading up to the present war. If we take all that into account we may state that the war indemnity was of no benefit to the German people.

Of course there are some other aspects to these questions. There is for instance also a psychological side to it.

There is a general feeling among the countries at war, that "we will make them bleed, we will make them pay this time." Jean Finot, for example, a very prominent French writer, wrote an article in the *New York Times* of March 22, 1915, saying that Germany has to pay, when the war is over, a war indemnity of \$34,000,000,000, to France alone. He reaches this figure by taking the war indemnity of 1870 as a basis.

There are some very weighty reasons why the peace parties of the world should try to prevent the extortion of war indemnities. If one country imposes heavy indemnities on the other countries, of course there will be wars of revenge; it makes for this spirit. They will try to seize the first opportunity to get that back and impose an indemnity on the others. It would mean more militarism and more wars. That is the main reason why programs for constructive peace contain the demand: no indemnities.

Another important consideration is that nobody would benefit by those indemnities. It would never mean that the victor actually does recover the costs. This can be shown from history and by applying common sense. The belief in the profit of indemnities is one of those illusions that actually did make for war.

We want to get a clear understanding of the truth, of the economic *facts*, which are that co-operation and exchange, buying and selling, these legal ways of producing wealth, are the *only methods* by which, in the long run, any one can benefit, and that physical force defeats those ends for which it is applied, and always has done so. War is, therefore, quite aside from its moral aspects, a great illusion, from the economic point of view that you can benefit by indemnities. The world should have learned this lesson from the past. It has not. Nations will continue to wage wars and to impose war indemnities on other nations until they will have learned the lesson that there is nothing to be gained by those methods of the cruel past, which are based upon a "great illusion."

DISCUSSION FOLLOWING ADDRESS BY DR. MEZ

Mr. Rice: I do not agree with the argument in favor of war indemnities, but I would like to have the question a little clearer. Take the case of the Franco-Prussian War. When the war was over and the French were entirely defeated the Germans could impose practically what they wanted. If they had not imposed an indemnity would Germany have been better off? That should be considered quite apart from the case of Alsace-Lorraine. War indemnity as a term of peace is not likely to keep alive the spirit of revenge. Suppose Germany had left Alsace-Lorraine in French hands, would the indemnity have caused this war?

Dr. Mez: As to the first question I would say: Certainly, Germany would have been much better off without a war and in consequence without the war indemnity. The main question is, Can the Victor Recover his Costs?

As to the second point, many other things would have to come into consideration. If there had been no war and no indemnity we will have to admit that the relations between Germany and France would have developed in another way. Financial conditions in Germany were worse than in France after the war. This was due to a large extent to the money that came into the country which made people believe they had gotten rich; first there was a great boom and then a crisis followed by a financial breakdown. The second question is closely connected with the first one. I do not believe the spirit of revenge would have been done away with if Germany had not taken Alsace-Lorraine, though it might have been less strong. Perhaps this has excited the French people more than the thought of the five billion francs. If you know human nature at all it is not likely that these five billion francs would have been paid and the matter settled once and for all. It did cause resentment, the country was kept occupied by German soldiers until the indemnity was paid, and that has contributed to the feeling against the Germans. I believe that conditions would not

have been worse for Germany if it had not received the indemnity. If it had been remitted there might have been some possibility of friendship and understanding between the two nations. Perhaps France could never have gotten the money out of the pockets of the people to pay for new preparations for war and to buy the friendship of Russia without the strong feeling in favor of a war of revenge created largely through both the conquest of Alsace-Lorraine and the indemnity.

Mr. Clapp: The statement has been made that war may be for the few that receive the direct payment of money, a direct benefit, the capitalistic class. The statement was also made that those fighting did not receive the benefits. The statement may be made also that, by the expenditure of the war indemnity as intimated by Dr. Mez, through ample payment in wages to the people of that country and indirectly they would receive benefits from the war indemnities paid.

I consider this not a very good argument, it does not furnish any grounds for stating that war is a good thing, but it will be presented by the other side that people will gain from a war indemnity. How shall we answer that?

Dr. Mez: Do you mean wages paid if the Government gets five billion francs and spends half of that on the Reichstag building and new barracks? These people have to work for these wages before getting them, and you do not mean to say that they would be unemployed, all of them, if no war indemnity came into the country?

Mr. Clapp: They might not be unemployed, but if there were more work for them to do they would receive more wages.

Dr. Mez: We may perhaps admit that. Of course the unproductive work means loss in work for more productive things. There is no material gain for the population, and then you forget that there have been sacrifices, lives and property, to obtain the indemnity, and then also the sums spent before the war should be recovered by the indemnity before there can be any talk of gain.

Mr. Clapp: The main proposition is true, in general we

can not gain by a war indemnity. But would there not be some grounds in this proposition just put and would there not be a tendency to bring up and overemphasize this point?

Dr. Mez: But what does this employment amount to?

Dr. Nasmyth: There are two parts to the question in general. One may be phrased, Does piracy pay? In the case of individuals we have decided it does not, and yet the belief is widespread that in international relations it does pay. Let us analyze some of the reasons why piracy does not pay: first, because it is not always successful, so that in balancing up you must say that at least 50% are not successful in recovering the costs. The indemnity should be for that war and as much more for the chance that it might not have been a victory. Second, there is the moral danger resulting from the national piracy idea. Mr. Rice pointed out that we should separate indemnities from the question of Alsace-Lorraine as a cause of war, and yet the anticipation of indemnities has been a very important factor in this war. In Germany the belief was widespread that in six weeks they would get to Paris, capture the French army, levy an indemnity to pay for the war and get at their enemy Russia, and that this war with Russia would be paid out of the indemnity. This belief is very important because of the war itself preventing the economic anticipations of the war from taking effect. Second. This levying of tribute on foreign nations corrupts the whole moral fabric. If you can live on the unjust exploitation of other nations why not on the unjust exploitation of others within your own country?

But there are certain special considerations in regard to indemnities to be treated. One of these is in regard to the question of employment brought up. Mr. Angell treats the question of indemnities largely on the assumption of the protectionist fallacy. If you assume the truth of this fallacy indemnity results in excess of imports over exports, less employment, less export trade with the resulting financial crisis all through Germany.

The real way to treat the question of indemnity scientifi-

cally is to treat it as a permanent loan. When a nation levies an indemnity of one billion dollars it cannot take at once the wealth of the country. What it gets is securities, paper money, notes, and so forth, which means that permanently thereafter there will be a flow of interest going into Germany not going there before. It means the shifting of interest from one country to another. This flows in the form of commodities. If nations were rationally organized this would mean increase of wealth and happiness. But in the irrational system of the present time this means unemployment. The inflow of goods throws people out of employment, they degenerate, finally becoming weak and diseased, and starve and die, so that the benefit which should come from the transfer of wealth does not result. "Why not rationally organize society so that increased inflow of wealth would mean increase of wealth and happiness?" This belief in the benefits of piracy prevents us from rationalizing society. We have got to see why piracy on a national scale does not pay before we can see why exploitation and social injustice do not pay.

Mr. Rice: Suppose all the billion dollars paid by France had come out of stockings, was money merely hidden. When it went to Germany a great deal would also be hidden. Suppose it had been put into actual circulation, would it have been of value to Germany? If the Allies had been victorious and had taken the money from Spandau, would this have been of benefit to the Allies?

Dr. Mez: If you had taken away actually thirty million dollars from Germany, then it looks as if the others would have benefited something by it. But they do not "get" it, they must fight for it and this means outlay, expenditure of something like ten million dollars a day. They cannot defeat Germany in ten days and expect to get costs paid by taking 120 million marks. If it were possible to impose a war indemnity without fighting for it, and without the danger of causing another war of revenge, then there might be some benefit.

CHAPTER X

THE INTERNATIONAL POLITY MOVEMENT: ITS AIM AND ORGANIZATION

SECTION I

WHAT ARE WE HERE FOR?

By Norman Angell

A CONFERENCE on International Polity implies a study of the means by which nations can live together in the world to the best advantage. Such a "polity" is necessary, not merely if we are to have peace but also if we are to have national security or defense and the efficient protection of our national rights.

There is a very widespread idea that if we have a much larger navy and a much larger army the whole problem of national security and the protection of our rights will be solved; that there would be no need to worry further about it and American patriotism would have done its duty.

Well, it does not require any elaborate theorizing to show that that idea is manifestly absurd. A larger army and a larger navy may be necessary—that is part of the problem—but those things of themselves would still leave America helpless to vindicate even her most elementary rights, like respect for the lives of her citizens and the sovereignty of her own flag. At this present moment America is helpless to protect those things and she would still be helpless though her army and navy had been multiplied many times.

American citizens have been cruelly massacred at sea; how do we propose to prevent the commission of a similar crime in any future war by a belligerent in the position of Germany? Even if America had the greatest navy in the

world it could make practically no change in the naval situation of the present war since England, France, Russia, Italy and Japan between them have a sea supremacy as complete as ships can make it. And if joining the allies means accepting their views of sea law, American ships could still in future wars be blown up legally by floating mines.

So that having fought a great war to secure immunity of American citizens from death at sea by submarine torpedoes, Americans might at its close find that it was still open to drown them by mines, and that it was still open for the foreign trade of America during a war in which she had no part to be at the mercy of the dominating belligerent.

American rights can only be protected by among other things a radical reform of sea law; that implies an international law and some means of enforcing it more effectively than taking sides in a war in which both sides may be violating it. The American Government is at this moment engaged in negotiations which may greatly affect the character of European civilization during maybe a generation or two. Unless America means really to defend her own rights, safety and interests, to say nothing of her dignity, she must prepare for something more than the training of soldiers; she must prepare for taking her part in the better organization of the world. How is she to set about it? What is her foreign policy to be? For what foreign international principle is she to stand?

Her future in large part depends on whether these questions are answered well or ill by the American people as a whole. The study of them is the object of the present conference.

SECTION II

DISCUSSION OF RESOLUTIONS TO BE SENT TO PRESIDENT WILSON, MEMBERS OF CONGRESS, ETC.

Mr. Angell: The Committee has drafted the following resolutions with the view to having them sent to the President and Congress as an expression of the sentiment of this

Conference, as we want to appear to the public as having something to say in the present difficulties:

We have stated here the actual situation pressing upon this Government. This can not be decided by war; war would imply taking one side or the other. It is an invitation to take sides with one or the other if you leave international law as it now stands. We would secure the protection of American rights and interests. We submit that American rights can not be protected save by a fundamental form of international law.

If that is a true position, if you desire to be just, you must all assist in framing the law, that will involve the formation of a legislative body. If you have such a body and frame the law you must have a body to interpret that law. Then if you have that decision you must have the means of executing it, therefore you have the fourth point that you must have an international arrangement, a pre-arrangement, for having the decisions of the court carried out.

Thus, this which starts merely from the protection of American rights is the only way in which they can be protected. This leads by these steps, the international legislative body, the international court, and the means of enforcing these decisions, which means nothing less than world government. That means creating your world government from the starting point of effective protection of American rights.

The first step to be taken, and the step which can now be taken while the war is on, is a conference of this republic with the others of this hemisphere, which will represent an enormous weight to stand for the law which they will advocate at the future international congress. In form it does not look ambitious, but if carried out it will secure the accomplishment of much of what we have been discussing here.

Mr. Sorenson: I move the adoption of the resolution. (Seconded).

Mr. Rice: This bases the whole argument for an international judicial body on the rights of neutrals in time

of war. That will be just the time when the world organization will fall down. If you put the whole thing on that basis you have a very small one for it.

Mr. Angell: I think any action looking to the restraint of war-making on the part of other states must have its justification in the concern which these states have in any war which may break out. Two states go to war and the other states will say, it is our business. There is strong ground for action, American action, at this time.

Mr. Rice: There certainly is for immediate action, but it seems to me that you are basing your world organization on the rights of neutrals in time of war.

Mr. Angell: This is not a basis, only a starting point. Does the starting point matter?

Dr. Nasmyth: We have also belligerent interests involved: England is protesting against submarine warfare just as the neutrals are; Germany is protesting against starving a belligerent country, just as the neutrals are.

Mr. Copeland: Why include only neutral nations of America, why not those of Europe?

Mr. Angell: Because in practical politics it is doubtful if the neutral nations of Europe would join a conference with us. President Wilson told some one here definitely that it would not be possible or even desirable to have the neutral nations of Europe join in a formal conference. Holland, for instance, can not take a strong line because of Germany. America can stand for interests the world over without doing so formally. If we take this step we are more likely to get more cohesive action than if we take in the states of Europe.

Mr. Brodie: I would not question the advisability of starting out as we do but I would include a more general statement as the rights of humanity; this would not in any way lessen the value of the resolutions as a whole.

Mr. Angell: In practice it would. We want to regard facts. We must be careful not to deal vaguely in large words and ignore practical politics. This does not deal in large, vague considerations, it indicates definite steps. It necessarily leads to the vindication of human rights as a

whole, but it does not start from that. It leads to that.

Mr. Bell: Would it be possible to make any inclusion of the point raised by Dr. Nasmyth, that belligerents have rights?

Mr. Angell: It is included in the preamble. It is included also in the sense that the belligerents of to-day may be the neutrals of to-morrow.

Dr. Nasmyth: Even as the belligerents have interest in the reform of sea law; Germany and England.

Mr. Angell: I think as this comes from the American Government, as we are recommending this for the American Government, it is perhaps best to leave it in that form. If action is to be effective from the American Government, it must proceed upon recognized right of action. She has that right of action in equity and in law by virtue of the violation of a definite right which she has suffered.

Mr. Fisher: I want to call the attention of the Conference to a word included in the fourth paragraph, namely, that we pledge ourselves to use force.

Mr. Angell: This means collective action by the nations to enforce decisions by such a combination of economic and military forces as may be best to use. America may find her most effective contribution to be an economic one. It does in some measure sanction force but it does not absolutely oblige this country to go to war in any way.

Mr. Fisher: It seems to me it does clear up the misunderstandings which I think are very real concerning the peace party on the question of non-resistance. We need not make an attack on the army at all. The greatest difficulty in this work is not in driving home the truths which Mr. Angell is preaching but rather in getting rid of the misapprehensions which now exist regarding the peace party as standing for peace at any price or saying that force is not necessary. The need at present for the peace party is to have a definite platform like the one proposed. We must dodge the armament question as far as possible, we must have definite planks to set before the country. The press and the people of the country should get back of the President and insist upon some such plat-

form. This country can not do anything by itself. If the country does stand for that platform let the President know that the country is undoubtedly behind him. Now is the time for getting the peace forces together, all can get together on this platform. We should go a step beyond the resolution and discuss the means of putting that before the country, so that it will express itself.

Mr. Crook: There is nothing said about the *status quo*. Mr. Fisher somewhat overemphasizes the difference between non-resistants and those who believe in force behind an international movement. I think Mr. Fisher would stand for the United States alone going in to intervene in Mexico where the non-resisters would not stand for that. But we would agree on the whole of the Americas or these with Europe going into that.

Mr. Nicholson: There is one statement in the first article which I want to question. It intimates that because all states seem to be violating what we consider international justice, therefore we are having no participation in the war. Does not that intimate that if only one side were violating these rights we should go in?

Mr. Angell: No. The fact is that as both refuse to accept what we regard as our rights we can not go in with either.

Mr. Nicholson: There is really very little difference of opinion among us except as to immediate methods of presenting our arguments. The last part of the resolution has been called into question. As a so-called non-resister I should be obliged to agree to the idea there presented. The man who agrees with the present system of internal police would have to agree with the idea of an international police.

In some of these discussions I have felt an undertone of sentiment that I should like to question a little. I do not stress that point too much in talking with people, but I have felt that sometimes we do attempt to defend war under some conditions. I am wondering whether or not that is a step in advance, whether it would appeal to the world as such. At the present time it is the opinion of the

great bulk of civilized sentiment that aggressive warfare should be done away with, the present war is a war of defensive warfare, a psychologic war, because constant emphasis upon the public mind has so stressed that psychologic condition that it made war inevitable. I wonder whether or not, if we do make the point that under some circumstances war may be justifiable, it will appeal to people at large that we have made much advance. The last few chapters of the "Great Illusion" have been thrown at me many times, people say we believe in a good war. That is perplexing to me. What position ought we to take on that particular question as to just how far we ought to justify war under any circumstances. People are ready for the truth, and we ought not to be afraid to give it to them as we have been privileged to see it. Will Mr. Angell consent to clear up my mind and several others on that point?

Mr. Angell: The truth is that when we get to the point of defense we get philosophically to a very difficult problem because we have another phraseology to deal with the problems involved. As a man striving towards political non-resistance I would support that resolution and justify it without doing violence to my beliefs. I think many Quakers would take that position. I can not urge upon you to take action in violation of your conviction, since you do not believe as I do. I may try to change your conviction, but act upon your conviction. Taking a position as trustee, here is an action which we can, as trustees, urge upon those whose interests we act for when we talk of public action, whatever our own opinions. I think that probably we shall find a ground of reconciliation in this, let the case for political non-resistance be stated by those who feel it and it will help to clear up the understanding of this matter. I confess I find a difficulty in making myself clear and I can discuss it only when we are discussing foundations. To-day we are working on a definite problem, what shall we do. This will get widespread action. You can tell your audiences, this is what we shall do. You can keep freedom of action and discussion and still support that.

Mr. Fisher: What is the theory in having this resolution? There is no use except simply its propaganda value in sending it to President Wilson.

Mr. Angell: Its use is that it represents a Minimum Program. We want to find the least statement of our case for disturbing the public peace. We ask people to go to our meetings, but they ask, "Why should we go to your meetings?" This resolution is for the purpose of saying you have got to consider this problem, you can not assert your rights by going to war. If you get this accepted in a man's mind he can not then finish with the subject at all until he has got to world federation. We do not want to bring him to the world federation by democratic control. The object is to keep bringing him back to the point that he has got to deal with the present situation. We are confronted by a condition, not a theory; what are you going to do about it? We must reform this law, must have a legislative body, a court and enforcement. We must exclude everything which may be controversial or may be pitched upon as an objection. I believe democratic control is the very basis of the theory, but if asserted here, the educated person would say, "Yes, very good, but think of having this situation in the hands of the representatives recently." He dismisses the whole thing and won't talk about it. He is wrong, but if we insert this plank we will lose his consideration. But this he can not object to, it is minimum. Having gotten him to think of this, we can then get in other things.

RESOLUTIONS

WHEREAS: Recent events have shown that the lives of American and other neutral citizens, and the rights of American and other neutral commerce on the high seas, cannot be made secure by America's taking part in a war in which both sides are, in some measure, straining and violating the law, and are supporting an interpretation of law which would leave those rights without due protection in the future,—

We respectfully submit that the protection of American

rights requires the development and reform of existing international law, so as to secure :

(1st) An international legislative body for the framing of such law, and,

(2nd) An international court for its just interpretation, and,

(3rd) An international arrangement for the due execution of the court's decision by such combination of economic or military measures as may be most effective.

And we further respectfully urge, as an action which can now be taken by the American Government and as a step towards the achievement of these four results, that the other republics of this hemisphere be invited to confer with our own concerning their common willingness to ordain and support concerted efforts to secure due consideration for neutral rights and interests at the settlement following the present war.

These resolutions shall be sent to President Wilson, to the members of the Congress of the United States, and to the Governing Board of the Pan American Union.

SECTION III

CONFERENCE ON EXTENSION WORK

Dr. Nasmyth: (presiding) Let us turn to the larger problem of extension work. What are we going to do with the knowledge we have? What are the results of the Conference to be? It is not valuable because of the results but because it is the starting point of all sorts of activities which will be good afterwards. People are going out to read articles, books, or good addresses, letters and newspapers. We are, to a certain extent, experts on the problem of international relations. We could answer jingo editorials and point out the fallacies involved. Special articles ought to go from this group into the magazines *The New Republic*, *The Independent*, *The Atlantic Monthly*, and so on. In the Harvard Club they have gotten most important results from missionary work.

carried on among other clubs and organizations of various kinds. Then there is the question of the forums which are growing up all over the country. There are scores of calls for speakers for these forums, and for Y.M.C.A.'s. We have not been able to supply these with speakers, as there was no possibility of getting speakers who were valuable.

Mr. Robinson: At the risk of boring you I should like to give some idea of the lecture bureau at Columbia. We have followed out the international polity idea but rather restricted in principle. The idea came to us to organize a lecture bureau, and we spoke to the social workers. They felt rather at sea and said it was doubtful if they would want us. Then we tried a number of other centers and found there would be careful and enthusiastic coöperation. The chairman of our group went down and interviewed the head of the Evening High Schools in the city. He said he would be glad to turn over the economic classes to speakers from college. Then came a call from the Labor Temple and from the Y.M.C.A.'s. We expect to have a larger call than we can supply. We have found it necessary to reach all sorts of people. We must reach the man in the street. We also had the rather selfish motive that we could best train the students of the university to a careful and scholarly outlook on these subjects by sending them down to discuss them. It gives them a certain grasp of a subject that no other method would bring out. We have had a number of meetings on international relations as connected with the problems of to-day. I should like to suggest this student lecture bureau to the larger colleges here represented. We are planning to make this bureau reach not only New York City but to reach throughout the suburban district.

Mr. Brodie: I should like to emphasize the great possibilities in the smaller discussion groups. In some places the Y.M.C.A.'s have found it very helpful to form smaller groups for discussion. I am not advocating that our clubs should be linked up with any other organization.

Mr. Sachs: There are certain possibilities arising from

the scheme of democratic education to bring into this country something of the successful democratic educational movement in England. This would mean having some large social center, Labor Temple, forum, some place for regular meetings of workers with the people interested in the social and economic problems which specially interest them. We of the International Polity Clubs could seize and almost control that movement. Even if this kind is not started on a nation-wide scale, we could start it in our own districts, arrange for conferences of those interested in social work, in social settlements, Y.M.C.A.'s, etc. We have got to keep the workers interested in this thing. We must be democratic. We will teach them democracy. Organize international polity groups for the study of social science on an international scale in which the social centers and the university groups shall be represented.

Dr. Nasmyth: One suggestion from the work going on in England. They have organized a Council for Promoting the Study of International Relations, with Lord Bryce at the head. Really effective work is done by people in the background, like our International Polity Clubs. That Council has established in almost every little village and city in Great Britain a little group to get down to the study of problems of war and peace and especially questions of settlements of treaties of peace.

Miss Brown: In methods of presentation, use motion pictures. It is a tremendous problem to use them as a cheap method of propaganda. We could possibly reach a larger audience than in any other way. This Conference has proved very good in serious argument, but a certain lightness of touch is wanting. We showed quite plainly that we were not ready to handle the kind of speaker who shouts, waves his hands and tells anecdotes. No one wants to carry on propaganda in that way, but we are likely to meet such men and must be ready to meet them.

Prof. Manley O. Hudson: There is no unanimity among us as to the exact purpose of the International Polity Club. I was exceedingly surprised to come here and hear a gentleman speak as though these clubs were peace propaganda

associations. If any one wants to organize a peace society or any sort I should be very glad to join it, but I should not like to see the Polity Club become a peace propaganda movement. If we are here to organize something new I am ready to coöperate, but frankly I believe it superfluous. Join the Emergency Peace Federation in Chicago, the American Peace Society or something like that. Run a peace propaganda organization. Are we not organized as groups of men in various universities for the study of international polity? We want a certain militarist flavor, without them we would have no interest and would have no possibility of real improvement. We need to meet with them in order to be sure what we really believe. If we want to organize peace groups in the colleges we should combine with the intercollegiate peace organizations. They are doing excellent work, but one of the weaknesses has been the fact that they have been holding oratorical contests and sending in men who had not had proper opportunities to read and to discuss questions.

It seems to me that we are an organization doing very intensive work on the study of foreign relations. We want militarists, pacifists and all sides. We want to give the other fellow a chance to say what he desires. There is before us the best sort of opportunity in the United States to wield some influence. I believe we have an opportunity to study international policy so as to train up a body of leaders for the next generation. I do not believe it nearly so important to go to some town and make an impression that will be dissipated the next week by one of the opposite side. The most important thing is to train men to be radiating centers of influence. That is the big thing ahead of us to do. Encourage the men who are to say what the policy of the next generation shall be and put the best thought and the best rationalism we have before them.

I am also very sorry to hear since I came here that in some quarters the international polity clubs have been organized among upper classmen only in some of the colleges. This is a great mistake. There have been some of the best men among the freshmen and sophomores.

Dr. Nasmyth: As to letting in the militarists as well as the pacifists, the question has come up, how can we keep the militarists from running away with the movement? We must believe that this constructive side is going to group them better than the destructive belief of militarism.

Dr. McCaul: Just a word on the part personality is going to play in the development of the work. I have benefited very greatly from the discussions of almost two weeks. But the thing of greatest value in the Conference is coming into contact with those who have been the leaders, getting their attitude and acquiring some of their spirit. In the future development of the work, while I would not disparage organization and technical knowledge as important, yet the amount of personality put into the movement is most important. This subject is sufficiently great that we ought to become specialists on it.

Mr. Angell: I want to refer for a moment to what Prof. Hudson has said. If I support Hudson, Karsten will think I am opposing him. There is the great difficulty in this Conference, if one declares a kind of work as necessary, that necessarily implies that other lines are not. We will not get anywhere unless we have the spirit exemplified by Karsten and Trachtenberg. We must also do as suggested by Prof. Hudson. We want more than one way of doing this thing. The International Polity Club must be an International Polity Club, must not be an Anti-Armament League. One can not replace the other. Take, for instance, the Polity Club formed in a university on anti-militarist lines. Will your militarist go and gain wisdom? He will not. If we do not make the International Polity Club that type of organization there will inevitably grow up clubs calling themselves as indicated in the aim of the Club "American Foreign Policy Club." During the next ten years America must take a large part in European and foreign affairs. Knowledge of these must become much more general than it is. It will become more and more a subject of discussion among university students. The American university will become more and more in the matter of interest in politics what the older universities in

England are. You may object that that type of organization does not get out and do things. That is perfectly true, that is why you need the other kind as well. You must have the International Polity Clubs if you are to play the part you may in the determination of American thought in foreign policies during the next ten years. Do not think the militarist can possibly have the better of you in the real case.

As part of the International Polity Club we can always have active groups carrying on active work. The point is, when active men get up and say that it should not be a discussion class and that it should do things the reply should be, "Get out and do them." Be as active as you like but do not drive out the other fellows.

REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE ON ORGANIZATION WHICH WAS,
AFTER SOME AMENDMENT, UNANIMOUSLY ADOPTED BY
THE DELEGATES:

"In recommending to the Conference the desirability of the Federation of the International Polity Clubs to vitalize this student movement, your committee presents the following suggestions:

1. The Aim—To give America a Rational Foreign Policy.
2. The Organization.
 - a. That there be elected by the delegates at the Conference an Executive Council of five men and two women with as representative a geographical distribution as possible. Such Council to act as coordinators in developing a powerful student movement. (For 1915-16 eight members were elected.)
 - b. That there be a President of the Federation.
 - c. That there be a Secretary of the Federation who can give a large part of his time to the Polity Clubs and the work of extending the movement into new colleges and universities throughout this country.
 - d. That the above named officers be ex-officio members

of the Executive Council, the elected students alone having power to vote.

- e. That the Executive Council have power to fill all vacancies occurring between the annual conferences.
3. That the autonomy of each club be preserved and that as far as possible each club be allowed to work out its own problems of organization and activities.
4. That a bulletin be published, which would help to keep each club in touch with the activities of every other club.
5. That nominal dues of twenty-five cents be assessed on each member to cover the cost of printing the bulletin.
6. That there be an annual conference of delegates from the Polity Clubs to interchange ideas and to unify this into a national student movement. There should be discussion, as at the present conference, on the most vital matters relating to our Foreign Policy."

W. HARRIS CROOK, Chairman,	C. A. SORENSON,
DAVID HUDSON,	SAMUEL A. TRUFANT, Jr.
SPENCER MILLER, Jr.,	

The following were elected by the Conference as members of the Executive Council: Don M. Brodie, Chicago; W. Harris Crook, Harvard; Bess East, Illinois; Daphne Hoffman, Indiana; Suh Hu, Cornell; Spencer Miller, Jr., Columbia; Edward M. Moses, Wisconsin, and Samuel A. Trufant, Jr., Tulane. Dr. George W. Nasmyth was elected President and Fred B. Foulk was chosen as secretary by the executive Committee.

APPENDIX A

REPLIES TO QUESTIONS

By Mr. Norman Angell

Prof. Manley O. Hudson (presiding): If the meeting will come to order Mr. Angell will answer the questions which have been handed in for the question box.

Mr. Angell: I will take a few to start.

"What is your attitude toward revolution?" "Is war for defense justifiable?" "Mr. Maxim says he believes in a 'good' war; how shall we answer that?" "Can we admit that a war in defense of a weak nation is justifiable?" "In most cases will not the removal of defensive force render aggressive war effective?"

I will deal with these in a ten-minute statement.

We have talked here a good deal about defense and aggression. Has anyone attempted to define the difference between these? To see how far defense can be justified and its relation to force? I do not believe in force, that is why I do believe in defense. This is not a paradox, because defense is the cancellation of force. If I quarrel with you about a money matter you say, "We have argued that long enough. You have the money on you, I happen to be armed and I am going to take it." I say, "Whether right or wrong, I am not going to allow force, your force, to settle this matter. If I allow you to take my money I shall be allowing force to settle it." You are unconvinced, you come for me and I disarm you. I say, "Having disarmed you and rendered you harmless I am ready to submit this to the judgment of someone whose judgment is not warped because he is a party to it." Because I happen to have your arms I am not going to compel you. Then I am a pacifist. But if I said, "Since force is the final appeal and I have the force, I will decide this," then I am a militarist.

The militarist does in fact use force finally, he does settle these things with it, and it is the final appeal. I was not saying so nor allowing my force to settle the thing.

If I had accepted the doctrine of force I should have knocked him down and emptied his pockets. This is the difference between the pacifist, the non-resister and the militarist; the submission to a third party who is disinterested.

It is often stated that force is the final appeal in the State, as force is the thing upon which the State rests. You will vote down or into power at the next election Mr. Wilson. Suppose you put him out, how do you know he will surrender the reins of power? You say, the army would turn him out, but he commands the army, he is commander-in-chief. You have no means of knowing that he will obey your mandate and surrender the government except the contract, the implied agreement between you that, if the election goes against him, he will step down. Suppose he refused, as the president sometimes refuses in Mexico and Venezuela. In Venezuela they really do believe in force, we do not. Then you would raise an army and turn him out. You would stay there until another army of rebellion turned you out, then the State would be resting on force as in Venezuela and Mexico. These states really do rest upon force, and ours does not. The foundation of our society is not force but an agreement to fulfill a compact. It may break down, it does break down. We may not keep the compact. Venezuela did not, so people say, "Well, force is inevitable, you must have armies and big ones."

It sometimes happened in Russian and Irish famines in the past that the people ate their children; they were driven to cannibalism. People were dying by hundreds of thousands. You may say, therefore, cannibalism is inevitable in human affairs, therefore, we need not try to prevent it. It may have been inevitable, we must not judge these people too harshly, but does that prevent any people from trying any possible measures to remove the causes of cannibalism, because in the last resort we are coming to it? Yet that is the way our militarist friends argue. They say, "In the last resort we are going to turn to force." That is precisely

why we want to prevent society from going to pieces, in order to prevent resorting to force. They organized agriculture to prevent famines. The same is true of wars. To prevent them, organize the minds of society. Society can fall into wars, can drop back into the previous condition of imperfection, because it has not yet arrived at the condition which renders it possible to avoid certain horrible things like war and cannibalism. Is that any reason why we should accept it? We should go on from that and make these things impossible.

It is said you could not have had certain results in human society unless there had been war. "This nation survived by virtue of cannibalism," you may argue, "therefore, long live cannibalism." In the War of the Roses they had a conflict of political opinion and both of them wanted to keep the center of the stage. How did they settle it in the 14th, 13th, 12th century? People went out with pikes and so forth and settled it. Does this mean any more than in the case of cannibalism, does it mean that in order to settle a question we must always do it in the same way? The same sort of political situation occurs 500 years later, one political opinion against another, they have acquired certain instruments, like books, schools, and so forth. In those days there would have been nothing but for Lloyd George to get the men and women of Wales together and march down against London. That would have been foolish. Now the people of Wales use newspapers, books. We have changed the instruments. Because in that time they could not have chosen any other instruments, must we lay down the law that no other instruments can be found? We can not accept that argument for armament.

(Q) What shall we say to the man who claims that world federation will not stop war, pointing to our own Civil War?

(A) It may not stop war. Is that any reason why we should not go on improving the system of government?

(Q) Is a war for defense justifiable?

(A) I tried to indicate what was defensive and what aggressive. If we consider the justice and right of resistance

against the Saracens, then are we not drawn to the position that the United States must join armies with any nation that is going about what we conceive to be best in modern civilization? Perhaps there was no better way at that time: does that mean we have no other means at our disposal now to settle questions with the Japanese and the Germans?

(Q) How shall we answer the man who says that the American Revolution gave a great impulse to the cause of democracy? If we admit his premise, how shall we stop short of the contention that wars are of benefit?

(A) If it has brought civilization within the state, why should we resist it between states? So long as it is the right of man to enforce his right with power in his own case, you can not have ordered society at all. The whole basis of society is that a man shall not be the judge in his own case and use force to impose his own point of view. There is the illustration of the friend who owes me money. I burgle his house, kill him, but the jury would not take my plea of right, that he owed me money, as sufficient excuse.

Prof. Hudson: Very frequently people see the distinction between defense and aggression, but they find it difficult to say who is the defender and who is the aggressor.

Mr. Angell: Society has found the same difficulty. The touchstone is this in society, the man who takes the law into his own hands. In leagues of peace they undertake to act in common against any member which commences hostilities and refuses to submit the case to judgment; that indicates the aggressor. Defense is the action of cancelling the power of the party which would impose its force; which does not depend upon the merits of the question at all. The crux of the question is refusing to submit the case to judgment.

Prof. Hudson: How can we connect this with things like the American Revolution?

Mr. Angell: We can not connect it. It is very difficult to define who is the aggressor, as it is very difficult to have good laws. It is difficult to judge. This brings us to another fallacy. The militarist expects the pacifist to put up a complete, watertight, infallible plan which shall never

fail. We do not make any such claim. All we claim is that it will be more effective than his method. We must get away from his method, from the mere collision of forces, to such things as the judgment of *third* parties. It is not necessary to establish a scheme which will guarantee a perfect government.

Mrs. Mead: The War of the Revolution was a civil war; all civil wars are in another category.

Mr. Angell: It was civil war just as you have had civil wars in England and in other states. Even if this war was inevitable does that mean that we are not to make the effort to improve things in the future by better government? England learned from the American Revolution, made better conditions for the colonies, made such wars less likely to occur in the future.

Mr. Nicholson: Must defensive warfare be limited to actual invasion? If Europe were invaded by lower civilization we would think it necessary to step in and join with her.

Mr. Angell: Justified if I had made no other measures to meet the situation. If I go into a savage country and every native attempts to stab me in the back I may be justified in shooting him, but that does not justify me in shooting any man I meet or who comes after me. We can not absolutely distinguish between offensive and defensive warfare because human nature is not infallible.

The world is concerned with the development of a real community of nations in Europe, concerned with the possibility for real peace.

(Q) How can we hope to alleviate the hatred and bitterness created by this war?

(A) We can only do that as it was done between religious groups. It is the story of conditions between the Catholic and the Huguenot on the morrow after St. Bartholomew. You could never get a state of political peace between them, said the Catholic. This was not true. The attitude of men's minds was changed by the indirect results of the Reformation. It goes slowly, but we are helping it a little in political and racial hatreds.

(Q) Is a war for defense not justified except when there is a chance of the success of the defense?

(A) This is very good. Personally I think a man could throw his life away more usefully.

(Q) What is war? Is it safe to use it in a symbolical sense at one moment and in a political sense at the next?

(A) Do not give symbolical and literal meanings in one sentence. As a definition for war I would say this, The killing of men in the mass by a community or the forces of a community. Some such definition as that. This does not touch upon the justifiability. It covers international war and civil war.

Mr. Nasmyth: There is Novikov's definition, "Collective homicide."

Mr. Angell: Homicide has a connotation which does not include legal killing, and war is legal killing.

(Q) Why is an international police force a possible sanction of the League of Peace?

(A) An ultimate sanction, I should say, not immediate. Europe has been split into two main groups during the last decade, now throw them together in a larger group for common ends, not rival ends. In the first stages they are very unlikely to include an international police in the League of Peace.

(Q) When a nation becomes overcrowded and wants colonies, how shall we answer them? Tell them to send their young men to other countries or decrease their increasing birth rate by economic measures?

(A) Germany was in this position. She could get only tropical colonies. Germans came in great numbers to London, Paris, demanded Russian commerce. They disseminated their influence, lived interesting lives. Why should they war about this thing? Because a German family is earning a large income in Petrograd, that does not mean expatriation in our day as it did a few hundred years ago.

1. This need has not been shown. German emigration has stopped. In fact more immigrants come into Germany than emigrants go out. She has had to import many men every year to carry on her work.

2. Germany could exploit countries like South America without going to them by virtue of channels of communication.

3. The colonies which she has and wants would not be suitable places for the growth of German population.

4. If she could conquer by military power places like Australia and Canada she could not turn them into German speaking countries. If she could not do it in Poland how could she do it in Canada? You can not take a nation and change it from an English one to a German one. It is a curious thing that economic pressure will not reduce the birthrate. As the standard of living rises the birthrate falls. Germany is increasing more slowly than thirty years ago. France is stationary. In new countries like Australia the birthrate is reaching a stationary point. The increase in the population in the United States comes not from that part of the population which for a generation or two has had a high standard of comfort, but from the elements with a much lower standard.

(Q) Do you believe that if the German Socialists had become the majority party in Germany they would have succeeded?

(A) Yes, if they had not been railroaded into war.

(Q) Please define the *status quo* in armament policy.

(A) No change in the existing standard of American armaments until this country has entered into a union with other states, and has more definitely defined its position on sea law, the Monroe Doctrine and Asiatic immigration.

APPENDIX B

IMPORTANT BOOKS ON INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

THE RELATION OF IDEAS TO SOCIAL AND POLITICAL CONDUCT

Angell, Norman. *Arms and Industry. A Study of International Polity.* New York: Putnam, 1914.

Barker, Ernest. *English Political Thought Since Spencer.* New York: Holt, 1911.

Draper, John. *History of the Intellectual Development of Europe.*

Jevons, William S. *Principles of Logic.* London: Macmillan, 1890.

Lecky, William E. H. *History of the Rise and Influence of the spirit of Rationalism in Europe.* London: Longmans, 1865; New York: Appleton, 1866.

— *History of European Morals, from Augustus to Charlemagne.* London: Longmans, 1869.

Marvin, Francis Sydney. *The Living Past. A Sketch of Western Progress.* Oxford: The Clarendon Press, 1915.

McDougall, Robert. *Social Psychology.* Boston: Luce and Co., 1909.

Mill, John Stuart. *Essay on Liberty.* London: Parker, 1859; Boston: Ticknor and Fields, 1863.

Myers, Philip Van Ness. *History as Past Ethics, an introduction to the History of Morals.* Boston: Ginn and Co., 1913.

Nasmyth, George W. *Social Progress and the Darwinian Theory.* New York: Putnam, 1916.

Robertson, J. M. *Letters on Reasoning.* London: Watts and Co., 1902.

Ruffini, Francesco. *History of Religious Liberty.* Translated by J. Parker Heyes. New York: Putnam, 1912.

Wallas, Graham. *Human Nature in Politics.* Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1909.

MISCONCEPTIONS AS TO THE NATURE OF GOVERNMENT AND THE PLACE OF POLITICAL AUTHORITY

Angell, Norman. *The Great Illusion.* New York: Putnam, 1913 (revised edition).

Bastiat, Frederic. *Economic Sophisms.* Translated by P. J. Sterling. Edinburgh: Oliver and B., 1873.

Chamberlain, Houston Stewart. *The Foundations of the Nineteenth Century.* Translated from the German by John Lies. London: Lane, 1911.

- Finot, Jean.** Race Prejudice. Translated by Florence Wade-Evans. London: Constable, 1906; New York: Dutton, importer.
- Hill, David Jayne.** World Organization as affected by the Nature of the Modern State. New York: Columbia University Press, 1911.
- Jordan, David Starr.** The Blood of the Nation. Boston: World Peace Foundation, free pamphlet,
- War and the Breed. Boston: Beacon Press, 1915.
- Krehbiel, Edward B.** War and Society. (Will be published early in 1916.)
- Morel, E. D.** Ten Years of Secret Diplomacy. Manchester: Labour Press.
- Perris, G. H.** A Short History of War and Peace. New York: Holt, 1911.
- Withers, Hartley.** Meaning of Money. New York: Dutton, 1909.

CONSTRUCTIVE PROGRAMS

- Angell, Norman.** America and the New World State. New York: Putnam, 1915.
- The World's Highway. New York: Doran, 1915.
- Dickinson, G. Lowes.** The Foundations of a League of Peace. Boston: World Peace Foundation, free pamphlet.
- Fayle, C. E.** The Great Settlement. New York: Duffield and Co., 1915.
- Hobson, J. A.** Towards International Government. New York: Macmillan, 1915.
- Lippmann, Walter.** The Stakes of Diplomacy. New York: Holt, 1915.
- Loreburn, Lord.** Capture at Sea. London: Methuen, 1913.
- Wehburg, Hans.** Capture in War on Land and Sea. London: P. S. King, 1911.

OTHER BOOKS SUITABLE FOR STUDY AND REFERENCE

- * **A Rifleman,** The Struggle for Bread. New York: Lane.
- Angell, Norman.** Peace Theories and the Balkan War. London: Marshall and Son, 1912.
- * **Bernhardi, Gen. Friedrich von.** Germany and the Next War. London: Arnold, 1912.
- Brailsford, H. N.** The War of Steel and Gold. London: G. Bell and Sons, 1914.
- Clapp, Edwin.** Economic Aspects of War. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1915.
- Coolidge, Archibald C.** The United States as a World Power. New York: Macmillan, 1912.
- Davidson, John.** Commercial Federation and Colonial Trade Policy. London: Sonnenschein, 1900.

- Freeman, E. A.** History of Federal Government in Greece and Italy. Edited by J. B. Bury, 2nd edition. New York: Macmillan, 1893.
- Gooch, G. P.** History of Our Time. New York: Holt, 1911.
- Graham, J. W.** Evolution and Empire. London: Headley, 1912.
- Harms, Bernhard.** Volkswirtschaft und Weltwirtschaft. Jena: Fischer, 1912.
- Higgins, Alexander Pearce.** War and the Private Citizen. Cambridge: The University Press.
- The Hague Conferences. Cambridge: The University Press, 1909.
- Hirst, F. W.** The Arbiter in Council. New York: Macmillan.
- The Stock Exchange. New York: Holt, 1911.
- The Six Panics, and other Essays. London: Methuen, 1913.
- Hobson, C. K.** The Export of Capital. London: Walter Scott, 1906.
- Hobson, J. A.** Imperialiam: A Study. London: Constable and Co., 1905.
- Hull, William I.** The Two Hague Conferences. Boston: World Peace Foundation, 1908.
- Johnson, Sir H.** Common Sense in Foreign Policy. London: Smith Elder.
- * **Johnston, R. M.** Arms and the Race. New York: Century, 1915.
- Lawrence, T. J.** Principles of International Law. New York: Macmillan, 1912.
- * **Lawson, W. R.** Modern Wars and War Taxes. London: Blackwood.
- * **Lea, Homer.** The Valor of Ignorance. New York: Harper and Bros., 1909.
- * — The Day of the Saxon. New York: Harper and Bros., 1912.
- Lord, W. F.** Lost Empires of the Modern World. London: Bentley, 1897.
- Loria, Achille.** Les Bases Économiques de la Justice Internationale. Kristiania: Nobel Institut, 1912.
- * **Mahan, Admiral A. T.** The Influence of Sea Power upon History. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1890.
- * — Some Neglected Aspects of War. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1907.
- * — The Interest of America in International Conditions. Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1910.
- * — Armaments and Arbitration, or the Place of Force in the International Relations of States. New York: Harpers, 1912.
- * **Maxim, Hudson.** Defenseless America. New York: Hearst International Library Co., 1915.
- Myers, Philip Van Ness.** General History for Colleges and High Schools. Boston: Ginn, 1906.
- Novikow, Jacques.** Les Luites Entre Sociétés Humaines et Leurs Phases Successives. Paris: Alcan, 1893.

- Novikow, Jacques.** *La Critique du Darwinisme Social.* Paris: Alcan, 1910.
- *War and Its Alleged Benefits.* New York: Holt, 1911.
- Phillips, Walter Alison.** *The Confederation of Europe.* London: Longmans, 1914.
- Reinsch, Paul Samuel.** *World Politics as Influenced by the Oriental Situation.* New York: Macmillan, 1900.
- *Colonial Administration.* New York: Macmillan, 1905.
- *Colonial Government.* New York: Macmillan, 1911.
- Rogers, James E. Thorold.** *The Economic Interpretation of History.* London: Unwin, 1888.
- Rohrbach, Paul.** *German World Policies.* Translated by Edmund von Mach. New York: Macmillan, 1915.
- Usher, Roland G.** *Pan-Germanism.* Boston: Houghton, Mifflin, 1913.
- * **Wilkinson, Henry Spenser.** *War and Policy.* London: Constable, 1900.
- Wilson, G. G. and Tucker, G. F.** *International Law.* Boston: Silver, Burdett and Co., 1913.
- * Militaristic.

APPENDIX C

MEMBERS OF THE CONFERENCE

- ADAMS, EDWARD A., State University of Iowa, Iowa City, Iowa, President Iowa Peace and War Society.
- ALDIS, GRAHAM, Harvard University, 30 Randolph Hall, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard International Polity Club.
- ANGELL, NORMAN, 4, King's Bench Walk, Temple, London E.C., England. Hotel Manhattan, New York City (while in the United States).
- ATKINSON, WILLIAM Y., University of Georgia, 126 Dearing St., Athens, Ga., Georgia International Polity Club.
- BALLINGER, EARL A., College of Agriculture, University of Minnesota, 1485 Cleveland Ave., St. Paul, Minn., Peace Club, College of Agriculture, University of Minnesota.
- BEAHAN, MRS. W., 2213 Bellfield, Cleveland, Ohio, Woman's Peace Party.
- BELL, JAMES C., JR., Columbia University, 337 N. Broadway, Yonkers, N. Y.
- BENEDICT, MRS. CRYSTAL EASTMAN, Secretary New York Branch, Women's Peace Party.
- BLAKESLEE, PROF. GEORGE H., Clark University, Worcester, Mass., Professor of History and International Relations.
- BLANSHARD, PAUL B., Andover Theological Seminary, Cambridge, Mass., Maverick Church, East Boston.
- BORST, GEORGE H., 277 S. 11th St., Philadelphia, Pa.
- BRANINE, HAROLD R., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, Kansas International Polity Club.
- BRODIE, DON R., University of Chicago, Chicago, Ill. .
- BROWN, C., Earl Hall, Columbia University, New York City.
- BROWN, LOUISE F., University of Nevada, Reno, Nev.
- BURGUM, EDWIN B., Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H., Organizer International Polity Club at Dartmouth.

- BURR, PROF. G. L., Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
- CALL, ARTHUR D., 613 Colorado Bldg., Washington, D. C., executive director and acting secretary of the American Peace Society.
- CAMPBELL, JOHN NEAL, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, Tenn., Vanderbilt Comity Club.
- CHARNOWITZ, GEORGE H., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo., International Polity Club of the University of Missouri.
- CHEN, C. S., Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y., Cosmopolitan Club, International Polity Club.
- CLAPP, F. C., Agricultural College of the University of Minnesota, St. Paul, Minn., Peace Club of the College of Agriculture.
- COFFMAN, RAMON, University of Wisconsin, now at Yale University, Yale Station, New Haven, Conn., Secretary of the Yale International Polity Club.
- COLLIER, PROF. THEODORE F., Brown University, Providence, R. I., Associate Professor of European History.
- COPELAND, MORRIS A., Amherst College, Amherst, Mass., Amherst Forum.
- COX, GARFIELD V., Earlham College, Earlham, Ind., President, Earlham International Polity Club.
- CRANE, DR. FRANK, Editorial Department, *New York Globe*, editorial writer for the Associated Newspapers.
- CREMER, J. D. JR., Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H., Secretary, Dartmouth International Polity Club.
- CROOK, WILFRID HARRIS, Harvard University, 21 Divinity Hall, Cambridge, Mass., President, Harvard International Polity Club.
- CUNNINGHAM, ALBERT B., Madison, N. J.
- DANAHY, JAMES W., Columbia University, Hartley Hall, New York City, Collegiate Common Sense League.
- DAVIS, A., 140 Nassau St., New York City.
- DAVIS, HALLOWELL, Harvard University, 44 Edgehill Rd., Brooklyn, Mass., Harvard International Polity Club.
- DICKSON, MISS CAROLINE E., Syracuse University, 761 Irving Ave., Syracuse, N. Y., Syracuse International Polity Club, Cosmopolitan Club.

- EARL, EDWARD M., Columbia University, 410 W. 115th St., New York City, Collegiate Common Sense League.
- EAST, MISS BESS, University of Illinois, 312 Daniel St., Champaign, Ill., President of the Young Woman's Peace Club of the University of Illinois.
- ERNST, GEORGE, 9 W. 90th St., New York City.
- FISHER, ARTHUR, Harvard University, Gore C. 33, Cambridge, Mass., Collegiate Anti-Militarism League, Harvard International Polity Club.
- FITZ, MISS A. M., 18 Common, Watertown, Mass.
- FLEMMING, E. G. Cornell University, Cosmopolitan Club, Ithaca, N. Y., President Cornell Cosmopolitan Club.
- FLICK, PROF. A. C., Syracuse University, Syracuse, N. Y., President Syracuse International Polity Club.
- FOULK, FRED B., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., now Harvard University, 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston, Mass., Editor of *The Cosmopolitan Student*, now secretary of the Federation of International Polity Clubs, member of the central committee of the Corda Fratres International Federation of Students.
- FRAZEE, JOHN P., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis., International Polity Club.
- GABEL, MISS LEONA C., Syracuse University, 619 Manlius St., Syracuse, N. Y., International Polity Club, Woman's Cosmopolitan Club.
- GANNETT, LEWIS S., Harvard University, 13 Berkeley St., Cambridge, Mass., Harvard International Polity Club.
- GARNER, R. L., Vanderbilt University, 2013 Terrace Place, Nashville, Tenn., Chairman of Vanderbilt International Polity Club.
- GRAY, MISS WINIFRED S., Syracuse University, 207 Erie St., Syracuse, N. Y., International Polity Club, Woman's Cosmopolitan Club.
- GRUETZMACHER, RAYMOND P., University of Minnesota, 3046 Oakland Ave., Minneapolis, Minn., Cosmopolitan Club, President of Minnesota International Polity Club.
- GULICK, REV. SIDNEY L., 105 E. 22nd St., New York City, Professor in Doshisha University, Japan.

- HALL, J. C., Columbia University, now at 126 Oakland St., San Antonio, Texas, Collegiate Common Sense League.
- HARBIN, R. M., University of Georgia, Athens, Ga., Georgia International Polity Club.
- HAYES, PROF. ALFRED, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
- HENDERSON, ERNEST, JR., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard Speakers' Club.
- HIMSTEDT, R. E., University of Illinois, 808 W. Lee, Urbana, Ill., Men's Polity Club, University of Illinois.
- HIKENBAUGH, WALTER A., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb., War and Peace Society.
- HOFFMAN, MISS DAPHNE, University of Indiana, 702 E. 3rd St., Bloomington, Ind., Indiana International Polity Club.
- HOLT, HAMILTON, Editor, *The Independent*, 119 W. 40th St., New York City.
- HU, SUH, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y., now Columbia University, Furnald Hall, New York City, International Polity Club, Cosmopolitan Club.
- HUDSON, D. ERNEST, University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo., now Harvard University Law School, Little Hall, Cambridge, Mass., International Polity Club.
- HUDSON, PROF. MANLEY O., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo., Chairman, Missouri International Polity Club.
- HUGINS, ROLAND B., Cornell University, 414 E. Seneca St., Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell International Polity Club.
- JENNINGS, FRANK, Ottawa University, 5738 Blackstone Ave., Chicago, Ill.
- KARSTEN, KARL G., Columbia University, Furnald Hall, New York City., President of Collegiate Anti-Militarism League.
- KIES, W. S., National City Bank of New York City.
- KLIEFOTH, ALFRED W., 116 S. Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill., Department Secretary of the Church Peace Union.
- LARIMER, J. M., Dartmouth College, Hanover, N. H., President of Dartmouth International Polity Club.
- LEVERMORE, DR. CHARLES H., 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston, Mass., Acting Chief Director of the World Peace Foundation.

- LEVY, MOE D., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo., Missouri International Polity Club.
- LINDSTROM, EMIL, University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minn., Minnesota International Polity Club, Cosmopolitan Club.
- LOCHNER, LOUIS P., 116 South Michigan Ave., Chicago, Ill., Secretary of the Chicago Peace Society, Secretary of the National Peace Federation.
- LOZIER, L. C., University of Missouri, Columbia, Mo., Missouri International Polity Club.
- MCCAUL, ROBERT, Rochester Theological Seminary, 305 East Ave., Rochester, N. Y.
- MCDONALD, PROF. JAMES G., University of Indiana, Bloomington, Ind., Indiana International Polity Club.
- MACKEY, PERCY, The Players' Club, New York City.
- MARKS, ELIAS, Williams College, Williamstown, Mass., Williams Good Government Club.
- MAXIM, HUDSON, 698 St. Marks Ave., Brooklyn, N. Y.
- MEAD, MRS. LUCIA AMES, 39 Newbury St., Boston, Mass., Secretary of Woman's Peace Party, member International Council of Women, author of "Swords and Ploughshares," "Primer of the Peace Movement," "Outline of Lessons on War and Peace," "Patriotism and the New Internationalism."
- MEZ, DR. JOHN, 613 Colorado Bldg., Washington, D. C., American Peace Society, President of the Central Committee of the Corda Fratres International Federation of Students.
- MILLER, SPENCER, JR., Columbia University, 217 Turrell Ave., South Orange, N. J., Collegiate Common Sense League.
- MORALES, H. BLANCO, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y., President Cornell Cosmopolitan Club 1914-15, International Polity Club.
- MOSES, EDWARD W., University of Wisconsin, Madison, Wis., International Polity Club.
- NASMYTH, DR. GEORGE W., 40 Mt. Vernon St., Boston, Mass., President Harvard International Polity Club 1914-15, President of the Association of Cosmopolitan Clubs

- 1915, President of the Federation of International Polity Clubs.
- NEUHAUS, HENRIETTE A., 70 Fifth Ave., New York City, Assistant to secretary Church Peace Union, member American League to Limit Armaments.
- NEWMAN, C. H., Harvard University, Cambridge, Mass.
- NICHOLSON, VINCENT, Harvard University, 5 Linden St., Cambridge, Mass., Harvard International Polity Club.
- ORTH, PROF. S. R., Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
- PETCHTLE, C. BOUCK, Columbia University, 135 Hamilton Place, New York City.
- PHILIPPS, W. M., Louisiana State University, Opelousas, La., President, War and Peace Society.
- PRINGLE, KENNETH W., University of Kansas, Lawrence, Kansas, Kansas International Polity Club.
- PUTNAM, MAJOR GEORGE H., 2 W. 45th St., New York City.
- REEVES, J. H., University of Texas, 2306 Guadalupe St., Austin, Tex., Texas International Polity Club.
- RICE, W. G., JR., Harvard University, Gore A. 25, Cambridge, Mass., Harvard International Polity Club, Harvard Cosmopolitan Club.
- ROTH, FELIX, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
- ROBINSON, L. R., Columbia University, 79 Carnegie Ave., East Orange, N. J., Collegiate Common Sense League.
- SACHS, ALEXANDER, Columbia University, New York City, now Harvard University, Divinity 33, Cambridge, Mass., International Polity Club.
- SARBAUGH, DONALD McM., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., Cosmopolitan Club, Michigan International Polity Club.
- SCHMIDT, PROF. NATHANIEL, Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y., Professor of history.
- SCHREUDER, P. J. V. D. H., Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y., Cornell Cosmopolitan Club, President of the Internationaler Studenten Verein, Leipsic.
- SHILLINGLAW, DAVID LEE, University of Iowa, 811 E. College St., Iowa City, Iowa, Iowa Peace and War Society.
- SIBLEY, CHARLES A., Wellesley Hills, Mass., Babson Statistical Organization.

- SMITH, MRS. RUBY G., Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
- SORENSEN, C. A., University of Nebraska, Lincoln, Neb.,
President of World Polity Club.
- STEVENSON, DAVID, Amherst College, Amherst, Mass., Amherst Forum.
- TAYLOR, MAX, University of Illinois, 404 E. Daniel St., Champaign, Ill., Alpha Sigma Phi Club.
- TOMIYAMA, SETTZO, Columbia University, Hartley Hall, New York City, New York Peace Society, executive secretary of Japan Peace Society, editor and publisher of the *Peace Magazine*.
- TRACHTENBERG, ALEXANDER L., Yale University, Yale Station, New Haven, Conn., International Polity Club, Cosmopolitan Club, treasurer Collegiate Anti-Militarism League.
- TRUFANT, SAMUEL ADAMS, JR., Tulane University, 1241 Philip St., New Orleans, La., Tulane International Polity Club.
- WALLING, WILLIAM ENGLISH, Nantucket, Mass., Author of "Socialists and the War."
- WELSH, WILLIAM W., University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, Mich., now with National City Bank, New York City, Michigan Cosmopolitan Club.
- WHITE, DR. ANDREW W., Ex-President of Cornell University, Ithaca, N. Y.
- WHITE, MISS CECILE, University of Indiana, Bloomington, Ind., Indiana International Polity Club.
- WILSON, MISS MARJORIE, Cornell University, 526 Stewart Ave., Ithaca, N. Y., Woman's Peace Party, reporter for *Ithaca Journal*.
- WOOD, MISS ELEANOR D., Wellesley College, 8 Summit Road, Wellesley, Mass., Professor Wellesley College.
- WYTHE, GEORGE, University of Texas, Austin, Texas, Peace Club of University of Texas.
- YANG, K. Y., Columbia University and Union Theological Seminary, 600 W. 122nd St., New York City, Collegiate Common Sense League.

INDEX

(Names of speakers in small capitals; titles of speeches in italics.)

- A. B. C., countries, mediation of, 29, 30, 41; and Niagara conference, 30; conference and effect on South America, 34.
- Adams, Charles Francis, 32.
- Aeroplane, in war, 134.
- Aggression, and armament, 122.
- Aggression, penalizing, 189-190; and defense, 396.
- Alabama Claims, 24.
- Alsace-Lorraine, 246, 260, 373, 375.
- America and the International Credit System*, 43-61.
- America, Defenseless*, 129-146.
- American rights, protection of, 181-183, 379-385.
- Americanization, 95-100.
- ANGELL, NORMAN, 43, 125-127, 141, 142, 143, 145, 165-167, 177-194, 204, 233-243, 247, 248, 255, 257, 258, 260, 262-277, 278, 282, 283-285, 291, 311, 313-322, 327, 341-343, 351, 362, 377-378, 380, 381, 382, 383, 384; referred to, 215, 218, 357, 363, 367, 370, 371, 375, 389, 393-399.
- Anti-Imperialism, 249.
- Arabic, the, 121.
- Arbitration, Permanent Court of (see Hague Court).
- Arbitration, treaties, 134; refusal of United States to arbitrate, 200, 259.
- Argentina, effects of war on, 52; commerce of, 60.
- Armaments, increase suspicion, 64; policy, 127; as a life saver, 136, 168; importance of, 213; as cause of war, 219; for defense, 269.
- Armaments, Increase of American*, 107-170.
- Armaments, question of increasing United States, 107-130.
- Armaments, Nationalization of the Manufacture of*, 146-170.
- Army, need of increase of United States, 116-118, 138-140.
- Art, and war and peace, 293; of theatre for propaganda, 305.
- Asiatic problem, America's*, 62-106.
- Austrian, view of law, 4, 10.
- Austria-Hungary, financial condition before war, 44; war loans, 44; cost of war to, 45.
- Babson, Roger W., 218.
- Ballinger, Earl A., 257.
- Bebel, August, views of, 227.
- Belgium, cost of war to, 45; invasion of, 121.
- BELL, JAMES C., 381.
- BENEDICT, MRS. CRYSTAL EASTMAN, 289.
- Bernhardi, von, 122, 125, 329.
- Bernstein, Edward, 210, 211.
- Bibliography, Asiatic Problem, 65, 71, 74, 77, 79, 84, 91, 100, 103; International Relations, 400 ff.
- BLAKESLEE, PROF. GEORGE H., 25-36, 37, 40, 41.

- BLANSHARD, PAUL B., 279, 288, 289, 306.
- Blockade, definition of, 17; principles of, 17; violations of by England, 17; by Germany, 18.
- Borah, Senator, U. S. expansion south, 32.
- Boycott, effect of, 186.
- Boycotts, as weapons, 187-189.
- Brazil, effects of war on, 52.
- Bright, John, and Crimea, 125.
- BRODIE, DON, 380, 386, 391.
- BROWN, MISS LOUISE FARGO, 36, 281, 306, 387.
- BROWN, C., 36, 288.
- Bryan, W. J., defense measures of, 114; treaties, 206.
- Bryce, Viscount James, 172, 310.
- Buenos Aires, 60.
- BURROUM, EDWIN B., 307.
- Butler, Nicholas Murray, 12.
- CALL, ARTHUR D., 344-347.
- Camps, student military, 128.
- Can the Victors Recover Their Costs?* 367-377.
- Capitalism, Nationalistic, 215.
- Capitalistic Plot, is War a, 233-250.
- Carnegie, Andrew, 133, 197.
- Central American Court of Justice, 31.
- Chile, effects of war on, 52.
- China, disregard of treaty pledges to, 63; and the coming peace conference, 109; as a jelly fish, 110; and the open door, 111; National Security League and, 123; and the powers, 129; and Boxer indemnity, 370; and cholera plague, 233-5.
- Cholera, as a capitalistic interest, 233.
- Citizen, duty of to the nation, 110.
- CLAPP, F. C., 259, 374.
- COFFMAN, RAMON P., 282.
- Contraband, defined, 18, 19.
- COPELAND, MORRIS A., 380.
- Court, International Prize, 6.
- Credit system, America and the International*, 43-61.
- CREMER, J. D., 141, 259, 363.
- CROOK, WILFRID HARRIS, 167, 382, 391.
- Crozier, General, 196.
- Cuba, government of, 42.
- DANAHY, JAMES W., 277, 278, 286, 344, 362.
- Darwin, Chas., 207, 344.
- Darwinism, Theories of Social*, 328-334.
- DAVIS, A., 128, 144, 282, 362.
- Debt, funded of nations at war before the war, 45.
- Defense, National, 107-129, 129-146, 146-170.
- Defense, Adequate, a relative thing, 126; meant by, 129; war for, 393; and aggression, 396.
- Democracy, and war*, 128, 199-313; defined, 207; industrial, 212; international, 216; political, 217; and armaments, 242; internal ideas shaped by, 252-254; and art, 294-306.
- Disarmament, one-sided, 224.
- Does Might Make Right?* 347-356.
- Douglas, Stephen A., 32.
- du Pont Co., 153-55, 160.
- Dynamic Symbols, Need of for Peace*, 292-313.
- EARLE, E. M., 143.
- EAST, MISS BESS, 391.
- Economic aspects of American-Asiatic problem, 66, 69, 72, 75, 76, 78, 79, 80-82, 88.
- Economic Aspects of War*, 356-377.

- Economics, and war, 128.
 Edelsheim, Freiherr von, 113.
 England (see Great Britain).
 Ethics, and international relations, 347-356.
Extension Work, Conference on, 385-392.
- Falabia, the, 121.
 Federal Reserve Act, effect on foreign trade, 56-59.
 Finance, international, 237.
 Finland, 344.
 FISHER, ARTHUR, 381, 384.
 Flag, as a symbol, 279, 303.
 FLEMING, E. G., 249, 326, 327.
 FLICK, PROF. A. C., 285, 363.
 Force, and the League of Peace, 174; in human affairs, 180; philosophy of, 313-334; as a final appeal, 394; international police, 398.
 FOULK, FRED B., 62, 391.
 Fox, F., 31.
 FRAZEE, JOHN P., 282.
 France, financial condition of before war, 44; war loans, 44; cost of war, 45; manufacture of munitions in, 149; interest in present war, 246; and War of 1870, 369.
 Free Trade, Universal, 356-367.
 French, cause of shortness of, 138.
- GABEL, MISS LEONA C., 365.
 GANNETT, LEWIS S., 124, 201, 280, 344, 360.
 Garcia-Calderon, 31.
 German, capital, 214, 215; bankocracy and conquest of India, 239-242; thought and influence, 323-325.
 Germans, in South America, 37, 38; in Catalonia, 37.
- Germany, financial condition of before war, 44; war loans, 44; cost of war, 45; and foreign commerce, 46, 54-56; and the peace of Europe, 109; invasion of United States by, 113-115; fleet of and Great Britain, 125; armament policy of, 126; preparedness of, 144; militaristic doctrine of, 166; military effectiveness of, 183, 184; and nonintercourse, 187-189, 190; and Alsace-Lorraine, 246; colonies of, 362, 398; indemnity in 1870, 369.
Golden Rule, Is It Applicable to International Relations? 334-347.
 Golden Rule Internationalism, 92-103.
 Great Britain, financial condition before war, 44; war loans of, 44; cost of war, 45; fleet compared with that of Germany, 125; and Lord Robert, 125; nation of shop-keepers, 146; example for world federation, 261.
 Grotius, Hugo, 9, 22.
 GULICK, PROF. SIDNEY L., 62-103.
- Hague, Conference of, 1907, 6, 7, 183; Third, 197.
Hague Conferences, Past and Future, 194-199.
 Hague Court, of Arbitral Justice, 20, 21, 22; representation, 23, 259; of arbitration, 20, 21, 22, 24, 172, 195, 346.
 Haldane, Lord, 349.
 Hardie, Keir, 243, 245.
 Harding, Senator, on Mexico acquisition, 33.
 HAYES, PROF. ALFRED, 250-255, 258, 261.

- Heraclitus of Ephesus, 329.
Higgins, Dr. Pearce, 10.
Hitchcock, Senator, 206, 208.
Hobson, C. K., 214.
HOFFMAN, MISS DAPHNE, 391.
HOLT, HAMILTON, 170-177.
HU, SUH, 8, 129, 145, 347-351, 391.
HUDSON, DAVID, 41, 391.
HUDSON, PROF. MANLEY O., 256, 290, 387-389, 393, 396.
HUGINS, ROLAND, 247, 248, 279, 361, 362, 364.
Huxley, Sir Thomas, 329.
Human Nature and War, 313-322.
Immigration, limitation of, 95-103.
Indemnities, futility of, 367-377.
Industries, private and peace, 146.
Instrument, most effective, 276.
Insurance, national defense as a matter of, 119-120, 133.
International law, 1-24; rests on enlightened self-interest, 3; means of enforcing it, 4-15; of the sea, 15-20; and a world court, 20-24; fundamentals of, 1-4; sanctions of, 6, 7, 9, 11, 349; represents consensus of opinion, 7; and the war, 8-15; sources derived, 11; of peace and war, 13; and private law, 171; *non-military sanctions for*, 177-194; how to enforce, 181-183.
International Commission of Inquiry 20, 21, 196.
International Policy, Reaction on Social Problems, 250-262.
International Polity Movement: Its Aims and Organization, 377-392.
International Relations and Ethics, 347-356.
International Will, form to take, 341-343.
Internationalism, Economic, 220.
Is Equality of Commercial Opportunity a Necessary Condition of Peace? 356-367.
Is War a Capitalist Plot? 233-250.
Italy, financial condition of before war, 44.
Japan, financial condition of before war, 44; and increased military expenditures, 126.
Japanese war-scare stories, 69.
Jefferson, President, 134.
JENNINGS, FRANK, 306.
Jesus Christ, belief in divine mission of and war, 134.
Jordan, David Starr, 133, 134, 151.
Jaures', voice of men of, 125.
Kant, Immanuel, 172, 205.
KARSTEN, KARL G., 122, 144, 287.
Kautsky, views of as to the war, 221-227.
Kiao Chow, Japan and, 37.
KIES, WILLIAM S., 43-61.
KLIEFOTH, ALFRED W., 340.
KNIGHT, FRANK H., 364.
Labor, and the war, 210.
Laboring man, way to reach, 279, 280.
Law, defined, 5; essence of, 9.
Lea, Homer, 329.
League of Peace, 170-199, 326.
League to Enforce Peace, 62; and Monroe Doctrine, 40; United States army and navy and, 120, 170-177; platform of, 170.
LEVERMORE, DR. CHARLES, 207.
Lloyd George, David, 148.

- Lodge, Senator, and Monroe Doctrine, 38.
- London, Declaration of, 17, 18.
- London, growth of as financial center, 56.
- LOZIER, L. C., 260.
- Lusitania, German arguments for sinking of, 19, 20; sinking of, 121, 126, 129, 130, 166, 167, 203, 206.
- MCCAUL, ROBERT, 124, 389.
- MCDONALD, PROF. JAMES G., 1-8, 15-24, 202.
- MACKAYE, PERCY, 292-306, 307, 308-311, 311.
- Mahan, Admiral, 196, 271, 329.
- Maine, the, 200, 202.
- Malthus, 328, 330.
- Manufacturers, of war materials, and the Government, 159-163.
- MARKS, ELIAS, 257, 258.
- Marxian Socialists, 209; position of, 211, 231, 244, 340.
- MAXIM, HUDSON, 129-138, 138, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146-165, 169.
- MEAD, MRS. LUCIA AMES, 37, 123, 206, 249, 259, 280, 285, 308, 327.
- Members of the Conference, 403-409.
- Mexico, acquiring territory in, 32; annexation of Northern, 33, 37, 41; and South America, 35; French intervention in, 40.
- MEZ, DR. JOHN, 36, 205, 307, 352, 356-360, 362, 366, 367-373, 373, 374, 376.
- Militarism or Golden Rule Internationalism, 64.
- Military Alliances, the Game of, 178-181.
- Military Force, when fails, 190-193.
- Military supremacy as solution of Asiatic problem, 72; would result in complete militarization of the Occident, 75; and in ultimate disaster to the entire world, 78.
- MILLER, SPENCER, JR., 138, 391.
- Mines and submarines, law loose in regard to, 19.
- Minimum Program, 259, 260, 384.
- Moltke, General von, 329.
- Monroe Doctrine, *Pan American Cooperation and the*, 25-43; present status, 26, 27; views of professors on, 26; views of American Press, 27, 28; should be a policy of U. S., 29; what it means, 36; and sale of territory, 37, 38; the real, 37, 38; idea of South American, 38; original idea of, 41.
- Monroe Doctrine, U. S. and the, 111.
- Montevideo, 61.
- Moral and Material Factors in International Relations*, 334-356.
- Morality, and international relations, 334-347.
- MOSES, EDWARD W., 280, 287, 391.
- Museum, Peace, 307, 308.
- NASMYTH, GEORGE W., 43, 140, 169, 201, 259, 291, 308, 322-326, 326, 339, 344, 352-356, 365, 375, 380, 381, 385, 387, 389, 391, 398.
- Nation, Outlawing a, 185-187.
- National City Bank of N. Y., branches in South America, 51, 57-59.
- National Security League, aims of, 107-109, 115; and Congress, 123; and the pacifists, 124, 126.

- Nationalism, 216, 340; and war, 272.
- Nationality, higher, 349-351.
- Nature, Human, 133.
- Navy, need of larger, 140-141.
- Neutral Nations, league of, 121, 231; rights of, 198; conference of, 380.
- NEWMAN, C. H., 258, 259.
- Niagara Conference, 30, 31, 35.
- NICHOLSON, VINCENT, 382, 397.
- Nietzsche, 329.
- Obligation to be intelligent, 315-318.
- Officers, army and navy, and question of defense, 157-159, 164.
- Olney, Secretary, and Monroe Doctrine, 39.
- One-sided Aberration, 263, 269-275.
- Organization, Report of committee on, 390.
- ORTH, PROF. SAMUEL P., 199-201, 201, 208.
- Pacifism, and American Colleges, 131; criticism of modern, 218.
- Pacifists, extreme, 121, and the National Security League, 124; as physicians, 130, 133; and makers of war materials, 155; bourgeois, 210.
- Panama Canal, 31, 32.
- Pan-American Council, 30.
- Pan-American Union, 30.
- Pan-American relations, 25-61.
- Pan-American Cooperation and the Monroe Doctrine*, 25-43.
- Pan-American, increase of sentiment, 30.
- Pan-American Cooperation and the Latin American States, 34, 35.
- Pan-Americanism, is it a dangerous term? 41, 42.
- Paris, Declaration of, 15.
- Peace, the word undesirable, 283, 289; need of dynamic symbols for, 292-313.
- Peary, Rear Admiral, 33.
- PETCHTLE, C. B., 289.
- Piracy, does it pay? 375.
- Police, International, 63, 220.
- Politics, Fatalistic view of, 263-268.
- Powers, seconding, 195.
- Preparedness, military, against Asiatic invasion, 63, 86-91.
- Preparedness, guaranty against war, 118, 137, 145, 165-166.
- Presentation, Methods of Effective*, 262-292.
- Press, American, views on Monroe Doctrine, 27, 28; sensational, 69.
- Private manufacture of munitions, and war-scare stories, 69.
- Property, Private, capturable at sea, 15, 16.
- Public opinion, International, 7, 11, 12, 198, 276, 314, 349.
- PUTNAM, MAJOR GEORGE H., 107-122, 122, 123, 124, 125, 127, 128, 129.
- Questions, Replies to, 393-399.
- Race prejudice, increased by military domination, 74.
- Reaction of International Policy on Social Problems*, 250-262.
- Reason, are we guided by? 318-322.
- Remedies, When, become diseases, 183-185.
- Renan, Ernest, 329.
- Resolutions, sent to President Wilson, 378-385.
- Reventlow, Count von, 125.

- Revolution, industrial, 213; economic, 224.
 Revolution, American and democracy, 396, 397.
 RICE, WILLIAM GORHAM, 36, 365, 373, 376, 379, 380.
 Rio de Janeiro, 60.
Rival Theories of Societies, 322-328.
 ROBINSON, LELAND, 36, 37, 142, 326, 339, 340, 386.
 Roosevelt, Theodore, views on Monroe Doctrine, 28, 29, 329.
 Root, Elihu, 10, 42.
 ROTH, FELIX, 39.
 Ruskin, 329.
 Russia, financial condition of before war, 44; war loans, 44; cost of war, 45.
 Russo-Japanese War, 202.

 SACHS, ALEXANDER, 39, 127, 279, 386.
 Saint, Rondet, 31.
 Sanctions (see International Law).
 Santos, 61.
 SCHMIDT, PROF. NATHANIEL, 334-339, 339, 341, 343, 344, 347.
 SCHVAN, AUGUST, 356.
 Sea Law, and America, 178, 181-183.
 Shaw, Bernard, 245.
 Shepard, Prof. Walter G., 8-15.
 SIBLEY, CHAS. A., 206.
 Sigsbee, Admiral, 139.
 SMITH, MRS. RUBY G., 328-334.
 Socialism, and war, 233-250.
Socialist Interpretation of the War, 209-233.
 Socialists, and the war, 209-233; types of, 209; views on war and peace, 210-213, 278.
 SORENSON, C. A., 204, 289, 379, 391.

 South America, European investments in, 49, 51; inducements to trade in, 50; effect of war on, 51-53; trade of United States with, 59.
 Spain, and Monroe Doctrine, 37, 38.
 Spanish-American War, a democratic war, 203.
 Spencer, Herbert, 135.
 St. Louis Masque, 294-302.
 States, little, importance of, 187, 188.
 Status Quo, the, 255, 256, 257, 399.
 Suffrage Party, methods of, 282.
 Sullivan, John L., 135.
 Switzerland, as a neutral, 112.
 Symbols, for peace, 309.

 Taft, William Howard, views on Monroe Doctrine, 29, 39; Arbitration Treaties of, 134.
 Talmadge, Dr., 134.
 Tariff, protective, 357-367.
 Tariffs, and war, 223.
 Theatre, art of for propaganda, 305.
 TRACHTENBERG, ALEXANDER, 128, 143, 202, 250, 256, 278, 279, 286.
 Treaties, Arbitration and Peace, 134; enforcement of, 186.
 Treitschke, 125, 329.
 Triana, Perez, 34.
 TRUFANT, SAMUEL, 168, 391.
 Turkey, financial condition before war, 44.

 United States, effect of war on, 45-51; foreign commerce of, 46, 53, 56, 59-61; balance of trade of, 47; effect of trade balance on, 47, 48; trade with South America, 59, 60; and foreign policies, 111; invasion

- by Germany of, 113-115; 143-145; defenselessness of, 107-129, 129-146; as an example for world federation, 172-174, 260; steps to take in European war, 193, 194.
- U. S. expansion south (expressions of opinion as to), 32.
- Venezuela, dispute with Germany, 38.
- Voltaire, 207.
- Vorwaerts, and the war, 228.
- WALLING, WILLIAM ENGLISH, 209-233, 243-247.
- War, cost of to nations at war, 45, 137; causes of, 62; effect on United States, 45; a good, 142; become internationalized, 178-181; desired by people, 199-201; an economic struggle, 214; as a paying proposition, 218; elimination of causes of, 220; a capitalist plot, 233-250; capitalistic relation to, 244-247; credit side of, 248; confusions as to, 263; a glorious thing, 273; human nature and, 313-322; inevitable, 325; a struggle for existence, 328-334; economic aspects of, 356-377.
- Warfare, deadliness of modern, 136.
- War-scare stories, 69.
- WELSH, WILLIAM W., 281, 282.
- West Point, vacancies in, 116.
- What Are We Here For?* 377-378.
- WHITE, DR. ANDREW D., 194-199.
- WOOD, PROF. ELEANOR D., 41, 206.
- Wood, Gen. Leonard, 131, 139, 144.
- World court, problems of a, 20-24, 62-63.
- World Federation, 172-175; and status quo, 255, 261.
- Wyndeyer, Sir William, 135.
- WYTHE, GEORGE, 290, 363.
- Yellow Peril, defined, 66; economic factor, 66; military factor, 66; racial factor, 67; moral factor, 67; critical study of, 80-84.

